Coalition Choices Research Articles

Elite Coalitions and Rebel Control in Northern Côte d’Ivoire

ABSTRACT How do armed movements gain civilian compliance and prevent counter-mobilization in localities under their wartime control? This paper argues that rebel capacity to control civilians is contingent on the coalitions formed between rebel mid-level commanders and elite groups embedded in local communities. Rebels are confronted with coalitional choices because local communities are contested and comprised of multiple sets of elite groups. Coalitional choices influence rebel control because they determine whether rebels ally with strong or weak local partners. Where rebel allies are weak, they should confront serious challenges to eliciting civilian compliance. Where rebel allies are stronger, rebels should confront less resistance. I argue that the availability of elites as potential allies for armed movements depends on their pre-conflict proximity to the state. This paper develops this argument through a comparison of three localities governed by the Forces Nouvelles (FN) in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2011).

Seeing Networks Clearly：The Influence of Holistic-Analytic Thinking Styles on Network Perception and Coalition Formation

Accurate knowledge of who knows whom in organizations have important benefits for individual work performance and managerial decision making, but people are not very accurate when recalling connections among others in their social networks. The present study investigates how holisticanalytic thinking styles influence the extent people can accurately perceive network relationships and choose the right persons to form a coalition in a fictious persuasive task. We focused on two dimensions of holistic-analytic thinking style, namely, attention to field (as opposed to parts) and interactionist (as opposed to dispositionist) causal theory. Results from 281 participants reveals that while individuals with greater attention to field were more accurate in recalling relationships in a social network, those inclined toward interactionism in causal theory were less accurate. Furthermore, greater attention to field enhanced the effectiveness of coalition member selection, in part through the mediation of accurate network perception; while interactionism, via the full mediation of network perception, indirectly led to less effective coalition choice.

COALITION CHOICE AND ELITE PERSONALISATION IN PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL (NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY) FACTIONALISM 2020

This paper seeks to analyze the causes of factionalism within PAN in 2020. The findings show that a combination of two factors caused factionalism. First, the policy regarding coalition choice after the 2019 presidential election and elite personalization within the party. We interviewed several DPP PAN (PAN's Central Executive Board) officials and collected documents from the media, previous research, and the party's internal document to obtain the data. PAN's coalition choice was divided into three key factors. First, pragmatism to maximize power (office-seeking) instrumentally by influencing the government's policy. Second, the ideological factor related to party elites' effort to return PAN to a centrist party based on the 2019 election results evaluation where PAN's proximity to Islamic conservatives failed to boost votes. Third, there is regime intervention through legal criminalization threats to several PAN cadres. The personalization of Amien Rais exacerbated this coalition choice in PAN. Amien's influence can bring PAN tendency to be Jokowi's opposition even though it is not a formal party decision. PAN's coalition choice policy led to divisions due to Amien Rais' camp support to the Mulfachri Harahap candidacy in Congress.

Is populism the third dimension? The quest for political alliances in post-crisis Spain

In this article, we defend the ideational approach to populism by arguing that populist discourses have consequences for government formation and the coalition choices of political parties. Using two attempts of government formation in Spain during 2016 as an example, we show that incorporating a populist dimension of competition alongside the two traditional relevant cleavages in Spain (left-right and center-periphery) can successfully explain agreements where approaches restricted to the two traditional dimensions fail. Essentially, populism forms a third, ideational dimension with its own content, one that can be considered alongside thick ideological dimensions in formal spatial analysis, shaping alliances among political parties.

The Political Nature of Ideological Polarization: The Case of Hungary

Polarization in Hungary is one of the most severe cases in Europe. It is predominantly elite-driven, and determined mostly by the antagonistic confrontation between the parties. Left and Right blocs oppose each other in a struggle where the loser is completely denied any influence on policymaking. The two blocs endorse opposing views on socio-cultural policies, but this division emerged as a consequence of the rhetoric and coalitional choices of parties, more than from the societal divisions that they ostensibly represent. Moreover, while the perceived ideological distance between party blocs is wide, the actual programmatic differences in the parties’ economic and social policy stances are modest. This article draws on a broad range of sources to describe the process of polarization in Hungary after the fall of communism. I discuss how a polarizing style of political competition can lead to a politically divided society and, over the long run, to democratic erosion.

Harsanyi Power Solutions in Coalitional Control Systems

In coalitional control the connections among the different parts of a control network evolve dynamically to achieve a trade-off between communication burden and control performance, and the coalition choices are made by selecting the network topology with minimal payoff. This work analyzes how Harsanyi power solutions for games in coalitional control schemes, which generalize the Shapley value in this context, can be used to quantify the value of the communication links under different control topologies. To this end, a game among these links is considered, and the payoff that each link receives is determined by the Harsanyi power solutions, which take into account the communication costs and the predicted infinite-horizon costs for these topologies. The concept of link power measure as a centrality index to configure the communication costs is also introduced. As a result, a more computationally efficient design method with respect to previous works has been proposed.

