In 2016, Federal Law no. 273-FZ entered into force, introducing a number of significant amendments to the so-called Law on Trade (no. 381-FZ), adopted in 2009 and the central law regulating trade activities in the Russian Federation. This article assesses the impact of the 2016 amendments on the situation of suppliers to retail chains. Its relevance and novelty stem from the significant regulatory asymmetry currently observed between online platforms and traditional retail chains amid the rapid growth of marketplaces. The paper formulates hypotheses regarding the impact of Federal Law no. 273 on suppliers' commercial expenses, based on a detailed review of legislation, analytics, and empirical research. The findings demonstrate the lack of a sustainable long-term effect of the 2016 amendments, the presence of a short-term decline in commercial expenses for food suppliers in 2017, and a widening gap between large and small suppliers. While some of the restrictions are offset by changes in contract structures, they may hinder competition between chains and marketplaces. The conclusions emphasize that the current provisions of the Law on Trade do not guarantee the equalization of bargaining power and require revision, taking into account digitalization and the development of marketplaces. The theoretical significance of this work lies in clarifying the mechanisms by which industry regulation influences the distribution of commercial costs and bargaining power in vertical relations, while its practical significance lies in providing a basis for amending trade legislation and developing more symmetrical competition rules for offline retail chains and marketplaces.

With the deepening development of the digital economy, competition among e-commerce platforms has become increasingly fierce, gradually evolving into "involutionary" competition characterized by continuous price suppression and excessive marketing. This competitive model guides merchants to continuously lower prices through algorithms and platform rules, forming a vicious cycle of "low price—low quality—lower price," which not only damages merchants' profits and innovation capabilities but also disrupts market order and affects the healthy development of the industry chain. From the perspective of competition law, this paper systematically analyzes the formation mechanism, legal attributes, and negative impacts of involutionary competition among e-commerce platforms on market competition. Combining this with current Chinese laws and regulations, it explores the dilemmas in regulation and proposes systematic suggestions from the perspectives of legislative improvement, enforcement optimization, and industry self-regulation to promote the standardized and orderly development of the platform economy.

Digital platform capitalism has restructured market coordination through data extraction, algorithmic governance, network effects, and ecosystem integration. Contemporary competition law, grounded in the consumer welfare paradigm, evaluates market conduct primarily through price-based metrics that obscure structural asymmetries. This article addresses the gap between allocative efficiency and structural justice by developing Ethical Market Failure (EMF)—a structural extension of classical market failure theory capturing infrastructural concentration, dependency locking, and distributive asymmetry in platform dominated economies. Integrating digital competition scholarship with Islamic political economy, the study employs the Maqasid alShariah framework as a normative evaluative architecture. The classical institution of hisbah is reinterpreted as a governance logic informing regulatory oversight. Using Indonesia as a semi analytical empirical anchor, the article demonstrates how subsidy driven expansion, gig labor absorption, and ecosystem consolidation generate long-term structural distortions despite short-term consumer gains. This study contributes to platform governance debates by situating consumer welfare within a broader justice sensitive institutional hierarchy.

Competition law is ordinarily complex and multi-dimensional requiring detailed analysis and balancing of economic efficiencies, innovation, productivity, and consumer costs. However, competition law has an additional dimension of complexity in eras of strategic conflict as national security becomes a factor for regulators. The complexity in the era of China-US strategic rivalry is particularly acute for three reasons. One, the expanding conceptualization of national security means that security is no longer relegated solely to defence from armed attack but encompasses economic, technological, and ideological power. Two, large and strategic corporations are the leading economic actors globally, inextricably connected to economic, technological and ideological power, and therefore constitute paramount national security assets. Three, the two great powers have contrasting economic governance models. China’s distinct political-economic governance raises speculation that Chinese corporations are under the influence of a corporate parent, the Party-state, and utilized to advance Party-state objectives. This paper endeavours to outline and discuss competition law in the era of strategic conflict from a US and EU regulatory perspective and offers some pathways on analysing the issues.

