Basic Telecommunications Research Articles

Review of “Right to Communicate”: Universal recognition under trend of telecommunications development

From a historical perspective, the “right to communicate” is based on human instinct and is also one of the fundamental human rights. The right to communicate relates to the fundamental freedoms and values of contemporary societies and represents the affirmation and expression of the most essential rights for human dignity. With the creation of new technologies of communication such as cellular phones, tele-facsimile and the Internet, it is clear that readily available access to telecommunication is highly important for our daily life. However, due to differences in economic development and resources distribution, there is still a big gap between industrialized and developing countries in access to basic telecommunications. Since everyone should have the equal right to communicate, it is the global aim to assist people living in remote and rural areas to gain basic telecommunications to access and connect with the outer world. The main aim of this article is to examine this innate right as it emerges from...

Services Liberalization from a WTO/GATs Perspective: In Search of Volunteers

Most existing commitments are confined to guaranteeing the levels of access that existed in the mid-1990s, when the Agreement entered into force, in a limited number of sectors. The only significant exceptions are the accession schedules of recent WTO Members and the negotiating results in two sectors (financial services and, in particular, basic telecommunications) that were achieved after the Uruguay Round. The offers tabled so far in the ongoing Round would not add a lot of substance either. Apparently, negotiators are ‘caught between a rock and a hard place’. For one thing, the traditional mercantilist paradigm, relying on reciprocal exchanges of concessions, seems to be provide less momentum than in the goods area. For another, there are additional - technical, economic and political - frictions that tend to render services negotiations more complicated, time-consuming and resource-intensive. The novelty of the Agreement adds an additional element of legal uncertainty from a negotiator’s perspective. This paper discusses various options that might help to overcome the ensuing reticence to engage. Few appear within reach at present, however. The bare minimum that would need to be achieved is to revive work on scheduling and classification issues with a view to putting both existing commitments and new offers on a safer footing, and to improve compliance with long-existing information/notification obligations.

Who Regulates Phones, Television, and the Internet? What Makes a Communications Regulator Independent and Why It Matters

More political scientists should engage in the debates surrounding regulation of communications networks, the infrastructure on which telecom, media, and Internet services ride. In 1990 there were 14 communications regulators worldwide, by 2007 there were 148. To fulfill World Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications commitments, many countries aim to create regulatory agencies that are “independent.” What characterizes independence? Regulators are embedded in a political context that includes three main constituencies : other government institutions, industry, and consumers. Independent regulators are able to take action autonomously from other government institutions and industry while serving as advocates for consumers. In a survey of 18 countries, several traits emerge; a leader who cannot be dismissed arbitrarily, regulatory authority clearly distinct from policymaking, independent funding, minimal staff exchange between regulator and regulated firm, and dedicated support for consumers. It is usually easier for a regulator to be independent if operators are privatized. In a study of 4 countries, independent regulators follow decision-making procedures that give the public notice about proposed rule changes, opportunities to provide comments, and final decisions with explanation. Also, independent regulators have gift, conflict of interest, and post-employment rules, which set ethical standards and expectations for staff.

The mobile turn in universal service: prosaic lessons and new ideals

Purpose – This paper aims to look at a key trend shaking up universal service policy around the world – the emergence of mobile and wireless technologies as a central feature of telecommunications and convergent media.Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the development of mobiles, and how they fit into the evolution of approaches to universal service. It then considers different facets of what mobiles represent for universal service, including the expansion of universal service, the relationship of access to universal service, spectrum management, and the user and innovation. The paper seeks to integrate these aspects into a consolidated account of what mobiles represent for universal service.Findings – The paper finds that mobiles are providing timely access to basic telecommunications, and so we need to reconfigure the apparatus of universal service to acknowledge and build upon this. It finds also that there is a strong case for building mobility into definitions of universal service. Accor...

