Communitarian Perspectives Research Articles

Merit and Inequality: Confucian and Communitarian Perspectives on Singapore’s Meritocracy

Merit and Inequality: Confucian and Communitarian Perspectives on Singapore’s Meritocracy

Self-Regarding Actions: African Communitarian Perspectives

Self-Regarding Actions: African Communitarian Perspectives

Editorial Presentation: Critical perspectives in social innovation, social enterprise and/or the social solidarity economy

Editorial Presentation: Critical perspectives in social innovation, social enterprise and/or the social solidarity economy

Towards reconstructing Africa: Recuperation and responsibility in Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Healers

A product of Africa’s pre-colonial and colonial history, Ayi Kwei Armah’s fifth novel, The Healers (1978), is steeped in an African communalistic worldview and the functional conception of art. In this article we examine the multiple dimensions to recuperation within the context of the reconstruction of Africa, the continental search for utopia, and the responsibility that this places on Africans. Using Armah’s communitarian perspectives on health as a guide, we identify six interlocking subsets of recuperation as healing, re-creation, renascence, repossession, recall, and Sankofa (return). Informed by Molefi Kete Asante’s construct of agency and Armah’s communalistic injunctions to readers, we establish that permeating each of these building blocks is the responsibility of Africans to operationalize the reconstruction of Africa, the leitmotif of the novel. As helpers, visionaries, and custodians of vital traditional knowledge and skills, the healers facilitate the sharing of information on Africa’s past and future against the background of British colonial domination. We also show that Armah deliberately gives the novel this polysemic title to transcend the spatial, cultural, and epistemic limitations imposed on the continent by the colonial order. We conclude that the social orientation and creative configuration of health in the work are consistent with the diverse and intermingling meanings of recuperation.

Moral visions of sanctuary across the great divides in contemporary political philosophy

ABSTRACT What are the most important conceptions of ‘sanctuary’ in relation to citizenship and community, and how do today’s sanctuary cities engage with such lines of thinking? This paper examines the moral visions underlying and animating many of today's sanctuary cities in the United States in order to illustrate how local communities have adopted a combination of liberal, communitarian and cosmopolitan perspectives in social and political philosophy. By tracing the recent history of the sanctuary cities movement and examining current public discourses among community leaders and activists in several leading sanctuary cities, the analysis shows how the idea of ‘sanctuary’ works across principles of individual freedom and human rights as emblematic within liberalism, notions of solidarity, social trust and local self-determination in communitarianism, and aspirations for shared responsibility and the advancement of human dignity as found in cosmopolitanism.

Would Armed Humanitarian Intervention Have Been Justified to Protect the Rohingyas?

ABSTRACT The mass killings, large-scale gang rape and large-scale expulsion of the Rohingyas from Myanmar constitute one of the most repugnant world events in recent years. This article addresses the question of whether armed humanitarian intervention would have been morally permissible to protect the Rohingyas. It approaches the question from the perspective of the jus ad bellum criteria of just war theory. This approach does not yield a definitive answer because knowing whether certain jus ad bellum conditions might have been satisfied is difficult to judge without detailed knowledge of military intelligence assessments. Nevertheless, I argue that there was just cause for intervention according to both liberal and communitarian perspectives; that legitimate authority in the form of United Nations Security Council authorization would not have been morally necessary; that it is doubtful whether permissible intervention would have required humanitarian intent; that in late August 2017, intervention might well have been a last resort, but that morally relevant facts suggest intervention might have been disproportionate and lacked a reasonable chance of success, such that, all things considered, it would have perhaps been impermissible.

The Proportionality Puzzle in Contract Law: A Challenge for Private Law Theory?

This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”?, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down”? rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.

Psychosocial and community assessment of relatives of victims of extra-judicial killings in Peru: Informing international courts.

During the Peruvian internal armed conflict, fifteen members of the Santa Barbara community were collectively executed by state agents, and their relatives were made victims of persecution, torture, and imprisonment. The case, known as the Santa Barbara massacre, was brought to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The documentation of individual, family and community impacts for the Court became a challenge due to the need to address cultural, geographical, political and community aspects. This paper aims to discuss the complexities of forensic documentation of human rights violations using a psychosocial and communitarian background. The assessment included seven survivors from three different families. Both qualitative and quantitative instruments were used. A participative action research framework guided the design, documentation process, and discussion of outcomes with the survivors. Results/ discussion: The report included four levels of documentation exhibited in the Istanbul Protocol framework: clinical impacts from a western perspective, emic formulations and cultural idioms of distress, communitarian perspectives, and a proposal of reparation measures for the Court. Individual analysis revealed chronic mental health sequelae of forced displacement, imprisonment and torture. Local idioms of distress (in Quechuan, "pinsamientuwan," "llaki," "ñakary," "umananay" and "iquyay") deepened the understanding of the damage faced by the survivors. The analysis of the community uncovered three main areas of collective damage: broken social and cultural identity, lack of political participation, and loss of perspective on the future. Regarding reparations, survivors highlighted the pursuit for justice, the dignified remembrance of their loved ones, social re-inclusion of displaced persons into the community, education for offspring, and measures for the preservation of their community's identity and culture. Psycholegal accompaniment for victims through a participatory research approach is essential for the proper documentation of the consequences of violence in complex contexts. It is also essential in guaranteeing that the forensic documentation of the impact of political violence can be proposed as reparative for the survivors in itself.

