Autocratic States Research Articles

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC AS A FACTOR IN THE STRENGTHENING OF NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM

It is argued that the Covid-19 pandemic has affected the political sphere, in particular the transformation of political regimes. Situational factors such as the Covid-19 pandemic are proven to exacerbate the authoritarian characteristics of the political regime, especially in states with an unstable democratic tradition. The key manifestations of the strengthening of neo-authoritarianism, which became apparent during the pandemic, are identified: imbalance between the branches of government; postponement of regular elections; introduction of new methods of mass surveillance; narrowing of guaranteed human and citizen rights and freedoms; increased censorship and pressure on the media; pressure on the opposition and critical segment of civil society, etc. It is substantiated that the coronavirus pandemic has had a destructive effect on the quality of democracy in states with all types of political regimes, especially in states with flawed democracies, hybrid and authoritarian regimes. The hypothesis is confirmed that autocratic state leaders, having experienced the benefits of their expanded competence during the pandemic, seek to retain their additional powers.

Art for democracy’s sake: How neo-McCarthyism is resisted by arts-based social movements

The rise of neo-McCarthyism has strengthened the power of the state through the repressive use of public institutions. Those who challenge capitalism and authoritarianism are singled out for reprisal. Arts-based social movements can resist state-sponsored neo-McCarthyite sanctions against democracy. Social movement activists can provide counter-narratives to the emerging forms of anti-leftism in autocratic states. As a model of resistance, travelling art and theatre groups could operate on a collaborative, crowdfunded basis, moving from place to place and providing innovative alternatives to the status quo. They would present comedy sketches, monologues, oratory, parodies, poetry, satires and songs that have a social and political message. They would at the same time disseminate information to help people make effective use of available resources and connect with solidarity networks. Performances could be live-streamed or recorded, then uploaded onto various social media platforms, helping to promote social movement objectives. Due to the collaborative nature of the work, public support would grow for these arts troupes that would eventually become self-funded. As social movement projects move online, artists encounter new forms of neo-McCarthyite repression.

The Party of People’s Distrust: The Roots of Electoral Success of the Communists in 2021

Abstract After the 2021 State Duma elections, the Communist Party of Russia Federation (KPRF) re-appeared on the Russian political landscape as a new political force with new faces and creative local campaigns. How and why were the communists being treated by most of the analysts and voters as systemic and rather passive opposition successfully accumulated political resistance and grievances at the polls in September 2021? In this study, we argue that mobilization against the pension reform in 2018 proved to be the crucial determinant of the electoral outcomes three years later. The latter provides evidence that protests bring about long-term consequences on voting behavior not only in democracies, but also in autocratic states. We rely on the original dataset on protests in 381 large Russian cities (more than 20,000 residents) that took place in Summer-Fall 2018 merged with the electoral data of the Duma elections in 2016 and 2021.

Civil society and contested elections in electoral autocracies: Dissent and caution in Uganda’s 2016 elections

ABSTRACT Civil society organizations (CSOs) respond differently to challenges from autocratic governments and opposition parties around the regulation and content of elections. Building on research on autocratic state regulation of CSOs, this article contributes a sharper focus on their horizontal relations to increase understanding of their diverse strategies of engagement. The article argues that even in contexts dominated by a heavy-handed state, relations between CSOs are especially important during elections, when they are most mobilized and motivated to build coalitions. The results of a study into how non-governmental associations (NGOs) and faith-based organizations (FBOs) engaged with electoral reforms around the Uganda 2016 general elections show how relations of cooperation, competition, or conflict between civil society organizations modify the effects of state regulation by adding to their incentives and capacities. The findings help explain the many ways CSOs engage with each other, the population, the state, and the opposition, including their submission to and protests against the autocratic order. Horizontal relations of conflict and competition among the FBOs prevented effective coalitions and facilitated submissive politics during Uganda’s 2016 elections. Relations among governance NGOs, however, were more cooperative and generated protest alliances, even though those alliances proved difficult to sustain.

