British Foreign Policy-making Research Articles

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The late Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at the Foreign Office and Director of Chatham House, once perceptively remarked that British foreign policy-makers had a degree of latitude, as they were insulated to a significant degree from public criticism, provided decisions were kept within the bounds of a reasonably wide spectrum of options. At that time, ministers and their official advisers were seemingly able to draw a pragmatic distinction between purely domestic issues and demands and external pressures from a variety of sources. Of course, in times of crisis, public interest, protest and debate were spurred by intense media controversy, as in the 1973 debate about joining the European Economic Community. Defence, too, provoked argument, especially over the issue of Britain's nuclear capability, but, by and large, foreign policy was bipartisan in character: support for NATO, the special relationship with the United States and the influence accorded to Britain with its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, participation in the Korean War and the Malayan counter-insurgency campaign in the 1950s were clear evidence of Britain's standing as a Great Power with an influential role in world affairs. And this aspiration was rarely challenged by a public beginning to enjoy domestic prosperity following the austerity of the immediate postwar years.

Rethinking Britain's Foreign Policy and the Occupation Zone in Germany 1945–1947: Questions of Structural and Functional Continuity in British Foreign Policy-Making

ABSTRACTThis article uses a detailed examination of British policy towards the occupation zone in Germany after World War II as a lens through which to illuminate enduring elements of structural and functional continuity in British foreign policy-making. Many of the problems facing British policy-makers in the post-World War II era replicated those relating to the occupation of the Rhineland and Ruhr in the early 1920s. Analysing the response of British policy-making to these resonances highlights underlying thematic trends in overall British foreign policy. The areas of continuity revealed challenge traditional historiographical views that foreign policy was shaped by elite group thinking in the Foreign Office. This article also evaluates British foreign policy in the light of recent developments in the historiography of the Cold War. Recent scholarship emphasises the multi-faceted and organic nature of the Cold War and highlights the difficulties involved in approaching issues such as ideology when the states involved were varied and had different infrastructures, cultures and foreign policy traditions and systems. By drawing out deeper resonances in foreign policy-making, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of the culture and tensions through which British policy was generated in the post-World War II period.

‘No more Hoares to Paris’: British foreign policymaking and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935

AbstractItaly's invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 prompted a major European crisis. This article applies the main theories of foreign policy analysis to the British Government's handling of this crisis. It argues that bureaucratic politics existed, but had little impact on outcomes. Domestic politics had more influence, but did not provide detailed instructions on how to act. The perceptions of key actors, informed by reasoned judgement, determined this. Fears of the threat posed by rival states coalesced with concerns about Britain's own military weakness, leading decision-makers to emphasise the need to act in tandem with France. British policy was therefore motivated by the tension between the public's desire to see action against Italy and the Government's wish to minimise any breach with her allies. These findings highlight the weaknesses of the bureaucratic politics model and show how domestic politics can affect foreign policy outcomes. They also demonstrate the interaction between rational analysis defined in terms of reasoned judgement, and actors' perceptions. It is thus argued that benefits are to be gleaned from combining these theories.

From Case to Narrative: The Marquess of Lansdowne, Sir Edward Grey, and the Threat from Germany, 1900–1906

The former Conservative and Unionist prime minister, Arthur Balfour, contributed an article in 1912 to the German magazine Nord und Süd in which he explained why the ‘English point of view’s viewed Germany with ‘deep uneasiness’s. His theme was the role of narrative in Anglo-German relations: British anxieties stemmed from the interpretation that people ‘have thought themselves obliged to place upon a series of facts, or supposed facts, each of which taken by itself might be of small moment, but which taken together can neither be lightly treated nor calmly ignored’s. The building of a large fleet, the arms race, the demands for territory, and the threats to Europe's small states, notably the Netherlands and Belgium, made an Anglo-German war appear increasingly likely. If Germany wanted to improve relations with Britain, Balfour concluded, it had to prove its love for peace by co-operating with other states. A longer narrative underlay the famous memorandum written five years earlier by the head of the western department of the foreign office, Eyre Crowe. For him, the ‘maintenance of a state of tension and antagonism between Third Powers’s had characterized German foreign policy since the time of Prince Bismarck, whose bid for colonies had been an act of ‘direct and unmistakable hostility’s to Britain. By the time Crowe put pen to paper, in January 1907, German antagonism had become a feature in the landscape of British foreign policy-makers.