Implications for J. Dewey Liberalism in the Communitarian Perspectives on Moral Education

Implications for J. Dewey Liberalism in the Communitarian Perspectives on Moral Education

Locating Temporary Migrants on the Map of Australian Democracy

This article asks whether there should be a limit on the number of years that a temporary migrant can reside in Australia before either being granted permanent residence or required to depart.<br />Temporary migration on the scale now experienced in Australia is a relatively recent phenomenon that contrasts strongly with the established pattern of permanent settler migration that characterised Australia in the 20th Century. As a result, the question of whether or not there should be a limit to temporariness has not yet been addressed in public policy debates.<br />Drawing on the approach of Jospeh H. Carens (2013), I take Australia’s self-definition as a liberal democracy as a standard to which the nation sees itself as ethically and politically accountable. I argue that a commitment to liberal democracy renders a purely contractual approach to migration invalid—more specifically, a migrant’s consent to the terms of a temporary visa does not provide sufficient ethical grounds to extend that temporary status indefinitely. Moving beyond a contractual approach to consider whether current temporary migration arrangements are consistent with the principles of representative democracy raises debates within liberalism, particularly between cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives. I argue that practical policy must reconcile these cosmopolitan and communitarian positions. I consider, but reject, the option of strictly time-limited temporary visas that would require migrants to depart after a set number of years and instead recommend a pathway to permanent residence based on duration of stay.

Libertariańska koncepcja podmiotu moralnego w świetle sporu liberałów z komunitarystami

The following paper seeks for a reconstruction of the libertarian concept of moral subject. According to author, libertarianism – defined in a narrow meaning as an absolutism of private property rights linked with natural law theory, austrian school of economics teachings and anarcho-individualist tradition – comprises two main anthropological aspects. First of them, which stems from the methodological individualism and subjectivism of austrian school, has already been clearly described in the scientific literature. However, as author points out, there is also another ingredient of the libertarian views on human nature, that has not been grasped neither by interpreters, nor by libertarians themselves. Namely, in order to provide tenability for their moral claims, a communitarian aspect of a self needs to be endorsed by libertarian thinkers. In author’s judgement such a conlusion follows from the dispute between Rawls, Nozick, MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel, Walzer and other protagonists of the liberalcommunitarian debate. In particular, a question of so called „natural assets” provides interesting clue about communitarian presumptions of the libertarian anthropology. A widespread opinion regarding libertarianism and communitarianism polar opposites on every fieldof philosophical inquiry should thereforebe overcome. In addition to that, author briefly summarises numerous divergences that make libertarian and communitarian perspectives contradictory to each other. Undouptedly, their approaches towards ethics and – subsequently – politics cannot be reconcealed whatsoever. Libertarianism remains morally individualist and politically anarchist, while communitarians are collectivists and basically statists. Nonetheless, these differences do not embrace the concept of self. At this angle proponents of those influential streams of the contemporary political thought turn out way more akin that one may suppose at glance.

Against Individualism and Comparing the Philosophies of Rosemont and Sandel

ABSTRACTAgainst Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion presents Henry Rosemont’s reflection on possible Confucian-based avenues for considering solutions to contemporary moral, political, and spiritual problems. Rosemont contends that the ideologies of capitalist economies, which are based largely on competition, and belief in autonomous individuality, including abstract notions of human rights, are fundamentally unable to deal effectively with many of today’s most pressing issues. For example, he argues against appealing to universalist principles in an attempt to dissolve ethical and political tensions between cultures and states. In accordance with this orientation, his work is then best judged on the contributions it makes to constructing new perspectives on the problems addressed rather than how accurately he represents any tradition. In fact, Rosemont readily admits that he may be “unfair” to individualism or “creative[ly] misreading” early Confucianism.In this review article, I will argue that some of the differences Rosemont finds between his Confucian critique of individualism and the communitarian critique of individualism are, in fact, not all that dissimilar. For example, while Rosemont sees Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel as “individualists,” the general orientation of their communitarian response to libertarianism shares much in common with the Confucian “role ethics” perspective on the person and morality or ethics. In this way, I will argue that while Confucian role ethics and communitarian perspectives certainly have their respective emphases, they also have a lot to offer one another.

