Abstract The ‘Party and Youth League’ model in the Chinese communist movement was copied from Soviet Russia, but its practice by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Youth League has been little studied, especially at the local level. This article draws on a variety of sources to analyse the model's operation in Shanghai. My findings reveal a lasting rivalry between the Communist Party and the Youth League in Shanghai, which both experienced a rise and fall from 1925 to 1927. Despite efforts from leaders on both sides, this conflict went unresolved. The Youth League's transformation from a ‘younger brother’ to a ‘powerful competitor’ within the revolutionary communist community vividly reflects the fact that the Chinese communists were far removed from the iron rule of Bolshevism at that time, and highlights the complexities and difficulties of localizing the international communist movement.

At the end of July 1921, thirteen Chinese supporters of Bolshevism, gathered at their first congress, proclaimed the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. They represented seven Chinese communist cells operating in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Jinan, and Tokyo, as well as Chen Duxiu (18791940), the most authoritative leader of the Chinese communist movement who was unable to come to the congress and sent his deputy instead. At that time, there were fifty-eight persons in the ranks of the newly established party. There were only two women among them, including Miao Boying (18991929), a twenty-two-year old student of the Beijing Womens Higher Pedagogical Institute, the first woman from China to join the communist movement which she had done back in November 1920. An active propagandist of Bolshevik ideas and a talented organizer of the women's and revolutionary labor movement, she lived a short but extremely eventful life, devoting all her strength to the cause of liberating China. The coming jubilee of the CCP is an appropriate date to pay tribute to her memory.

Reviewed by: Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao by Michael Dillon Yafeng Xia (bio) Michael Dillon. Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020. xi, 302 pp. Paperback $29.95, isbn 978-178-831-930-0. Among several books in English on the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (who served from 1949 to 1976), two stand out. The first, by Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, “explores the nature of” Zhou’s political behavior and assesses how such behavior affected twentieth-century Chinese history.1 The second, by former senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historian Gao Wenqian, which is based on classified party documents and personal interviews with high-level party officials, provides a revisionist account of Zhou Enlai. This volume is an abridged English translation of Gao’s Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s Later Years), which, having been adapted for Western readers, includes the stories of Zhou’s earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and elaborates the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors (chapters 2–7, pp. 21–104).2 Relying primarily on Chinese sources supplemented with writings by Western journalists who visited CCP bases during the War of Resistance against Japan and foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing in the 1950s and the 1960s, Michael Dillon presents a sympathetic account of Zhou’s life from his birth in 1898 to his death in 1976 in twenty-three chapters. This is a standard biography of Zhou, covering his childhood, education, upbringing, personality, political activism, and revolutionary activities, presenting a thorough picture of Zhou the diplomat and statesman. Dillon argues, “This private side of Zhou Enlai is one [End Page 263] of the reasons why he became the world’s favorite Chinese Communist, but Zhou’s character was complex” (p. viii). According to Dillon, Zhou “was a statesman rather than simply a political operator and achieved much on the international stage” (p. ix). But scholars on Zhou Enlai and the history of the CCP will not be pleased, as the book does not add much to what they have already known about Zhou. To correctly understand and evaluate Zhou’s historical role in the Chinese Communist movement and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is crucial that we correctly understand Zhou’s relationship with Mao Zedong, the CCP Chairman and China’s paramount leader from 1949 to 1976. The reviewer cannot agree with several of Dillon’s major assertions, such as, “Zhou had remained personally close to Mao, never criticized him in public, and was himself never criticized openly :: : . Eventually he was attacked, viciously but covertly, by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing” (p. 264). I feel that the author is unfamiliar with some of the new findings on Zhou Enlai that have been revealed in the last two decades. In the following paragraphs, I try to set the record straight. The relationship between Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is a key issue in our understanding of Chinese politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are three popular models of the relationship: Zhou was a faithful follower of Mao; Zhou was a puppet of Mao; and Zhou was a moderating force on Mao, which is the version the official Chinese Communist historiography promotes.3 Dillon falls into the third model, as he writes, “During the Great Leap and particularly the Cultural Revolution, Zhou was in an impossible position. To survive, he said and did things he would have preferred not to. By surviving, he ensured a degree of damage limitation and protected many friends and colleagues” (p. 270). For years, Zhou was “the Beloved People’s Premier,” a sensitive and effective administrator and a moderating force in the PRC’s politics. He was good-looking, urbane, brilliant, and a master diplomat. He always valued the nation’s needs above his own. He managed to save hundreds of purged officials during the Cultural Revolution. But Gao Wenqian turns the tables on Zhou. According to Gao, Zhou was a tragic backroom schemer, a puppet of his master Mao, and a man who so rigorously observed a...

