Mind-brain Relationship Research Articles

Consciousness: Some Basic Issues— A Neurophilosophical Perspective

This paper concentrates on the basic properties of “consciousness” that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception—Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. This includes a discussion of the concept of the body-image, phantom limbs, the alleged projection of sensations, the ontological status of phenomenal space, the homunculus argument, the validity of topographic coding, the difference between the stimulus field and the visual field, and two theories of brain–mind relationship—the Identity Theory and the Bohr–Heisenberg theory of brain–mind complementarity. Finally I suggest that the binocular rivalry obtained in the case of the stroboscopic patterns that result from intermittent photic stimulation of one eye, when used in animal expeiments with unit recording, offers a good experimental method of investigating the binding problem.

Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: A thermodynamic-holographic resolution to the mind-body problem

This address describes Neurological Positivism's (NP) energetic evolution of consciousness, mind, and the brain-mind relationship within a model that integrates ideas and research from chaos theory, Pribram's holonomic brain theory, evolutionary theory, and the laws of thermodynamics (the energy laws The energetic evolution and encapsulation of space-time consciousness from chaotic-holographic environments is described. Consciousness is described as a natural evolutionary space-time template of continuously generated self-referential energy patterns (algorithms). The energetic evolution of mind is described as a natural self-referential exteriorization of the algorithmic organization of consciousness in the form of culturally shared mental models. It is proposed that the brain-mind energy relationship has historically undergone and continues to undergo change, and that this change is a natural thermodynamic arrow that constitutes the evolution of culture. That is, the evolution of culture proceeds in the direction of progressively more complete and efficient exteriorizations of the algorithmic organization of the brain-thus, for example, the recent evolution of brain-like computing systems and virtual reality systems. Accordingly, an uneven, but closing, central-energy-state identity (self-similarity) between brain and mind is described. It is concluded that NP's conception of mind helps us understand the evolutionary unfoldment of culture, and provides a sense of direction as to its future.

The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology

I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which arguably lies behind the Churchlands' strongest criticisms of anti-reductionism — namely the complaint that anti-reductionists fail to supply principled explanations for the character of the mind-brain relationship. While lending support to anti-reductionism, the view defended here also insures a permanent place for mind-brain reduction as an explanatory ideal analogous to Newtonian inertial motion or Aristotelian natural motion.

Psychobiology and the brain-mind relationship

Psychobiology and the brain-mind relationship

Popper's three world theory of mind-brain relationship

Popper's three world theory of mind-brain relationship

Brain, Mind and Dementia: With Particular Reference to Alzheimer's Disease

ABSTRACTA new theoretical framework for understanding and working with the dementing illnesses of old age is presented, and explicated with particular reference to senile dementia of the Alzheimer type. For several reasons the commonly accepted model, which assumes a simple linear causal relationship between neuropathology and dementia, is inadequate. A more comprehensive model, grounded in a monistic view of the mind-brain relationship, must take into account not only the psychological states that correspond to particular brain states, but also both developmental and pathological aspects of brain structure. Using this we can describe the dementing process, ‘normal’ psychological functioning in old age, pseudodementia and ‘benign senescent forgetfulness’. Further, the scope for some degree of ‘rementia’ is explored.

Science, Values, and Survival

In the context of today's mounting global problems, the relative demand for medical, educational, and related social benefits that derive from the neurosciences is diminished. At the same time the human value spin-offs of brain research and related sciences are thrust into a strategic position of top concern because of their key role as criteria for policy priorities and decision-making guidelines. Recent conceptual developments in the mind-brain sciences rejecting reductionism and mechanistic determinism on the one side and dualisms on the other clear the way for a rational, realistic approach to the theory and prescription of values and to a natural fusion of science with ethics and religion. Science can be upheld as the best route to an increased understanding and rapport with the forces that made and move the universe and created humanity. The outlines for a global ethic emerge that include reverent respect for nature and the evolving quality of the biosphere, which, if implemented, would set in motion the kind of social change needed to lead us out of the vicious spirals of increasing population, pollution, poverty, energy demands, and so on. The strategic importance of neuroscience and the central role of prevailing concepts of the mind-brain relation to all of the foregoing remain evident throughout, as does also the direct relevance of efforts to bring added insight and substantiation of these mind-brain concepts through further advances in brain research.

