Concessionaire Selection Research Articles

Legal Dilemmas in the Field of Granting Concessions in Slovenian Law and Some Solutions in Comparative Law

In Slovenian law, the granting of concessions is governed by a number of (general and special) laws, which are supplemented by the Public-Private Partnership Act (PPPA) as a systemic law for the granting of concession to public-private partnerships regardless of the value of the concession, as well as the Act on Certain Concession Contracts (CCCA), which is the basic regulation for the award of construction concession and service concession contracts falling within the scope of the Directive 2014/23/EU. The CCCA is primarily used in relation to other regulations. Regardless of special law provisions, the provisions of the CCCA should be applied in the procedure of granting concessions that simultaneously meet the criteria for concession contracts from the scope of the Directive 2014/23/EU, and special law provisions should be applied only if they do not contradict the CCCA (reverse rule lex specialis). The complexity of the procedure for granting concessions in Slovenian law is thus reflected in the need to combine the use of different regulations, which frequently regulate the same issues in completely different ways, introducing confusion into the legal order. As an example, the author highlights differences in the legal nature of the act on concessionaire selection and, as a result, legal protection against decisions in concessionaire selection procedures, and discusses some specifics that apply to concessions for social and other special services. In addition to the provisions relating to the concession award procedure, there are other inconsistencies between the CCCA and sectoral regulations concerning the implementation of the concession contract. In view of all the shortcomings, the author implies that the Slovenian legislator should either adjust the sectoral regulations to the CCCA regulations or adopt a single procedural law that would apply to all concessions, with specific (stricter) rules applicable to concessions above the relevant value threshold.

PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS: CONCESSIONAIRE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Purpose - Public Private Partnership (PPP) has increased in popularity and is being used extensively in the construction market. For PPP projects already completed or for those in progress, the question is how effective are these projects? Do they meet their performance requirements and are they valuable to the stakeholders? How are PPP project performances assessed? The main target of this paper to cover the necessity of study key performance indicators (KPIs) that will measure and enhance PPP performance in Egypt. Design/methodology - A questionnaire survey was conducted to prioritize the main functional KPIs for PPP projects. Reliability analysis using the Cronbach’s alpha was performed to check the internal consistency and reliability of the results. Finding - The result of this research will be to contribute to the existing understanding of PPP performance measurement of developing countries, by providing a framework for selecting KPIs to measure the PPP concessionaire performance. Validation of results was done by PPP experts. Social - The partnership provides a competitive and transparent mechanism to pursue opportunities that bring together ideas, experiences and skills of both sectors and develop creative solutions to a community’s needs. Originally/value - It is targeted that government adopts an evaluation system of concessionaire selection based on performance. The results could be used to create prediction models for evaluating PPP project performance.

Conceptual Framework for the Performance Measurement of Public-Private Partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been used widely to deliver economic and social infrastructure projects. There has been widespread debate about the factors that contribute to their success and failure. Critical to their successful implementation is effective performance measurement of the projects. With this in mind, a comprehensive review of the normative literature in association with PPPs (e.g., critical success factors, roles of public sector, concessionaire selection, risk management, cost and time issues, and finance) is undertaken and a conceptual framework for dynamic life-cycle is proposed. The paper provides both public sector and private entities with an insight into effective and efficient performance measurement within the context of PPP infrastructure projects.

Private Involvement in Sustainable Management of Indonesian Port: Need and Strategy with PPP Scheme

The gap between rural/fringe area and urban, performance services of sea transportation (including inland waterways and ferry transport), and financial limitations are facing the port development project in Indonesia. The management (in this case: purely the goverment) should conceive the sustainable management of port facilities. Partnership management could advancing the aspects of port circumstances by involving of private sector with public private partnership (PPP) scheme. This paper focuses on suggestion of PPP project practices for port development such as: identifying policy related to port sector of PPP arrangement, PPP framework on port sector, parties involved in PPP implementation project, and also the financing process of PPP project implementation in Indonesia. Other related issues on PPP project port sector are advantage and disadvantage of PPP arrangement project in Indonesia, risks associated to the project sponsor during implementation of PPP project especially in port sector, concessionaire selection methods to get best concessionaire, and critical success factor of PPP project.