How did 'intellectuals' evolve from a class of subjects in Marxian thoughts to highly visible populations under communism? Such 'reifications of the intellectual' have deeply affected subjectivity, conflict and organization, but received little attention in the political sociology of communism. This essay draws on research on classifications and social boundaries to address the objective and subjective foundations of the reifications and their impact on communist rule. The intellectual is viewed as an identification formed and performed around multiple social axes (most notably family background, educational achievement, occupational history, institutional affiliation and revolutionary rank) that reflected broader patterns of communist political domination. I use the Chinese Communist movement to demonstrate that (1) interaction of political contests, ruling strategies and institutional developments turned a diversity of persons into 'intellectuals' who were allegedly imbued with reprehensible interests and habits linked to privileged economic classes; (2) constant competitions for power and organizational changes led to classificatory ambiguities and, in turn, allowed individuals some control over their identifications; and (3) the developments profoundly influenced identity, state and class formation. Focusing on the dynamics that produced a highly visible but fluid population of 'intellectuals' opens new pathways for comparative research on communism.

Until 1921, the texts on Marxism aimed at reaching the Chinese Communist movement were dominated by an economic determinist interpretation of the materialist conception of history. Many Chinese converts to Marxism considered that belief in “orthodox” Marxism necessitated belief in its economic determinism. In 1921, with the publication in China of the famous Dutch Marxist Herman Gorter's An Explanation of the Materialist Conception of History, it became evident that there were alternatives to economic determinism which could also claim to be “orthodox” Marxism. Gorter's flexible and multifaceted perspective on Marxism allowed that many factors can influence “historical evolution,” and that they can interact in ways specific to particular historical contexts. Gorter emphasized the political and ideological struggles of the working class as central to the success of revolution. He nevertheless insisted, following Engels, that the economic factor was ultimately dominant. Gorter's ideas were well received by Chinese Marxists, particularly his Chinese translator Li Da who amplified the influence of Gorter's Marxism in his own prolific essays on the materialist conception of history. It is possible that Mao Zedong was influenced by Gorter's ideas, either directly or indirectly via the writings of Li Da, and the evidence for this is evaluated.

NEWLY RELEASED SOVIET DOCUMENTS reveal that during the 1920s the Soviet Foreign Ministry East Asian specialists assigned growing significance to the British crown colony of Hong Kong. One may credibly argue that, at least in Britain's case, Cold War conflicts with the Soviet Union for influence over existing colonies, for example, Hong Kong, and in such developing countries as China, began in 1920. This article examines the interactions and issues generated by the collision of British Hong Kong, the Soviet Union and China during the 1920s. It investigates the extent of Soviet involvement in Hong Kong and South China, the reasons why the communist movement collapsed so drastically in both places by the late 1920s, divisions between Comintern and Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID) officials over Soviet policy toward the area, and Hong Kong's significance in Soviet policies toward both China and colonial

(2002). The role of philosopher to the Chinese communist movement: Ai Siqi, Mao Zedong and Marxist philosophy in China. Asian Studies Review: Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 419-445.