Deputizing in war: British policies and predicaments in Iraq, 200307

This article explores UK involvement in the war in Iraq since the invasion of 2003. It explores three different dimensions of UK involvement: British control over the four southern governorates, the role of UK policy-makers and advisors in Green Zone politics, and British policies on the international stage in support of their stance in and towards Iraq. It does so by placing British foreign policy under the Blair government in the context of the overall objective of serving as a transatlantic bridge, a position that is central to how British foreign policy-makers operate but which has become increasingly incoherent in light of the severe differences between the United States and the major continental European states over the invasion of Iraq. The effect of British involvement, however, has not been neutralized by this incoherence; in fact, in crucial dimensions, it has added to the process of Iraq's fragmentation.

Choosing between America and Europe: a new context for British foreign policy

Power in Britain has changed hands from a prime minister who sought to balance intense UK-US consultation on foreign policy with the ambition to be ‘at the heart of Europe’ to one whose approach towards both the United States and the European Union has yet to be tested. It is an appropriate moment, there fore, to assess how these two contextual poles of British foreign policy-making have changed over recent years and what this might mean for UK foreign policy choices. The premise of this article is that the days are now largely over when the UK can or should start out by trying to build an Anglo-US position on a foreign policy challenge before trying to tie in the European and transatlantic positions. The UK is now a central player in the development of increasingly activist European foreign policies, whether these can later be coordinated effectively with the United States or not. A strong, bilateral relationship continues to serve the interests of both sides on multiple levels, but this relationship does not sit upon the same foundations as during the Cold War. There are now significant underlying factors, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the US and July 7 2005 in the UK, that pull the US away from Europe and the UK, while pushing the UK towards Europe as the first port of call in developing foreign policy strategies. It is also notable that, today, UK positions on most global issues and foreign policy challenges tend to conform more closely to the dominant EU line than to the United States. On balance, the UK might think about European integration more from a US than from a European perspective, but it now thinks about global problems more from a European than from a US or transatlantic perspective.

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post–World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.

Ethical policies or empty promises? New labour and human rights in British foreign policymaking

Since the announcement of a mission statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in May 1997, debates on British foreign policy have tended to focus on the ideas of ‘ethical foreign policy’ or ‘ethical dimensions’ and evaluated policy decisions according to how they fit with these frames. However, human rights were a key component of New Labour's approach to foreign policy. By analysing the differing treatment of human rights between the Conservative and New Labour administrations, this article seeks to assess how far policy attitudes have changed in this respect. It also notes the bureaucratic effects that persist – despite an apparent decline in ministerial support.

Raising Frankenstein: Great Britain, ‘Balkanism’ and the Search for a Balkanlocarno in the 1920s

This paper explores the utility of the interpretive device of ‘Balkanism’ for the analysis of British foreign policy-making in the 1920s. It does so through the case study of the efforts to construct a regional security pact involving guarantee and arbitration treaties reconciling former enemies, a so-called ‘Balkan Locarno’. This was not the most important or fruitful initiative in interwar diplomacy, but it is nonetheless revealing. On the one hand, it illustrated the existence amongst British policy-makers of a network of deeply embedded negative and essentialising assumptions about the region and its peoples. On the other, it casts new light on the nature of the 1925 Locarno settlement itself: the terms in which British policy-makers construed the extension of the Locarno principles indicates that in endowing it with mythic significance, they overlooked the fact that it was concluded only because of the coincidence at a particular moment of otherwise divergent national interests.

London's policies towards British volunteers for the International Brigades: an attempt to safeguard her precarious diplomacy

British foreign policymakers saw the Spanish Civil War as a vital issue in avoiding a European conflagration. They saw the British volunteers as a hindrance to British diplomacy. If the Spanish Civil War were allowed to complicate the relationship with Italy, France, and Germany, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and others in the British Government believed that Europe might spiral into a world war. As Britain tried to stay neutral, the volunteers for the International Brigades were seen as a possible complication to these relationships. British policymakers believed the Spanish issue was the key to European war or peace. Some historians have argued that class and political prejudices rather than strategic considerations motivated leaders in the British Government. This article will argue that close reading of the top decision-makers' motivations does not support this thesis. Eden and others in the British Government believed that the volunteers had the potential to upset the delicate European balance of power, and to drive Europe closer to war, and thus they attempted to restrict Britons from going to Spain and attempted to withdraw them once they were there.

