Changes In Capital Requirements Research Articles

Bank capital requirements and risk-taking: Evidence from basel III

We study the effects of both tighter and looser bank capital requirements on bank risk-taking. We exploit credit register data matched with firm and bank level data in conjunction with changes in capital requirements stemming from Basel III, including the introduction of a SME supporting bank capital factor in the European Union. We find that tighter capital requirements reduce the supply of bank credit to firms, while looser capital requirements mitigate the credit supply effects of increasing capital. Importantly, at the loan level (credit supply), banks more affected by capital requirements change less the supply of credit to riskier than to safer firms, and these asymmetric effects occur for both the tightening and the loosening of bank capital requirements. Finally, these effects are also important at the firm-level for total credit availability and for firm survival. Interestingly, our results suggest that those banks most impacted by the tighter Basel III capital requirements prioritize credit among ex-ante riskier firms to avoid their closure, consistent with loan evergreening.

Capital adequacy, competition and liquidity creation of banks; evidence from Kenya

PurposeThe study seeks to evaluate the effect of capital adequacy and competition on the liquidity creation of Kenyan commercial banks.Design/methodology/approachUnbalanced panel data from 36 Kenyan commercial banks with licenses from 2001 to 2020 is used in the study. The generalized method of moments (GMM), a two-step system, is employed in the investigation. To increase the robustness and prevent erroneous findings, serial correlation tests and instrumental validity analyses are used. The methodology developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) is used to estimate the commercial banks' levels of liquidity creation.FindingsThe study supports the financial fragility-crowding out hypothesis by finding a significant negative effect of capital adequacy on the liquidity creation of commercial banks. The research also identifies a significant inverse relationship between competition and liquidity creation, depicting competition's value-destroying effect.Practical implicationsA trade-off exists between capital adequacy and liquidity creation, which must be carefully evaluated as changes in capital requirements are considered. The value-destroying effect of competition on liquidity creation presents a case for policy geared toward consolidating banks' operations through possible mergers and acquisitions.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to empirically offer evidence concurrently on the effect of competition and capital adequacy on the liquidity creation of commercial banks in a developing economy such as Kenya. Additionally, the authors employ a novel measure of competition at the firm level.

Leverage and the cost of capital for U.S. banks

We examine the relationship between leverage (the assets-to-equity ratio) and the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) for an unbalanced panel of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) over the period spanning 1996 through 2019. We assess the extent to which changes in capital requirements affect the WACCs of these institutions and find significant differences across three, mutually exclusive asset-size classes of BHCs. In particular, the WACCs of small and medium-sized BHCs are found to be more sensitive to changes in capital requirements than the WACCs of large BHCs. For a hypothetical doubling of Tier-1 capital, we find that the largest BHCs saw their WACCs increase by 42 basis points, while the WACCS of small and medium-sized BHCs are estimated to have increased by 62 and 76 basis points, respectively. We attribute differences between these results to differences in the strength and scope of government guarantees and in the composition of BHCs’ assets and liabilities as reported on their balance sheets.

The real effects of capital requirements and monetary policy: Evidence from the United Kingdom

We examine how changes in capital requirements and monetary policy shocks affect corporate investment during a credit boom. Our empirical analysis uses data on SMEs in the UK between 1998 and 2006, a period when monetary policy and microprudential regulation were set by independent institutions. We find that an increase in bank-specific capital requirements led to a contraction in corporate debt and investment, but only for firms with short bank relationships. This suggests that relationships between firms and banks are crucial for the transmission of regulatory shocks. Long relationships also attenuate the impact of monetary policy shocks, but to a smaller degree than for capital requirement changes. We also find that the two policies do not dampen or amplify the effect of each other, but their effects vary with the size of banks’ capital buffers and the creditworthiness of firms.

Bank capital requirements and lending in emerging markets: The role of bank characteristics and economic conditions

This paper offers novel evidence on the impact of raising bank capital requirements on lending in an emerging market and explores heterogeneous effects, depending on bank characteristics and economic conditions. Using quarterly bank-level data and exploiting the adoption of bank-specific capital buffers, we find that higher capital requirements are associated with lower credit growth in Peru. But the effect is short-lived and becomes insignificant in about half a year. The impact of capital requirements varies with economic conditions and bank characteristics. The effects is stronger during periods of lower economic growth. Weaker (less profitable, less capitalized and less liquid) banks react more to changes in capital requirements. Our findings are robust to estimating a variety of specification to address concerns about the endogeneity of capital requirements.