What Happens to Accounts of Mind-Brain Relations If We Forego An Architecture of Rules and Representations?

While some philosophers have assumed that there are only two options for characterizing the ontological status of mental models in cognitive information processing psychology--treating them as nearly autonomous from theories of brain activity (Putnam 1975 and Fodor 1974) or eliminating them in favor of neuroscience accounts (Churchland 1979)-- cognitive scientists have often tacitly assumed a third option. This involves treating the mental models as systems of rules and representations that are instantiated in the nervous system much in the way computer programs are instantiated in computers. While this seems to be the position of those endorsing the autonomy of psychology, it, in fact is consistent with a much weaker interpretation if one recognizes that the vehicle in which mental processes or computer programs are instantiated may limit and constrain what kinds of mental processes or computer programs can be instantiated.

Subjective antedating of a sensory experience and mind—brain theories: Reply to Honderich (1984)

Honderich claims that our "delay-and-antedating" hypothesis, of a delay in cerebral production combined with a subjective antedating of a conscious sensory experience, involves self-contradiction which may cast doubt on some of our experimental findings and on the hypothesis. This claim misses the distinction between the phenomenological subjective mental content of an experience and the physical-neuronal configuration that elicits the experience; also, it cannot explain the experimentally observed discrepancy, between subjective timing and the empirically delayed time for cerebral adequacy for eliciting the experience, found when stimulating a subcortical sensory pathway. Honderich usefully distinguishes between our stated (delay-and-antedating) hypothesis and a different though unacceptable one which would have serious implications for mind-brain theories. The delay-and-antedating hypothesis does not provide a formally definitive contradiction of monist-identity theory (of the mind-brain relationship). However, our experimentally based hypothesis does dissociate subjective/mental timing from the actual physical/neuronal time of an experience. This phenomenon, though conceptually strange, must be encompassed by any mind-brain theory.

Organic Mental Disease

The potentially curable causes of progressive intellectual deterioration represent the most overlooked treatable medical conditions in America (Geschwind). Freemon's monograph on these conditions is a well-written and comprehensive modern introduction to the phenomena of organic mental disease. Pointing out the brain-mind relationship, he reminds us all of the dilemma as to whether these are neurological or psychiatric conditions. Specialists in both fields, as well as the general physician, still have the tendency to slough these problems off. After reading Freemon's book, one is able to grasp a better understanding of the problem and the potential for better management of these patients. Failure to recognize and accept these conditions is probably the single greatest impediment to understanding organic mental dysfunction and to proper and human treatment of the many patients who suffer from these disorders. Freemon's 11 chapters begin with a general discussion of neuroanatomy and physiology in chapters on the

The Hebbian perspective on mind-brain relations.

The Hebbian perspective on mind-brain relations.

