Central Claim Research Articles

Are Stereotypes About Minorities More Negative?

ABSTRACTVarious theories on intergroup bias predict that stereotypes about minorities are more negative than those about majorities. Although there is clear evidence that specific minorities are often subject to negative stereotypes, a systematic test of the relationship between group size and stereotype valence across various social groups is lacking. We conducted a multinational study across seven Western European countries to examine this relationship. We retrieved objective data on group sizes for 196 political, social, religious, ethnic and sexual orientation groups and assessed people's stereotypes about these groups. With 19,958 stereotype ratings from 1397 individuals (∼200 per country), our findings reveal that stereotypes about minorities are indeed more negative. This pattern persisted when controlling for respondents’ group membership and several robustness checks (e.g., which country is studied). Our study provides a systematic test of a central claim in stereotype research within WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) countries.

Abortion and infanticide: why the parent–child relationship symmetry breaker fails

Some pro-life philosophers have argued that if one accepts abortion, one should accept infanticide. Prabhpal Singh has proposed a symmetry breaker. He argues that the parent–child relationship can only be...

Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?

Abstract Trope metaphysics tries to explain the world and its features in terms of tropes. Tropes as properties are particulars where as properties, universals are multiply-realizable. The theory of tropes has rejected the existence of Universals. The central claim of this paper is that the trope theory offers comparatively a better metaphysical explanation of the world of everyday experiences than the theory of the Universals. This paper argues that trope metaphysics is better in the sense that (a) it is qualitatively more parsimonious, and (b) its account of the world and its properties is more comprehensive than what the theory of universals offers.

Commentary on Friedman et al. (2024): A General Preference for Complexity?

It is typically assumed in the empirical aesthetics literature that generalizable abstract stimulus attributes like familiarity, fluency, and complexity drive preferences. This general nature means that they can, at least in principle, apply to any stimulus regardless of its characteristics and sensory modality. However, most studies in this tradition are restricted to group-level trends and particular stimulus properties. Therefore, they say nothing about amodal or general preferences for particular levels of such abstract attributes independently from their characterization at the individual level. Moreover, the hypothesis of a general, amodal preference for attributes like complexity was not empirically supported and only scarcely tested until we provided empirical evidence against it in our Clemente et al. (2021) study. In their quest for empirical evidence in favor of a preference for complexity across the auditory and visual modalities, Friedman et al. (2024) made two central claims: First, they found it surprising that aesthetic sensitivity for visual and musical complexity did not correlate in our study. Second, they expressed concerns about the comparability of the musical and visual stimuli we used. In this commentary, I show how these claims and the premises on which they rely are debatable and how the results of Friedman et al. (2024) support our conclusion that stimulus information rather than abstract attributes like complexity drive evaluative judgments such as liking.

Usage-Based Models Around and Inside BLC Theory Peer Commentary on the Essay by Jan Hulstijn Entitled “Predictions of Individual Differences in the Acquisition of Native and Non-Native Languages: An Update of BLC Theory”

In his essay entitled “Predictions of Individual Differences in the Acquisition of Native and Non-Native Languages: An Update of BLC Theory”, Jan Hulstijn updates his theory of Basic Language Cognition (Hulstijn 2011, 2015). His central claim is that there is a fundamental difference between the Basic Language Cognition that is sufficient for dealing with oral language and the Extended Language Cognition required for handling reading and writing. In my invited commentary, I argue that used-based models of language provide a wider theoretical background that helps to ground Hulstijn’s theory. I illustrate what this means with reference to the Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model (Schmid 2020). Based on this model I discuss Hulstijn’s predictions regarding the extent of interindividual differences to be expected among L1-speakers and L-2 speakers.

La más verdadera tragedia: conciliación y antagonismo en las <i>Leyes </i>de Platón

This paper examines the quarrel with the tragic poets in Laws, VII 817b-d, by emphasizing, on the one hand, fundamental differences with the more famous quarrel of the Republic, and by arguing, on the other hand, for a strong (and not merely rhetorical) reading of the central claim of the passage, namely, that the very political constitution proposed in the dialogue is itself the “truest tragedy.” Assuming this perspective, I show that the constitution of Magnesia is the best possible tragedy insofar as it makes possible the greatest realization of the community’s life, recognizing, appealing to, and integrating human passions and weaknesses within itself. We are confronted with a notion of tragedy that, while recognizing as its starting point the antagonism proper to the tragic genre, aspires to common happiness as the most beautiful culmination of the human drama.

