Caught Cheating Research Articles

Perceptions of Afghan EFL undergraduate students about exam cheating

The main purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate EFL undergraduate students’ perceptions about cheating in exams: reasons, techniques, and consequences. It also examined the differences between participants’ responses by their gender and class. A total of 185 EFL undergraduate students at two public universities took part in the study. A survey questionnaire was used to collect data for the study. SPSS version 28.0 was used to analyze the data. The results revealed that students cheated in exams for various reasons including getting a higher grade, passing an exam, and not having enough time. Students used different ways to cheat in exams such as cheat sheets, cellphones, clothes, and their body parts. Furthermore, students faced certain consequences as a result of cheating in exams. For instance, they failed a particular course due to being caught cheating in exams and they lost their class ranking and self-respect. The study also revealed that there were differences between the participants by their gender but not class. Lecturers should use student-centered learning and formative assessment techniques in their teaching practices to engage students in the learning process and maximize their learning.

Upaya Guru PPKN dalam Meningkatkan Sikap Jujur Siswa

ABSTRACT
 The purpose of this study was to determine the efforts of PPKn teachers in improving students' honest attitudes and what obstacles were encountered by teachers in improving students' honest attitudes at SMPN 3 Payakumbuh District. The type of research used is qualitative with descriptive method. The results of this study are: 1) PPKn teachers' efforts in improving students' honest attitudes are: (a) Providing learning motivation for students; (b) Provide various learning models; (c) Reduction of value when caught cheating on the results of a friend's test; (d) Assign error points weights; (e) The imposition of punitive sanctions. 2) The teacher's obstacle factors in improving students' honest attitudes are: (a) Factors from within the students; (b) The interest of students in learning is low; (b) Lack of understanding of students in applying an honest attitude; (c) Factors from outside the students, such as the teacher's busyness and environmental factors. The conclusion that the PPKn teacher's efforts in increasing honesty in students is to always instill and increase honesty in themselves.
 Keywords: Honest Attitude, PPKN Teacher.

Lessons learned during Covid-19 concerning cheating in e-examinations by university students

PurposeThe researchers aim to investigate how students can be deterred from cheating, whether legal or ethical policies and procedures are effective and whether there are gender differences.Design/methodology/approachUsing data on students undertaking midterm and final e-examinations, as well as a control group of students who were caught cheating in an online mid-semester examination, the authors attempt to answer the research questions.FindingsNo differences were found in cheating in terms of students’ gender or whether they were repeating a course or not. However, the study revealed that if there are more internal controls imposed and if before the examination students are made to reinforce their academic integrity, e-examination cheating is reduced.Originality/valueNo other published study was carried out with students who were involved in cheating.

Personalization (Election Campaign Coverage)

Personalization (Election Campaign Coverage)

Why Do Countries in Financial Distress Strategically Delay Seeking Help?

The paper differs from current literature by providing a systematic analysis of the relationship between sovereign financial distress and political career concerns via a novel game-theoretic model, in order to analyze the strategic behavior of governments in revealing financial distress and requesting a rescue program from international organizations. The analysis shows that, in equilibrium, a rent-seeking government will gamble for resurrection by strategically delaying the revelation of financial distress through the creation of hidden debt, hoping that things will improve in the future which will enable getting away with hiding the unfavorable news. This is so when the electorate only has short-term commitment power, if the government expects sufficient rents, provided a re-elected government adds to national output through experience, or international rescue organizations charge a relatively low interest rate, or the electorate discounts the future sufficiently. The analysis discusses incentive systems, such as differential interest rates when the government has been caught cheating, credit limiting and austerity, that can deter strategic delays, and a precommitment mechanism to get around time inconsistency.

Why do countries in financial distress strategically delay seeking help?

The paper differs from current literature by providing a systematic analysis of the relationship between sovereign debt, financial distress and political career concerns via a novel game-theoretic model, in order to analyze the strategic behavior of governments in revealing financial distress and requesting a rescue program from international organizations. The analysis shows that, in equilibrium, a rent-seeking government will ”gamble for resurrection” by strategically delaying the revelation of financial distress through the creation of ”hidden debt,” hoping that things will improve in the future which will enable getting away with hiding the unfavorable news. This is so when the electorate only has short-term commitment power, if the government expects sufficient rents, provided a re-elected government adds to national output through experience, or international rescue organizations charge a relatively low interest rate, or the electorate discounts the future sufficiently. The analysis discusses incentive systems, such as differential interest rates when the government has been caught cheating, credit limiting and austerity, that can deter strategic delays, and a precommitment mechanism to get around time inconsistency.

Can Audits Deter Performance Exaggeration?