Bank response to policy-related changes in capital requirements

We estimate how banks respond to regulatory capital requirements. We use a novel measure called capital surplus/shortfall, which we construct from notifications on regulatory capital requirements sent to Slovenian banks over the period 2009–2015. Capital surplus/shortfall is more relevant than capital adequacy ratio (CAR). It conveys more information about future lending because it is a forward-looking measure of bank capitalization. Our paper carries policy implications for supervisors in countries with a distressed banking sector. Using this measure we show that the same firm has on average a 3.54 p.p. lower loan growth when the loan is obtained through a bank with 1 p.p. higher capital shortfall. Finally, we show that in response to an increase in capital requirements banks engage in risk-taking behaviour.

The Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital Requirements

This paper presents empirical evidence on the impact of changes in capital requirements on bank lending, and delivers estimates of their costs and benefits in terms of foregone real GDP growth. The empirical analysis is based on large international datasets at a firm and country level, including data of the 2007-2009 crisis and beyond. I find that an increase in regulatory capital ratios reduces real GDP growth, with this reduction offsetting its benefits in terms of a reduced probability of a banking crisis. This evidence suggests that the net benefits of an increase in capital requirements may be negligible.

On a tight leash: Does bank organizational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers?

This paper examines whether the organizational form of multinational banks' foreign affiliates affects cross-border spillovers of macroprudential regulation. We compare changes in the growth of lending provided by foreign banks' branches versus subsidiaries in the United Kingdom in response to changes in capital requirements, lending standards and reserve requirements in foreign banks' home countries. Our results suggest that a tightening of capital requirements at home reduces UK branches' interbank lending growth by 5.7pp more relative to subsidiaries. We link this effect to the higher degree of control which parent banks hold over operations of their foreign branches compared to subsidiaries. Supporting this hypothesis, a set of further tests illustrates that the response of foreign affiliates operating under a branch structure is stronger where parent banks are more likely to delegate more decision making authority to the board of directors of their subsidiaries.

How Mortgage Finance Reform Could Affect Housing

Although major changes in mortgage finance have occurred since the subprime bust, several issues remain unresolved, centering on the roles of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA. We analyze how some reforms might affect house prices in a framework rich enough to simulate the impact of several reforms which change mortgage interest rates and/or loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of first time home buyers, the key drivers of house prices in recent decades. Simulations suggest that ending the GSE interest rate subsidy would have small effects, while changes in capital requirements or maximum FHA loan size limits would have larger effects.

What Determines How Banks Respond to Changes in Capital Requirements?

Legacy asset overhang and incentive to shift risk due to government guarantees can both affect bank capital issuance and lending decisions. We show that such frictions lead to ambiguous predictions on how one should expect a bank to react to a change in capital requirements. One sustained prediction is that lending is less sensitive to a change in capital requirements when lending prospects are good and legacy assets are healthy. Using UK bank regulatory data from 1989 to 2007, we find strong empirical support for this prediction.

Revisiting the Impact of Bank Capital Requirements on Lending and Real Activity

Several studies undertaken in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crises found a relatively small impact of an increase in capital requirements on lending and real activity both in the shortand long-run. The calibrations of some recent equilibrium models deliver a significantly larger impact of changes in capital requirements on lending and real activity than these earlier studies. This paper revisits the issue reviewing the recent literature and providing novel evidence using international data panels at a firm and country level. This new evidence and the counterfactual experiments of some calibrated equilibrium models suggest that the negative short-run and long-run impact of an increase in capital requirements on bank lending and real activity is significantly larger than previously thought. *The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy.

Estimating the impact of changes in aggregate bank capital requirements on lending and growth during an upswing

Abstract This paper estimates the effect of changes in banks’ capital requirements on lending by studying the joint dynamics of the historic aggregate capital ratio of the UK banking system and a set of macro-financial variables. This is achieved by means of sign restrictions that attempt to identify shocks in past data that match a set of assumed directional responses of other variables to future changes in capital requirements aimed at increasing the resilience of the banking system to losses during an upswing. This may provide policy-makers with a plausible ‘upper bound’ on the short-term effects of future increases in macroprudential capital requirements in certain states of the UK economic cycle. An increase in the aggregate bank capital requirement during an economic upswing is associated with a reduction in lending, with a larger effect on lending to corporates than on that to households. The impact on GDP growth is statistically insignificant.

Capital requirements, liquidity and financial stability: The case of Brazil

This paper simulates the effects of credit risk, changes in capital requirements and price shocks on the Brazilian banking system. We perform the analysis within the context of a model that integrates data on bilateral exposures in the interbank market with information about the liquidity profile of each financial institution. Asset prices in the model are determined endogenously as a function of the total volume of fire sales, thus creating the possibility that marking to market may trigger new rounds of fire sales and downward asset price spirals. The simulation results show that the Brazilian banking system is robust, as relatively large increases in the NPL ratio lead to only modest losses in the system. We also compute the contribution of each financial institution to systemic losses under severe shocks and find that contributions from medium-sized banks can be significant. However, if shocks become more severe, only large banks will contribute significantly to systemic losses.

