Belief Bias Research Articles

Interactive Self-Deception in Digital Spaces

Self-deceptive projects are frequently supported by our social environment, with others influencing both our motives and capacities for self-deception. Digital spaces offer even more opportunities for interactive self-deception. Digital platforms are incentivized to sort us and capture our engagement, and online users also have desires to be sorted and engaged. The execution of self-deception is partially offloaded to algorithms and social networks that filter our evidence, selectively draw our attention to evidence, offer rationalizations, and give us repetitive and emotion-laden feedback. Nevertheless, this is not so different from what we find in offline environments. Further, most of this offloading of information processing is willingly accepted by users and is in line with their desires. As such, responsibility for any motivationally biased beliefs largely lies with the individual internet user.

First do no harm: Measuring weight bias beliefs in preschool-age children

Although the importance of investigating the development of weight bias in young children has been documented, little research has examined potential impacts of children’s participation in such research. The purpose of the current study was to assess whether participation in research measuring beliefs about body size may engender changes in the development of weight beliefs in young children. Eighty children (44 boys, 36 girls), ages 3–5 (M = 3.73, SD =0.69) participated in tasks assessing weight bias beliefs and perception of their own body size at two time periods (two weeks apart). Participants’ responses at Time 2 were also compared to data collected from a similar sample who completed the measures only once. Results demonstrated main effects of gender (girls reporting greater weight bias) and age (older children reporting greater weight bias)) across time points that are consistent with prior research. Importantly, there was no change in participants’ responses from Time 1 to Time 2 and no significant differences between Time 2 data and data collected from participants who only completed the measures at one time period, suggesting that participation in such research may not pose undue risks to young children.

Preservice Teachers’ Misconceptions in Solving Probabilistic Problems

Concerns about the influence of misconceptions, culture and social setting on probabilistic reasoning of teacher trainees led to a study in this area to explore the reasoning of preservice teachers from a college of education in Ghana. This study investigates preservice teachers’ misconceptions and difficulties in probabilistic problems solving before they learn Elementary Stochastic as part of their course of studies. The identification of preservice teachers’ misconceptions will serve as a reference point for planning and enactment of lessons for effective training of teachers. The study employed explanatory sequential mixed methods research design. The participants in this study were 181 level 200 female preservice teachers offering a Diploma in Basic Education. Diagnostic test and semi-structured interview were used to collect data. Data collected were analysed descriptively. Also, content analysis was employed to analyse some parts of the data collected. The results indicate that preservice teachers had some probability difficulties such as conceptual difficulties, interpretation difficulties, and procedural difficulties. Similarly, the study found that preservice teachers entered college with the following probability misconceptions: equiprobability bias, representativeness bias, negative and positive recency effects, outcome orientation bias, and belief bias. This study shows the need for teaching and learning activities to focus on addressing probability misconceptions and difficulties in order to developed better probabilistic reasoning of preservice teachers.

Assessing Students' Achievement through Problem-Based Learning to Reveal the Implicit Bias of Fake News

The widespread dissemination of fake news could have serious negative consequences for individuals and society. First, fake news could upset the balance of authenticity in the news ecosystem. For example, the most popular fake news was more prevalent on Facebook or Instagram media. Second, fake news intentionally persuaded consumers to accept biased or false beliefs. Third, fake news was changing the way people interpret and react to real news. For example, some fake news was created to mistrust and confuse people, so it was impossible, to tell the truth from what was not. To mitigate the negative impact of fake news, it was very important to develop methods to automatically detect fake news in social networks, namely problem-based learning, in order to differentiate between real and fake visual content. Qualitative and quantitative approaches were performed using experimental and control groups to determine whether problem learning could induce students to engage more actively with the topic and develop critical thinking skills to avoid the implicit bias of fake news. This study was conducted at Universitas Katolik Santo Thomas Medan, Indonesia. This research showed that problem-based learning could promote the development of learning communities where learners could freely exchange ideas and ask questions related to the material being studied. Therefore, problem-based learning was an effective way to improve the analytical ability to distinguish between real news and fake news based on the credibility of the news.

The eighteenth-century Dutch Republic and its inhabitants in the eyes of Teodor Anzelm Dzwonkowski

Teodor Anzelm Dzwonkowski was an average-educated nobleman who left Poland at the end of the 18th century in search of wealth. In Amsterdam, he enlisted in the army and, with the rank of corporal in the infantry, travelled to the Dutch East Indies (1787–1793) — the account of this expedition forms the main part of his memoirs written years later.
 The article shows how Dzwonkowski viewed the Netherlands, its people, and the way the Dutch East India Company (whose officials he considered to be an extension of the arm of the Republic’s government) operated. His remarks concerning them are present in a small part of his diary (and, in addition, not always expressed directly), because the author’s main interest was in the exoticism of southern Africa and the Far East, and in the Poles he met during his travels. Dzwonkowski was impressed by the management and wealth of the United Provinces, especially by the ease of making a career, although he could hardly be called uncritical: he also saw the dark sides of the local reality, including the loosening of moral norms and corruption. Interestingly, despite his noble background, he seems to be free of state and religious bias against the people of the United Provinces. His view of the Dutch does not differ from the way they were described by British tourists visiting the Dutch Republic during the Stuart Period.

