Capital Portfolio Research Articles

Knowledge Management: An Introduction and Perspective

Leaders of successful organizations are consistently searching for better ways to improve performance and results. Frequent disappointments with past management initiatives have motivated managers to gain new understandings into the underlying, but complex mechanisms ‐ such as knowledge ‐ which govern an enterprise’s effectiveness. Knowledge Management, far from being a management “fad”, is broad, multi‐dimensional and covers most aspects of the enterprise’s activities. To be competitive and successful, experience shows that enterprises must create and sustain a balanced intellectual capital portfolio. They need to set broad priorities and integrate the goals of managing intellectual capital and the corresponding effective knowledge processes. This requires systematic Knowledge Management. With knowledge as the major driving force behind the “economics of ideas”, we can expect that the emphasis on knowledge creation, development, organization and leverage will continue to be the prime focus for improving society.

Foreign Investments Are a Reserve for Economic Development

High investment activity is a necessary condition to economic development. It is attained by increasing the volume of investment resources and their most effective use in the priority sectors of material production and the social sphere. Investments form the production potential on the new scientific-technical base and predetermine the competitive positions of countries in world markets. The attraction of foreign capital in the form of direct capital investments, portfolio investments, and investments in other assets plays by no means the last role for many states, especially those that are extricating themselves from economic and social adversity.

Some hypotheses about risk in venture capital investing

Venture capital investing differs in important respects from investment decisions involving the securities of Fortune 500 companies, or decisions to purchase established companies, which are generally made in accord with widely recognized financial models. Investing in new ventures involves a high level of uncertainty as well as a high risk of failure. Venture capital investing is characterized by high variability in the outcomes of new ventures and in the performance of venture capital portfolios. Venture capital investing decisions are complicated by a general lack of quantifiable financial and market data for early-stage ventures, and investment decisions remain hostage to unanticipated competitors, market shifts, and financial cycles. Some observers have suggested that venture capital investment decisions are primarily subjective assessments. While the question of risk in venture capital investing has been addressed on an ad hoc basis in several empirical studies, there has been little effort to develop a theoretical framework of risk perceptions and risk-reduction strategies. Despite differences in investor experience, investment preferences, and tolerance for risk, venture capital managers share many common perceptions of the risks involved in investing in new ventures and the distribution of those risks over the venture-capital-funded phase of development. Venture capital managers also utilize many common behaviors and strategies in adapting to these risks. These perceptions and reactions to risk in investing, and strategies for controlling risk can, in theory, be used to construct a behavioral framework that can predict how venture capital managers will behave in choosing between various investment opportunities in order to minimize risk and to maximize potential returns. In an attempt to begin to identify various elements of such a behavioral framework of venture capital reactions to risk, the authors have drawn upon psychological risk theory of decision-making under uncertainty, including classic expected utility theory, later modifications to that theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). and Coombs and Huang's (1970) “portfolio approach” to risk, that are applicable to venture capital investing. These expected behaviors to risk have been used in conjunction with empirical studies of venture capital investment and portfolio outcomes, distributions of investments within portfolios, and venture capitalist perceptions of risk, to propose nine hypotheses about how venture capital managers behave in making investment decisions. These hypotheses include differences in variation and magnitude of returns for early-stage versus later-stage ventures, explanations of how risk distributions change over the stagewise development of new ventures, differences in the behavior of “aggressive” versus “conservative” investors in screening investment prospects, and strategies utilizing a lower “ideal level of risk” to reduce the chances of achieving negative or sub-normal final portfolio returns.

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis. In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading. The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences. The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors. While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.