* The Federal Government publishes each year a volume on the cases decided at the Federal Power Commission. The cases, rendered in chronological order, deal with matters related to pricing and sales of natural gas and electricity in interstate commerce. They are that part of the formal work or output of the five Federal Power Commissioners that is supposed to guide the surveillance activities of FPC staff members and ultimately the economic performance of the electricity and natural gas industries. The last complete set of such cases, Volume 42 of The Federal Power Commission Reports, provides a record of the last few months of the Chairmanship of Lee C. White in 1969 and the beginning months of the new Republican Chairman, John C. Nassikas, in that same year. As far as can be determined, not many friends or critics of the FPC have read this volume of 1041 pages through to the end, possibly because there are few general questions that can be answered by doing so. This volume is reviewed here to answer only two questions: what were the aims or goals of the Commissioners behind the decisions arrived at, and how are these decisions likely to affect the economic performance of the regulated companies? The goals of decision-making by the Commissioners should be made clear in the more than 350 cases in Volume 42. The legislation of Congress in the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act, and the FPC cases decided on appeal by the Federal Courts, direct the Commissioners in their decisions and require the use of certain language in their written findings and orders. But it is not at all clear that precedent provides strict goals for the case decisions-the language of the statutes and appeals cases appears to be so general that it could serve as the basis both for decicling a case and for rationalizing a decision once it has been made. The Commissioners might well have their own reasons, and be able to express their will with wide latitude in their own decisions. The cases may show whether they seek to favor consumers, or rather to favor the producers they regulate. The first type of favoritism would tend to drive prices towards the level of
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