‘The veiled protectorate of Kowait’: liberalized imperialism and British efforts to influence Kuwaiti domestic policy during the reign of Sheikh Ahmad al‐Jaber, 1938–50

British foreign policy-makers confronted a difficult quandary when in the late 1930s exportable quantities of oil were discovered in Kuwait. The discovery transformed Kuwait from an obscure corner of the British imperial map significant only for securing the route to India to an important, if not critical, strategic and economic asset. Grasping Kuwait's new-found importance, British strategists quickly realized that they could take full advantage of Kuwait's oil resources only if they were able to exert influence over Kuwait's domestic policies. The structure of Britain's treaties with Kuwait, however, denied such a prospect. In 1899, when the Government of India negotiated the first treaty governing Britain's relationship with Kuwait, Kuwait's only value was its strategic location along the sea lanes to India. Britain consequently had negotiated control only of Kuwait's foreign relations, and had solemnly pledged not to interfere in matters of domestic concern. But as British strategists now discovered, such an arrangement was satisfactory only so long as Kuwait remained a quiet port concerned with pearl diving and localized trade; with oil revenue now flooding Kuwaiti coffers, allowing the Kuwaitis to manage their internal affairs without British guidance was no longer acceptable. The Kuwaitis, however, were hardly prepared to relinquish their right to unimpeded self-government. Thus, British interests and politico-legal realities confronted head on. As a result, the British were compelled to try to reconfigure their relationship with Kuwait in such a way that would give them influence over Kuwaiti affairs yet would violate neither their treaty obligations nor emerging liberal international norms. Over the ensuing decade, two strategies were devised: first, promotion of limited liberalization and democratization; and second, when that failed to yield acceptable results, attempts to persuade Kuwait to

The dilemma of French foreign policy

The special position enjoyed by France on the international scene has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. German unification and Germany's place within the Community present France with a set of new challenges. Following on from William Wallace's article on the new problems facing British foreign policy-making ('International Affairs', July 1992), Daniel Vernet now discusses the historical background to the present French 'obsession' with its role in the world, and the possible way forward for France within an integrated Europe.

Groupthink and Integrative Complexity in British Foreign Policy-Making: the Munich Case

Walker, S. G. and Watson, G. L. Groupthink and Integrative Complexity in British Foreign Policy-Making: the Munich Case. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIV, 1989, 199-212. We focus in this paper upon the groupthink construct as a partial explanation for the flawed decision-making by British leaders in managing the Munich crisis with Germany. In order to assess its explanatory power, we follow the precedent established in previous case studies, which explore the link between groupthink and the levels of integrative complexity exhibited by decision-makers. The hypothesis linking the two phenomena is that in cases where groupthink is present, the level of integrative complexity will be significantly lower than in cases where it is absent. The Munich case is a particularly appropriate case for replicating the test of this hypothesis because, unlike other groupthink cases, it did not lead to unsuccessful military interventions or escalations. Our results indicate that: (1) groupthink existed in the Munich case; however, it did not persist throughout the entire crisis. (2) Its presence and absence within the crisis fluctuated consistently with the expectations associated with the theory which accounts for its dynamics. (3) The integrative complexity exhibited by Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax varied as predicted by the hypothesis linking it with groupthink.

The British Foreign Policy-Making Elite - D. C. Watt: Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. Pp. xii276. $6.00.)

The British Foreign Policy-Making Elite - D. C. Watt: Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. Pp. xii276. $6.00.) - Volume 29 Issue 1

America and the British Foreign Policy-Making Elite, from Joseph Chamberlain to Anthony Eden, 1895–1956

This study suggested itself to the author when he noticed that such work as had been done on British attitudes to America fell into two main divisions: (a) studies, usually of American origin, of movements in the mass of British opinion; (b) studies of the radical and politically “nonconformist” elements in British political society. Both of these seemed to the author to be vitiated as contributions to the understanding of the various developments of Anglo-American relations, the former because the social structure of British political power does not weigh mass movements of opinion very highly, the latter because in the 61 years from 1895–1956, radical elements have controlled British foreign policy for a mere eight years and disputed control only for a further six.