British Leadership Research Articles

Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire.

Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire.

Implementation of an Ideological Paradigm: Early Duginian Eurasianism and Russia's Post-Crimean Discourse

Alexander Dugin, the well-known public philosopher, entered Russia's intellectual and political life in the 1990s, with strongly anti-American and often anti-Western statements. Dugin's philosophy, especially in its early version, was of great use for foreign analysts with its emphasis on the irreconcilable conflict between the Eurasian civilization – with Russia in its centre – and the Atlanticist civilization led by the United States. While the image of Atlanticism and Americanism as despiritualizing forces ready for global predominance emerged in Dugin's work early on, it was later supplemented by another image, stressing Atlanticism as a desire to play God, to change the nature and the man himself. Consequently, Atlanticism and Americanism cannot live in peace until the Eurasian civilization is destroyed completely. While geopolitical Duginism of the 1990s had few direct translations into actual Russian foreign policy, it had an indirect relationship to Putin's posture in Crimea and Ukraine, and on the economically centred Eurasian Union. The importance of Duginism in the minds of segments of the American and British leadership is due, rather, not so much to the danger of an aggressive Russia, but to the waning of Washington's influence in Europe. Duginism is less a manifestation of Kremlin policy, than an ideological construction mostly belonging in the past. Instead, pragmatic nationalists are the most influential people in the present-day Russian elite.

Book Review: The Men who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of Empire, written by Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy

Book Review: The Men who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of Empire, written by Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy

A Historical Perspective : The Emergence of Islam and Muslim Identity in India : British Colonialism and Indian Congress Leadership in the Vivisection and Partitioning of India

This paper attempts to deal with the complex and intricate issue of the emergence of Islam and Muslim identity in undivided India. In so doing, the paper focuses on an historical perspective, for purposes of recalling the great divide in India before partition. The two papers also encapsulate the issues that permeate Indian independence from British colonialism and, they attempt to discuss, the formation of two independent countries in the form of independent India and independent Pakistan, as two distinct nation states. More importantly, these aspects will be discussed in paper two of the two part series of articles. This partition or vivisection of the Indian subcontinent was a great tragedy of history and of our times, in the 20 th century. It will also very briefly discuss the formation of Bangladesh as a relic of British colonialism in the great design to split the Indian subcontinent into three nation states. This will be undertaken in paper two. It therefore discusses the designs of British colonialism and brings to the fore issues that need to be grasped in terms of both Indian and British leadership in dividing the Indian sub – continent. The role of Indian leaders and of Viceroy Lord Mountbatten are discussed as a great tragedy to justice and the infliction of great pain to so many people that, were unnecessarily massacred and separated from their land of birth by partition. This aspect will be discussed in paper two of this series of articles. The paper draws upon the work of Jaswant Singh, Peter Hardy, William Dalrymple, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a great son of India, Richard Hough and, a host of other distinguished writers and scholars, in respect of the emergence of Islam and Muslim identity in the Indian sub – continent. On the other hand the paper draws from the experiences and observations of the writer himself, who was a student in India for seven years (1971 – 1979). Travelled the length and breadth of India during this period, and lived in New Delhi, Bombay, Lucknow, Hyderabad and Udaipur in Rajasthan for protracted periods of time. Interviewed and spoke to many people and travelled to Muslim and Hindu regions of the subcontinent and travelled to Indian Kashmir and to Ladhak, and its capital Leh (part of India but in Western Tibet). For a period of seven months in 1974, at the young and tender age of 22, the writer travelled from Jammu (Kashmir) by road to Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and, had the opportunity of seeing for himself some of the issues raised in this paper. Had the opportunity of mingling with the locals of different religions and cultures of these countries and battled the harsh terrains and, saw the magnificent sceneries’, the diverse and rich cultures of magnificent, proud and intellectual people, in spite of a sea of