The Role of Philosopher to The Chinese Communist Movement: Ai Siqi, Mao Zedong and Marxist Philosophy in China

The early relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) is regarded as an important issue in contemporary Chinese history, but the explanation of this phenomenon has differed for a long time. There is a major dispute in controversy in interpretations of this event. Some hold that the KMT ”accommodated Communists,” and the CCP insists that the Communists ”allied with the KMT,” The CCP realized that allying with the KMT was the correct choice at the time, and it was also in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist revolution strategy. Why dose the CCP say so? And what is the truth? This essay, from the perspective of the history of the Chinese Communist movement, attempts to understand what the CCP means by the ”historical conditions of the time?” Why was cooperation with the KMT the right historical choice? Is it possible or not to say, from the point of view of the CCP, that joining the KMT was ”the only choice?” In the 1920's, both parties were facing the difficulties of social mobilization, and there also existed the complementary interaction for revolutionary identification. In fact, the CCP leaders of that time clearly recognized that the only method which Dr. Sun Yet-sen would accept was that Communists could join the KMT as individuals, instead of as a group under the name of the CCP. On the other hand, because the Comintern was supporting both the CCP and the KMT, if the CCP did not join the KMT, the Comintern might have had to choose between the two parties. Since the danger of losing the support of the Comintern was much greater than that of joining the KMT, we may say that for the CCP, joining the KMT was in fact the one and only choice they had at the time.

Book Review: From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936 From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936, by chingChan Lau Kit. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. $59.95. Pp. 342.

Remarks at Harvard University Memorial Service for Benjamin I. Schwartz Yu-sheng Lin Among the eminent intellectual historians in the world after World War II, Ben Schwartz was one of the most subtle and profound. He was deeply rooted in—but not confined by—the humanist tradition of Montaigne and Pascal, and this provided him with insights into the wretchedness as well as the grandeur of the human condition and with a conscious Socratic moral and intellectual drive toward self-examination as a prerequisite for any inquiry into human affairs. Indeed, the distinctivecharacter of Ben's scholarship lay in his integration of morality and intellect. These humanistic resources in combination with his outstanding intellectual endowment enabled Ben to reach great heights of scholarly endeavor. To mention just a few of his many enduring achievements: Ben's thesis, advanced as early as 1951 and based on a study of the inner history of the rise of the Chinese Communist movement from a comparative perspective, developed the idea that the trajectory of Marxism eastward to Russia and China was, in fact, "a steady process of decomposition." This powerful argument has stood the test of time, whereas both the notion, on the Right, of a monolithic world communism and the idea, on the Left, of the Chinese Communist movement as the embodiment of the intellectual and moral legitimacy of Marxism fell by the wayside. His In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West, which offers a double mirror, with modern China illuminated by the modern West and vice versa, is a trailblazing work in intercultural intellectual history. Furthermore, The World of Thought in Ancient China, Ben's prizewinning magnum opus, which treats the whole range of ancient Chinese thought from a world-historical perspective, has achieved a methodological, no less than a historiographical, breakthrough. Ben's discussion of the need to "descend from the level of total cultural orientations to the level of shared problématiques" advances boldly beyond Max Weber's ideal-typical analysis in comparative world history. Historiographically, Ben's study of the general orientations in ancient China and their dialectical relations with the problématiques manifested in different schools of thought is the most incisive and comprehensive treatment of ancient Chinese thought to date. These great achievements derived from his ability to combine deep insights into historical realities with a humane simplicity in holding onto what is central in life. Such a simplicity was manifest in his spontaneous humility, a quality that furnished him with the moral and intellectual resources by which to develop empathetic understanding of the various strands of thought in China as well as in the West. Ben's analyses of human problems from a world-historical perspective, while characteristically erudite, subtle, complex, and at times extraordinarily brilliant, were singularly free from any trace of the influence of intellectual fashions and from any sort of [End Page 187] posturing or self-exhibition. He always struggled at the center of life and history, making the best effort to enter into the depth of human reality, drawing out its significanceas fully as he could. These great attainments were, I submit, a natural outgrowth of the strength of his moral and intellectual character, which led him to be truly open-minded and thus acutely perceptive. It was because he was so seriously interested in the study of humanity that he so seriously studied the Chinese. His universalist concerns fused with his humanist humility and thus empowered him to lift the field of Chinese studies out of its various forms of parochialism. The Confucian philosopher Xun Zi once said that the genuine scholar "explains with a humane compassion, listens with a studious attitude, and engages in disputation with an impartial mind." I know no one other than Ben Schwartz to have attained this ideal. His absolute joy in intellectual give-and-take and his delight, with his eyes gently sparkling, in reaching an understanding of a complex issue were infectious. It was indeed my good fortune and great privilege to be able to sit at the feet of Professor Schwartz. He embodied most eloquently the very essence of humanistic scholarship; his spirit is and shall always be a...

