The dynamics of social relations in the religious sphere today is of epoch-making importance, which in turn leads to the involvement of the state in church affairs. Due to conflicts and gaps, obsolescence and imperfection of national legislation, there are attempts to replace the norms of canon law with the norms of positive law, as well as attempts to resolve canonical disputes through the mediation of the latter. That is why the Supreme Court plays a crucial role in preventing such situations. It is the Supreme Court that currently bears the burden of responsibility for extending the judicial jurisdiction of national courts to disputes with a religious component.
 It is also important to formulate the conceptual principles that the Supreme Court implements when determining the jurisdiction of a dispute; this approach should not be based on the example of only one case, but should have universal features and be a guide for national courts.
 In this context, it should be noted that such an approach, in particular, may be the differentiation of relations with a religious component on the basis of the primary (basic) and secondary (derivative) relations, as emphasized in the dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court judges. Accordingly, it can be postulated that if relations arise from the religious sphere and then formally acquire other legal features, then in the event of a dispute, the latter is subject to consideration by a church court, not a state court. If relations arise on the basis of positive law (purchase of a land plot for the construction of a temple, lease of a building used as a place of worship, etc.), then such relations cannot be transformed into religious relations only because of this component.
 The above naturally raises the question, if we take as a basis the thesis that relations with a religious component should be resolved in national courts only on the grounds that they guarantee a person the right to a fair trial (access to court), what results do we expect? The question of whether a court can move a former nun into a monastery cell is not rhetorical, since the court of first instance did so, but isn’t such a court decision an interference by the state through the court in church affairs? Whether such decisions will not undermine the delicate balance of separation of church and state is a question that we have yet to answer.
 Obviously, one of the tasks of the Supreme Court in resolving disputes with a religious component is the progressive secularization of judicial practice.
 We must also recognize as a general observation that the normative approach to resolving disputes with a religious component is not very helpful and effective, and may even lead to false conclusions. In this sense, the comprehensive, combinatorial and interdisciplinary approaches, etc., are helpful.
Read full abstract