Political and cultural polarisation are leading explanations for climate change denial and inactions as seen in the Cultural Cognition Thesis (CCT). In this view, individuals hold positions on contested issues to conform to their ideological groups: people ascribe to certain beliefs, not to express what they know but to show their group identity. We present a conceptual test of the CCT using high-quality cross-national data from 21 European countries, Russia, and Israel (total N = 44,378). Climate change concern was correlated with identification with the political left (rs = 0.04–0.13), egalitarianism (rs = 0.04–0.13) and communitarianism (rs = 0.01–0.07), but in a broad definition cultural cognition was a weak predictor of climate change beliefs (R2 = 3.82%), policy preferences (R2 = 2.09%), and actions (R2 = 0.62%). Moreover, climate change polarisation was not greatest among the highly educated as predicted by the CCT. Education was positively associated with climate beliefs (rs = 0.07–0.17), irrespective of political affiliation. Non-linear regressions indicated little evidence that the CCT's predictions held better for more extreme ideological groups. These results suggest cultural cognition may not be central to thoughts about climate change in Europe.