Previous articleNext article No AccessReviewsFrom Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936. Chan Lau Kit-ching Hon-ming YipHon-ming Yip Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 45Jan., 2001 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/3182435 Views: 5Total views on this site Copyright 2001 The China JournalPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

This article attempts to present the impression made by Chinese communism in Hong Kong during the germinal period of the Chinese Communist Movement from 1921, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded, to 1934, when the communist presence in Hong Kong and Guangdong had virtually disappeared and communist activities were not to be revived until shortly before the outbreak of China's war with Japan. The early perception of communism and its importance have to be understood in the context of the dual society of the colony, with the British as the ruler and the Chinese as the ruled in almost totally separate communities.

Reviewed by: From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936 Gordon Y. M. Chan (bio) Chan Lau Kit-Ching . From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. ix, 342 pp. Hardcover $59.95, ISBN 0-312-22428-1. As Professor Chan Lau Kit-Ching aptly observes, Hong Kong's first encounter with Chinese Communism predates July 1, 1997. It has been involved in the Chinese Communist movement ever since the movement's inception in 1921, and for many years before the Communist takeover in 1949 Hong Kong had served as headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Guangdong. The examination of this previously neglected history promises to shed light on our knowledge of the revolutionary movement not just in the locality of Hong Kong but also in Guangdong and the Chinese nation as a whole (pp. 1-2). Based in Hong Kong, Chan enjoyed a favorable position while exploring this topic. Besides ready access to local archives, both government and private, the proximity of Hong Kong to Guangzhou allowed her to conduct archival research conveniently in the Guangdong Provincial Archives, which hosts the most comprehensive collection of pre-1949 Party documents on Guangdong (including Hong Kong) accessible to both Chinese and foreign historians.1 Furthermore, the Feng Ping Shan Library at the University of Hong Kong has an impressive and expanding acquisition of historical materials on the CCP in Guangdong, published [End Page 412] both publicly and internally in the People's Republic of China (PRC). These resources were within "easy reach" (p. 12) for Chan, who teaches at the University. Given Chan's obvious advantages, the outcome of her research is, however, disappointing. Notwithstanding some shrewd observations, this present work is marred by a marked unfamiliarity with the historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution. A quick historiographical survey will refute Chan's belief that there is "a dearth of regional studies of the Chinese Communist Movement, especially in the English language" (p. 2). Over the last two decades, Western scholarship has produced intensive studies of the revolution in local contexts,2 although they are predominantly rural in focus. Chan's study could well be a valuable contribution to the underrepresentation of the Chinese Communist urban revolution in the recent literature. Unfortunately, her lack of awareness of many major issues at stake, coupled with her reluctance to discuss the possible implications of her own findings with other scholars in order to enhance our general understanding of the CCP's history, suggests otherwise. The structure of this book is simple. Its four main parts trace the history of the CCP in Hong Kong and Guangdong from 1921 to 1936. The story begins with the small Guangzhou Communism Group that was initiated, in 1921, by Chen Duxiu, together with three Guangdong students he had taught in Beijing who had been exposed to the "new thoughts" of the May Fourth Movement. About a year later, the Socialist Youth League, which was to be superseded by the Communist Youth League in 1925, was established in the province. This organization represented the earliest Communist presence in Hong Kong (the CCP was not founded in the colony until 1924). As a British colony, Hong Kong expectedly exhibited many political and socioeconomic features distinct from those of Guangdong. The awareness of their existence impelled many Hong Kong cadres to ask their superiors on the other side of the border for special treatment and greater autonomy in pursuing revolutionary activities. Several times Chan emphasizes that these appeals mark the initial conception of "one country two systems"—a principle that the PRC employed to resolve the colonial questions of Hong Kong and Macao. The inference drawn here is interesting. Readers should bear in mind, however, that the desire of the regional Party branches for more autonomy based on concerns about their peculiar local conditions was common in the early history of the CCP and was by no means unique to the Communists in Hong Kong.3 Before 1925, Communists had made little headway in Hong Kong; it took the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike/Boycott to bolster their position. Because of this...