Why We Should Be Experientialists about Suffering.

Increased interest in suffering has given rise to different accounts of what suffering is. This paper focuses the debate between experientialists and non-experientialists about suffering. The former hold that suffering is necessarily experiential-for instance, because it is necessarily unpleasant or painful; the latter deny this-for instance, because one can suffer when and because one's objective properties are damaged, even if one does not experience this. After surveying how the two accounts fare on a range of issues, the paper presents a decisive argument in favor of experientialism. The central claim is that non-experientialist accounts cannot accommodate cases of suffering that are virtuous and that directly contribute to some objective good.

The representational and phenomenal richness of perceptual experience

This paper deals with the issue of the admissible content of perceptual experience at the centre of the debate that opposes Conservatives and Liberals —who advocate, respectively, a Sparse and a Rich Content-View— and aims, specifically, to consider how this debate interacts with the Externalism/Internalism debate in philosophy of perception. Indeed, apart from a few exceptions (Siegel, 2006, 2010, 2013; Bayne, 2009; Ashby, 2020a; Raleigh, 2022), this issue has not yet been sufficiently addressed, and the present paper, in the wake of the aforementioned works, aims to focus on this issue in order to assess whether it would be more congenial for a Liberal to adopt content internalism or rather content externalism. In my paper I argue that the best move the Liberal should make is to endorse externalism with regard to the content of perceptual experience and internalism with regard to its phenomenal character. But, as it will turn out, this combination can only be sustained consistently if the Liberal discards the standard interpretation of one of its central claims, the so-called (Ashby, 2020a, p. 689) “phenomenal reflection claim” (PRC) —the claim according to which perceptual properties are reflected in/reverberate in the phenomenology of the experience— and adopts a different interpretation of it. To indicate what alternative interpretation of PRC the liberal should provide is one of the main goals of the paper.

Cicero and the Philosophic Grounds of Liberty

Abstract The prevailing view of the origin of the idea of republican liberty holds that it emerged as a polemical tool to wield against political opponents in the Roman republic. But viewing republican liberty as partisan rhetorical device has obscured the important philosophical innovations that were necessary to render it theoretically viable and coherent. Turning to Cicero, the earliest extant theorist of republican liberty, I seek to explore the depth of the conceptual revolution that made it possible to articulate that ideal. Cicero transforms the practice of republican libertas into a coherent ideal through a re-thinking of some of the central claims of Greek political philosophy.

Concept-formation and deep disagreements in theoretical and practical reasoning

This paper explores the idea that deep disagreements essentially involve disputes about what counts as good reasoning, whether it is theoretical or practical reasoning. My central claim is that deep disagreements involve radically different paradigms of some principle or notion that is constitutively basic to reasoning—I refer to these as “basic concepts”. To defend this claim, I show how we can understand deep disagreements by accepting the indeterminacy of concept-formation: concepts are not set in stone but are responsive to human needs, and differences in individuating and ordering concepts lead to clashes in paradigms of reasoning. These clashes can be difficult to resolve because linguistic concepts, especially basic concepts, impose a normative structure onto thought to make reasoning possible at all. This, I also argue, is an authentically Wittgensteinian account of the nature of reasoning. While deep disagreements involving theoretical and practical reasoning both stem from the same root problem of clashing paradigms of basic concepts, I will also draw attention to the particularly radical indeterminacy of moral concept-formation, which makes moral deep disagreements more difficult to resolve. Over the course of the paper, I will discuss two examples of deep disagreements to illustrate and defend my central claim: deep disagreements over vaccines and the concept of “evidence” (theoretical reasoning) and deep disagreements over affirmative action and the concept of “fairness” (practical reasoning). I conclude by suggesting how my account of reasoning does not lead to moral relativism.