Theory as Thought: Britain and German Unification

Inspired by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein's call for analytic eclecticism and making use of newly available, previously classified archival documents, we distill the essential logics of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism and examine their role in shaping the debates amongst British policymakers in the context of German unification in 1989-90. We find that, although all the theoretical logics help shape the policymaking surrounding unification, none stands alone as a basis for understanding social reality. Indeed, all functioned together as British policymakers thought in terms of theory to make sense of German unification. The logic of realism clearly played an important role in shaping the perceptions of top British leadership, particularly Margaret Thatcher, of German unification as a problem. But realism did not determine the solution to the "problem." Instead, British policymakers drew on the logic embedded in neoliberal institutionalism, turning to institutions to manage the unification process. The reason for this can be found in the role of constructivist logics-particularly identity and rhetorical entrapment-that constrained British policymakers to cooperative policy options. By taking this approach, this article makes several important contributions. First, it sheds light on British policy during a critical historical moment. Second, it significantly improves understanding regarding Germany's historical and current place in Europe. Third, it ties major theoretical traditions together through a foreign policy analytical approach, and in the process suggests that many of the theoretical boundaries separating scholars are overdrawn. Finally, the article pushes international relations scholars to keep in mind the complex relationship between reality and theory. In the final analysis, bringing to bear these three perspectives highlights the complexity of the processes that produced British policy-and by extension those that shaped German unification-as well as the importance of breaking free of the strictures of the ideas versus materiality debate.

Great Britain and the Bulgarian‑Yugoslavian Rapprochement (Fall 1944‑Winter 1945)

Due to their geographical position in the vicinity of the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, where the main routes to British colonies started, the Balkans were always an important region of Europe for London. Therefore, when towards the end of World War II, Britain’s influence in Greece and Turkey was endangered by the projected union of communist Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, both within the Kremlin’s orbit, the British leadership firmly counteracted. On the one hand, Churchill made an agreement with Stalin on retaining Greece under almost exclusive influence of the Anglo‑Saxon powers. On the other hand, the Foreign Office issued a strong objection to Moscow regarding the concept of federalization of both Southern Slavic states, which, from London’s point of view, would be conducive to the the expansion of communism from those countries and with the main role of the Soviet Union. The British attempts led to breaking the Yugoslavian‑Bulgarian negotiations regarding the federation, which was, paradoxically, beneficial also for Moscow, Sofia, and even Belgrade, which initially made efforts to implement this plan without delay.

‘Cornerstone of the Commonwealth’: The Press Union and the Preservation of the Penny Cable Rate, 1941–67

The article examines the protracted commitment of the Commonwealth Press Union (formerly the Empire Press Union) to maintaining cheap press rates during the post-war period as a means of promoting information exchange and co-operation among commonwealth countries. In documenting the strenuous efforts of the Press Union, ultimately unsuccessful, to resist calls, from the late 1950s onwards, for increased press cable charges, the article demonstrates that the Press Union's ongoing defence of the commonwealth press rate extended beyond its British leadership to include longstanding member countries, such as Australia, which had traditionally been disadvantaged by distance from London and exorbitant communication charges. Consequently, its protracted defence of the penny cable rate constitutes an important, if neglected, episode in understanding the changing character of commonwealth relations in the critical post-war years.

The men who lost America: British leadership, the American Revolution, and the fate of the empire

The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire By Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013 466 pages $30.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] This work provides a welcome reappraisal of the British loss of their American colonies, i.e., the American Revolution during 1775-83, in the context of British global strategic decisionmaking. The subject is not new. Author Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy credits Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (1964, reprinted 1992), on the first page of the Acknowledgment, highlighting Mackesy's belief that the war was winnable but was lost to poor generalship, among other things. O'Shaughnessy states clearly that American victory was not inevitable. It is a somewhat harder task to challenge the conventional wisdom that the British loss was due to incompetence and mediocre leadership, both political and military. The author packages the monograph in nine biographical chapters, examining ten British leaders at policy, strategic, and theater strategic/operational levels, in sequence: King George III; Lord North as prime minister; the Howe brothers, Admiral Lord Richard and Lieutenant General Sir William; Major General John Burgoyne; Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, a third Secretary of State created in 1768; Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton; Major General Charles, 1st Marquis Cornwallis; Admiral Sir George Rodney; and John Montague, Earl of Sandwich, as First Lord of the Admiralty. The work features senior leaders wrestling with an unprecedented set of problems, in the author's words obstacles of such magnitude. He explains their decisionmaking in the overall context of the eighteenth century; the nature of the English state, extant political institutions, and their processes; global strategy; and ultimately the nature of the military element of power, land and naval. For example, despite the previously showcased ministry of Sir Robert Walpole in British history, O'Shaughnessy underlines the as-yet evolutionary nature of English government at the time, especially the gradual development of true cabinet government with collective ministerial responsibility. His interpretation is not without controversy, at least insofar as extant practice to ensure political survival resulted in conduct for collective shielding. He believes the most fundamental miscalculation of these senior leaders was the belief that Loyalists constituted a majority of the population in America. Moreover, these same leaders did not understand the changes that took place in the war's nature. Its length, seeming without end, increased popular antipathy toward British military presence. Significantly, O'Shaughnessy cites the Declaration of Independence as a seminal document for genuine, revolutionary change: a radical republican creed which beckoned a better future. Furthermore, in current terms, he sees a serious imbalance in ends, ways, and means. He highlights the major aspects of the post-war drawdown after 1748, following the end of the War of Austrian Succession. He concludes that both the Royal Navy and British Army were too small for the task at hand. The latter simply lacked the strength to conquer and occupy the American colonies, especially given the alacrity with which Patriot forces had taken control of established institutions, further underlining Loyalist weaknesses. Multiple demands upon military power exacerbated this imbalance. O'Shaughnessy repeatedly reminds readers to comprehend Britain's global responsibilities. War against the thirteen American colonies occurred with simultaneous concerns for Canada, the Caribbean, India, and Europe itself. These other theaters became ones of pressing urgency with French and others' active intervention in the war from 1778. …