Biased belief updating in causal reasoning about COVID-19.

In three experiments using 977 participants, we investigated whether people would show belief bias by letting their prior beliefs on politically charged topics unduly influence their reasoning when updating beliefs based on evidence. Participants saw data from fictional studies and made judgments of how strongly COVID-19 mitigation measures influenced the number of COVID-19 cases (political problems) or a medicine influenced number of headaches (neutral problems). Based on rational Bayesian models using strong versus weak priors to represent biased beliefs about causal strength, we predicted that people who strongly supported the use of mitigation measures (mainly liberals) would overestimate causal strength on political problems relative to neutral problems while those who strongly opposed mitigation measures (mainly conservatives) would underestimate strength on political problems. Results suggested that belief bias is driven more by specific beliefs relevant to the reasoning context than by general attitudinal factors like political ideology. In Experiments 1 and 2, liberals and conservatives who strongly supported mitigation measures overestimated strength on political problems. In Experiment 3, conservatives who strongly opposed the use of mitigation measures underestimated causal strength on political problems and conservatives who supported mitigation measures made higher strength judgments on political problems than those who opposed these measures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Cunning and Disorderly: Early Nineteenth-Century Witch Trials of Joseph Smith

Cunning and Disorderly: Early Nineteenth-Century Witch Trials of Joseph Smith

Projection bias in environmental beliefs and behavioural intentions - An application to solar panels and eco-friendly transport

The projection bias corresponds to the human tendency to project current preferences into the future as if present preferences will remain unchanged, omitting a range of external influences over the current preferences. We design a survey experiment to investigate the projection bias relevance on two environmentally friendly initiatives, namely solar panels and eco-friendly transport. We found that beliefs and behavioral intentions are subject to positive change when individuals are solicited a day when the weather is congruent with the proposed changes. We draw several policy and managerial implications for environmental issues.

Reconciling scientific and commonsense values to improve reasoning.

Scientific reasoning is characterized by commitments to evidence and objectivity. New research suggests that under some conditions, people are prone to reject these commitments, and instead sanction motivated reasoning and bias. Moreover, people's tendency to devalue scientific reasoning likely explains the emergence and persistence of many biased beliefs. However, recent work in epistemology has identified ways in which bias might be legitimately incorporated into belief formation. Researchers can leverage these insights to evaluate when commonsense affirmation of bias is justified and when it is unjustified and therefore a good target for intervention. Making reasoning more scientific may require more than merely teaching people what constitutes scientific reasoning; it may require affirming the value of such reasoning in the first place.

Orthodoxy and the myriad of challenges posed in the socio-economic sphere of Africa

The above title does not only pause a challenge to us but also displays before us the celebration of our achievements in Africa which are worthy of celebration. In this paper therefore I will address the problems of Africa on social and economic ground in relation to culture. I addressed this issue before and have discussed it at length with my brother-in-Christ father Evangelos who is an ethicist. The social and economic problems are not entities in themselves but they each have a root cause and unless we address the roots we may not find any positive or lasting solutions. The root problem faced by many is a sense of cultural erosion which has led to lack of self-identity and thus resulted in many of the visible problems we are experiencing and we are desperately trying to find solutions to them. This problem may be self-inflicted as some of us may think but it is largely blamed on Religious missions in Africa from the past centuries to now, and also on the colonial powers who imposed themselves on Africa. The positive and negative effects of the two have left a great impact on an African way of thinking and acting. We have become aliens in our own African land, whether we are Black, Arab, White or Indian or whatever race of African. As each day dawns we are faced with the consequences of the past mistakes and even in trying to find solutions we repeat the same mistakes on an ongoing basis. I will discuss my reflection on several of these bases; 1) dialogue with African culture a) identity crisis, b) Cultural erosion c) Cultural disintegration d) family unit and social unit break ups and confusion, e.) Generation gap f.) Economic gap g.) Religious bias and mission misrepresentation h) indigenous languages, species i) Colonial Stigma j) Economic imbalance and trade unfairness.

