Capgras’ syndrome is the first misidentification syndrome described. It was originally individualized in 1923 by the French psychiatrist Joseph Capgras who termed it “l’illusion des sosies”. The subject has the delusional belief that people emotionally close to him have been replaced by doubles physically similar to the originals, but psychologically different. The impostors are generally persecutors. There is sometimes double of the self. Capgras’ syndrome is the most common of the delusional misidentification syndromes (Fregoli syndrome, the syndrome of inter-metamorphosis and the syndrome of subjective double) but is relatively rare, occurring predominantly in the context of paranoid schizophrenia. However, more recently, it has been estimated that a quarter to a third of these cases are associated with neurological, toxic or other organic disorders. And the course of the Capgras syndrome generally follows the course of the basic illness. Thus, there is some discussion in the literature about whether the delusion of doubles should be considered as a syndrome or a symptom. Moreover, neuro-imaging exploration suggests a link between Capgras’ syndrome and right hemisphere abnormalities (particularly in the frontal and temporal regions). Neuropsychological research has reported the presence of impairments in facial processing (which is an established right hemisphere function). Ellis and Young adapted Bauer’s two routes to face recognition model: one ventral visual-limbic route for the overt recognition and one dorsal visual-limbic route for the covert recognition. These authors propose that Capgras patients present an intact ventral route which leads to physical face recognition, but a disconnected dorsal route which prevents the affective confirmation of this recognition. Capgras delusion would be the mirror of prosopagnosia resulting from the preserved overt recognition coupled with a loss of affective responses. After a review of the literature relative to the psychodynamic approaches of Capgras’ syndrome (feelings of depersonalization, problem of ambivalence, affective trouble, incestuous desires…), we have described an original case of Capgras’ syndrome occurring without an organic or psychiatric context. We suggest a re-examination of this curious trouble: the Capgras’ syndrome would be an autonomic entity, which could consist firstly in a functional deficit of affective identification face, this affectivity trouble could be rationalised by the patient and would lead secondly to a delusional interpretation. Capgras patients would recognise the intimate’s face physically but not affectively. The deficit of affective face identification could be caused by organic lesions or functional troubles (psychiatric troubles) or, in our case, by an isolated functional trouble. This loss of affective familiarity of a close relative could be explored by the Bruyer and Schweich face recognition Test. In the case we are considering, patients would attempt to explain this contradictory information by a delusion. This dissociated perceptual experience (known face but strangeness feelings) could be interpreted to make sense and would then produce Capgras delusion.