Following China’s 2024 Judicial Interpretation on Civil Antitrust Litigation, the article examines how private enforcement of competition law has developed in China and the European Union. Both systems rest on the two modes of contract and tort, although the balance and mechanisms differ. In China, the nullity of agreements reflects the interaction between public and private law. Yet this contract-based approach primarily functions as a sanction and provides limited direct remedies for consumers. In the EU, Article 101(2) TFEU renders anti-competitive agreements void, while the tort model, reinforced by the Damages Directive, enables claims for damages. However, these actions are costly, impose stringent evidentiary burdens, and are often ineffective in addressing harms like deadweight loss. From a consumer perspective, both frameworks therefore fall short. Collective redress mechanisms have emerged as partial remedies, but the expansion of opt-out models continues to encounter institutional and procedural constraints. This paper contributes by placing China’s recent practice in dialogue with EU law and by urging a recalibration of private enforcement through a consumer-oriented perspective. It advocates closer scrutiny of derivative “fruit” agreements within the contractual framework and the exploration of public compensation tools within the tort framework, with the objective of enhancing the effective consumer protection.

The article examines the transformation of unfair competition under conditions of digitalization and the growing dominance of platform-based business models. It argues that traditional anti-competitive practices increasingly acquire an algorithmic nature and are implemented through ranking systems, recommendation mechanisms, automated pricing tools, and large-scale data processing. The study identifies key algorithmic mechanisms of competitive distortion, including self-preferencing, visibility manipulation, algorithmic coordination, data opacity, interoperability restrictions, and the reinforcement of market power through network effects. It demonstrates that the interaction between data, algorithms, and platform infrastructure produces a new configuration of digital market power that challenges conventional competition law doctrines. The paper develops an integrated economic and legal model of regulatory response that combines ex post antitrust enforcement with ex ante preventive obligations. The proposed model includes algorithmic risk detection, legal qualification of conduct, proportional remedial measures (transparency requirements, algorithmic audits, interoperability duties), and compliance monitoring. Particular attention is paid to the evidentiary challenges associated with algorithmic opacity and the need for adapted standards of digital proof. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the conceptualization of a systemic framework linking algorithmic mechanisms, digital market structures, regulatory instruments, and digital evidence in the context of contemporary antitrust control.

Abstract Abuse of economic dependence, or abuse of superior bargaining position, has increasingly been introduced as a standalone prohibition within competition law across jurisdictions. This article explores why such dependence-centred competition rules are adopted, with what policy objectives, and how implementing jurisdictions address the concerns raised about them. It first maps legislative and institutional designs across 34 jurisdictions and identifies 13 systems with explicit provisions for abuse of dependence, operating alongside abuse of dominance. It then discusses the principal concerns surrounding such rules and weighs them against their complementary benefits, taking into account internal safeguards used in practice. This article notes that, while the concerns are reasonable and may justify non-adoption, this does not, in itself, mean that adoption is inherently misguided. It highlights that dependence-centred rules have complementary advantages—bringing the vertical power-over dimension to the centre of power analysis and enabling a more flexible, dynamic assessment of competitive harm—and that, with safeguards, such as structural power and impact screens, the concerns can be mitigated in practice. It concludes that, when so designed, dependence-centred rules can serve as a balanced complement and outlines directions for future research.

ABSTRACT Competition law serves not only to regulate markets but also to construct and deepen them, particularly during transitions from centrally planned or heavily regulated to market economies. Its significance is both economic and political: Since its inception, competition law has sought to prevent concentrated economic power from distorting the functioning of democracy. This article explores how competition law shapes democratic transitions and democratic erosion. It puts forward that competition law supports democratisation by constraining powerful economic interests, reinforcing the separation of powers through enforcement and advocacy by independent agencies and strengthening state capacity. Conversely, authoritarian actors may instrumentalise competition law to entrench their power, reward allies and suppress opposition. Democratic erosion, in turn, undermines the autonomy of competition agencies and their enforcement efforts. The article draws on economic and democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Latin America and charts recent cases of democratic decline in these contexts to illustrate its arguments.