Mind-brain interaction. Mentalism, yes; dualism, no

A traditional working hypothesis in neuroscience holds that a complete account of brain function is possible, in principle, in strictly neurophysiological terms without invoking conscious or mental agents; the neural correlates of subjective experience are conceived to exert causal influence but not mental qualities per se. This long established materialist-behaviorist principle has been challenged in recent years by the introduction of a modified concept of the mind-brain relation in which consciousness is conceived to be emergent and causal. Psychophysical interaction is explained in terms of the emergence in nesting brain hierarchies of high order, functionally derived, mental properties that interact by laws and principles different from, and not reducible to those of neurophysiology. Reciprocal upward and downward, interlevel determination of the mental and neural action is accounted for on these terms without violating the principles of scientific explanation and without reducing the qualities of inner experience to those of physiology. Interaction of mind and brain becomes not only conceivable and scientifically tenable, but more plausible in some respects than were the older parallelist and identity views of the materialist position. This revised concept of consciousness as causal, with its recognition of mental phenomena as explanatory constructs in science, has brought a marked change during the past decade in the scientific status of consciousness and of mental and cognitive phenomena generally. Resultant mentalist trends within science have been accompanied also by a corollary rise in acceptance of various mentalist-related concepts and dualist beliefs in the supernatural, the paranormal, and in unembodied forms of conscious existence that receive no logical support from the new mind-brain concepts of neuroscience. Reasons are advanced to show that our latest mind brain model is fundamentally monistic and not only fails to support dualism, but serves to further discount fading prospects for finding dualist forms or domains of conscious experience not embodied in a functioning brain.

Changing Priorities

In the context of today's mounting global problems the relative demand for medical, educational, and related social benefits that derive from the neurosciences is diminished. At the same time the human value spin-offs of brain research are thrust into a strategic position of top concern because of their key role as criteria or policy priorities and decision-making guidelines. Recent conceptual developments in the mind-brain sciences rejecting reductionism and mechanistic determinism on the one side, and dualisms on the other, clear the way for a rational approach to the theory and prescription of values and to natural fusion of science and religion. Science can be upheld as the best route to an increased understanding and report with the forces that made and move the universe and created man. The outlines of the value-belief system emerge that include an ultimate respect for nature and the evolving quality of the biosphere, which, if implemented, would set in motion the kind of social change needed to lead us out of the viscious spirals of increasing population, pollution, poverty, energy demands, etc. The strategic importance of neuroscience and the central role of prevailing concepts of the mind-brain relation to all of the foregoing remain evident throughout, as does also the direct relevance of efforts to bring added insight and substantiation of these mind-brain concepts through further advances in brain research.

Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no

A traditional working hypothesis in neuroscience holds that a complete account of brain function is possible, in principle, in strictly neurophysiological terms without invoking conscious or mental agents; the neural correlates of subjective experience are conceived to exert causal influence but not mental qualities per se. This long established materialist-behaviorist principle has been challenged in recent years by the introduction of a modified concept of the mind-brain relation in which consciousness is conceived to be emergent and causal. Psychophysical interaction is explained in terms of the emergence in nesting brain hierarchies of high order, functionally derived, mental properties that interact by laws and principles different from, and not reducible to those of neurophysiology. Reciprocal upward and downward, interlevel determination of the mental and neural action is accounted for on these terms without violating the principles of scientific explanation and without reducing the qualities of inner experience to those of physiology. Interaction of mind and brain becomes not only conceivable and scientifically tenable, but more plausible in some respects than were the older parallelist and identity views of the materialist position. This revised concept of consciousness as causal, with its recognition of mental phenomena as explanatory constructs in science, has brought a marked change during the past decade in the scientific status of consciousness and of mental and cognitive phenomena generally. Resultant mehtalist trends within science have been accompanied also by a corollary rise in acceptance of various mentalist-related concepts and dualist beliefs in the supernatural, the paranormal and in unembodied forms of conscious existence that receive no logical support from the new mind-brain concepts of neuroscience. Reasons are advanced to show that our latest mind-brain model is fundamentally monistic and not only fails to support dualism, but serves to further discount fading prospects for finding dualist forms or domains of conscious experience not embodied in a functioning brain.

The brain as agent

It was Sir John Eccles (1953) who said that the brain is the sort of machine a ghost could operate; since then, neurophysiologists have embraced various philosophical positions on the mind-brain relationship problem, including psychoneural identity, dualism, even "trialism."1 In recent years, the ascendancy of the computational approach to problems in the description of brain functioning and "cognitive processes" has encouraged a resurgence of mentalistic and physicalistic modes of reductionism with respect to the analysis of various mental predicates. In this paper, I shall examine several claims made by neurophysiologists about the mind-brain relationship and indicate some conceptual difficulties with them. I shall concentrate upon two basic mental predicates (along with their relevant participles), recognition and thought, in an attempt to show that when such categories are predicated of brains, incoherent conceptual consequences inevitably are entailed. Whatever it is that brains do, they do not recognize anything nor do they think of, about or that anything, although they may enable persons to do these things. It is further argued that the question: how do brains enable persons to do these things? is problematic in several significant respects.

