Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes The author would like to thank Jennifer Erickson from Cornell University for her support and revision of this article. 1 Reflecting the inevitable regional dimension to the nuclear dispute between Pyongyang and Washington, the other members of the Six‐Party Talks include South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. 2 James Clay Moltz, C. Kenneth Quinones, ‘Getting Serious About a Multilateral Approach to North Korea’, Nonproliferation Review (Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004), p. 136. 3 The United States imposed sanctions on the BDA after the Treasury Department accused it of money laundering and counterfeiting on behalf of the North Korean regime. 4 Mitchell B. Reiss, ‘A Nuclear‐armed North Korea: Accepting the ‘Unacceptable?’, Survival (Vol. 48, No. 4, 2006), p. 101. 5 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, No Good Choices: The Implications of a Nuclear North Korea, in Brown Journal of World Affairs (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005), p. 270. 6 For a thorough examination of the agreement's provisions see, for example, Paul Kerr, ‘Initial Pact Reached to End North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program’, in Arms Control Today (Vol. 37, No. 2, 2007), ⟨ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/NKPact.asp ⟩ (accessed 19 March 2007). 7 Under II.1.of the agreement, North Korea agrees to ‘shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyong nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel (…)’. Under II.2., the agreement calls on North Korea to ‘discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs’, including those for extracting plutonium but without any mention of its HEU facilities. 8 See Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), pp. 263–4. 9 International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 48. 10 See Jonas Schneider, Nach Pjöngjangs Kernwaffentest [Engl. After Pyongyang's Nuclear Test], working paper, April 2007, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, ⟨ http://www.swp‐berlin.org/ common/get_document.php?asset_id=3890 ⟩ (accessed 15 April 2007). 11 Press Briefing by Tony Snow, White House Press Secretary, 13 February 2007, ⟨ http://63.161.169.137/news/releases/2007/02/20070213–3.html ⟩ (accessed 4 April 2007). 12 Frank Ching, ‘Promising Steps with Pyongyang,’ South China Morning Post, 28 February 2007, p. 13. 13 Joseph Cirincione, ‘North Korean Pressure Points’, 13 February 2007, Center for American Progress, ⟨ http://www.americanprogress. org/issues/2007/02/north_korea.html ⟩ (accessed 14 March 2007). 14 Paul Richter, ‘White House Foreign Policy has Shifted,’ Los Angeles Times, 8 March 2007, p. 4. 15 Moo‐Jin Yang, ‘The Democratic Party's Victory in the U.S. Midterm Elections and the North Korean Nuclear Issue, Nautilus Institute, Policy’ Forum Online, 5 December 2006, ⟨ http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/06101Yang.html ⟩ (accessed 6 April 2007). 16 Don Oberdorfer, ‘So Far, So Fast: What's Really behind the Bush Administration's Course Reversal on North Korea – And Can the Negotiations Succeed?,’ Newsweek, 14 March 2007, ⟨ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17612517/site/newsweek ⟩ (accessed 3 April 2007) 17 David E. Sanger, Thom Shanker, ‘Rice is said to have speeded North Korea Deal’, New York Times, 16 February 2007, p.3. 18 David E. Sanger, ‘Top Hawks Are Leaving Bush's Team,’ International Herald Tribune, 22 March 2007, p. 1. 19 Anna Fifield, ‘N Korea Sharpens Tongue to Counter US ‘“Sweet Talk”’, Financial Times, 25 April 2007, p. 8. 20 Howard LaFranchi, Donald Kirk, ‘Key Step Forward on North Korea,’ Christian Science Monitor, 12 April 2007, p. 1. 21 Andrew Ward, David Pilling, ‘Further Sanctions Threat for N Korea,’ Financial Times, 27 April 2007 (web publication).