Coastal State Jurisdiction Research Articles

Considering the contemporary global importance of transboundary submarine cables and pipelines, particularly from economic and societal perspectives – in contrast to the intentional breaking or injuring of such infrastructure – the aim of this research is toexamine the extent to which international law supports the jurisdiction of coastal states over maritime areas where they hold only certain sovereign rights. To that end, the author analyzes the legal regimes of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone,as well as the relevant international law governing the protection of submarine cables and pipelines. Two key international treaties are examined: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Sub-marine Telegraph Cables. In line with the research objectives, the author also considers the opinions of legal scholars, state practices, and relevant international jurisprudence. After synthesizing the findings, the author provides a nuanced answer regarding the scope and legal foundations of coastal states’ jurisdiction in their continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, in relation to the jurisdiction of states whose vessels or citizens intentionally damage submarine cables or pipelines.

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Western world, including the G7 and EU, implemented an oil price cap on Russian oil as part of economic sanctions. Consequently, oil tankers transporting Russian oil without complying with the price cap faced strong maritime blockades, including port entry bans, restricted access to waters, and prohibitions on ship-to-ship transfers. However, Russia responded by organizing a shadow fleet of tankers. In fact, several countries like North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela have also operated dark ships to evade sanctions. The shadow fleet evolved from dark ships but differs significantly in scale. At one point, shadow fleets constituted approximately 20% of the world's oil tankers. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has defined shadow fleets as vessels operating illegally to evade sanctions, safety or environmental regulations, insurance costs, or for illegal activities. Shadow fleets are characterized as aging, substandard vessels with inadequate safety equipment and non-existent or inadequate insurance. They also employ deceptive transportation practices such as AIS manipulation and spoofing, frequent flag changes, vessel identity manipulation, and ship-to-ship transfers. Due to these characteristics, shadow fleets pose a serious threat to maritime environment and safety. On December 6, 2023, in IMO Resolution A.1192(33), the IMO warned that the proliferation of shadow fleets is increasing the risk of oil spills and urged member states to prepare accordingly. Recently, incidents of damage to undersea cables and gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea have occurred frequently, with shadow fleets being identified as the cause. The EU Parliament, in its most vulnerable position to Russian threats, adopted a comprehensive resolution on shadow fleet sanctions in November 2024. This resolution recommended specific sanction measures, including vessel designation, along with enhanced monitoring using satellites or drones. By tracking changes in the scale of shadow fleets, it appears that port entry bans and prohibitions on ship-to-ship transfers had little effect due to Russia's securing of alternative routes, while vessel designation had somewhat more effect. Overall, sanctions against shadow fleets can hardly be considered successful. Ultimately, a response based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is important. According to UNCLOS, the primary responsibility for ensuring maritime safety lies with the flag state. Article 235 of UNCLOS emphasizes the obligation of states to cooperate for the payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds. Flag states must comply with the obligation to cooperate for appropriate compensation regarding maritime environmental and safety threats posed by shadow fleets. However, when the flag state is either the party trying to evade sanctions or a flag of convenience country, there is a lack of willingness to faithfully fulfill these obligations. Therefore, while strengthening coastal state jurisdiction would be ideal, this is difficult without amending UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the spread of shadow fleets can be prevented through strengthening coastal state authority, such as establishing permitted zones in exclusive economic zones, restricting ship-to-ship transfers, and identifying and monitoring ship-to-ship transfer operations.

In September 2022, an alleged act of sabotage damaged the submarine pipelines, known as Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, that were built to transit natural gas from the Russian Federation to Germany. The broken points of these pipelines have been located in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the continental shelves of Denmark and Sweden. While relevant states initiated domestic investigations to uncover the truth behind these incidents, international law scholars are still looking for applicable laws to characterise them. This article discusses the jurisdictional issues over the Nord Stream incidents under international law. In particular, it discusses coastal state jurisdiction over incidents such as foreign transiting pipelines in the EEZ and on the continental shelf under the law of the sea. It then examines three scenarios that could arguably characterise the Nord Stream incidents and discusses which states could establish and exercise jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrators.