Shaping the Spiritual Exercises: the Maisons des retraites in Brittany during the Seventeenth Century as a Gendered Pastoral Tool

In the second half of the seventeenth century, on the periphery of Catholic Europe, Brittany was the site of intensive missionary activity aimed at both men and women. Based on a heterogeneous corpus of manuscripts, printed books, and iconographic sources, this article shows how, far from Rome, Jesuits and devout laywomen adopted a gendered perspective in reconceptualizing mission. In the city of Vannes, the Jesuit Vincent Huby and the aristocrat Catherine de Francheville instructed large groups of men and women in the Spiritual Exercises. They supervised two retreat houses to welcome them and created a “missionary kit” of moral images adapted to their gendered pastoral field. The Breton context presents a particularly good example of the importance of gender to missionary interactions. Here, the Jesuit “way of proceeding” allowed for the integration of local communitarian perspectives, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the mission.

Communitarian and Subsidiarity Perspectives on Responsible Innovation at a Global Level

All stakeholders agree publicly that innovation and governance of emerging technologies should be done responsibly. However, the international debate on who should do what to contribute to this lofty goal is nowhere near a solution. The starting point of this paper is the issue of how and for which reason to engage stakeholders in addition to governments in the international governance of nanotechnology. This article examines the mainly North-American communitarian criticism of political liberalism and the related (mainly European) concept of subsidiarity in order to shed new light on this discussion. The central research question is: Can a communitarian-subsidiarity perspective on the roles of governments, companies and civil society actors that hold a stake in emerging technologies clarify the grounds on which each actor should be expected to contribute to responsible research and innovation at the international level? After selecting some relevant aspects of a communitarian-subsidiarity model for a dialogue society, an analytical framework is proposed. This framework is then applied to the recent international dialogue on responsible governance of nanotechnology. The outcomes of the analysis are compared to the OECD planning guide on public engagement and outreach in nanotechnology, and indicators for monitoring progress in responsible global innovation are suggested. The main contribution of the selected communitarian-subsidiarity perspective is that it offers philosophical grounds for a return of citizens to the driving seat in cooperative international responsible innovation.

Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private, by Catherine Lu

Catherine Lu Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. 239 pp., $31.00 (paper) ISBN: 978-0-230-28565-1The subject of military intervention has always been prominent feature of normative debates in international relations (IR), and the past decade has been no exception. In the past 10 years there have been so many publications and books about the subject of intervention and the corollary idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that it has become increasingly difficult to say much new about it. Catherine Lu's book, however, succeeds in this regard by providing fresh normative analysis of intervention based on the public-private distinction borrowed from feminist political theory. Originally published in 2006, the paperback version of Lu's book, Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics, was released in 2011 and contains new Afterword where the author addresses developments since the original publication of the book, most notably, the debate over R2P. The rest of the book, however, remains unchanged from the original edition.This book's central argument is that the debate over humanitarian intervention can be illuminated by the public-private distinction as espoused in feminist political theory. In short, the author uses the public-private distinction as analogous to the international-domestic distinction in IR and as way to illuminate the normative structure of international society more broadly, as well as to probe issues pertaining to the responsibilities of, and the relationships among, different international actors involved in intervention. The book also uses this public-private construct as way to critically examine prevailing normative approaches to the question of intervention and the legitimacy of recent interventionary practices.The book begins with an application of the public-private distinction to IR, with the main insight being essentially that affairs are those which states regard to be internal matters protected from interference from external actors, whereas matters are those which are the legitimate business of the international community. The analogy is thus both intriguing and intuitive. For example, family privacy has historically been way for domestic abuse to occur unchecked by outside authorities, similar to how state sovereignty has permitted states to commit variety of injustices toward their own people-such as mass atrocities-largely unchecked by international society. In both cases, we see how there should be clear limits placed upon what actions or policies can be justified as a private matter, which is to say as part of state's sovereign prerogative.In the next three chapters the author critically examines prevailing normative approaches to the issue of intervention in light of the public-private distinction. This analysis begins in chapter 3 with an examination of realism and ultimately concludes that this approach is incapable of supporting morally consistent normative position either for or against intervention. Chapter 4 is similarly critical investigation of communitarianism, which fares little better than realism, as the author reveals the inconsistency and inadequacy of communitarian accounts of the public and private lives of states. In chapter 5, however, Lu argues that unlike the realist and communitarian perspectives, cosmopolitan perspective is capable of generating moral considerations that can provide morally consistent account of intervention that can accommodate and shape the private and public lives of states. …