Ahmedabad's Home Remedies: Housing in the Re-Making of an Industrial City, 1920–1960

Long known as innovative in modernist architecture, mid century Ahmedabad was also pioneering in another area of built form: housing. Starting in the 1920s when Indians seized control of urban politics, Ahmedabadis launched a number of bold new initiatives to improve housing in the city, involving a striking range of actors—labour activists, middle-class reformers, mill owners, and municipal leaders. Largely ignored under earlier British leadership, housing became a key way for Ahmedabadis to lay claim to a new, more inclusive vision of the city. Although housing continued to play a prominent role in politics after Independence, the 1950s actually marked a retreat from that earlier inclusive vision, ultimately enshrining the class and community segregation that marks Ahmedabad today.

The European Union and sub-Saharan Africa – from intervention towards deterrence?

This article argues that aspirations of maintaining a dominant influence over sub-Saharan security issues has spurred the French and British leadership of European Union (EU) foreign and security policy integration, just as it has informed military capability expansions by the armed forces of the main EU powers. While Europe's initial African focus was on stabilising a continent marred by state failure, civil wars and genocides, changes in the global security context, especially the shift towards multipolarity manifest in China's growing engagement, has prompted a complementary focus on deterring other powers from making military inroads into the subcontinent. Hence Europe's sub-Saharan security focus is shifting from stabilisation towards deterrence. This helps explain recent military procurements which, in spite of the extremely challenging fiscal position of most EU member states, feature large-scale investments in long-range deterrence capabilities.

War Pessimism in Britain and an American Peace in Early 1916

By offering a reinterpretation of an Anglo-American pact known as the House-Grey Memorandum, this article challenges prevailing views about British decision-making in 1916 in the months leading up to the Battle of the Somme. It argues that serious doubts that the war could still be won without American assistance were the defining characteristic of their deliberations. Owing to deep scepticism about the proposed offensive and severe worries about their financial resources, a majority of the key British civilian leaders were prepared to accept a compromise peace mediated by the United States. Yet these efforts failed primarily because of intrigue at the highest levels of British politics, hard-line Conservative opposition and serious diplomatic missteps by American President Woodrow Wilson. In the end, although doubting it would produce any meaningful results, the British civilian leadership allowed the Somme offensive to go forward only because of their failure to unite on another course of action to prevent it. Finally, this study significantly revises existing thinking about American diplomacy during this period by challenging prevailing notions of the practicality and rigidity demonstrated by U.S. leaders in their foreign policy.

Tweaking the Lion's Tail: Edgar J. Tarr, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and the British Empire, 1931–1950

In its first 2 decades the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), Canada's premier foreign policy think tank, never functioned merely as a neutral and apolitical research organization. Under the leadership of Edgar Tarr, president of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, and in its capacity as the Canadian Council of the transnational Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), in the 1930s and 1940s the CIIA became an instrument that championed Canadian national autonomy and sought to expand Canada's international role, while challenging British imperialism, racism, and Anglo–Saxon dominance. Prominent Canadian diplomats and other officials were complicit in this enterprise, which reached its apogee at the IPR conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942. The CIIA's activities during this period revealed the porosity and imprecision of the boundaries in Canada between the state and non-state realms. Throughout World War II, DEA and other Canadian government representatives attended CIIA and IPR conferences as “official non-officials,” effectively cooperating with private individuals in a network of purportedly non-governmental organizations that enabled Canada to exert leverage on the British government, reject British leadership, align itself with the United States, and secure a greater world role. CIIA leaders and Canadian officials also consciously encouraged nationalist forces in India, China, and Southeast Asia that sought to reject colonial rule and Western dominance. CIIA activities thus became part of a web of diplomatic interactions across a transnational network of think tanks within and outside the British Empire that had their own impact upon international affairs.