The eclipse of the universal service obligation: taking broadband to Australians

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to evaluate the success and continuing relevance of the universal service obligation (USO) in delivering voice telephony, basic digital data capability and broadband services to all Australians.Design/methodology/approachThe paper outlines the background to the National Broadband Plan being implemented by the Labor Government elected in November 2007. The costs of this plan and other funding programs implemented since 1996 are annualized and compared to the cost of the USO.FindingsThe paper reveals that the USO has been eclipsed as a policy tool for making basic telecommunications services universally available in Australia, at least for the time being. It survives as a policy mechanism, but is contained to fixed line telephony, payphones and basic digital data capability. Its declared costs have fallen. The proposed national broadband network continues the trend towards using government funding to achieve telecommunications policy goals. This trend was initiated by the previous government with some of the proceeds from privatizing the former government monopoly, Telstra. The national broadband network also supplements this trend with a reversion to a degree of state participation in a facility (a fibre‐to‐the‐node network serving 98 percent of the population) likely to have strong natural monopoly characteristics.Originality/valueThe paper considers the USO as just one of many tools available to ensure basic telecommunication services are universally available and the debates about it in Australia less as arguments about where an old concept should go in the future, and more about what a very young concept really means.

Municipal broadband wireless networks

"...people lack many things: jobs, shelter, food, health care and drinkable water. Today, being cut off from basic telecommunications services is a hardship almost as acute as these other deprivations, and may indeed reduce the chances of finding remedies to them."---UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in a keynote address to the International Telecommunication Union, Oct. 9, 1999.

Municipal broadband wireless networks

"...people lack many things: jobs, shelter, food, health care and drinkable water. Today, being cut off from basic telecommunications services is a hardship almost as acute as these other deprivations, and may indeed reduce the chances of finding remedies to them." ---UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in a keynote address to the International Telecommunication Union, Oct. 9, 1999.

Broadband Cordect: Technology for Building Knowledge Societies

The Internet has emerged in the last few years, not just as another communication means, but as sheer power and access to it provides access to a lot of information. Lack of access to internet will bring strong digital divide between rich and poor countries and also brings strong divide within the rural and urban communities of a country which in turn will affect the socio- economic development of a country. So there is a need for low-cost information technologies that are suitable to the conditions prevailing in a developing or third world country. Broadband CorDECT is one of the cost-effective fixed wireless broadband Access Solutions used for networking and building knowledge societies in a developing country. It is based on the DECT standard specification from the ETSI. It provides a complete wireless access solution for new and expanding telecommunication networks with seamless integration of both voice and internet services. It has been designed and specified to inter-work with many other types of network, such as the PSTN, ISDN, GSM and more. Broadband CorDECT provides the basic telecommunications as well as broadband Internet services and thus bridges the digital divide and such a service cannot be provided by any other product today in the world even double the cost. This paper discusses the relevance of broadband CorDECT in the context of current trends and provides a description of the technology.

From National Champions to Global Players? Lobbying by Network Operators During the WTO's Basic Telecommunication Negotiations

Observers generally assume that firms which engage in lobbying know what they want. Business—government relations and especially the corporate political activities of network operators during the basic telecommunication negotiations of the World Trade Organization present a slightly different picture. European monopoly providers benefited from the old international regime and initially ignored trade discussions in their sector. In the course of negotiations, however, they became part of a three-level game, which obliged them to consider national, European, and multilateral objectives simultaneously. In the course of these complex negotiations, their preferences evolved. Because governments advanced independently on the liberalization project, companies adapted their policy stances from reluctance to support for the negotiations. This article thus cautions against treatments of lobbying that consider preferences as exogenously given.

Constructivism, fuzzy sets and (very) small- N: Revisiting the conditions for communicative action

Fuzzy set techniques, both as a methodological and theoretical tool, can engage in a fruitful liaison with constructivist research. Several important properties of fuzzy set analysis overlap with constructivist theorizing and research practice. In particular, fuzzy set methods are compatible with and support research based on a holistic ontology and on detailed qualitative comparisons of cases. To demonstrate the usefulness of the approach, a comparative case study [Niemann A. Between Communicative Action and Strategic Action: The Article 113 Committee and the Negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement. J Eur Public Policy 2004;11(3):379–407.] investigating the conditions for communicative action using fuzzy sets is replicated and re-interpreted. The result of the replication is an improvement of the informational content, the precision, and the validity of the conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the re-interpretation points to theoretical and conceptual issues that need more consideration in future research. From a methodological point of view, the article shows that fuzzy set techniques are useful research tools even in instances where the number of studied cases is very small.