Tolerance and recognition

Even though “toleration” and “recognition” designate opposing attitudes (to tolerate something, implies a negative stance towards it, whereas recognition seems to imply a positive one), the concepts do not constitute mutually exclusive alternatives. However, “toleration” is often associated with liberal universalism, focusing on individual rights, whereas “recognition” often connotes communitarian perspectives, focusing on relations and identity. This paper argues that toleration may be founded on recognition, and that recognition may imply toleration. In outlining a differentiated understanding of the relationship between toleration and recognition, it seems apt to avoid an all-to-general dichotomy between universalism and particularism or, in other words, to reach beyond the debate between liberalism and communitarianism in political philosophy.The paper takes as its starting point the view that the discussion on toleration and diversity in intercultural communication is one of the contexts where it seems important to get beyond the liberal/communitarian dichotomy. Some basic features of Rainer Forst’s theory of toleration and Axel Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are presented, in order to develop a more substantial understanding of the relationship between the concepts of toleration and recognition. One lesson from Forst is that toleration is a normatively dependent concept, i.e., that it is impossible to deduce principles for toleration and its limits from a theory of toleration as such. A central lesson from Honneth is that recognition – understood as a basic human need – is always conflictual and therefore dynamic.Accordingly, a main point in the paper is that the theory of struggles for and about recognition (where struggles for designates struggles within an established order of recognition, and struggles about designates struggles that challenge established orders of recognition) may clarify what is at stake in conflicts concerning toleration and its limits. At the same time, Honneth’s theory of the need for recognition seems to be a source for the kind of argumentative justifications that a just toleration are dependent on, according to Forst.Another important point in the paper is that toleration (pace Forst) is a practice or attitude that implies taking a stance, but in a differentiated way, and that this presuppose a reflective distance towards one’s own positions. To be tolerant means saying “yes” to something (the beliefs and practices that one endorses), saying “no” to something (the intolerable), but also being able to say “no, but…” to something (that which is tolerated). Intolerance means saying “no” without justifiable reasons, whereas misguided tolerance means accepting something without justifiable reasons – both attitudes may be taken to indicate that one lacks proper understanding of the reasons for holding the viewpoints that one actively endorses.In discussing of Honneth’s theory of recognition, I argue that an ability to take a stance in a differentiated way is seminal, if struggles for and about recognition are to unfold productively. In all spheres of mutual recognition (primary, secondary and tertial groups), the potential for conflicts seems to rely on an unavoidable tension between identification with the other and identification of the other as another. This is the reason why recognition – in Honneth’s sense – seems to imply toleration, or at least is reliant on the same kind of self-reflective distance and ability to differentiate that is constitutive of toleration according to Forst.Finally, I argue that the concept of “communal values” that Honneth refers to in the context of “solidarity” cannot be taken to designate a set of substantial values that are constitutive of community, but rather that important forms of recognition take place in a social space and shape cultural codes that are both the results of and the subjects of conflict. Thus while “culture” is conflictual and complex, “value pluralism” – including diversity of beliefs and practices – may be productive. In this context, toleration is not about avoiding or resolving conflict, but about establishing the conditions for productive conflicts, enabling an ongoing creation and reappraisal of values.

Toleranse og anerkjenning eller: <br>Kva vil det seia å verdsetja mangfald?