Planning Armageddon: British economic warfare and the First World War

Before the First World War, the British Admiralty conceived a plan to win rapid victory in the event of war with Germany--economic warfare on an unprecedented scale.This secret strategy called for the state to exploit Britain's effective monopolies in banking, communications, and shipping--the essential infrastructure underpinning global trade--to create a controlled implosion of the world economic system. In this revisionist account, Nicholas Lambert shows in lively detail how naval planners persuaded the British leadership that systematic disruption of the global economy could bring about German military paralysis. After the outbreak of hostilities, the government shied away from full implementation upon realizing the extent of likely collateral damage--political, social, economic, and diplomatic--to both Britain and neutral countries. Woodrow Wilson in particular bristled at British restrictions on trade. A new, less disruptive approach to economic coercion was hastily improvised. The result was the blockade, ostensibly intended to starve Germany. It proved largely ineffective because of the massive influence of economic interests on national ambitions and the continued interdependencies of all countries upon the smooth functioning of the global trading system. Lambert's interpretation entirely overturns the conventional understanding of British strategy in the early part of the First World War and underscores the importance in any analysis of strategic policy of understanding Clausewitz's political conditions of war.

‘British Leadership is Experienced, Cool-Headed and Predictable’:Anglo-Danish relations and the United States from the end of the Second World War to the Cold War

This article analyses and portrays the bilateral relationship between Great Britain and Denmark from the end of the Second World War to 1951. It is shown how Great Britain played an important role for Denmark in this period both as a trading partner and as a political partner. This state of affairs was primarily due to most Danish politicians holding a dichotomous view on the still more influential partner in the far west, the United States. In the early post-war years, Denmark thus relied on Britain in both major and minor matters. It is argued that Britain exploited this state of affairs to promote British policies and political as well as economic interests in the still more important Nordic region in an era where British influence on world politics was diminishing and where British policies were certainly not always in concordance with American policies.

A German Preference for a Medium-Range Battle? British Assumptions about German Naval Gunnery, 1914–1915

In several recent studies of the Royal Navy a theory has emerged about the development of British battle-fleet tactics. It is suggested that, in the period leading up to the battle of Jutland, the Admiralty possessed intelligence which indicated that the German naval leadership, if it sought to fight at all, wanted to engage at medium range, where its superior secondary batteries and heavier torpedo armament could be used to maximum advantage. Rather than seeking to frustrate this desire by manoeuvring to keep the battle at long range, the British, it has been argued, decided to accommodate to the German preference, but only with a view to using their superior main armament to unleash a concentrated five-minute pulse of fire at the approaching German vessels, before turning away. This article looks at one of the underpinnings of this argument, namely British intelligence on German gunnery. It shows that from the start of the First World War, if not earlier, the Admiralty had information that contested the idea that the Germans wanted a medium-range engagement. Not only was it discovered that the Germans had been practising long-range firing for some years, but, in addition, early wartime encounters with German vessels, for example at the battle of the Falkland Islands, showed that they had developed considerable proficiency in it. This quickly led the Royal Navy’s top leadership to the conclusion that engagements at maximum range rather than medium range might better reflect both German capabilities and intentions and that British tactics would need to take this into account. In the light of this finding, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, which have defied obvious explanation when it was assumed that the British naval leadership expected the Germans to seek a medium-range engagement, can now be put into a more logical context.

Saving civilization from empire: Belligerency, pacifism and the two faces of civilization during the Second Opium War

Conventional accounts of international society’s expansion have traditionally emphasized the role played by ‘civilizing missions’ in facilitating and legitimating European aggression and imperial expansion. Conversely, in this article, I demonstrate that the relationship between imperial violence and the rhetoric of ‘civilizing missions’ was far more contested and contingent than International Relations scholars have generally assumed. Using the parliamentary debate surrounding Britain’s involvement in the Second Opium War as a case study, I reveal that civilizational rhetoric in the 1857 ‘China debate’ was equally implicated in both anti-imperialist and imperialist agendas. Richard Cobden’s victory in the debate over Palmerston’s pro-war ministry further illustrates the political potency of appeals to civilization as a brake — however temporary — on Britain’s imperial expansion. An appreciation of civilization’s janus-faced character — as a rhetorical commonplace that at different times abetted and inhibited imperial aggression — is therefore critical if we are to comprehend the halting and arrhythmic pattern of international society’s progressive expansion under British leadership in the mid-Victorian period.