A Three-Country Model of Coalition Formation with Trade Costs

We consider a three-country model of trade and oligopoly with endogenous tariffs and exogenous trade costs under both certainty and uncertainty, where customs unions are possible. We find that trade costs critically affect choice of output by firms and choice of tariffs and coalitions by governments With symmetric trade costs as trade costs vary we find different coalitions forming in equilibrium. The introduction of demand uncertainty affects coalition choices by changing the cutoff trade costs at which a country may be indifferent between two different coalitions. Further, coalitions that may form under certainty or low uncertainty may not form with high uncertainty. On the other hand under different configuration of trade costs coalitions that may not be feasible under certainty may be shown to be possible under uncertainty. As a special case we show that under certain conditions two geographically distant countries may choose to form a coalition excluding a nearby country if the market volatility and correlation between partner countries is high enough.

Seeing Networks Clearly: The Influence of Holistic-Analytical Thinking Styles on Network Perception

Accurate perception of network relationships is an important determinant of critical organizational processes and outcomes such as leadership and decision-making. In the present study, we advance research on network perception by investigating the role of holistic-analytical thinking styles in influencing network perception and decision-making on coalition selection. We focused on two dimensions of holistic-analytical thinking style, namely, attention to field (as opposed to parts) and interactionist (as opposed to dispositionist) causal theory. Results from 281 participants revealed that holistic thinking, compared with analytical thinking, had both advantages and disadvantages for network perception. While individuals with greater attention to field reported more accurate network perception, individuals inclined toward interactionismin causal theory were less accurate. Further, when linked to organizational decision-making, attention to field enhanced the effectiveness of coalition selection, in part through the mediation of accuracy in network perception; while interactionism, via the full mediation of network perception, indirectly led to less effective coalition choice. We discuss theoretical and practical implications, and suggest further research on the implication of holistic-analytical thinking styles for network perception and organizational processes and outcomes.

Regulating competing coalitions: a logic for socially optimal group choices

In Multi Agent Systems it is often the case that individual preferences are not compatible and coalitions compete to achieve a given result. The paper presents a language to talk about the conflict between coalitional choices and it expresses deontic notions to evaluate them. We will be specifically concerned with cases where the collective perspective is at odds with the individual perspective.

The impact of supporters’ ideological preferences on parties’ coalition choices: Evidence from New Zealand and Japan

Works on coalition formation and survival have traditionally focused on tactical and policy considerations at the elite level, and frequently neglected the role of voters. This study draws attention to how policy preferences among supporters may constrain parties’ coalition choices and affect their subsequent electoral performance. New Zealand and Japan, which have seen both significant party system changes and the emergence of previously unfamiliar coalition cabinets as the new norm since the 1990s, provide suitable cases for hypothesis testing. Analysis of cross-temporal survey data demonstrates that the distance between the ideological mean of each coalition partner (measured by its supporters’ left—right positions) and the coalition mean is negatively correlated with its vote share change in the following election. Parties participating in or supporting an ideologically distant cabinet, especially when alternative coalition choices are possible, face particularly heavy electoral sanctions. These findings highlight a micro-political explanation complementing existing coalition theories, and confirm the ideal of democratic representation that governments are held accountable by their voters.

Voting for government coalitions in Ireland under single transferable vote

This paper addresses the issue of whether voters indicate a preference for a government rather than, or in addition to a preference for a party, when they cast a ballot under the system of the single transferable vote (STV). It thus contributes to the existing literature on strategic coalition voting by examining whether coalition preferences matter where electors are given the option to rank the parties in order of preference. The question then becomes: does this ranking reflect or signal a coalition preference? Using survey data from two Irish elections, this paper finds that whereas first preferences are closely aligned with coalition choices, Irish voters do not systematically use second preferences to express a view on their preferred coalition formation.

Introduction: Government Coalitions in Multi-level Settings—Institutional Determinants and Party Strategy

Government formation is an essential aspect of party politics. In those countries with a multi-level system of governance, coalition formation itself is a multi-level game. This special issue brings together contributions that explore regional coalition formation in Belgium, Spain, Germany and Italy. Party coalition choices appear to be constrained by systemic determinants, such as whether the federal setting tends to be joint or competitive, bipolar or multipolar, majoritarian or consociational and uni- or plurinational. Furthermore, the distribution of veto powers in the multi-level decision-making structure is a crucial determinant of how integrated party coalition strategies are across levels. Other key factors that explain these choices pertain to how integrated national and subnational party systems are and to individual party attributes, such as ideology, goals and internal organization. Last, but not least, it appears that the role of personal relations both within parties at different governing levels and between parties at the same level is also highly important, as multi-level settings are characterized by great complexity.