Brain and Behavior

Cognitive neuroscience is a new interdisciplinary approach to an understanding of mind-brain relations that combines cognitive psychology and neurological sciences. These two fields of study seek answers to many of the same questions and have methodological and conceptual contributions to offer one another. Further envisioned is the possibility of going beyond the of mutual contributions towards developing a unified, interdisciplinary science of human nature. The physiological basis for the storage of information in the nervous system-or the formation of memory-is an important problem that requires an interdisciplinary effort. One theoretical framework of cognitive psychology, the consolidation model for memory, states that information storage involves a sequential process, which begins with a short-term sensory store. The shortest of memory stores is the sensory register and is called the iconic store. Here sensory items are perceived and subsequent attention to material in this iconic store may lead to literal copy of the input and transfer to short-term store. Information can be maintained for only a second or two; and if it is not transferred to short-term stores, there is much information loss. Short-term memory, the next stage of processing, has a time duration measured in minutes and seems to have capacity limitations as well. Transfer of shortterm information to long-term stores may be accomplished through rehearsal, and long-term memory may last a lifetime. The transitions from one store to the next probably require neurochemical processes. Recent developments of this consolidation model suggest that shortterm memory may be the active state of long-term memory (Posner 1977). In this more unitary view of memory processes, any stimulus can have multiple representations including visual, tactile, phonemic, or semantic systems. Minimizing the distinction between short-term and long-term stores, this hypothesis emphasizes the existence of levels of human memory where depth of processing may play an important role. In this theoretical framework, preliminary analysis includes physical features as edges, angles, brightness, hue, pitch, and loudness. Later stages consist of recognizing patterns and matching these against stored patterns. A word, for example, is immediately processed phonemically and morphemically, only to trigger further semantic associations based on the subjects' experiences. This enrichment and elaboration of the word allow the subject to extract meaning, and of course, this depth of processing approach is not restricted to verbal material. A recent clinical experience with an elderly patient illustrates the disruption of the ability to choose and maintain an appropriate memory level. This man had great difficulties organizing the trivialities of his daily life. Formerly automatic events, such as putting on both shoes and tying them, or finding his way to his office, had become insurmountable chores. Forgetting the time and often his exact location, he frequently wandered to distant corners of the hospital. When confronted with the apparent aimlessness of his direction, he responded with a gruffness and indignation that befitted his former brilliance. Throughout his long life he had been the creator of a number of powerful scientific theories. His philosophical treatises had also gained him worldwide recognition; yet, at moments he could not remember the time of year and had only a vague glimmer of intuition regarding the reasons for his hospitalization. To the ordinary medical examiner he appeared hopelessly demented, but further analysis revealed several tantalizing possibilities. By establishing contexts with linguistic cues he verbally reconstructed past episodes about his life. For example, the mere mention of a former colleague prompted an emotive and accurate

