The author traces the correlation between secularization and desacralization occurring not only within the religious landscape ("temple") but also in the field of culture ("museum"). The symptoms of secularization are noted through the works of Hieronymus Bosch, Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Michelangelo, da Messina, Botticelli and others, as well as through desacralization of sacred images, development of "silhouette" and "vanitas" still-life painting genres, appearance of winter landscape picture, coldness and "moon"-like features and shadows in the visual arts of 16th — 18th centuries. Secularization trends are also noted in the development of 20th century Protestant theology where God transforms from transcendent to immanent being and can be found exclusively in the mundanity, in the "mass of people" (Dietrich Bonhoeffer). The secularization and desacralization have led to formation of rather peculiar forms of contemporary Christianity such as "prosperity theology" and even paradoxic "civil religion" (Robert Bellah). The author concludes that the symptoms of secularization, particularly, the pronounced feelings of existential discomfort experienced by contemporary humans (the feeling of "missing something"), are caused by numinous capacity for religious perception, that serves as a priori attribute of human beings (Rudolf Otto). Thus, it is too early to declare that religion has no place in the public space of contemporary society (Jurgen Habermas).

This article analyzes the genesis of the Farewell to Winter festival based on Soviet-era methodological literature. It examines the evolution of the holiday from the 1920s, from the all-out campaign against Christian Maslenitsa as a hostile phenomenon, to the 1960s attempt to replace it with a socialist holiday incorporating elements of traditional rituals. The methodological basis of the work is a comparative historical analysis used to compare traditional Russian Maslenitsa (based on ethnographic sources from the 19th and 20th centuries) and the Soviet Farewell to Winter holiday (based on methodological and journalistic materials from the 1950s and 1960s). It also utilizes a conceptual analysis based on the theory of civil religion, allowing for the interpretation of the Soviet Farewell to Winter holiday not simply as a cultural or ideological phenomenon, but as a form of quasi-religious practice in which the political system is imbued with sacred meaning. A comparison of traditional Maslenitsa as depicted in ethnographic descriptions and the Soviet Farewell to Winter celebrations reveals fundamental differences behind the similar external images. These include the abundance of communist slogans, the active participation of party functionaries, and the strict regulation of the celebration. But most revealing is the analysis of the demonstrative erasure and oblivion of previous meanings, such as Maslenitsa’s focus on honoring newlyweds, visiting relatives, and so on. This highlights important features of the Soviet civil religion, for which there is no personal past, no “person-to-person” relationships, only “person-to-society,” not to mention the Christian desire for reconciliation on Forgiveness Sunday. The article concludes by arguing that the new Farewell to Winter festival became a tool for the imposition of Soviet civil religion, with its focus on the future, the idea of social control, and the unchanging and sole purpose of Soviet existence, labor. The experience of constructing a Soviet civil religion, given its failure, is all the more valuable, given that similar attempts are being made in contemporary Russia to construct a new civil pseudoreligion with elements of national holidays and pan-Russian values, underscoring the relevance of this research.

This article analyzes the genesis of the Farewell to Winter festival based on Soviet-era methodological literature. It examines the evolution of the holiday from the 1920s, from the all-out campaign against Christian Maslenitsa as a hostile phenomenon, to the 1960s attempt to replace it with a socialist holiday incorporating elements of traditional rituals. The methodological basis of the work is a comparative historical analysis used to compare traditional Russian Maslenitsa (based on ethnographic sources from the 19th and 20th centuries) and the Soviet Farewell to Winter holiday (based on methodological and journalistic materials from the 1950s and 1960s). It also utilizes a conceptual analysis based on the theory of civil religion, allowing for the interpretation of the Soviet Farewell to Winter holiday not simply as a cultural or ideological phenomenon, but as a form of quasi-religious practice in which the political system is imbued with sacred meaning. A comparison of traditional Maslenitsa as depicted in ethnographic descriptions and the Soviet Farewell to Winter celebrations reveals fundamental differences behind the similar external images. These include the abundance of communist slogans, the active participation of party functionaries, and the strict regulation of the celebration. But most revealing is the analysis of the demonstrative erasure and oblivion of previous meanings, such as Maslenitsa’s focus on honoring newlyweds, visiting relatives, and so on. This highlights important features of the Soviet civil religion, for which there is no personal past, no “person-to-person” relationships, only “person-to-society,” not to mention the Christian desire for reconciliation on Forgiveness Sunday. The article concludes by arguing that the new Farewell to Winter festival became a tool for the imposition of Soviet civil religion, with its focus on the future, the idea of social control, and the unchanging and sole purpose of Soviet existence, labor. The experience of constructing a Soviet civil religion, given its failure, is all the more valuable, given that similar attempts are being made in contemporary Russia to construct a new civil pseudoreligion with elements of national holidays and pan-Russian values, underscoring the relevance of this research.