The Price of Centralization: A Comparative Study of Tocqueville and Late Ming Chinese Thinkers

ABSTRACT This article offers a comparative study of the views of Alexis de Tocqueville and those of several Chinese thinkers of the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644)—primarily Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi—on the socio-political processes of centralization. My central claim is that their views of political centralization and of the decentralized polycentric society that preceded it in their respective countries exhibit a remarkable array of analogous structural features. More specifically, both Tocqueville and his Chinese counterparts perceive in centralization an inherent unsustainability driven by its self-destructive nature: since the foundation and strength of statism depends on its social resources, the centralization of power inevitably results in the weakening of its own basis. I conclude that through their nuanced reinterpretation of self-interest, both parties advocate a “small-community-oriented communitarianism” instead of the increasingly centralized modern state.

Resource-Rational Virtual Bargaining for Moral Judgment: Toward a Probabilistic Cognitive Model.

Recent theoretical work has argued that moral psychology can be understood through the lens of "resource rational contractualism." The view posits that the best way of making a decision that affects other people is to get everyone together to negotiate under idealized conditions. The outcome of that negotiation is an arrangement (or "contract") that would lead to mutual benefit. However, this ideal is seldom (if ever) practical given the resource demands (time, information, computational processing power) that are required. Instead, the theory proposes that moral psychology is organized around a series of resource-rational approximations of the contractualist ideal, efficiently trading off between more resource-intensive, accurate mechanisms and less. This paper presents empirical evidence and a cognitive model that test a central claim of this view: when the stakes of the situation are high, then more resource-intensive processes are engaged over more approximate ones. We present subjects with a case that can be judged using virtual bargaining-a resource-intensive process that involves simulating what two people would agree to-or by simply following a standard rule. We find that about a third of our participants use the resource-rational approach, flexibly switching to virtual bargaining in high-stakes situations, but deploying the simple rule when stakes are low. A third of the participants are best modeled as consistently using the strict rule-based approach and the remaining third as consistently using virtual bargaining. A model positing the reverse resource-rational hypothesis (that participants use more resource-intensive mechanisms in lower stakes situations) fails to capture the data.

Populism in Power and Different Models of Democracy

Populism is both prolific and resilient. By now, populist forces around the globe have managed to enter the highest echelons of power (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016). It is no wonder that the contemporary academic debate has shifted its focus to exploring the consequences of populism in power, particularly its impact on democracy. Although populism and democracy are not synonymous, the representation of “the people” is a central claim to both. Most populism scholars agree that “all forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation of and appeal to ‘the people’” (Canovan 1981, 94). However, depending on which democratic ideas are emphasized over others—as well as which political practices and structures are favored to institutionalize these ideas (Dahl 1991; Held 2006; Lijphart 2012)—the basic tenet of the “rule by the people” may have many different meanings.

Review of Gary Clark, Carl Jung and the Evolutionary Sciences: A New Vision for Analytical Psychology. London and New York: Routledge, 2025

Abstract Carl Jung and the Evolutionary Sciences: A New Vision for Analytical Psychology by Gary Clark returns to the anthropological theories of Jung’s time to assess whether they, and those of Jung’s ideas informed by them, remain useful for contemporary Jungian research in light of more recent scientific advances. This essay presents Clark’s central claims, including his validation of Jung’s use of supposedly discredited evolutionary beliefs, and evaluates whether Clark’s project truly represents ‘a new vision for analytical psychology’.

The moral and ethical worlds of coercive confinement: A prologue

‘Morality’ and ‘ethics’ are terms which are peppered throughout political and academic discourse on coercive confinement, but which feature such diverse ways that their usage is bound to confuse or even disconcert. The introduction to this themed issue offers a more deliberately conceptualised account of morality and ethics, and outlines what studying them empirically could bring to prison studies and other studies of confinement. It starts by outlining some central claims to an empirical study of ethics, drawing heavily on work in anthropology, where this sub-discipline is very well-developed. It then describes the main contributions that the empirical study of ethics could make to studies of coercive confinement, all of which are demonstrated by the papers in this issue. The studies cover a range of geographical regions (India, Central America, the United States, Europe and the United Kingdom) and contexts of confinement (prisons, nursing homes and post-release community settings). It ends by looking back at the perspective for which it advocates, questioning its value and considering whether there is a role in this approach for critique.