ABSTRACT Despite the influence of ordoliberalism in EU law, the mutual feedback between market power and political influence of dominant corporations has not become an explicit consideration in competition law enforcement and has remained rather in the background as an implicit rationale. If the threats to competition posed by regulatory capture are to be addressed, such a mutual feedback loop should become an explicit part of the analysis in competition law cases. This article proposes a factors test in order to determine when the exercise of a company's political rights has degenerated into a scenario of heightened risk of regulatory capture. The factors of the test are drawn from the main tenets of the extant literature on lobbying in the EU that describe the dynamics of how stakeholders gain access to the ears of policymakers. Once a heightened risk of regulatory capture is established, this article argues that specific instances of lobbying for a defined policy proposal can be covered by Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU. The requirement of a heightened risk of regulatory capture is designed to align the prosecution of anticompetitive lobbying with the CJEU's case law on abuse of rights as an abuse of dominance, following from AstraZeneca . When corporations aim to capture areas of public policy, they abuse their political rights and can therefore be subjected to competition law liability. In this way, competition law enforcement can complement other areas of public policy aimed at preventing market distortions caused by political influence, such as transparency obligations of corporate political activity and state aid laws.

ABSTRACT This article argues that the proliferation of goals in competition law—from efficiency and consumer welfare to inclusion, transformation and sustainability—cannot be coherently pursued without a guiding normative framework. Using South Africa as a case study, it shows how ambitious statutory objectives, left without such a framework, have produced fragmented jurisprudence: Some decisions retreat to economic orthodoxy, others invoke public interest without principled integration. Drawing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation, it contends that competition law, like all law, must be interpreted in its best moral light, situated within the constitutional order that gives it purpose. Without this normative anchor, expanded mandates risk incoherence as global regimes seek to move beyond the narrow confines of consumer welfare.

ABSTRACT The development of artificial intelligence and the growing use of algorithms to optimize prices have generated significant debate about their benefits and potential adverse effects on competition and consumers. Two key issues dominate this discussion: algorithmic price discrimination through personalized pricing and algorithmic tacit collusion. Although the risks associated with algorithmic tacit collusion have been extensively studied, the potential harms from algorithmic price discrimination remain underexplored. This article examines algorithmic price discrimination from an EU perspective and whether the current EU competition law framework is adequate to tackle algorithmic price discrimination that harms consumers. It argues for robust competition law enforcement under Article 102(a) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to ensure that algorithmic pricing does not become a tool for exploitative abuse in the digital economy.

Background: As in many Western countries, a combination of population aging and workforce shortages challenges the current and future ability to meet health and social care needs in the Netherlands. These issues typify the wicked problems that local and regional cross-sectoral partnerships - a type of purpose-oriented network - aim to address. However, there is limited empirical insight into how such partnerships can be classified or how effective they are in achieving their (quintuple aim) goals, depending on their strategies (e.g., governance form, leadership, target group involvement, and resource availability) and context. This study aims to address key gaps in previous research through a large sample size, validated measurement methods, and state-of-the-art data analysis. Approach: Since Q4 2023, a yearly survey and benchmarking cycle has been conducted among network managers. The survey applies a clear definition of cross-sectoral partnerships for health and well-being and incorporates validated measurement instruments for effectiveness and its potential antecedents. The 2024 survey round includes an additional short survey for network partners to gain more refined insights into the structure and effectiveness of a subset of partnerships. The survey data have been—or will be—analyzed using social network analysis (SNA), latent-class analysis (LCA), qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and machine learning (CatBoost). A report with individual and aggregate partnership scores is shared with all participating network managers. Results: In 2023, 103 partnerships responded to the survey. Preliminary findings (as of 15 November 2024) from QCA and CatBoost analyses suggest that effective leadership combined with high partner trust is particularly associated with substantive interorganizational partnership effectiveness. Additionally, LCA results indicate that partnerships can be divided into two classes: those likely to have implemented network-administrative steps (e.g., alignment of payment incentives, compliance with competition rules, and changes in service delivery among partnering organizations) and those less likely to have done so. These steps are generally considered critical for achieving structural integration and impact. Results from the 2024 survey round are being collected and will be analyzed in Q1 2025. Implications: Methodological limitations in identifying classes and antecedents of cross-sectoral partnership effectiveness were partially addressed. However, ongoing and refined analyses are required to validate the initial findings on the importance of leadership and trust. The 2024 data collection offers the opportunity to deepen insights by including longitudinal and multi-level data (e.g., partner-level input). Our presentation will illustrate and stimulate discussion on the possibilities and challenges of establishing a structured, country-level approach for collective learning and transferring lessons about the antecedents of effectiveness across regions. This approach could benefit practice, policymaking, and science in health policy, integrated care, and organization/management.