The Contribution of Services Liberalization to Poverty Reduction: What Role for the GATS?

There are various conceivable links between services liberalization and poverty reduction, including the efficiency effects associated with increased competition in intermediate (infrastructural) services, income transfers generated by workers moving abroad, or the mobilization of private investment for social policy purposes. Arguably the most promising option for interested governments, regardless of complementary moves by trading partners, is the opening of, and creation of favourable investment conditions in, core infrastructural services. However, apart from basic telecommunications, both the Uruguay Round schedules and the offers submitted in the Doha Round to date have remained disappointing in this respect. Given the apparent lack of political impetus in broader-based trade rounds, this article discusses options, in particular from the viewpoint of smaller and poorer participants, how the submission of more meaningful offers could be encouraged.

CREATION OF A SEPARATE TELECOM REGULATORY AGENCY: A DURATION ANALYSIS OF ITS TIME PATTERN

At the center of the issues set out in the 1997 WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services was the creation of separate telecom regulatory agencies. Using the Cox proportional hazards model, this study examines how a country's socioeconomic factors affect the country's incentive to reorganize its regulatory structure and create a separate telecom regulatory agency. The main empirical findings suggest that a country's incentive to institute a separate telecom regulatory body is greater when its telecom sector performance is relatively poor and its political environment is more competitive with few institutional barriers. (JEL L52, L96)

Interconnection regulation in India: Lessons for developing countries

Interconnection is not only a major competition issue per se, it is also a critical element of the basic telecommunications agreement of the WTO. An important issue in interconnection regulation is interconnection charging especially in the context of a dominant incumbent. Most regulators in developing countries face challenges in setting interconnection prices in the absence of market information on the incumbent's or entrant's costs, competition or demand and models suited for developing countries that also adhere to the WTO guidelines. There are few papers that illustrate the challenges faced by regulators in such a context. This paper attempts to bridge the gap by highlighting the nature of interaction between the regulator, incumbent, judiciary and the political environment, the role of formal models in setting interconnection charges and the implications of rapid technological changes in a developing country context through a case study of India. The case study highlights the point that besides independence, it is important to vest enforcement powers in the regulatory agency for it to be credible. Incorporating the WTO interconnection guidelines within a developing country context has implications for network growth and poses challenges to the regulatory processes. Although Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) started with a distortionary, inefficiently priced network providing low coverage and quality, it has meandered its way to a more reasonable network access pricing regime. The decreasing cost of technology and increasing incomes in India and political interventions in regulation have put pressure on TRAI to provide lower interconnection charges and faster telecom growth. Thus, it is pragmatic for regulators to start with a “quick and dirty” estimate, provided that they can signal the downward trend in interconnection pricing, rather than wait for the “correct” estimates. Adoption of future looking strategies (interconnection exchanges), use of a variety of formal models, and strengthening of regulatory capacity are all necessary steps in fostering a competitive environment. Interconnection regimes set up early in the reform process require a review. For successful competition, effective dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions are also important.

Beyond Problem-Solving and Bargaining: Genuine Debate in EU External Trade Negotiations

AbstractThis article suggests that existing negotiation theory, which is dominated by the two paradigms of 'bargaining' and 'problem-solving', does not capture some important characteristics of international negotiations. It is argued that 'genuine debate' encapsulated by Habermas's concept of 'communicative action', which has largely been ignored in the negotiation literature, furthers and complements our understanding regarding negotiators' rationale for action and the dynamics of international negotiations. The paper specifies five conditions conducive to genuine debate: (1) a strongly shared lifeworld among negotiators; (2) uncertainty and lack of knowledge; (3) technical or cognitively complex issues; (4) the presence of persuasive individuals; and (5) low levels of politicization. My hypotheses are probed through a case study of EU negotiations concerning the WTO basic telecommunications agreement. My findings imply that genuine debate may occur most likely in pre-negotiations and at the diplomatic level of negotiations. I also conclude that agreements arrived at through genuine debate tend to be more enduring than those reached by bargaining and problem-solving, and that communicative negotiators are vulnerable to those merely pretending to participate in genuine debate. My analysis also tentatively indicates what kind of arguments may be persuasive in genuine debate.