Among American sympathizers, or one-time American sympathizers of the Chinese Communists, Harold R. Isaacs represents a complex case. He played a spectacular and important role for the underground Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai during the early 1930s. As the only English voice for the Chinese Communist movement, the journal China Forum that he edited contributed significantly to publicizing the Chinese Communist cause both in China and abroad. After two years of intense involvement, however, Isaacs abruptly broke with his Chinese Communist.sponsors and became a Trotskyist, before finally terminating any connections to the Communist movement a few years later. Isaacs' controversy with the CCP has remained a mysterious chapter in CCP history. It has been mentioned in some discussions of American sympathizers of Chinese Communism, Chinese and American Trotskyism, and the well-known Chinese political figure Song Qingling (Madame Sun Yat-sen). Owing to a lack of sources, however, past writings on the topic have been sketchy. For instance, it is known that Isaacs' friendship with a radical journalist named Frank Glass was crucial to his Trotskyist tum. Yet, how much weight Glass had in the affair has been a matter of speculation. 1Any discussion of the breakup between Isaacs and the CCP must also involve the thoughts and actions Isaacs himself. Differences with his Chinese Communist friends, according to Isaacs, originated with his untutored resistance to [the CCP' s] untruth and exaggeration. Yet Isaacs himself provided little published information on the subject. 2 The recent opening of Harold Isaacs' papers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology now gives us the opportunity to look into the affair more thoroughly. I do not attempt here to write the whole story of Isaacs' involvement in Chinese radical politics. My intention is to use Isaacs' personal papers to track down the course of his controversy with the CCP. Hopefully, my research can help clarify matters in this episode and provide new information for further studies.3