ABSTRACT After the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, all the martyrs’ cemeteries were destroyed by the Sri Lankan army. Yet Tamil activists have continued to commemorate the fallen fighters each year during Maaveerar Naal (‘Great Heroes’ Day’). This ceremony both sustains Tamil activism and contributes to the transmission of a national memory of a people oppressed yet still resisting Sinhala nationalism – a commemorative practice first instituted by the LTTE. This article examines how the LTTE, and later Tamil activists and diaspora associations that have continued its legacy, mobilised religious and cultural symbols to produce a form of civil religion in which the martyrs are venerated as deities and the cemeteries function as sacred sites. Drawing on participant observation in Jaffna, London, and Paris, it analyses the relationship between religion and heritage as manifested through this commemoration. By reworking elements of Tamil heritage, the LTTE presented itself as the defender of Tamil culture while rendering the veneration of the martyrs both legitimate and intelligible within that cultural framework.

This article aims to summarize and explore four of the main topics addressed by Daniel Barbu in his writings over the last three decades, and, therefore, to foreground his contribution to the restoration of an authentic critical approach to (current) social and political processes. Always careful to avoid monocausal narratives and categorical statements about society and politics, Daniel Barbu sagaciously situated his reasonings and explanations beyond mainstream stereotypical intellectual discourses. Also, without explicitly referring to them, he bypassed Western-centrism and Oriental-centrism, which unfortunately often entrap influential scholars in the social and political sciences literature. The four topics discussed here to highlight Barbu’s endeavor to reaffirm the principle of axiological neutrality are: the articulation of Romanian society (and culture) at the convergence of traditional organicity and rationalizing modernization; the pitfalls of ideological constructs (such as apotheosis and demonization) in the study of the communist past; the absent res publica and the Romanian intellectual elites’ new propensity for wooden languages and civil religions; the today (post)modern European democracies, as forms of apolitical regimes, and the (plausible) future configuration of non-democratic regimes.

Between 1966 and 2024, Dutch schools have experienced significant changes. Due to processes of secularization, individualization and pluralization, many confessional schools now find that most students no longer base their life perspectives and personal identities on Christianity. The rise in mental health issues among young people might be partly linked to these processes. Confessional schools have been developing new fundamental principles to shape their educational identity. By grounding their school identity in Christian-human values, the authors suggest that these schools can be viewed as part of ‘civil religion’. Religious education has also undergone major transformations: most schools no longer adopt the ‘learning into religion’ approach and instead focus on ‘learning from religion’. It is interesting to observe emerging trends among Generation Z. This generation appears somewhat more religious than previous generations. Providing religious education for the diverse students in the classroom seems more relevant than ever for society’s future.

This essay responds to Peter van Rooden’s critical review of the report God in the Netherlands 1966-2024 in this journal. Besides minor criticisms of the scope and methodology of the study (the research was limited to Christianity, as in all previous editions, and the authors’ commentaries were primarily intended to be informative, leaving interpretation and further research to specialists), Van Rooden criticizes the report’s characterization of Dutch ‘civil religion’ as a serious error. The use of this concept — which he associates with right-wing extremism — without examining Muslims ‘stinks of a brown sewer’. Because he emphasizes he is giving a political judgement of a scholarly work for the first time in his academic career, this response brings back to mind Van Rooden’s own interpretation of the so-called ‘purple unity’ of the Dutch religious regime, magnifying non-Christian liberalism while neglecting Islam and orthodox Protestantism (Van Rooden 1996). The critic falls on his own sword.