Exaggeration of performance metrics (revenue, product efficacy, ad viewership, etc.) by entrepreneurs to investors and clients is a common problem in high tech entrepreneurship. We model this as a principal-agent problem in a contract-theoretic setting, where the entrepreneur (agent) can undertake costly actions to strategically lie about a key performance metric (agent type) in order to extract higher payment from the investor (principal). We demonstrate that the optimal contract features widespread exaggeration by all entrepreneur types, and the investor exploits it as a screening mechanism to ordinally rank the entrepreneur by his true underlying type. We study the effect of an audit in which, if caught cheating, the agent pays a penalty. We show that rather than deterring fraud, audits actually amplify the degree of exaggeration.

Daring dishonesty: On the role of sanctions for (un)ethical behavior

According to seminal utility-based theories of norm-violating and unethical behavior, the decision to lie involves trading-off the potential benefits of dishonesty against the potential costs if caught. However, even in paradigms with zero risk of sanctions, individuals do not consistently cheat. Still more strikingly, most of the few findings available from studies implementing a sanctioning system run contrary to what would be expected based on utility-based accounts of dishonesty, showing increased cheating when there is a small risk of sanctions as compared to when the risk is zero. Given the striking nature of these findings and the general scarcity of corresponding evidence, we devised a targeted empirical test of the role of sanctions for dishonest behavior. Specifically, in two experiments, we manipulated the probability (i.e., 16.7% vs. 50%) that the factual truth of one's response in a cheating paradigm is checked. In Experiment 2, we further varied the severity of sanctions for being caught cheating. Results showed that the willingness to lie strongly decreased with increasing probability of being caught as well as with increasing severity of sanctions. As such, the results clearly support the theoretical notion that external costs influence unethical behavior, in the direction implied by utility-based models.

Quantum private comparison with a malicious third party

In this paper, we will show that quantum private comparison protocol is secure when a malicious third party is presented. The security of the protocol is considered in a cheat-sensitive model, in which the TP is kept honest by the possibility of being caught cheating. Besides, we enhance the privacy of the quantum private comparison protocol, where the participants' inputs and the comparison result can be preserved. Furthermore, in contrast to pervious protocols requiring a large amount of quantum resources, such as entanglement and quantum memory, our protocol is based on BB84 protocol, which is more feasible for practical applications. Finally, we analyze the security of the presented protocol.

Predicting Academic Dishonesty on National Examinations: The Roles of Gender, Previous Performance, Examination Center Change, City Change, and Region Change

The purpose of the present studies was to evaluate and predict academic cheating with regard to a national examination in a Middle East country. In Study 1, 4,024 students took part and potential cheaters were classified as those having discrepant scores in multiple administrations that exceeded 1 SD in absolute terms. A latent class mixture analysis suggested two pathways for potential cheating: (a) The first path involved students—most male—who changed city or region of examination during test taking, and (b) the second path described students—most male—who did not change city, region, or center of administration. Study 2 profiled cheaters using a sample of examinees who were actually caught cheating. Participants were 545 students, 253 of whom were caught cheating between 2002 and 2012. Both samples were selected from a pool of 319,219 testees using random sampling procedures. Results indicated that a 4-class solution best fitted the data as in Study 1. Furthermore, a predictive model was tested with an independent cross-validation sample of 112 examinees (56 cheaters, 56 noncheaters). Results indicated that the model classified correctly 78.57 of the new cheating cases (sensitivity) and 94.64% of noncheaters (specificity).

Does it Matter if Stockbrokers Get Caught Cheating? Consequences of Misconduct on Careers

This analysis investigates the consequences of misconduct on the careers of U.S. stockbrokers. The basic expectation is that, besides official penalties, individual-level misconduct results in reputational damage and impaired future labor market opportunities. However, the consequences of misconduct seem mild on Wall Street where misconduct could be perceived by employers as a sign of aggressiveness or a cost of doing business. To address this ambiguity, we investigate the career consequences of one form of Wall Street misconduct where stockbrokers cheat their customers by generating higher fees through conducting unnecessary, unsuitable, or unauthorized transactions. Specifically, we examine whether visible instances of misconduct are associated with higher/lower likelihood of exiting the profession and being able to leave one’s current employer. We also examine whether a stockbroker’s tenure moderates the consequences of misconduct as misconduct may be a weaker signal to the market the more experienced ...

Combating Examination Malpractices in the Basic Education Certificate Examinations (BECE) in Ghana

annual basis, WAEC furnish Ghanaians with a stunning number of candidates who are caught cheating in their examinations. WAEC cancels the results of such candidates and even hand some culprits over to the Police for prosecution at the courts. But cheating continues and in most cases, increases year by year. There has been allegations and counter-allegations as to how and why these examination malpractices is on the increase in Ghana. In an attempt to unravel the mysteries of malpractices surrounding the conduct of the Basic Education Certificate Examinations (BECE), funding was sought from education-oriented Non- governmental Organisations (NGOs) and recruited thirty fresh graduates from Ghanaian universities and guided them to gain teaching appointments in schools that are noted by the community to indulge in examination malpractices, but for one reason or the other, has never been caught red-handed. The accounts of these thirty recruits spread across all the ten regions of Ghana forms the basis of this paper.

