I argue that union democracy regulation is misguided for a number of reasons. First, the regulations do not do a good of reducing agency costs of union leadership because internal union elections are not salient to most union members who rationally do not make the investments in time and information to participate. Second, they are misguided because the franchise is limited to full-fledged union members. Employees, therefore, must expose themselves to the risk of union discipline in order to have any say in critical economic decisions concerning the terms of their collective representation. Finally, the rules artificially limit the supply of representation service providers to non-profit membership organizations whose structure conforms to federal requirements. I propose in place of existing regulations a legal regime that is indifferent to the form that bargaining agencies take. They can be for profit or nonprofit, oligarchies or democracies. The Landrum-Griffin Act model is only one option. What federal law should require is that employees in a bargaining unit have statutory rights, irrespective of membership, to cast secret ballots on whether (i) they want collective representation, (ii) who the collective representative shall be, (iii) dues structure, i.e., costs of representation, (iv) employer's last offer in bargaining, (v) strike authorization, (vi) contract ratification, and (vii) reauthorization or deauthorization of the bargaining agency. These "critical voting opportunities" should be made available irrespective of whether the employee is a union member and should be available without any prior showing of interest by represented employees. What the bargaining agent does with union dues and other income is its business, subject to the usual rules for enforcement of contracts and prohibition of fraud. Because the proposal envisions an "easy out" approach to deauthorization, consideration might also be given to an "easy in" approach to authorization of the bargaining agency without elections and on the basis of card signatures, although this is not necessary to the proposal. The government's job is to facilitate these elections by regularizing the format for ballots and perhaps using the Internet to give potential competitors information about upcoming election dates, etc. The proposal should promote a better functioning marketplace for representational services, and give employees a greater set of options in deciding whether to pursue (or retain) collective representation.