The recent edition of God in the Netherlands presents an intriguing image of contemporary Dutch Catholics. Church membership, practice and salience are in decline, while the appreciation for the cultural role of religion and national pride are on the rise. In particular for Catholics and unaffiliated believers, Christianity tends to function as a civil religion. This aligns with a global trend, such as the rise of white Christian nationalism in the United States. Generation Z, with slightly higher church membership rates than Generation Y, takes part in the rising positive appreciation of the social and political role of religion. Catholics are underrepresented in Dutch Generation Z but in countries such as France, the popularity of Catholicism among this generation is growing. There is anecdotal evidence for an increase of baptisms in the Netherlands as well, next to a growing popularity of Catholicism in online culture. This calls for further research.

This article critically reviews the concept of religion underlying the research God in the Netherlands. This research is conducted every ten years in the Netherlands. The research was first conducted in 1966, when the Netherlands were still predominantly Christian. Since then, the Netherlands became more secular: (Christian) religious beliefs and institutions declined. The question that is central in the 2024 edition is: what holds Dutch society together, given the decline of Christian religiosity? It argues that civil religion connects Dutch people today. Indeed, Christianity, more precisely, Protestantism, functioned as a public religion already in the Dutch Republic. However, I argue that we need to understand civil religion in connection with white Christian nationalism.

Civil religion has significantly shaped Tanzania’s political landscape since the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Serving as a unifying ideological framework, it has provided the moral and ethical foundations essential for national cohesion and governance. This paper explores the development of civil religion in Tanzanian political discourse, tracing its evolution from independence to the present. Through analysis of key speeches, policies, and public rhetoric, it demonstrates how civil religion has helped construct national identity, foster political unity, and promote moral governance.Nyerere played a central role in establishing a uniquely Tanzanian form of civil religion, grounded in his personal values and the broader ideology of Ujamaa. His governance style emphasized social justice, communal responsibility, and national unity, drawing on both indigenous traditions and religious moral codes. This blending of political ideals and ethical principles created a strong sense of collective purpose among Tanzanians. In the post-Nyerere era, successive governments have adapted the discourse of civil religion to suit evolving political and global realities. As Tanzania transitioned from socialism to a liberalized economy, political leaders adjusted the civil religion narrative to confront challenges such as economic reform, globalization, and increasing religious diversity. Each administration emphasized different aspects whether economic pragmatism, moral governance, or national identity within the overarching framework of civil religion. The study concludes that civil religion continues to play a vital role in Tanzanian politics by shaping leadership expectations, legitimizing governance, and reinforcing national unity. It remains a powerful influence on political discourse and the broader socio-political environment.

This study critically examines the civil–religious influence of Korean conservative Protestantism, which mobilizes heteronormative strategies to oppose anti-discrimination and family rights legislation, through the lens of Christian normativity. These movements justify heteronormative values by appealing to the immutability of the “creation order” in Genesis. Yet such literalist interpretations disregard contemporary findings in evolutionary biology and animal behavior that document same-sex phenomena across species, thereby framing creation and evolution in rigid opposition. Imported from American fundamentalism, “creation science” has further fueled an anti-intellectual public sentiment that naturalizes heterosexuality as divine law. The absolutism of the creation order and special revelation exposes deep theological contradictions when confronted with the existence of diverse sexual and gender identities. In response, this study turns to process theology, which reimagines creation as open-ended, dynamic, and co-creative. Engaging Catherine Keller’s apophatic theology to reopen theological space for sexual minorities, it further develops Justin Sabia-Tanis’s interpretation of transgender transformation as a process of co-evolution, in dialogue with Donna Haraway’s notion of cyborg hybridity. Moreover, drawing on John B. Cobb Jr.’s “persuasive political theology,” it argues that participation in divine co-creation must be expanded into the socio-political sphere. Ultimately, this study seeks to resist anti-intellectualism and advocate for a transformative Christian civil religion in Korea—one oriented toward justice, inclusion, and continual co-creation.