Nigeria’s Polio Elimination Playbook: Lessons To Strengthening Health Systems For Other Eradicable Diseases

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), poliomyelitis (polio) is a highly infectious viral disease that largely affects children under 5 years of age. In August 2020, Nigeria was declared free of the wild poliovirus by the WHO and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). This review assesses the available evidence on issues with Nigeria’s efforts and challenges towards the fight against poliomyelitis such as the wild poliovirus (WPV) and vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV). Published grey literature was assessed to make this mini-review. No restriction on publication dates was applied during the literature search. Available data showed efforts such as strong government accountability framework; introduction of geographic information systems to ensure more efficient utilization of resources and coverage; the digitalization of vaccine delivery; optimal utilization of disease notification officers (DNOs) at every unit of the local government; commitment of resources from the federal government to states that were prone to the reoccurrence of Polio; improved social mobilization, supervision, and monitoring; as well as assistance from international organizations were deplored. Some of the notable challenges faced with the eradication of polio include the refusal of parents to consent to vaccinations for their children, reoccurrences due to poor supplies of potable water, religious bias from the northern region, differential routines, and supplemental immunization coverage. The lessons learned in polio eradication can be channeled into the elimination of other diseases, but efforts must be in place to continue to monitor the reoccurrence of polio and other emerging diseases through surveillance systems.

Validating the Diathesis–Stress Model Based Case Conceptualization Procedure in Cognitive Behavioral Therapies: The LIBET (Life Themes and Semi-Adaptive Plans—Implications of Biased Beliefs, Elicitation and Treatment) Procedure

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) approaches use case formulation procedures based on the diathesis–stress conceptualization model, arranged in two dimensions: emotional vulnerability (present in a patient’s consciousness in terms of core beliefs) and coping strategies. Nevertheless, despite its pivotal role, there are a limited number of validation studies for this model. Life themes and semi-adaptive plans: Implications of biased beliefs, elicitation and treatment (LIBET) is a CBT case formulation method grounded on the CBT diathesis–stress model that aims to help validate the CBT case formulation model, and, in particular, its bidimensional arrangement. In LIBET, the two classic CBT dimensions are called “life themes,” which are mental states of focused attention to emotional sensitivities represented as core beliefs in consciousness, and “semi-adaptive plans,” which are the rigid management strategies of “life themes” implemented by adopting coping strategies such as anxious safety behaviors, compulsive controls and aggressive or rewarding strategies. The study uses quantitative textual analysis to validate the LIBET procedure in a clinical sample. The investigation discusses the extent to which the results can be considered a validation of the arrangement of the general CBT diathesis–stress model in the two dimensions of core beliefs and coping strategies.

Optimism where there is none: Asymmetric belief updating observed with valence-neutral life events

How people update their beliefs when faced with new information is integral to everyday life. A sizeable body of literature suggests that people's belief updating is optimistically biased, such that their beliefs are updated more in response to good news than bad news. However, recent research demonstrates that findings previously interpreted as evidence of optimistic belief updating may be the result of flaws in experimental design, rather than motivated reasoning. In light of this controversy, we conduct three pre-registered variations of the standard belief updating paradigm (combined N = 300) in which we test for asymmetric belief updating with neutral, non-valenced stimuli using analytic approaches found in previous research. We find evidence of seemingly biased belief updating with neutral stimuli — results that cannot be attributed to a motivational, valence-based, optimism account — and further show that there is uninterpretable variability across samples and analytic techniques. Jointly, these results serve to highlight the methodological flaws in current optimistic belief updating research.

The Dogma Within? Examining Religious Bias in Private Title VII Claims

In recent years, American politicians have become increasingly concerned that judges who identify as Christian are making decisions based on that identity—that Christian judges harbor a certain “dogma” within them that shapes their decision making. In this article, we investigate whether this concern is warranted by examining how such judges handle claims that are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits private discrimination in employment on the basis of religion. By focusing on decision making in cases of private discrimination—rather than public discrimination—we make progress on a theoretical conundrum that has dogged previous efforts to identify causal effects in religious accommodation cases. However, our tests produce little evidence to support the idea that Christian judges are more likely than their non‐Christian colleagues to favor claimants, even in this alternative domain. Our findings therefore suggest that the current political focus on possible bias among Christian judges is empirically unfounded, at least in situations of religious accommodation.

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies.This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Emotion perception bias associated with the hijab in Austrian and Turkish participants.

In a cross-cultural study, we investigated the link between explicit attitudes towards the hijab and implicit measures of cultural and religious bias during the recognition of emotions. Participants tested in Austria (N = 71) and in Turkey (N = 70) reported their attitude towards the hijab, and categorised in a mousetracker task happy and sad faces of women, shown with five levels of intensity, and framed either by a hijab or by an oval-shaped mask. The two samples did not differ in their explicit attitudes towards the hijab. However, negative attitude towards the hijab predicted greater sadness attribution to happy faces with the hijab in Austrian participants. Unrelated to their explicit attitudes, Turkish participants attributed more sadness to happy faces with than without the hijab. Results suggest that the sight of the hijab activated, in both Austrian and Turkish participants, implicit biases resulting in associations with sadness and negative emotions.