Party Competition in the Spanish Regions

Party politics in multi-level systems has become a growing research field in political science (see Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006), but has rarely focused on comparing structures of multi-level party competition. Regional party competition is particularly important in political systems where state decentralisation has significantly shifted the electoral and coalitional incentives available to party actors, whether statewide or non-statewide. This paper will compare structures of party competition in the Spanish regions, using three principal dimensions of analysis: electoral support for statewide parties in regional elections; patterns of coalition formation at regional level; and patterns of alternation in regional government. The paper finds that multi-level party competition in Spain displays 'vertical' (central-regional) and 'horizontal' (inter-regional) incongruence (Thorlakson, 2006; 2007). This incongruence has never undermined party competition at central level, due partly to the weakness of systemic linkages between regional and central party systems. The main exception is Catalonia, where systemic linkages with Spanish politics are so strong that all parties (statewide and non-statewide) have sought to pursue a strategy of coalitional congruence. Divergent patterns of regional party competition have encouraged some regional branches of statewide parties to become more autonomous from the central leadership, both in their electoral strategies and coalitional choices, while others have remained closely integrated with the central leadership. This has significantly reinforced the degree of internal asymmetry in the multi-level organisation of statewide parties in Spain.

Network economics and optimal replacement of age-structured IT capital

The constructed hierarchical optimization model of vintage capital replacement takes into account network effects and the age-dependent technological structure of capital equipment. It involves the control of a network coalition choice, endogenous investments, capital structure, and capital lifetime. The qualitative analysis of the model shows how the lifetime and financial structure of the IT capital depends on technological change. These results are relevant for strategic management on a firm level. Provided numeric examples simulate the optimal lifetime of personal computers.

Regional Carbon Dioxide Permit Trading in the United States: Coalition Choices for Pennsylvania

An overview is given of the growing number of regional associations in which states have entered into voluntary arrangements to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In particular, in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a number of northeastern states have joined to create a regional GHG cap and trade program, beginning with the utility industry. Analysis is made of the five key issues relating to these current and potential climate action associations: the extent of the total and individual state mitigation cost-savings across all sectors from potential emission permit trading coalitions; the size of permit markets associated with the various coalitions; the relative advantages of joining various coalitions for swing states such as Pennsylvania; the implications of the exercise of market power in the permit market; and the total and individual state/country cost-savings from extending the coalition beyond US borders. It is shown that overall efficiency gains from trading with a system of flexible state caps, with greater overall cost savings increasing with increasing geographic scope.

Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

ment of an empirical tradition that allows scholars to evaluate the relative importance of competing theories. We resolve this problem by applying an empirical framework that is appropriate for modeling coalition choice to evaluate several leading explanations of government formation. Our approach allows us to make conclusions about the relative importance of traditional variables relating to size and ideology and to assess the impact of recent new-institutional-

Fragmentation versus stability in bimodal coalitions

Competing bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It accounts for local versus global alignment with respect to the joining of a coalition. The existence of two competing world coalitions is found to yield one unique stable distribution of actors. On the opposite a unique world leadership allows the emergence of unstable relationships. In parallel to regular actors which have a clear coalition choice, “neutral”, “frustrated” and “risky” actors are produced. The cold war organisation after world war II is shown to be rather stable. The emergence of a fragmentation process from eastern group disappearance is explained as well as continuing western group stability. Some hints are obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation relationships. European construction is analyzed with respect to European stability. Chinese stability is also discussed.

Customs unions and the core

Customs union formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage countries make coalitional choices according to core theory. In the second stage optimal tariffs are determined. This yields a theory that predicts which customs unions form. An example shows that a customs union can be an equilibrium even when both member countries do better at free trade.

Contending “signals” in coalition choice

During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e., rank position of points accumulated) and two also using monetary reward as an incentive, are analyzed. Both relative status and resources (weights) were apparent to subjects in the studies. Results for coalitions and for payoffs show that a theory based on resources as the signal and one based on status as the signal both separately achieve success in the same bodies of data. As expected, the status‐signal theory better predicted coalitions in the two status‐reward studies, and the resource‐signal theory better predicted in the monetary‐reward studies. However, in all four studies, a two‐signal model which accounts for the reinforcing effects of signals achieves greater success. This indicates the importance of analyzing actors’ adoption of signals into their decision process, particularly in multisignal environments.

Attraction, Expertise, and Coalition Choices

Summary Coalition choices with one of two powerful others by a “weak” Pachisi player were predicted from two scenarios (N # 72 male and female college students). In one, attitude similarity provided an attraction variable. The weak player was attitudinally similar to one of the others, or they were similar only to each other. In the other scenario, educational status provided an expertise variable. The weak player and one other were college freshmen; the remaining player was a graduate student or in high school. It was found that choices were for the more attractive or equally expert player, but reciprocal choices were not expected. A coalition which would simplify bargaining for winnings was preferred.