The jurisdiction of a state principally extends to its own territory, territorial sea, and airspace. At sea, states generally have jurisdiction only over vessels within their territorial waters. The high seas are areas where the freedom of navigation is guaranteed and fall under the jurisdiction of no specific state. Under the principle of flag state jurisdiction, a vessel on the high seas is subject to the jurisdiction of the state whose flag it flies. One significant exception to this flag state principle is the right of hot pursuit, as stipulated in Article 111(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The right of hot pursuit allows a coastal state to pursue and seize a vessel suspected of violating its laws and regulations while in its territorial sea, contiguous zone, or exclusive economic zone (EEZ), even if the pursuit extends onto the high seas. This right effectively extends the coastal state's jurisdiction to the high seas and constitutes a significant exception to the principles of freedom of navigation and flag state jurisdiction. However, the requirements for exercising the right of hot pursuit have long been a subject of controversy in international law, and even after being codified in 1982 UNCLOS, issues of interpretation remain contentious. Key areas of disagreement include the maritime zones where pursuit may begin, the entities authorized to conduct the pursuit, the continuity of pursuit, and the use of force during pursuit. For South Korea, where much of the national territory is adjacent to the sea, analyzing the legal principles and cases related to the right of hot pursuit under UNCLOS has considerable significance in enforcing domestic law at sea. This paper first briefly examines the extraterritorial application of criminal law in connection with passive personality jurisdiction when exercising the right of hot pursuit. It then explores the requirements for the right of hot pursuit under UNCLOS, with a particular focus on the maritime zones where pursuit may commence and the requirement of continuity. The domestic case of the M/V Tyumen is analyzed in this context. Additionally, this paper addresses considerations for interpreting and applying the provisions on the right of hot pursuit under UNCLOS, as well as key factors to be considered by domestic law enforcement agencies, such as the Korea Coast Guard, when exercising this right.

Reorienting approaches to maritime boundary disputes: A case for hydro-diplomacy?

Given the rapid growth of ship-borne tourism in Antarctica, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) area-based management tools (ABMTs) could be a timely and effective contribution to mitigate some of the associated risks. Utilization of IMO ABMTs in Antarctic waters, which constitute high seas, raises several legal and practical issues. The central challenge is how to ensure compliance with IMO measures on the high seas, given the lack of generally accepted coastal state jurisdiction in Antarctica and shortcomings in flag state control. This article addresses these questions and analyzes port state jurisdiction as a potential mechanism to enforce IMO ABMTs in the Antarctic. The article concludes that Antarctic port states have sufficient legal arguments to justify the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to IMO ABMTs, and that significant constraints lie in the economic and political dimensions of regulation rather than in regulation itself.

The implications of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) in the South China Sea: A Chinese perspective

Abstract In Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), the International Court of Justice delves into the matter of exclusivity when assessing alleged violations committed by foreign States within an Exclusive Economic Zone. Additionally, the Court examines the legality of legislative acts concerning the contiguous zone and outlines criteria for the drawing of straight baselines. The Court’s aim seems to be establishing a comprehensive theory of exclusivity, seeking to allocate and balance the rights and jurisdiction of coastal States and other States involved. In this context, it becomes apparent that the abstract notion of freedom of navigation imposes limitations on coastal States, preventing them from enacting legislation that expands the scope of their jurisdiction or adopts a liberal interpretation of permissible conditions within relevant regulatory frameworks. The implications of this theory for the evolution of the legal order pertaining to maritime spaces warrant significant attention.

This research studies investment opportunities within the tuna fish pole and line fishery by the coast of the African Atlantic Façade (mainly SW–Senegal), and the associated value chains. Also, a section is dedicated to investigating the specific case of investment of French capital in tuna fisheries in Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. The investigation was conducted under the FarFish project, which overarching objective is to provide knowledge, tools and methods to support responsible, sustainable and profitable EU fisheries outside European waters, both within the jurisdiction (EEZ) of non-EU coastal states as well as in international waters/high seas. In order to achieve this, the aim of this research is to identify, study and potentially recommend investment opportunities for EU operators within some of the project’s case study countries. The investigations done into tuna fisheries were based on interviews with relevant stakeholders, including shipowners and key personnel from public bodies and institutions both in West Africa and Europe (see Appendix A for the list of stakeholders consulted). In addition, most of the data presented in this section was acquired from DG-Mare in a non-public dataset compiling every fishing lot from EU vessels operating within SFPAs in Senegal. A second case study in tuna fisheries in this case in the Indian Ocean, investigates the investment from the French company SAPMER to improve the land infrastructure in the Port of Victoria (Seychelles), as this would be the only notable investment by European interests in recent years for tuna fishing in Africa. These sections conclude that the fishing area where EU pole-and-line vessels are active is becoming less productive, decreasing the profitability of European flagged vessels, as well as of Senegalese flagged vessels that maintain close partnerships with Europe. As a response, they have attempted to extend their fishing grounds. Additional fishing opportunities are opening in The Gambia (whose EEZ is restricted) and other countries are expected to follow. Contrastingly, the EU sustainable partnership fisheries agreement with Senegal or Mauritania could include fewer fishing opportunities in terms of tonnage, as well as increasingly restrictive conditions for access and landings. European operators have reacted so far by considering the switch to private regime, instead of operating under SFPA, as a preferred strategy.

Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Contiguous Zone and Transnational Organised Crime

Coastal State Jurisdiction over Ships in Need of Assistance, Maritime Casualties and Shipwrecks, written by Iva Parlov

The paper examines the newly proclaimed Italian Exclusive Economic Zone and its impact on the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between Italy and Montenegro. By Law No. 91 of 14 June 2021, published in the Official Journal No. 148 of 23 June 2021, the Italian Parliament proclaimed its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), to allow Italy to fully project its economic rights over an area of the sea extending up to 200 miles from its shores or up to the limit allowed by international law. In line with the trend of progressive extension of the jurisdiction of coastal states in waters beyond their territorial sea in the Mediterranean, this measure is taken in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to allow the country to protect its economic activities, and biodiversity protection. Anyway, even if the law authorizes the EEZ establishment, a further ad hoc measure is required to this aim. Its delimitation will take place primarily based on agreements: Italy is supposed to negotiate new agreements with the neighboring Countries, including Montenegro, in order to define its boundaries.

Coastal State Jurisdiction over Living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, written by Camille Goodman

As a result of the work of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a single international legal order was established in the oceans covering 2/3 of our planet and approved by virtually all States. An important part of it is the procedure for allocating from the common space of the World Ocean part of the waters and the bottom, lawfully subject to the jurisdiction of coastal States. With the warming of the climate on Earth, the water level of the World's oceans began to rise, and the established limits of the zones of jurisdiction are violated. Currently, two ideas have been formed for determining the limits of national jurisdiction: to fix the baseline for measuring zones of jurisdiction; to establish a fixed external limit of such zones. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is universally recognized and is not disputed by anyone.

Abstract This paper tackles legal and policy issues concerning Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the Mediterranean Sea. Since the 1970s, Mediterranean Countries have been at the forefront in international cooperation for the protection of marine ecosystems: notably, significant results have been achieved through the establishment of a network of Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Interest (SPAMIs). After framing the general legal context, the paper examines the specificities of the above network, while at the same time pointing out its weakness when put to the test of facts. Accordingly, some proposals are made for improving the SPAMI system, which include a better allocation of jurisdiction among coastal States in the case of transboundary MPAs. It is argued that in a delicate phase of transition, characterized by the proclamation of EEZs and the ensuing maritime delimitation disputes, the creation of SPAMI may enhance the spirit of cooperation among Mediterranean States with opposite or adjacent coasts and possibly represent an alternative to the definition of a precise maritime boundary. Most notably, the creation of transboundary SPAMIs appears worth further exploration in the context of the negotiations aimed at defining the boundaries of the Italian EEZ.

INTRODUCTION. At various times, the sustainable use of marine living resources in the high seas outside exclusive economic zones, as well as in areas under the jurisdiction of Arctic coastal states, has been severely damaged by illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. As the climate warms, the threat of unregulated fishing has also emerged on the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean. As a result of multi-round negotiations on October 3, 2018 in Ilullissat (Greenland, Denmark) in the so-called «five plus five» format – representatives of five Arctic and four non-Arctic states, as well as the European Union, the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean was signed. This new international legal document reflects national interests in the optimal use of marine living resources of the Arctic states, the Arctic indigenous peoples and residents, as well as interested states. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article shows the evolution of international legal instruments to prevent illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in the high seas. Particular attention is paid to the study of normative and doctrinal materials revealing the treaty practice of states in the Arctic enclaves. The legal interpretation of the provisions of the 2018 Agreement is also given. In the study the authors used historical, comparative-legal and some other general scientific and special legal methods. RESEARCH RESULTS. From an international perspective, the 2018 Agreement is an innovative legal document that reflects the interests of not only the Arctic states but also non-Arctic states. Despite concerns about the participation of the latter (China, in particular)on the part of Western states, the Agreement was nevertheless signed and ratified before possible commercial fishing on the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean starts. This would prevent illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in advance and thus prevent the depletion of marine living resources in this part of the Arctic Ocean, unlike it happened in other enclaves of the high seas in the Northern Hemisphere. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The entry into force of the 2018 Agreement marked the beginning of cooperation among interested states in prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. Besides the general purpose of the Agreement, scientific cooperation between the Parties will contribute to better understandingof the least-explored area of the high seas. It is likely that the environmental cooperation in the Central Arctic Ocean will expand considerably in the future.