This article critically examines the practice of "Budi Pekerti" (character education) in schools in Batam, Indonesia, by analyzing it as a form of civil religion and symbolic ritual. Drawing on personal experiential reflection and theoretical frameworks from Clifford Geertz, Émile Durkheim, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jean Baudrillard, the study reveals a fundamental paradox: instead of fostering genuine morality, the ritualized and compulsory nature of these activities often produces false obedience and performative conformity. The analysis identifies key failures, including the erosion of intrinsic meaning (ritual failure), the prioritization of administrative compliance over ethical internalization, and the reinforcement of social hierarchies and biases. Furthermore, for Generation Z, these practices are often perceived as empty liturgies, leading to disenchantment. The study concludes that the institutionalization of moral values through coercive, standardized rituals results in a "pseudo-morality," where symbols replace substance and performance trumps authentic ethical commitment. It argues for a reimagining of moral education that prioritizes critical reflection, personal autonomy, and authentic lived experience over rigid ceremonial formalism.

This paper focuses on the role Deviant Voluntary Associations (DVAs) play in the radicalizing of domestic terrorists associated with the alt-right in the United States and the outsized role social media plays in forming social capital bonds with those who become lone wolves. Drawing on Rousseau and Nietzsche, we explore the theoretical roots of the American political system particularly and liberalism more generally to better understand how violent acts such as these are deeply enmeshed in American culture. The contemporary case of paramilitary groups in the United States is explored, arguing the use of violence by these groups to achieve their ends has enabled the actions of the misnamed “lone wolf.” We end with recommendations for additional research on DVAs and civil society to further explore the connection between liberalism and nationalism, delve into the interaction of populism and civil society, document the fracture of civil religion through increased partisanship, and investigate the concomitant closing of civic spaces in the United States.

From the late 1950s to his untimely death in July 2013, Robert N. Bellah was one of the Western world’s most renowned sociologists of religion. His first book, Tokugawa Religion (1957), displayed what was to remain Bellah’s trademark interest in the role of religious ethics in the shaping of modern capitalism, politics, and civil religion across cultures and history. In addition to being rigorously comparative, Bellah’s sociology of religion was distinctive in that it situated the human reality of religion in a cultural-evolutionary framework. While rejecting the stage-like sequence of unilinear development prominent in late nineteenth-century varieties of social evolution, this model emphasized that there were broadly convergent patterns to social and religious change over space and time, as seen most dramatically in the rise of ‘axial age’ religions in ancient times and the transformation of religion under the influence of nation-making and industrialization in the modern era. Introduced and edited by four of Bellah’s lifelong colleagues in the sociology of religion (Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton), Challenging Modernity brings together three of Bellah’s most important final essays; the essays highlight the fate of religious values in light of the political, economic, and ecological crises humanity faces today. Each of Bellah’s three chapters is in turn the subject of critical assessment by seven scholars from the disciplines of history, sociology, anthropology, and ethical philosophy. The editors and the seven commentators assess and extend Bellah’s insights, underscoring the relevance of a historical and comparative sociology for addressing the political, ecological, and moral crises of our age. Far-ranging in its topics and theoretical insights, Challenging Modernity is one of the most important books on religion and modernity published in the years since Bellah’s passing.

ABSTRACT Although corporations acknowledge the continued systemic racism faced by people of color, the central question is whether corporations should have any responsibility to promote racial justice. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. affirmatively answered this question in his seminal work, Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?. This essay argues that Dr. King’s critique of the economic structures that perpetuate Black oppression is the foundation for a political theology of the corporation as a tool of racialized capitalism. The essay discusses the continued relevance of Dr. King’s political theology by arguing that the Supreme Court’s practice of a national civil religion built on racism has empowered the corporation as a juridical person. In order for the corporation to move towards justice, we can look to Dr. King’s focus on employees, suppliers, and the community as the precursor to stakeholder primacy theory.