Clarifying the meaning of WTO telecommunications obligations: Mexico – measures affecting telecommunications services

PurposeTo provide the key findings of a WTO Panel regarding Mexico's commitments in basic telecommunications service in a way that will help telecom regulators and government policy makers implement their WTO commitments and to respond to criticism of the panel's findings.Design/methodology/approachThe article assists government policy makers and telecommunications regulatory authorities to understand the WTO Panel's decision which concluded that Mexico failed to carry out its WTO obligations in basic telecom services. It analyzes the WTO Panel decision and articles criticizing the decision, reviews relevant WTO documents and draws on the author's participation in the WTO basic telecom services negotiations. It provides a brief introduction to the relevant WTO agreements, describes the key findings of the WTO Panel and lessons for telecom regulators and policy makers based on those findings, sets out the claims made by the USA against Mexico, and describes the WTO Panel findings. The article also includes a response to criticisms leveled against the WTO Panel decision.FindingsThe WTO Panel decision provides important guidance in interpreting the scope of obligations in cross‐border supply of international telecom services, cost‐oriented interconnection, access to and use of the public switched network on reasonable terms and conditions and the scope of anti‐competitive conduct that needs to be regulated. Much of the criticism of the WTO Panel decision is based on incorrect interpretation of WTO obligations, lack of knowledge of the negotiating history and exaggerated readings of the panel decision.Practical implicationsThe WTO Panel decision clarifies many of the most important WTO obligations related to basic telecom services. Government policy makers and regulatory authorities need to understand the WTO Panel decision as they take action to implement their own WTO obligations and as they consider undertaking new obligations.Originality/valueThe article offers practical advice to government policy makers and regulatory authorities on how to implement their WTO commitments in basic telecom services.

Uberregulation without Economics: The World Trade Organization's Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services

In April 2004, the World Trade Organization (WTO) assumed a new role as a highly specialized, global regulator of domestic telecommunications policy. In response to a complaint filed by the United States, a WTO arbitration panel found that Mexico had violated its commitments under the Annex on Telecommunications to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by failing, among other things, to ensure that Telmex, Mexico's largest supplier of basic telecommunications services, provide interconnection to U.S. telecommunications carriers at international settlement rates that were cost-oriented. The WTO panel deemed long-run average-incremental cost (LRAIC) to be the appropriate cost standard for setting settlement rates. Mexico thus became obliged to change its domestic telecommunications regulations or face trade sanctions.The decision is the first WTO arbitration to deal solely with trade in services under GATS. This article shows that both the U.S. complaint against Mexico and the WTO decision misunderstood or ignored critical economic facts and principles. Both conflated international settlement rates and domestic interconnection pricing, and both failed to recognize the factors that would justify Mexico's permitting Telmex to charge a settlement rate exceeding LRAIC. Moreover, the U.S. government failed to understand that U.S. long-distance carriers were not passing reductions in Mexico's international settlement rate on to their U.S. customers. Finally, both the U.S. government and the WTO incorrectly defined the relevant market and incorrectly evaluated market power. The relevant economic question should have been whether Telmex had market power in point-to-point international telecommunications services between the United States and Mexico. The WTO decision reveals a startling low level of economic sophistication in its analysis of inescapably economic questions. Given the high level of economic sophistication that is now standard in competition law and sector-specific regulation around the world, the WTO has made a poor start in its implementation of the GATS arbitration process.

The measurement and effects of barriers to trade in basic telecommunication services: the role of negotiations

Using econometric methods, this analysis develops quantity impacts of impediments to trade in voice telephone services, focusing on the perspective of negotiated agreements. These impacts, estimated on the basis of market, demographic, and policy variables, establish a baseline from which the achievements of future trade rounds, including the Doha Round, could be compared. In a departure from previous literature in this area, this article draws on documents appended or pertaining to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to identify barriers to trade in voice telephone services, and to estimate quantity impacts on this basis. The article finds that market access and national treatment commitments scheduled by WTO members under the GATS, when complemented by commitments to pro-competitive regulatory disciplines, may be formulated into meaningful policy variables. These policy variables are found to be statistically significant in explaining market penetration in voice telephone services, as are variables for income and private sector ownership.