Even though “toleration” and “recognition” designate opposing attitudes (to tolerate something, implies a negative stance towards it, whereas recognition seems to imply a positive one), the concepts do not constitute mutually exclusive alternatives. However, “toleration” is often associated with liberal universalism, focusing on individual rights, whereas “recognition” often connotes communitarian perspectives, focusing on relations and identity. This paper argues that toleration may be founded on recognition, and that recognition may imply toleration. In outlining a differentiated understanding of the relationship between toleration and recognition, it seems apt to avoid an all-to-general dichotomy between universalism and particularism or, in other words, to reach beyond the debate between liberalism and communitarianism in political philosophy.The paper takes as its starting point the view that the discussion on toleration and diversity in intercultural communication is one of the contexts where it seems important to get beyond the liberal/communitarian dichotomy. Some basic features of Rainer Forst’s theory of toleration and Axel Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are presented, in order to develop a more substantial understanding of the relationship between the concepts of toleration and recognition. One lesson from Forst is that toleration is a normatively dependent concept, i.e., that it is impossible to deduce principles for toleration and its limits from a theory of toleration as such. A central lesson from Honneth is that recognition – understood as a basic human need – is always conflictual and therefore dynamic.Accordingly, a main point in the paper is that the theory of struggles for and about recognition (where struggles for designates struggles within an established order of recognition, and struggles about designates struggles that challenge established orders of recognition) may clarify what is at stake in conflicts concerning toleration and its limits. At the same time, Honneth’s theory of the need for recognition seems to be a source for the kind of argumentative justifications that a just toleration are dependent on, according to Forst.Another important point in the paper is that toleration (pace Forst) is a practice or attitude that implies taking a stance, but in a differentiated way, and that this presuppose a reflective distance towards one’s own positions. To be tolerant means saying “yes” to something (the beliefs and practices that one endorses), saying “no” to something (the intolerable), but also being able to say “no, but…” to something (that which is tolerated). Intolerance means saying “no” without justifiable reasons, whereas misguided tolerance means accepting something without justifiable reasons – both attitudes may be taken to indicate that one lacks proper understanding of the reasons for holding the viewpoints that one actively endorses.In discussing of Honneth’s theory of recognition, I argue that an ability to take a stance in a differentiated way is seminal, if struggles for and about recognition are to unfold productively. In all spheres of mutual recognition (primary, secondary and tertial groups), the potential for conflicts seems to rely on an unavoidable tension between identification with the other and identification of the other as another. This is the reason why recognition – in Honneth’s sense – seems to imply toleration, or at least is reliant on the same kind of self-reflective distance and ability to differentiate that is constitutive of toleration according to Forst.Finally, I argue that the concept of “communal values” that Honneth refers to in the context of “solidarity” cannot be taken to designate a set of substantial values that are constitutive of community, but rather that important forms of recognition take place in a social space and shape cultural codes that are both the results of and the subjects of conflict. Thus while “culture” is conflictual and complex, “value pluralism” – including diversity of beliefs and practices – may be productive. In this context, toleration is not about avoiding or resolving conflict, but about establishing the conditions for productive conflicts, enabling an ongoing creation and reappraisal of values.

“And You Welcomed Me”

In this article, I assess rival liberal and communitarian ethical perspectives underlying contemporary debates regarding migration policy in the US. I then propose a critical via media in a rights-based ethics of solidarity with migrants. I conclude by addressing the distinctive role played by citizens of faith in a religiously pluralist polity like our own, noting, in particular, the place (locus) of Christian belief in immigration policy.

ASEAN Paradigm Shift from a State to People-Oriented Organization: A Neo-Communitarian Perspective

AbstractThis paper attempts to examine the paradigm shift in ASEAN from a state-based to a people-based organization. We argue that by adopting a people-based organization, ASEAN now enters an era of Neo-Communitarianism replacing the Old Communitarianism of the old generation of ASEAN. By using communitarian perspectives, we look at the continuities and changes in ASEAN with regard to how it deals with issues involving their members. Three important issues namely the debates on intervention principle; the adoption of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community; and the inclusion of human rights are seen as the signposts where ASEAN departs from their Old to a Neo-Communitarianism. Although there have been a lot of challenges to the realization of the people-based organization, we see that the dynamics of debates and the active participation of the community in the debates show good prospects for the new paradigm to realize. In this paper, we use debate on the formation of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (ICHR), to show the involvements of people in setting the agendas for the future ASEAN.

DEGREES OF DISENCHANTMENT: A REVIEW ESSAY

In this review essay, Mark Brenneman and Frank Margonis address three recent book‐length contributions to the ongoing discussion around cosmopolitanism and educational thought: Mark Olssen's Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Social Democracy: Thin Communitarian Perspectives on Political Philosophy and Education, Sharon Todd's Toward an Imperfect Education: Facing Humanity, Rethinking Cosmopolitanism, and Ilan Gur‐Ze’ev's Beyond the Modern‐Postmodern Struggle in Education: Toward Counter‐Education and Enduring Improvisation. Brenneman and Margonis argue that these contributions exhibit a marked disenchantment with Enlightenment conceptions of human possibilities as these inform concrete recommendations in the field of the philosophy of education. All three books call for a rethinking of modernist categories in educational thought, a call that is supported by the authors' respective distrust and ultimate disenchantment with the residual presence of ideas of human perfectibility harbored in the philosophical categories that animate discussions in multicultural, liberal, neoliberal, and postmodern educational discussion. Brenneman and Margonis argue that each of these books theorizes from its own respective regionally specific circumstances, and they therefore prove valuable to philosophers of education who struggle toward their own local responses to human difference and the pedagogical possibilities of educational relations.