The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq has three avenues: the political track, the economic track, and the security track. (1) While the three are mutually reinforcing, the national strategy is largely dependent on significantly improving security. Moreover, security has been most important and pressing objective since the summer of 2003. (2) As noted then by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Without security, we can't rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure and protect it from sabotage, nor we expect Iraqi political life to revive if Iraqis don't feel secure enough to travel, go to meetings, express their views without intimidation. (3) In July 2003, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz articulated the basic US exit strategy: properly train the Iraqi police, army, and civil defense forces and they will take over the security work being done by Americans. (4) This carried forward into the national strategy, which contains the core assumption that while the United States can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term. (5) Prominent critics have repeatedly called on the administration to accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, or quickly finish it. (6) None, however, has challenged the core assumption that US forces are mostly going to train their way out of Iraq. It would appear, therefore, that training the Iraqi forces is one of our most important and pressing objectives, a key to victory. To that end, some of the world's best instructors have trained over 277,000 Iraqi security forces. (7) Courses have ranged from basic police officer training to special commando training. More than 40 countries have participated in this effort, with billions of dollars spent. (8) Other coalition forces have mentored the Iraqis through field exercises and supervision. Yet despite significant progress, there is nearly universal agreement that Iraqi forces will not be able to take over our security responsibilities any time soon. Why hasn't all of this training solved the problem? At least part of the answer is that training is the wrong intervention for many of the ills in the Iraqi security forces and society. Training help solve many human performance issues. It help make great armies. It is rarely, however, the entire solution, and it is a poor match for many of the problems identified in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. As the painful events of the last three years have shown, more training courses are not going to stabilize Iraq. This article explains why and provides a clearer lens through which to view this key part of the overall mission. The Power of Training Training is a form of performance intervention designed to improve the skills, knowledge, and, to some extent, the attitudes of students. This often leads to improved work performance. In the US armed forces, training is used to solve or prevent problems ranging from bad mess hall food to unstable nuclear weapons. It also supports new performances. Training is normally thought of as a specific course of instruction, usually in a classroom or at a training facility. On-line and computer-based courses are also becoming more widespread. Other learning activities such as unit exercises, drills, and individual performance counseling are also sometimes called training; however, the national strategy appears to use the label for these types of programs. Thus, US forces are said to be training and mentoring the Iraqi forces, or helping, assisting, and training them. (9) A good training program begins with some sort of analysis of the gap between current and desired knowledge and skills. Many programs, however, assume that the incoming students know little about the material and focus on identifying the desired end-state. For more complex matters, the analysis may be called a competency map; that is, a formal effort to identify, list, track, label, and measure the knowledge, skills, attributes, attitudes, and traits necessary for a student to succeed at various levels of an organization. …
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May 20, 2011
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