Concessionaire Selection Model Based on Data Envelopment Analysis

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) project delivery approach is gaining popularity because it offers public employers the advantages of delivering vital infrastructure projects while minimizing the need to secure financing. However, one key challenge for BOT projects is concessionaire selection. Poor concessionaire selection may result in difficulties in execution, or even failures to deliver vital projects to the public. As a result, there is a need for an appropriate methodology to select the concessionaire that provides the best offer and has strong overall capabilities. The purpose of this paper is to propose a concessionaire selection model that is based on data envelopment analysis (DEA). The strengths of the proposed DEA model include its ability to incorporate dozens of subjective and objective criteria and to accommodate any number of considered concessionaires. Based on both extensive literature review and practitioners’ input, the research identifies 22 concessionaire selection criteria. The proposed DEA model was practically illustrated based on a case that includes six competing concessionaires.

A systematic framework for infrastructure development through public private partnerships

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) play an important role in bringing private sector competition to public monopolies in infrastructure development and service provision and in merging the resources of both public and private sectors to better serve the public needs. However, in worldwide practices, there are mixed results, substantial controversy, criticism and conflict over PPPs. This paper proposes a systematic framework for the delivery of public works and services through PPPs in general. Justified by public procurement principles, aimed at a public–private win–win solution, and based on worldwide best industrial practices and lessons from unsuccessful projects, this framework integrates the four broadly divided stages that repeat over time: (1) design of a workable concession, (2) competitive concessionaire selection, (3) financial regulation, and (4) periodic reconcession and rebidding. The four-stage framework takes into account the requirements of public services, realignment of responsibility and reward among multiple participants in PPPs, the monopolistic rights of the concessionaire, and the wide range of risks and uncertainties in the long concession period. Varying competition elements are incorporated in each of the four stages for continuous performance improvement in the delivery of public works and services. The design of the right concession forms the base on which other stages are implemented in addition to planning the project and allocating risks for enhanced efficiency. The financial regulation allows the government to address changing conditions and to regulate the concession for efficient operation with due discretion, whereas the competitive concessionaire selection and periodic reconcession and rebidding play critical roles in achieving innovation, efficiency and cost effectiveness through direct competition rather than government discretionary intervention.

Status and Psychology of DBB and BOT Construction Project Participants

Adopting the BOT (build-operate-transfer) delivery method for construction projects has brought opportunities for desired performance. Studies have investigated many issues of BOT projects such as concessionaire selection criteria or risk factors, but the soft issue of the status and psychology change of project participants from traditional DBB (design-bid-build) method is not investigated. This research explored the status and psychology of DBB and BOT project participants and drew implication for performance. By using the case study method, this study selected ten projects in which five from DBB and five from BOT methods; interviewed 36 owners, designers, constructors and other participants in 14 times; and analyzed and compared their design and construction work interaction, designer and constructor status, and owner and concessionaire psychology. It is found that for DBB civil projects performance would be stable because of completed design, more cautious owner, and respected designer that is good to performance. For BOT civil projects, performance would vary and the designer and constructor can better cooperate. The flexibility and vitality brought by the BOT mechanism should be better used to create better performance.

Examining Construction Quality Supervision and Organization Procedures for BOT Projects by Comparing with DBB Projects

Adopting the BOT (build-operate-transfer) delivery method has brought opportunities and challenges in construction time and quality for urban infrastructure. Many studies investigate the upstream issues of BOT projects such as concessionaire selection criteria and risk factors. But the project execution becomes complicated such as the escalated quality supervision organization and procedure at the construction stage. This extra supervision may have constituted hidden redundancies as waste to economic sustainability. This paper investigated construction quality supervision of BOT projects to pinpoint adequate degree of supervision and detect redundant organization and procedures. The study adopted ten subway construction projects as cases in which five were from the traditional design-bid-build (DBB) and five from the BOT methods. Thirty six project participants including owners, contractors, designers, and concessionaire managers of the ten projects were interviewed to tell their views on these issues. The quality supervision measures of the DBB projects were used as the baseline and compared with those of the BOT projects. The research results show that the construction quality seems no difference for the DBB and BOT projects. Construction quality comes out of supervision but excessive supervision organization and procedures do not necessarily improve quality. This finding indicates that adequate degree of supervision is enough to achieve required quality to save immense paperwork for large construction projects.