This article traces the creation of Eurocapitalism as a response distinct from neoliberalism to the challenges of the 1970s. By reconsidering the historical relationship between the European project’s competition law regime and its environmental policies, it suggests that the European Community has, since the late 1960s, constituted a unique form of Eurocapitalist development project, one that, in several fundamental respects, differed markedly from the neoliberal developments that characterized the American Leviathan. The article thereby also unearths the global origins of a Eurocapitalist ecology, demonstrating the long lineage of industrial programs like the EU’s Green Deal as tools to tackle climate change.

This paper analyzes the evolution of the concept of “agreement” in European Union competition law, with particular reference to the application of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the digital context. The point of departure is the traditional understanding of an agreement as the expression of a concurrence of wills between market participants (“meeting of minds”), which, through the practice of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union, has acquired a broad and functional meaning. The paper specifically examines the Eturas judgment, which for the first time recognized that a digital platform may operate as a means of anticompetitive coordination between competitors. This case marks a turning point in the development of the doctrine of concerted practices, as it introduces the possibility of coordination occurring even in the absence of direct human contact. The paper further considers the typology of algorithmic coordination as an analytical framework for assessing whether algorithmic mechanisms may give rise to an agreement or a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. The author concludes that contemporary technological developments require a reassessment of the classical notion of agreement in competition law and a shift of focus from the concurrence of wills toward the foreseeable anticompetitive effects of algorithmic systems — from the “meeting of minds” to the “meeting of algorithms.

ABSTRACT Wheelchair rugby (WR) is a mixed-sex sport, with a point-based classification system ranking players on arm-trunk impairment. Players are classified as low-point (LP, 0.5–1.5) or high-point (HP, 2.0–3.5). Teams are allowed four players on court with a total score ≤8.0; 0.5 point is added to this score per female on court. This study explored sex-based differences in strength and wheelchair activities in WR players. Twenty-four female and fifty-eight male international WR players completed six isometric strength tests and 3×10m sprints on-court. One-way ANOVAs compared performance differences between groups (LP, HP, Females, Males, No-trunk (NT), Trunk (TR)). Female-LP-players had significantly lower scores than Male-LP-players on elbow flexion (−47%), push (−46%) and pull (−37%) strength. Female-HP-NT-players had significantly lower scores than Male-HP-NT-players on elbow flexion (−64%), shoulder flexion (−56%), shoulder extension (−52%), push (−61%) and pull (−56%) strength. Female-HP-TR-players had significantly lower scores than Male-HP-TR-players on elbow flexion (−54%), shoulder flexion (−66%) and push (−66%) strength. No differences were found between sexes in 10m sprints, but sprint momentum showed clear differences. Female WR players had less strength compared to males, with more pronounced differences in HP-players. This strength disparity has direct implications on current international regulations, supporting compensation through competition rules.

The necessity to balance economic interests and environmental protection calls for reform in multiple policy frameworks, including legal instruments that regulate business interactions in the market. This research is qualitative in nature, chosen to explore in depth the relationship between competition law and the implementation of a green economy in Indonesia, by analyzing legal documents, regulations, KPPU decisions, academic literature, and best practices in other jurisdictions. The relevant national regulations are the Law on Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, in conjunction with Law No. 11 of 2020 on Job Creation, which have not provided regulations that provide legal certainty and are in line with the environmental interests of the green economy. There is an urgent need to reformulate competition law policy to be more adaptive, accompanied by strengthening the role and capacity of the KPPU as an independent institution that conducts competition supervision in a professional, transparent manner, and in line with the sustainable economy agenda. The implementation of Articles 50 and 51 of the Monopoly Practices Law regarding exemptions and state monopolies in strategic sectors needs to be optimized through clearer guidelines so that each exemption remains oriented towards efficiency, sustainability, and the public interest.