Say, Sismondi e o debate continental sobre os mercados

O artigo versa sobre o debate travado entre Say e Sismondi a respeito da possibilidade de saturação geral dos mercados. Na primeira seção, descreve-se o contexto histórico da Europa continental nas primeiras décadas do século 19, destacando-se as particularidades da experiência francesa de industrialização ante a liderança britânica nesse campo. A seguir, traça-se breve perfil da formação intelectual de Say a fim de apresentar sua visão sobre o funcionamento dos mercados. Na continuação, examina-se a perspectiva histórica de Sismondi em sua crítica da ortodoxia clássica, bem como sua versão para a tendência do sistema capitalista à superprodução. Nas duas últimas partes, recuperam-se os comentários recíprocos de Say e Sismondi a respeito de suas divergências teóricas sobre os limites da acumulação de capital.

Europeanising the National Interest: Tony Blair's and New Labour's Lost Objective

The UK's well documented reluctance concerning a deepening engagement with Europe came under challenge from Tony Blair's New Labour Party once it had assumed governmental office in 1997.From the outset it appeared that a pro-European discourse might be successfully constructed, one that sought to correlate Britain's national interest with the interests of its continental neighbours. More specifically, the discourse created was intended not only to convert much of British public opinion but additionally to help force through an agenda promoting British leadership in the European Union. This article focuses on the origins, the course and subsequent failure of the discourse. In so doing, it provides a critique of Blair's leadership in matters of European policy initiatives and shows how any failure to Europeanise the national interest can be largely attributed to 10 Downing Street.

The Ethics of Terror Bombing: Beyond Supreme Emergency

Recent years have seen a revival of interest in Michael Walzer's doctrine of ‘supreme emergency’. Simply put, the doctrine holds that, when a state confronts an opponent who threatens annihilation, it can be morally legitimate to violate one of the cardinal rules of the war convention – the principle of non-combatant immunity. Walzer cites the case of Britain's decision to bomb German cities in 1940 as a case in point. Although the theory of supreme emergency has been scrutinised, the historical case that Walzer refers to has not been looked at in depth. This article seeks to remedy this problem by asking whether the principle actors involved in the decision to bomb German cities understood themselves to be in a supreme emergency. It argues that the British leadership never openly admitted that they were in fact targeting German civilians, and that the principle reason for this was a widespread belief that the British and American publics would not support such a campaign. As a result, throughout the war, the British government publicly maintained the fiction that the devastation of German cities was a collateral product of attacks on its industrial infrastructure. This, in turn, suggests that liberal societies – even those facing imminent destruction – do not tend to support a relaxing of the rules of non-combatant immunity, suggesting that the prohibition on deliberately killing non-combatants may be more embedded than has hitherto been thought.

Political Centralization and Policy Constraint in British Executive Leadership: Lessons from American Presidential Studies in the Era of Sofa Politics

Despite often superficial comparisons of British executive authority and American presidentialism over the past three decades, British politics has yet to develop anything approaching a sub-discipline of leadership or executive studies. Owing to the increased bifurcation of political and policy authority in Britain, whereby an increasing centralization-personalization of politics coexists with growing policy constraint, this paper argues that British politics could now benefit from incorporating theories and frameworks developed in the American context for understanding prime ministerial power. The fragmentation of the governing environment in Britain, combined with a centralization of executive power, suggests that models of American presidential leadership can help explicate and improve our understanding of changing executive politics on this side of the Atlantic. This paper investigates the pertinence of theories of presidential leadership to Britain, arguing that the classic Neustadtian model of the ‘politics of persuasion’ possibly has greater resonance with British executive leadership than American owing to the more extreme polarization of presidential power in the United States. Bringing a leadership perspective to executive politics, we argue, invites scholars to pose a host of previously unexplored research questions that promise to provide a more differentiated, sophisticated and nuanced portrait of policy and political leadership in Britain than that offered by standard institutional perspectives that emphasize the strength of executive authority and thus ‘black box’ matters of leadership.