498 China Review International: Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall 1997 Brian G. Martin. The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. x, 310 pp. Hardcover $40.00, isbn 0-520-20114-0. Researching the Shanghai Green Gang must have been a difficult task since it was such an unsavory organization, engaging as it did in a host of sordid criminal activities ranging from drug dealing to murder. But doing research on organized crime is like doing research on a disease; it is necessary to understand its origins, development, and character, ifways of eradicating it are ever to be found. In view of the rampant corruption and increasing illegal activity that is accompanying the de facto transformation of the People's Republic of China from a socialist to a capitalist economy, Brian G. Martin's thorough investigation of this nefarious organization is a timely one. It is all too easy to envision the emergence of a contemporary Green Gang in Shanghai (or some other major city along the China coast, for that matter), exploiting the working population, profiting from the political tensions both within the municipality and between Shanghai and Beijing, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by rapid economic development . Martin's cautionary tale should be mandatory reading for the next generation of Chinese leaders. Using such diverse sources as the diplomatic correspondence of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Shanghai Municipal Police Special Branch files, and manuals issued by the Green Gang itself, Martin reconstructs the Byzantine history of this notorious criminal cartel, which resembles SPECTRE ("Special Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terror, Revenge, and Extortion"), the fictional criminal organization in James Bond novels and movies. The Green Gang has captured the imagination of generations of China scholars and students; the story of its involvement in Jiang Jieshi's "White Terror" (April 12, 1927), which nearly destroyed the nascent Chinese Communist movement, is a staple of modern Chinese history courses. Martin's detailed account dispels the myths surrounding this secret society, certainly contradicting the Gang's self-serving notion that its members were haoxia ("men of honor and courage") engaged in a crusade against injustice, fighting on behalf of the downtrodden. Chinese Robin Hoods they were not. If anything, they were agents of violence used by the French colonial administration , the Nanjing government, and others against the people of Shanghai. While© 1997 by University Chinese were ambivalent and anxious about the establishment of the Communist ofHawai'i Pressgovernment in 1949, they were at least in agreement that its elimination ofthe Green Gang and other criminal elements was a positive accomplishment. Reviews 499 Martin's central thesis is that the Green Gang was a relatively new "secret society " and an integral part ofmodern Shanghai rather than a feudalistic remnant, with the capability ofadapting to die social and political changes ofthe early part ofthe twentieth century. It was very much a product offin-de-siècle China and was still in the process ofmaturation on the eve of the war ofresistance against Japan. Unfortunately, Martin overreaches himselfin claiming that the Green Gang "played an intrinsic part in [the] modernization" ofShanghai. Except for investing their ill-gotten gains in certain enterprises, it is difficult to see how the Green Gang constituted a modernizing force. In other words, they were hardly investment capitalists. Like Parks M. Coble, Jr., before him, Martin wisely follows the money to trace the Green Gang's political development. It is not a pretty picture. Martin has conducted a painstaking examination ofhow the Green Gang acquired control ofvarious rackets, especially the traffic in opium, and ofits interaction with the different classes ofShanghai society. His work is, in part, a criminological case study of the Shanghai style of organized crime, which he compares, in the conclusion ofhis book, to the Italian Mafia, American organized crime, Indonesian gangsters, and the Japanese yakuza. What is more important, Martin uncovers the Green Gang's symbiotic relationship with various centers of authority such as the colonial governments of the foreign settiements, warlords, nationalists, and communists . Like the Americans in their use of the Binh Xuyen river pirates to combat the National Liberation Front infrastructure in...

A study of the roots of revolution in the Chinese province of Henan, this book describes in detail more than two decades (1925 to 1949) of the efforts of the Communist Party to build mass support for revolution. These were decades of social and political crisis, beginning with the May 30th Movement, exacerbated by the Japanese invasion in 1937, and culminating in the Communist victory of 1949. Looking for historical continuities and changes, the book traces the Communist movement's trajectory from the cities to the countryside and back to the urban centers, in the process testing the major social science paradigms of peasant-based revolution. The author studies the interaction in Henan between the Communist revolutionaries and various groups that constituted the social base of the revolution - workers, religious sectarians, rural elites, student intellectuals, the military, and, above all, the peasantry. He closely studies the behavior of these groups and explains the social and structural forces that facilitated or constrained the Communist movement. He also shows how Communist mobilization tactics changed to accommodate such varied settings as the war zone, the mountains, and the floodplain. The author concludes that the key to the Communists' victory lay in their ability to maneuver their way to political power, their skillful use of nationalist sentiment, and their community and reform programs that ultimately won over the peasant masses. Thus, he sees the Chinese Communist movement as a dual revolutionary process of power politics and social revolution.

How communist is Chinese communism? And how Chinese is Chinese communism? In this study of the ideological aspects of the Chinese communist movement and its development, Michael Luk provides a comprehensive analysis of these questions using original Chinese Communist Party materials, and reinterprets previously held views on the early history of Chinese communism.