ABSTRACT This paper argues for the recognition of economic dependence as a relevant concept within EU competition law, moving beyond the traditional—yet limited—dominance‐based framework of Article 102 TFEU. Comparative analysis shows that this, or an equivalent concept, is already embedded in the domestic competition regimes of several EU Member States, as well as in Japan and South Korea, to address severe imbalances of bargaining power in vertical commercial relationships that may distort the competitive process below the dominance threshold. Whereas the DMA embodies a regulatory response to forms of collective dependence linked to gatekeepers, its limited scope leaves many problematic scenarios unaddressed. In the context of the ongoing evaluation of Regulation 1/2003, introducing economic dependence at EU level would offer a more comprehensive response to contemporary economic power, in line with EU constitutional values, while enhancing internal coherence and promoting normative convergence with like‐minded democracies.

The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the procedural activities for the protection of competition carried out by antimonopoly authorities. The study analyzes issues of compliance with the principles of legality and transparency (openness) of the antimonopoly process, the sequence of administrative procedures, their predictability, formalism, and imperative nature as well as the active (investigative) role of the antimonopoly authority in the process. Particular attention is given to the specific content of administrative procedures for the protection of competition, expressed in the dualism of state bodies ensuring such protection, the unconditional consideration of the state of competition in the relevant market when making final procedural decisions, and the priority of preventive measures over punitive ones. These principles, rules, and limitations should form the basis of legal processes for implementing state antimonopoly control functions, including control over economic concentration, the granting of state and municipal preferences, inspections by antimonopoly authorities for compliance with antimonopoly legislation, consideration of cases concerning violations of antimonopoly legislation, complaints about violations of antimonopoly legislation, and complaints related to tender procedures. Adherence to these requirements ensures the effective application of substantive competition law norms aimed at protecting competition. A significant violation of these principles should result in the court recognizing the actions and decisions of the antimonopoly authorities as illegal.

ABSTRACT This introductory article sets competition law in the transformative context. It explains that competition law is not only something that is transformed but is also transformative in its own right. A twofold argument is advanced: first, that competition law has an important role to play in ensuring that the wide range of transitions in play today (i.e., green, digital and industrial) are both just and enduring, and second, that there are significant lessons to be learnt from economic transformations that have already taken place in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and countries from the Global South. To this end, the article explains that the manner in which CEE and select Global South countries designed and enforced their competition laws has allowed competition law to play a meaningful role not only as an instrument but also as an architect of their economic transformations. Against this background, the article argues that the EU's openness to these transitional experiences is desirable not only because it would supplement the transitions within the EU but also because it will facilitate the pathway to similar transitions in other non‐European jurisdictions that look to the EU for guidance. In terms of structure, first, the article examines the possible role of competition law in the course of transitions. Second, it examines the possibilities and limitations of the role competition law has already played in the transitions in CEE and Global South countries. The article concludes with an invitation to all readers to engage with this kaleidescope to gain a deeper insight into these issues.

ABSTRACT Academic research is increasingly questioning whether the goals of competition law should extend beyond the traditional focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare to include non‐economic issues such as social justice, democracy, environmental sustainability and equality. In this regard, the African experience is particularly valuable since public interest considerations (PICs) are a feature of merger control regimes in many African countries. After an analysis of PICs in Africa, the paper zooms in on South Africa's extensive experience in the field, particularly its legal test for determining when PICs are justified in merger assessment and offers recommendations that could inform other countries. Drawing on the South Africa merger assessment, this paper recommends that PICs and the competition standard be analysed separately but in an interrelated manner, as they complement each other. The likely effect of the merger on specific public interests must be identified and considered only when it is substantial and linked to the merger. Additionally, a merger should be prohibited only if the proposed remedies seeking to address the negative effects on the specific PIC are inadequate, inappropriate, disproportionate or unenforceable. Importantly, when PICs collide, competition agencies should balance each public interest against the others, focusing on whether the likely effect is substantial or whether the remedies are inadequate. In sum, competition agencies should adopt public‐interest merger guidelines that provide businesses with the necessary guidance on the legal test and procedures, enhancing legal certainty and attracting investment.