In the past, the sea has been a space where routes are designed fornavigation like roads on land, or where freedom of navigation is guaranteed.However, as the jurisdiction of coastal states has been expanded for variousreasons such as resource development and security, there was growing concernthat the high seas, the waters where the freedom of passage of ships isguaranteed, will gradually decrease, which may limit the passage of ships. As aresult, a system such as the right of innocent passage was prepared to ensurefreedom of navigation even in the waters within the sovereignty of the coastalstate. The right of innocent passage literally means that when a vessel isharmless to the coastal state when it passes through the waters under thejurisdiction of the coastal state, it guarantees the passage of the vessel.However, the traffic-prohibited sea area for oil tankers established along thecoast of Korea prohibits passage regardless of whether or not oil tankerspassing through the sea area are harmless, which may violate the UNConvention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore, it is considered that it isnecessary to change the area to a cautionary zone for oil tankers to ensurecareful navigation of oil tankers and active management of coastal states rather than unilaterally prohibiting the passage of oil tankers. By doing so, it will bepossible to achieve the legislative purpose of the traffic-prohibited sea area foroil tankers and to solve the problem of conflicts with international law.

This research aims to assess and find possible ways to improve the international legal framework to exercise state jurisdiction to prevent pollution from offshore oil rigs. In effect, the paper analyzes the legal status of offshore rigs to provide for the necessary jurisprudential, geo-political, and energysecurity dimensions. While doing so, the pertinent provisos (sections) of all the international conventions relatable to offshore oil & gas production have been examined. The study has found that the legal status of offshore rigs is not clear in international law, and as such, it concludes that the 1982 UNCLOS convention has addressed specific issues, albeit not in an extensive way. The extant international regulations for the protection of offshore oil rigs have not been effective, even in cases of allision and collision. Right from the legal status of offshore rigs to security zones, they have been debated much and have been the subject of dispute for over 40 years. There are specific and pivotal jurisdictional issues in matters to do with the location of oil rigs in the high seas, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, which has proved to be an area of contention. The Legal status of offshore rigs has become a source of much disagreement in International Law. There are fundamental questions about whether a type of rig could be considered a ship under national and international law. Should an oil rig be considered a ship, some international law rules relatable to ships, such as the law of flag, allision, collision, and pollution, would become applicable in equal verve to oil rigs as well? As a natural corollary of those above, a query would come up: how else can oil rigs be classified? Traditionally, oil rigs, offshore installations, artificial islands have been dubbed to be part of one category. A meticulous examination of the legal status of offshore rigs would reveal that it is one of the most contumacious and troublesome areas of International Law. The aforementioned is significant because there are many practical and legal consequences, given specific situational dictates. Indeed, the legal status could directly impact issues with the jurisdiction a state may have in matters relatable to the exercise of the states’ legal prowess over offshore rigs, and the applicability of certain maritime law principles and rules centric to offshore rigs need to be studied astutely. As an indicative archetype, should an offshore rig be located at an exclusive economic zone, it could be considered a ship in the eyes of the law, and hence, the flag state would have exclusive jurisdiction over it. Nonetheless, the coastal state would have exclusive jurisdiction if it were considered an installation. Quintessentially, the legal status of offshore oil and gas rigs would determine the rights, duties, and obligations of the different states, and hence the subject could throw up some complicated issues.

Article 234 of UNCLOS is in many ways exceptional, but it is not unique in the sense that it grants to the coastal state “complete” legislative power. Arguably, “complete” coastal state jurisdiction exists in the territorial sea for the purposes enumerated in Article 21(1), allowing coastal states to adopt ship reporting systems, pilotage, and other routing measures unilaterally. The analysis of state practice reveals that states often decide to engage the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in different ways, even when such a course of action is not mandatory. This article advocates for meaningful deliberation as both a suitable method of meeting Article 234’s due regard standard, and a practice that can be expected from a steward.

Beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction, the seabed and its mineral resources are governed by a comprehensive international regime, which determines by whom and under what conditions these natural resources can be exploited. However, the same mineral resources that deep sea mining actors are keen to exploit in the Area, are also available within zones falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states. So even if strict rules and precise standards would be enforced with regard to seabed mining operations in the Area, similar activities within a coastal state’s national jurisdiction remain unchecked by international law. Therefore, the question can be raised whether this might lead to substandard exploitation of the minerals of the seabed without adequate supervision? This article tests this assumption in a detailed case study of the relevant legislation of the Cook Islands, comprising the 2017 Marae Moana Act and the 2019 Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Act. Following a concise analysis of the competences of coastal states on their continental shelf, the domestic laws of the Cook Islands are critically compared with the international legal framework governing the Area, to assess whether they contain equivalent rules, mechanisms and safeguards.