BOOK REVIEWS199 alists were primarily elitist reformers. Their approach was to stress national capitalist development, education based on reason and science, and in general a moral or ethical transformation of the people at large led by a humanistic, cosmopolitan -minded body of intellectuals. They borrowed much from English liberalism , the Gandhian principle of self-reliance, and indigenous cultural symbols to weave their eclectic fabric of national strength as a prerequisite for regaining national independence—eventually. The radicals, inspired by Marxism and populist ideas and putting peasants and laborers at the center of their platform, denounced all cultural nationalists as deceitful and self-serving or vacuous slogan -mongers. The radicals saw no distinction between them and Korea's foreign exploiters. Independence must come first, the radicals argued, and a relentless class struggle must be waged by the have-nots of Korea both toward this end and for reconstructing the nation along fully egalitarian lines. Yet, as Robinson points out, this rhetoric was not without its own conundrum of elitism, for it too had to reckon with the Marxist concept of a vanguard of committed intellectuals leading the masses on the revolutionary path. Here Robinson makes good, though only passing, comparisons with Li TaChiao of the Chinese Communist movement (later Mao Zedong was to pick up where his mentor Li had left off). At any rate, clearly the early 1920s produced much new nationalist thinking and in Korea, as in China and Japan, it was marked by variety, conflict, and irresolution. Need one point out that the reverberations of that era are still being heard in both North and South Korea? By his rigorously focused inquiry into a critical phase of modern Korean nationalism, Robinson has made a solid contribution to the study of twentieth century Korean history. The author deserves hearty congratulations, and so does his jacket designer for producing what strikes me as an aesthetically stunning cover! Vipan Chandra Wheaton College The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 18961910 , by Wayne Patterson. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988. xii + 274 pp. Maps, appendix, bibliography, glossary, index. $30. Any sustained migration is the sum of hundreds of individual decisions made at many levels. The great migrations of Europeans to the Americas have kept historians busy for generations, and will continue to do so. Only in recent decades has the movement of Asians to North America and its political outliers been the subject of scholarly attention. The migration of Koreans to Hawaii, having involved about seven thousand persons and having lasted for only a few years—it might seem that it would be simple to write up the story. Anyone thinking this would be far wrong. Wayne Patterson wrote his dissertation in history in 1977 on Korean immigration to 200BOOK REVIEWS Hawaii, and spent a decade updating it and doing a vast amount of further research and travel. It is Patterson's genius that he is able to tell this complicated tale with accuracy and with a style that keeps the reader's interests. In many parts of this book the tracing of illicit actions, bribery, and corruption makes the history of Korean immigration to Hawaii read like a detective story. The central motivation of the Planters Labor and Supply Company, which became the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, was to import workers who would be cheaper than the Japanese labor in the canefields, and would act as strikebreakers whenever the canefield workers—predominantly from Japan— called a strike (for what we later would consider thoroughly acceptable reasons). The central figure in getting the emigration from Korea started was Horace N. Allen, U.S. minister to the Korean court, a complex man, often likeable even when he was conniving, paying off political debts, and lying to all and sundry. Patterson deals nicely with the larger picture in which Korean immigration to Hawaii operated. From the American viewpoint, there was the national schizophrenia of wanting cheap labor, but not wanting the cheapest possible laborers, Asians. From the Japanese viewpoint, there was the desire to become peers with the West, but not wanting to be considered as Oriental as the Chinese. Upon this backcloth of motivations of the institutional players we see the slowly...

While Mao Zedong might still be China's most famous communist, only scholars of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have heard of Wang Jiaxiang and even they have never studied his career in detail. But recent Chinese publications show that there were very few CCP leaders who had such a tremendous impact on the Chinese communist movement in general and Mao Zedong's career in particular. This article will show that Wang not only supported Mao during the power struggles of the 1930s and helped convince Stalin that Mao should be acknowledged as the CCP's leader, but that Wang also played a decisive role in establishing Mao Zedong-Thought as the Party's guiding ideology. The release of numerous Party documents in the last five years also throws some light upon the relations and conflicts between Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders such as Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Shaoqi in the decade between the Long March and the Seventh Party Congress of 1945.