The FCC's Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect Competition

This article examines the consequences in using service definitions as the basis for a vertically driven regulatory regime in telecommunications despite converging markets and technologies. The article examines Internet-mediated telephone service as a case study for showing problems resulting from the Federal Communications Commission'd use of vertical regulatory silos that develop a single regulatory status regardless of whether changed circumstances favor a change in regulation. Vertical regulation makes it difficult for incumbent stakeholders to change their regulatory classification. Incumbent telephone service providers continue to fit within the basic telecommunications services, common carrier regulatory model even as newcomers manage to provide a competitive alternative that qualifies for little regulation based on the information services classification. The article proposes the use of a horizontal, layered approach to regulation consistent with what the European Union has endorsed. Adding to what others have written about a layered approach to telecommunications regulation, the article identifies likely difficulties in the implementation of a horizontal regulatory model, and also suggests remedies.

Levelling the Playing Field: Is the World Trade Organization Adequately Equipped to Prevent Anti-Competitive Practices in Telecommunications?

This paper analyses whether, following the adoption of the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the so-called on basic-telecommunications), the WTO is well equipped to prevent anti-competitive practices in telecommunications. The paper first analyses the respective advantages of general competition rules and of sector-specific rules to control market power in telecommunications. It then presents an overview of the rules that can be found in the WTO framework. WTO Members have so far failed to agree on general competition rules. By contrast, the vast majority of the Members that are part to the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications have also agreed to a set of sector-specific rules designed to provide safeguards against anti-competitive practices in the telecommunications sector that are contained in the so-called Reference Paper. The paper then analyses whether the Reference Paper is an adequate document and the extent to which it could be strengthened and addresses the question of whether, assuming that the Reference Paper could be strengthened, there would remain a need for general competition rules at the WTO level. In its conclusions, the paper makes some suggestions. First, it argues that, while the Reference Paper is a step in the right direction, it could, however, be strengthened to reach a better balance between three main objectives: precision, simplicity, and flexibility. In most cases, this would mean increasing the degree of precision of the provisions of the Reference Paper, as the current document tends to be very general. However, in order not to loose too much flexibility, increased precision may at times be obtained, not by specifying substantive provisions in great details, but by offering Members some choices between different, well defined solutions, or by strengthening procedural rather than substantive rules. Second, it argues that, even if the Reference Paper could be strengthened along the aforementioned lines, a case could still be made for adopting a WTO Agreement on Trade and Competition Policy. Such an agreement could be helpful to prohibit some anti-competitive behaviour that would still remain un-addressed in the Reference Paper and to protect operators against anti-competitive behaviours beyond the narrow scope of telecommunications activities. The paper argues, however, that if such additional competition provisions were to be adopted, they should focus on improving market access.

Between communicative action and strategic action: the Article 113 Committee 1 and the negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement

This article argues that Habermas’s concept of communicative action significantly adds to our understanding of EU negotiations concerning the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services. Accounts of bargaining and strategic action alone leave us in the dark about important parts of these negotiations. Building on existing work, the paper suggests how the concept can be made operationalizable for empirical research. The most important step in this direction has been a further specification of the conditions conducive to communicative action. Important conditions that have been identified are: a strongly shared ‘lifeworld’ amongst negotiators, uncertainty and lack of knowledge, technical or cognitively complex issues, the presence of persuasive individuals and low levels of politicization. By contributing to the conditions and mechanisms of actors’ preference and (norm) change, the article adds to the debate on socialization. As the concept of communicative action advanced our understanding of international negotiations, it should generally contribute to our comprehension of EU negotiations: an important precondition for communicative action, the existence of a shared lifeworld is particularly well developed in the EU, given its dense patterns of institutionalization and socialization.