SUBJECTIVE REFERRAL OF THE TIMING FOR A CONSCIOUS SENSORY EXPERIENCE

Subjective experience of a peripherally-induced sensation is found to appear without the substantial delay found for the experience of a cortically-induced sensation. To explain this finding, in relation to the putative delay of up to about 500 ms for achieving the "neuronal adequacy" required to elicit the peripherally-induced experience, a modified hypothesis is proposed: for a peripheral sensory input, (a) the primary evoked response of sensory cortex to the specific projection (lemniscal) input is associated with a process that can serve as a 'time-marker'; and (b), after delayed neuronal adequacy is achieved, there is a subjective referral of the sensory experience backwards in time so as to coincide with this initial 'time-marker'. A crucial prediction of the hypothesis was experimentally tested in human subjects using suitably implanted electrodes, and the results provide specific support for the proposal. In this, the test stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) and to surface of somatosensory cortex (C) were arranged so that a minimum train duration of 200 ms or more was required to produce any conscious sensory experience in each case. Each such cerebral stimulus could be temporally coupled with a peripheral one (usually skin, S) that required relatively negligible stimulus duration to produce a sensation. The sensory experiences induced by LM stimuli were found to be subjectively timed as if there were no delay relative to those for S, that is, as if the subjective experience for LM was referred to the onset rather than to the end of the required stimulus duration of 200 ms or more. On the other hand, sensory experiences induced by the C stimuli, which did not excite specific projection afferents, appeared to be subjectively timed with a substantial delay relative to those for S, that is, as if the time of the subjective experience coincided roughly with the end of the minimum duration required by the C stimuli. The newly proposed functional role for the specific projection system in temporal referral would be additional to its known role in spatial referral and discrimination. A temporal discrepancy between corresponding mental and physical events, i.e., between the timing of a subjective sensory experience and the time at which the state of 'neuronal adequacy' for giving rise to this experience is achieved, would introduce a novel experimentally-based feature into the concept of psychophysiological parallelism in the mind-brain relationship.

A Unifying Approach to Mind and Brain: Ten Year Perspective

Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on the mind-brain relationship. The approach to the mind-brain relation arose largely out of efforts to explain the seeming unity and/or duality of conscious experience in the bisected brain. The chapter focuses on the interpretation of consciousness as an emergent of brain activity. It interprets the emergent conscious properties in terms of conventional neural circuit theory. A further postulate is added to this discussion in which the subjective conscious effect of a brain process is viewed as a functional or operational derivative. In other words, subjective meaning is conceived to depend primarily on the way a given cerebral process works in the context of brain dynamics. The thing that counts in determining a conscious perceptual effect is the preparation to respond to a perceived outside stimulus in an adaptive, meaningful adjustment, rather than the way in which the brain's neural process happens to copy or correspond with the perceived stimulus with respect to shape, size, unity, texture, timing, etc. Conscious phenomena, thus, conceived as dynamic emergent properties of high order cerebral processes, are not merely products of neural complexity, but are also designed specifically to produce operational subjective effects.

Self-medication with mood changing drugs.

The aim of this article is to examine some of the consequences of the recent advances in neurobiology in terms of the ability of drugs to manipulate the mind. Most laymen are totally ignorant of the general mechanism underlying the brain-mind relationship and therefore of the action of mind-altering drugs. Professor Grahame-Smith considers that one of the intrinsic evils of man's neurobiological make up is that a prime motive of the brain seems to be to bring comfort, security and pleasure for itself. Therefore it is not surprising that drugs - notably the barbiturates and more recently the benzodiazepines (tranquilizers) - have been prescribed to give to the brain that peace of mind that it seeks. However, it can be argued that such drugs cannot replace anxiety with peace of mind or unhappiness or depression with happiness. The action of such drugs upon the molecules of the brain is negative - a placebo effect.

A Physiological Approach to Clinical Neurology

Not many authors have used patients and their diseases as the models for the neurophysiology which they wish to teach. Dr. Lance has done this in an admirable way and has produced a volume which is laced with evidence of his understanding of neuroscience and clinical neurology. His approach is clinical and his subject is the patient, not the monkey, cat, or dog. In order to add interest, Dr. Lance traces the evolution of neurophysiologic thinking as he develops the topic under discussion. For illustrations, Dr. Lance draws on the classics such as the statue of Laocoon as well as line drawings of tracts, graphs of muscle activity, and photographs of patients. Like all good neurologists, he considers the mind-brain relationship and takes an occasional wide swing into speculative neurology. For this, one admires rather than faults him because it is evidence of a man who is not tied to