Explicit risk of getting caught does not affect unethical behavior

AbstractResearch showed that given the opportunity, people behave dishonestly only to the degree that will allow them to maintain a positive self‐concept. These experiments did not include the probability of getting caught cheating, although in everyday life, this risk always exists. If it is shown that people behave more honestly when faced with an explicit risk of getting caught, the ecological validity of these experiments may be at risk. This study showed that explicit risk, framed as the probability of getting caught or as the complementary probability of not getting caught, did not reduce participants’ dishonest behavior relative to no risk. These findings support the ecological validity of previous research on unethical behavior.

Motivation for Earnings Management among Auditors in Malaysia

Historically, there have been numerous fraud cases in which firms, which were experiencing financial difficulties or having problems in the management of their earnings, were caught cheating in the preparation of their financial reports. Thus, the motivation of this action must be identified in order to solve this problem. This study adapts the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) to detect the behaviour of earnings management in the financial statement. The purpose of this study is to identify the motivation of earnings management in Malaysia. This paper used a set of questionnaires that were distributed to the auditors to gather data regarding the motivation of earnings management. The results show that the primary motive for auditors to be involved in earnings management is derived from the pressure of affiliated parties. The second motive is altruistic and is followed by speculative motivation.

An Anti-Doping Sampling Strategy Utilizing the Sewerage Systems of Sport Villages

It is widely accepted that modern athletics is blighted by theuse of performance-enhancing substances that can giveathletes a better physical condition and can help them winan important sports competition. A number of well-knownathletes have been caught cheating and others, by refusingto undergo tests, raise suspicions about their use of suchsubstances. In recent decades, a number of athletes havehad to give back Olympic medals and, generally, the scaleof concerns over doping is ruining sports. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in 1999 with themission“

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

AbstractA model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.

MAGICIAN AS CONJUROR

This article uses frame analysis to examine the performances of the Victorian mediums, Charles Foster, Henry Slade and the Davenport brothers. Frame analysis is concerned with how individuals define and organize their experience, and describes how actions are recognized as, for example, ‘serious’ or ‘play’. It is particularly relevant to the performance of magic and other deception‐related interactions such as psychic fraud. Foster, Slade and the Davenports presented themselves both privately and publicly as genuine mediums, and their performances as manifestations of departed spirits. Nevertheless, all of them were denounced as tricksters by most of the public. While each of them pioneered a new kind of conjuring effect, all of these effects were copied by stage conjurors and later became staple tricks of stage magicians. Furthermore, all of these mediums were caught cheating during performances. In spite of this, spiritualists continued to claim that they were genuine mediums. It would be easy to dismiss spiritualists as gullible fools, as many Victorians did, but a frame analysis of their performances shows that there was a great deal more to how these performances were made to seem real, rather than trickery.

The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation

In the context of a noisy, continuous-choice prisoner's dilemma, the authors examine how leadership turnover and domestic institutions affect the depth and reliability of cooperative agreement that can be enforced between states through the use of leader-specific punishment strategies. If foreign nations target punishments against leaders observed to cheat on cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the responsible incumbent remains in office), then citizens remove leaders caught cheating, providing the cost of doing so is less than the value of the cooperation foregone. For leaders whoare easily replaced, being caught cheating cost them their job. Since cheating jeopardizes their tenure, such leaders can credibly commit to deeper and more reliable cooperation. The authors derive hypotheses about the patterns of cooperation and leadership turnover predicted under different institutional arrangements.

Quantum protocol for cheat-sensitive weak coin flipping.

We present a quantum protocol for the task of weak coin flipping. We find that, for one choice of parameters in the protocol, the maximum probability of a dishonest party winning the coin flip if the other party is honest is 1/sqrt[2]. We also show that if parties restrict themselves to strategies wherein they cannot be caught cheating, their maximum probability of winning can be even smaller. As such, the protocol offers additional security in the form of cheat sensitivity.

Effects of Participant Ethnicity, Target Physiognomy, and Target Gender on College Students’ Judgments of Cheating

History and some research suggest that the degree of prejudice by Whites as well as within the African American community is related to the extent of African physical characteristics and the gender of the target. The goal of our experiment was to determine if White and non-White males and females would judge targets differently based on the target’s physiognomy and gender. Participants were divided into eight groups, each judging photographs depicting a different level of target physiognomy and gender (European, mixed, moderately African, and extremely African males and females) following presentation of a false scenario about the target’s having been caught cheating. Although Whites’ratings did not differ according to target physiognomy, non-Whites favored more African targets.