Designing Confucian democracy: A semi‐parliamentarian framework

AbstractDespite Confucian democrats’ successful attempt in establishing Confucian democracy as a normatively plausible ideal, little has been said regarding its institutional design. However, to the extent that Confucian democracy involves some synthesis between a formally democratic regime and substantively Confucian ends, it has to ask for a more specific choice among various possible democratic institutional frameworks, so as to make sure that the exact form of the former is conducive to the realization of the latter. This article addresses such a question by presenting semi‐parliamentarianism as an appropriate institutional framework for designing Confucian democracy. My central claim is that compared with other types of constitutional structure, a semi‐parliamentarian bicameral one is more likely to simultaneously advance Confucian democrats’ dual commitments to benevolent government and deep harmony. The article thus contributes to both the “institutional turn” in democratic theory and the “meritocracy versus democracy” debate in contemporary Confucian political theory.

Anti-Love Biomedical Intervention and the Necessity of Consent

This paper is an investigation into the conditions under which anti-love biomedical intervention is justified. Our central claim is that anti-love biomedical intervention can be justified without the “simultaneous consent” of recipients (where the simultaneous consent of a person S is understood as S’s consent at time t to an intervention at t) when it contributes to increased autonomy. We begin with an overview of earlier discussions of the ethics of anti-love biomedical intervention, focusing on the pioneering work of Earp and colleagues. We then present some cases in which paternalistic intervention may be effective. We will then present an argument for the idea of anti-love biomedical intervention without simultaneous consent, based on an analogy between (biomedical intervention in) addiction and (biomedical intervention in) love. One premise of this argument is that love and addiction are importantly similar in that they can compromise the autonomous capacity for self-governing. The other premise of this argument is that biomedical intervention in addiction without simultaneous consent can be justified if the intervention is expected to restore the compromised capacity for self-governing. We will propose the “Ulysses contract”, a contract to enforce anti-love biomedical intervention when the recipient refuses it, as a possible measure of such paternalistic intervention and discuss its possible risks.

The communist empty signifier: the Australian League of Rights and the Voice to Parliament referendum

ABSTRACT In 2023, voters across Australia resoundingly rejected the Constitu-tional institution of an Indigenous Voice to Parliament. Among several claims made by vote no campaigners against this institution, a text published in the 1980s by the notorious extreme right organization, The Australian League of Rights, surfaced. The central claim of this text, titled Red Over Black, is that Aboriginal claims for justice and land rights are a communist conspiracy. In the lead-up to the referendum, the campaign to vote no echoed this claim. Drawing upon the Laclauian Discourse Analysis, this paper considers how this signifier, ‘communist,’ continues to resonate in political campaigns in Australia. My claim is that the foundations for this continued resonance emerge in enduring reactionary organizations such as the Australian League of Rights, which was founded in the 1940s. The paper thus outlines how the League imagines the communist conspiracy and explains how this conspiracy remains embedded in political discourse today.

Drawn into Dancing and Danced into Drawing: Exploring Deleuze’s Lines of Flight through Dancing–Drawing Approaches in Early Childhood Dance Pedagogies

Abstract This article explores Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) notion of ‘lines of flight’ as a philosophical concept and a phenomenon in dance pedagogical learning events by focusing on approaches combining dancing and drawing in an early childhood educational context. I share how the enquiry has been guided not only through the concept of thinking with theory (Jackson and Mazzei 2023) but also through dancing with theory through a series of creative approaches. This study is situated in the field of artistic research, with its theoretical framework in post-human theories (Barad 2007), intra-active pedagogy (Lenz Taguchi 2010) and assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) thinking. Diffractive reading (Barad 2007) is used in narrating the key moments, theorised as translations, that have been significant in researching the lines of flight and the intra-active relationship between drawing and dancing. The central claim is that working with dancing– drawing assemblages may expand children’s potential entry points and modes of participation. This can support more diverse, inclusive and participatory forms of dance pedagogies. Through dancing–drawing approaches, dance improvisation may become a mode of multimodal meaning-making, fostering rich and varied artistic experiences for children where embodied and artistic thinking intersect in novel ways.

Digital Recording and the Hazards of Unbounded Moralized Judgment

Digital Recording and the Hazards of Unbounded Moralized Judgment