The lesson learn of non-self financing ability BOT project: large-scale rail transportation systems in Taiwan

Finance–base or Service Delivery approaches were utilized to dominate BOT projects but both approaches require a reasonable self–financing ability ratio (SFA). In addition, few studies show successfully implemented BOT schemes with low SFA. To examine the heuristic rule, two cases including one of the largest BOT projects, Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) Transportation Plan, are used to conduct interview correspondence, close examination, and analysis of the document of concessionaire selection. We draw on the experience of the process of the Large–scale Rail Transportation concessionaire selection practices where the story of PPP s projects remains limited worldwide. In our case, government involves financing the BOT project to provide a long–term loan guarantee for the private sector on the finance aspect. The issues which cause BOT construction to be costly as well as

Best value concessionaire selection through a fuzzy logic system

Best value is the ultimate goal in the development of infrastructure projects through public private partnerships. This necessitates a best value approach in selecting the right private partner (i.e., the concessionaire) that involves evaluating alternative concessionaires against multiple conflicting criteria of varying degrees of importance and uncertainty. Correspondingly, this paper has developed a quantitative best value concessionaire selection system. The essence of this system lies in (1) the establishment of four-package evaluation criteria that can effectively measure the concessionaire’s capability and “predict” its future performance toward achieving the government’s best value objectives and (2) the development of a fuzzy-composite scoring and ranking method that ensures the right “tradeoff” between these criteria by relatively weighting fuzzy scores and logically aggregating evaluation results. This system would not only provide the government integrated assessments of alternative concessionaires so as to award the contract to the right concessionaire whose proposal is perceived to be able to maximize the outcome of the project, but also satisfy the requirements of the legal decision in order to withstand legal challenges concerning the public contract awarded in a best value approach. A hypothetical case study is provided to demonstrate the application of this best value concessionaire selection system.

Discussion of “Concessionaire Selection: Methods and Criteria” by Xueqing Zhang

Discussion of “Concessionaire Selection: Methods and Criteria” by Xueqing Zhang

Closure to “Concessionaire Selection: Methods and Criteria” by Xueqing Zhang

Closure to “Concessionaire Selection: Methods and Criteria” by Xueqing Zhang

Improving Concessionaire Selection Protocols in Public/Private Partnered Infrastructure Projects

A critical contributor to the success of a public/private partnered (PPP) infrastructure project is the selection of the right private-sector partner, the concessionaire, who would provide the best overall deal throughout the build-operate-transfer (BOT)[build/operate/transfer] development process. This paper proposes a core concessionaire selection protocol that incorporates public procurement principles, best-value selection approach, competitive selection process, and multicriteria tender evaluation. Key pointers for an improved concessionaire selection protocol are discussed and analyzed by drawing experience and learning lessons from worldwide PPP practices. These include improved project brief and tender documents, formulation of a best-value selection methodology, determination of suitable criteria and methods for prequalification and tender evaluation, capital structure (equity-to-debt ratio), financial models, and potential improvements in different stages of the concessionaire selection process. Relevant results of a questionnaire survey of international PPP expert opinions on an enhanced concessionaire selection protocol are also presented.

Concessionaire Selection: Methods and Criteria

Various innovative public private partnerships (PPPs) have been explored in worldwide infrastructure development in which BOT (build-operate-transfer) is the underlying concept. Selection of the right concessionaire, which is critical to the success of such BOT-type PPPs, depends on the quality of identifying and defining suitable project-specific criteria and the quality of formulating an efficient tender evaluation methodology. A systematic research approach (including literature review, case studies, interview/correspondence, and a structured questionnaire survey) has been adopted to draw experience and learn lessons from international PPP practices and to unearth and refine experiential and expert knowledge from worldwide experts and practitioners. Tender evaluation criteria and methods currently used in diverse types of PPP projects in both developed and developing countries are identified, compared, analyzed, and then generalized.

Concessionaire Selection for Build-Operate-Transfer Tunnel Projects in Hong Kong

A significant realignment of risks between project participants is a fundamental facet of the new procurement paradigm of BOT (build-operate-transfer). A BOT concessionaire assumes far more and deeper risks than a contractor. One critical contributor to the success of a BOT project is the selection of an appropriate concessionaire who has the necessary capacity to provide the best overall deal throughout the build-operate-transfer process. However, various BOT-type procurement protocols are not yet proven and are still being tried and tested. Many countries are at the lower ends of their learning curves. Therefore, there is a need to benchmark the best practices that have been emerging. The Hong Kong government has developed a well-structured concessionaire selection framework supported by the Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis technique. This paper analyzes and draws experiences and lessons from this concessionaire selection practice. Current concessionaire selection practices worldwide are also discussed with a view to improve the procurement process of regions lacking in such experiences or expertise.