Effects of Depressed Mood on Syllogistic Reasoning: The Buffering Role of High Working Memory Span.

Previous research provided consistent evidence for the existence of the unique cognitive limitation in depressed mood: the impairment of the construction of mental models. In the current research, we applied the classical paradigm using categorical syllogisms to examine the relationship between depressed mood and integrative reasoning, aiming at gathering research evidence on the moderating role of the operation span of working memory. Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that high working memory capacity is a buffering variable and acts as a protective factor preventing the negative impact of depressed mood on syllogistic reasoning. A categorical syllogism, in the simpler evaluative form, consists of two premises (that are assumed to be true) and a conclusion that is to be evaluated as valid (when it follows logically from the premises) or invalid (when it does not follow from the premises). In the cover story, we informed participants that they would read about some observations carried out in a normal garden (believable conclusions) versus in a garden with radical genetic transformations (unbelievable conclusions) in order to stimulate the emergence of belief bias. The participants were 115 high school students who filled out the BDI scale and completed the OSPAN task. In line with predictions, there were main effects of depressed mood and operation span on the accuracy of performance (worse performance in the group with a high in comparison to a low level of depressed mood and much worse performance in low compared to high OSPAN participants). The analyses yielded a strong interaction effect of Depressed mood × OSPAN × Conflict. For participants with high levels of working memory capacity, there were no limitations related to a high level of depressed mood in syllogistic reasoning. On the other hand, a different pattern emerged for participants with low working memory span. In this group, participants with a high level of depressed mood in comparison to those with a low level of depressed mood showed much higher limitations in syllogistic reasoning, especially in reasoning concerning conflict syllogisms. We discuss the implications of this research for recent therapeutic programs using computerized cognitive tasks aimed at individuals with a high level of depressed mood.

Social Exchange of Motivated Beliefs

Abstract We use laboratory experiments to study whether biases in beliefs grow more severe when people socially exchange these beliefs with one another. We elicit subjects’ (naturally biased) beliefs about their relative performance in an intelligence quotient (IQ) test and allow them to update these beliefs in real time. Part of the way through the task we give each subject access to the beliefs of a counterpart who performed similarly on the test and allow them both to observe the evolution of one another’s beliefs. We find that subjects respond to one another’s beliefs in a highly asymmetric way, causing a severe amplification of subjects’ initial bias. We find no such patterns in response to objective public signals or in control treatments without social exchange or scope for motivated beliefs. We also provide evidence that the pattern is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism and standard versions of confirmation bias. Overall, our results suggest that bias amplification is likely driven by “motivated assignment of accuracy” to others’ beliefs: subjects selectively attribute higher informational value to social signals that reinforce their motivation.

Do People Prescribe Optimism, Overoptimism, or Neither?

Past work has suggested that people prescribe optimism—believing it is better to be optimistic, instead of accurate or pessimistic, about uncertain future events. Here, we identified and addressed an important ambiguity about whether those findings reflect an endorsement of biased beliefs—that is, whether people prescribe likelihood estimates that reflect overoptimism. In three studies, participants (N = 663 U.S. university students) read scenarios about protagonists facing uncertain events with a desired outcome. Results replicated prescriptions of optimism when we used the same solicitations as in past work. However, we found quite different prescriptions when using alternative solicitations that asked about potential bias in likelihood estimations and that did not involve vague terms such as “optimistic.” Participants generally prescribed being optimistic, feeling optimistic, and even thinking optimistically about the events, but they did not prescribe overestimating the likelihood of those events.

Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance

The dual strategy model posits that reasoners rely on two information processing strategies when making inferences: The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, and the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In this paper, we focused on individual differences in strategy use as a predictor of performance on four reasoning tasks: Belief bias, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and denominator neglect. Predictions from the strategy use model were contrasted with predictions from Dual Process Theories, which suggest that individual differences in performance reflect variations in cognitive ability. In each of four studies, a large number (N ≈ 200) completed one of the above reasoning tasks, a strategy use diagnostic questionnaire, and measures of IQ, cognitive reflection, and numeracy. In three of four studies, individual differences in strategy use predicted differences in reasoning performance when the effects of the other variables were eliminated. Bayesian analysis indicated that none of the individual differences measures predicted a significant portion of variance on the conjunction fallacy task, and that strategy use was a strong predictor on the remaining three tasks. This research suggests that the type of strategy that is adopted paves a road to successful reasoning that is independent of cognitive capacity.