This study aims to evaluate the theoretical claims of American Civil Religion (ACR) in the context of the sociological experiences of American Muslims. The lack of sufficient research on ACR’s potential to include minority groups underscores the significance of this study. The research examines how ACR’s core values—unity, inclusivity, equality, and diversity—are reflected in the experiences of American Muslims. It is based on semi-structured interviews with 16 American Muslims in Phoenix, Arizona. The findings reveal that while ACR theoretically presents itself as a unifying and inclusive narrative, it was often perceived to operate in ways that exclude certain religious and ethnic groups. Participants highlighted that ACR’s rhetoric is Christian-centric, weakening the sense of social belonging among American Muslims. Furthermore, ACR is perceived not only as exclusionary but also as a factor complicating social cohesion for minority groups. In conclusion, this study emphasizes the need to reassess ACR’s theoretical claims in light of American Muslims’ lived experiences. It contributes to ACR literature and broader sociological discussions on the relationship between minority groups and religious frameworks.

Pancasila as a civil religion has been the ideological foundation for the Indonesian state since its independence in 1945. This concept reflects the unique spirit of unity in diversity, depicting a vision of an inclusive country that accepts and respects the diversity of religions, cultures and ethnicities in Indonesia. However, in the context of the challenges of multiculturalism and religious plurality, the role of Pancasila as a solution to various social and religious problems in Indonesia becomes increasingly important to understand. This research aims to explore the role of Pancasila as a civil religion in providing solutions to religious and societal challenges in Indonesia. This research also aims to understand the impact and implications of the Pancasila concept in promoting tolerance, interreligious dialogue, and building a socially just society. The research method used in this research is descriptive qualitative with a literature study approach. Data was collected through analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources, including official documents, books, journal articles and related research reports. The research results show that Pancasila as a civil religion has a significant role in facilitating tolerance, inter-religious dialogue and the development of a socially just society in Indonesia. The Pancasila concept creates an inclusive and comprehensive philosophical foundation for harmonious and civilized religious and social life. Although there are still challenges that need to be overcome, with joint efforts and strong commitment, Indonesia can continue to strengthen its unique national identity and build an inclusive, just and civilized society

Since the 1960s, the concept of civil religion has informed a great number of scholarly works exploring the relationship between religion and nationalism in the west — and beyond. It is therefore not surprising that the concept also informed seminal works on Buddhism and politics in Thailand. In recent years, however, the concept appears to have fallen out of fashion within Thai Studies and perhaps Southeast Asian Studies more broadly. This article surveys and critically discusses the widely diverging and confusing ways in which the concept of civil religion has been used in the study of Thai history and politics. It then seeks to demonstrate the continued relevance and analytical utility of civil religion, understood as a particular kind of nationalism, according to which the state should accommodate or actively encourage and support religious pluralism by developing ideological and institutional links with multiple religious communities. In Thailand, the dominant form of civil-religious nationalism is ‘cosmopolitan royalism’, which positions the king as the leading patron and protector of religions (plural). The final section of the article illustrates how this conception of civil religion might inform both the study of Thai intellectual history and the study of contemporary political contestation.

As white Christian nationalism takes center stage in American politics and the second Trump administration, preachers and church leaders find themselves disoriented and concerned about what this means for the church and the nation. Through sociological, historical, theological, and homiletical perspectives on white Christian nationalism and its antecedents in U.S. history and culture, this article offers a starting point for interpreting the present moment of uncertainty and volatility. The article considers related themes such as American exceptionalism, the American rhetorical “jeremiad,” and civil religion that reflect cultural and social myths that can hamper prophetic and authentic preaching and even Christian discipleship, and suggests what preachers might “keep” and “throw-away” in their preaching and leadership.

This article recovers the original meaning of the concept of political theology or civil theology. Since the publication of Schmitt's Political Theology (1922), scholars have disagreed on this concept's meaning, legitimacy, and usefulness but generally assume that political theology presupposes divine revelation. This article challenges this assumption by returning to Augustine's critique of Varro's civil theology. For Varro, civil theology is a rational reinterpretation of the Roman civil religion. However, the Roman elite did not claim their religion was divinely revealed but rather it was a matter of public utility and human convention. Furthermore, Augustine argues that Varro's civil theology is not opposed to natural theology but is intimately intermingled with it. This original meaning sheds light on why modern philosophers (Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Spinoza) supported the idea of civil religion and why contemporary political thinkers (Kelsen, Schmitt, and Negri) engaged in political theological arguments to support their distinct political ideologies.