The Real Effects of Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy: Evidence from the United Kingdom

We study the effect of changes to UK bank-specific capital requirements on small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from 1999 to 2005. Following a 1% rise in capital requirements, SME asset growth (and investment) contracts by 3.5% to 6.9% (12%) in the first year of a new bank-firm relationship, but this effect declines over time. These results are robust to a number of different fixed effects specifications and measures of capital requirement changes that are orthogonal to balance sheet characteristics by construction. Banks with tight capital buffers are the most significant transmitters of this shock. Monetary policy only affects the asset growth of small bank borrowers, but has a similar impact on the same sectors as capital requirements. There is evidence that these instruments reinforce each other when tightened, but only for small banks. Firms that borrow from multiple banks and operate in sectors with alternative forms of finance are less (equally) affected by changes in capital requirements (monetary policy).

Do capital requirements affect cost efficiency? Evidence from China

This paper contributes to the debate on the effect of capital requirements on cost efficiency. We study the relation between capital ratio and cost efficiency for Chinese banks over the period 2004–2009, taking advantage of the profound regulatory changes in capital requirements that occurred during this period to measure the exogenous impact of an increase in the capital ratio on banks’ cost efficiency. We find that such an increase has a positive effect on cost efficiency, the size of which depends to an extent on the bank's ownership type. Our results therefore suggest that capital requirements can improve cost efficiency.

Macro effects of capital requirements and macroprudential policy

I investigate macro effects of higher bank capital requirements on the Norwegian economy and their use as a macroprudential policy instrument under Basel III. To this end, I develop a macroeconometric model where the capital adequacy ratio, lending rates, asset prices and credit interact with each other and with the real economy. The empirical results suggest that changes in capital requirements are primarily transmitted via lending rates to the other variables in the model. The proposed increases in capital requirements under Basel III are found to have significant effects especially on house prices and credit. I also derive optimal paths for the countercyclical capital buffer in response to various shocks. The buffer is found to equal its imposed ceiling of 2.5% in response to most of the shocks considered while its duration varies in the range of 1–12 quarters depending on the shock and its persistence.

Estimating the Impact of Changes in Aggregate Bank Capital Requirements During an Upswing

This paper estimates the effect of changes in capital requirements applied to all UK-resident banks on lending by studying the joint dynamics of the aggregate capital ratio of the UK banking system and a set of macro-financial variables. This is achieved by means of sign restrictions that attempt to identify shocks in past data that match a set of assumed directional responses of other variables to future changes in capital requirements aimed at increasing the resilience of the banking system to losses during an upswing. This may provide policymakers with a plausible ‘upper bound’ on the short-term effects of future increases in macroprudential capital requirements in certain states of the economic cycle. An increase in the aggregate bank capital requirement during an economic upswing is associated with a reduction of lending, with the effect larger for lending to corporates than for that to households. The impact on GDP growth is statistically insignificant.

Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment

The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro‐prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time‐varying, bank‐specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK‐owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one‐third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.

Governance, crash risk, and systemic risk: evidence from large US banks

This study investigates how the governance structure of bank holding companies (BHC) influences two types of market risks: crash risk and systemic risk. Using a sample of large BHC in the USA, we find limited evidence that high pay sensitivity is positively associated with banks' crash risk. In addition, high pay sensitivity and weak governance increase the systemic risk of banks. This study provides empirical support that governance decisions impact banks' risk exposure differently compared to those of corporate firms: 1) in opposite to the desired direction; 2) in conflicting manner. The study lends thus more credence to the recent call for redesigning the incentives and monitoring structure of banking industry. Our findings are important to regulators as they evaluate how best to intervene in the banking industry to forestall market contagion and failure. In particular, recent changes in capital requirements might not suffice to prevent future system shocks.

Macro Effects of Capital Requirements and Macroprudential Policy

I investigate macro effects of higher bank capital requirements on the Norwegian economy and their use as a macroprudential policy instrument under Basel III. To this end, I develop a macroeconometric model where the capital adequacy ratio, lending rates, asset prices and credit interact with each other and with the real economy. The empirical results suggest that changes in capital requirements are primarily transmitted via lending rates to the other variables in the model. The proposed increases in capital requirements under Basel III are found to have significant effects especially on house prices and credit. I also derive optimal paths for the countercyclical capital buffer in response to various shocks. The buffer is found to equal its imposed ceiling of 2.5% in response to most of the shocks considered while its duration varies in the range of 1-12 quarters depending on the shock and its persistence.