Cruelty and Corpo-reality: Connecting Technologies and Practices Integral to the Infliction and Investigation of Torture

Abstract Torture has a complex relationship with technology. Technology variably facilitates or hinders modes of inflicting and investigating torture. Torture itself remains a technology for producing proof, simultaneously primitive and sophisticated. Torture techniques and practices evolve and travel, are prevalent in both democratic and autocratic states, and are often accompanied by a pseudo-scientific rhetoric of ‘controlled’ pain. Conversely, juridical processes pursuing accountability for torture also focus their evaluative gaze on the tortured body and to scientific expertise. To this end, sustained transnational efforts have culminated in the crafting of evidentiary technologies to document torture as grounded in state-of-the-art medical and psychological knowledge. What is more, despite this demand and supply, the utility of this ‘technology of knowledge’ remains unfulfilled in practice for different reasons. I start with the dialectic interplay between infliction and investigation produced by these practices—with prevalent methods informing documentation practices, and with those responsible for infliction adjusting their practices accordingly to evade accountability. With the long-anticipated revised version of the UN Istanbul Protocol now at hand, I revisit the origins and promises undergirding these efforts and their implications for anti-torture practice. I conclude with a critical reflection on the contested dynamics of knowledge imbued in these practices—asking how we (and the law) can ever adequately know about the tortured body.

The Impact of Domestic Surveillance on Political Imprisonment: Evidence from the German Democratic Republic

How does domestic surveillance affect the frequency of political imprisonments in autocratic states? In contrast to conventional wisdom, I argue that surveillance reduces the frequency of political imprisonments in power-maximizing autocracies. Surveillance decreases uncertainty about the correct targets of repression, allowing for more selective detentions and shifts to silent instruments of repression. To investigate these claims, I draw on a unique county-level dataset of political imprisonment in the German Democratic Republic between 1984 and 1988. I proxy the number of monitored individuals with newly collected county-level data on surveillance operations. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and instrumental variable models to investigate the impact of surveillance on political imprisonment. I find that higher shares of spies per monitored individual were associated with a reduction of political imprisonment. Further, increasing levels of spy infiltration were linked to a systematic shift to silent instruments of repression.

Manipulating Remittances: Strengthening Autocratic Regimes with Currency Overvaluation and Remittance Flows

This paper investigates the link between remittances and autocratic regime stability. It challenges the prevailing assumption that remittances cannot be directly captured as a source of hard capital by states. It proposes that remittances increase regime durability by incentivizing and enabling currency overvaluation and seigniorage revenue generation in autocratic states that produce non-freely convertible currencies. It uses cross-national time-series data from autocratic regimes in Sub-Saharan African countries from 1975-2015 to test this theory. The analysis shows that remittances increase autocratic regime durability in countries that have monopoly control over domestic currency production.

Wither the Trade Regime?

Abstract Democratic governance, liberal values, and the open trading regime are facing interconnected existential challenges. For most of the post-WWII period, they were “legs to the same stool.” Today, the connections among the three have frayed, and this has implications for the future of the liberal international economic order. While the trade regime successfully incorporated smaller autocratic states, the rise of China and increasing tension among signatories to the WTO has challenged the rule-based trading system. This essay argues that even with these divisions among the memberships, all trading nations, including China, need the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO. Trade requires market predictability; exporters and their home governments require some means to adjudicate conflict. The GATT/WTO remains the best, and perhaps the only, organization that can facilitate such coordination and finesse the changing nature of the international system to assure an open world economy.

Manuel Pérez-García (2021). Global history with Chinese characteristics. Autocratic States along the silk road in the decline of the Spanish and Qing empires 1680-1796

Manuel Pérez-García (2021). Global history with Chinese characteristics. Autocratic States along the silk road in the decline of the Spanish and Qing empires 1680-1796

Keeping Receipts: Lessons on Civic Engagement in Autocratic States from Kazakh Advocacy for Xinjiang

Abstract How do civil society actors in authoritarian states use the internet to mobilize and advocate for rights claims? The internet has changed the patterns of political communication for civil society actors, but the range of tactics used in autocracies remains undertheorized. In this paper, I analyze the activities of Atajurt Eriktileri, a group that petitions the Kazakhstani government on behalf of co-ethnics detained in Xinjiang, China. Empirically, I complement five semi-structured interviews with an interpretive analysis of 3,272 petition videos (an original dataset) posted to Atajurt’s YouTube channel. I identify four visual–discursive patterns and three scripts that characterize the petitions, which speak to Atajurt’s strategy of atomized collective action; this approach helps avoid the repression that comes with more traditional forms of mass mobilization. The hypervisibility of Atajurt’s social media presence challenges the dominant literature on civil society and resistance in authoritarian regimes that emphasizes hidden forms of contention.

Manipulating Remittances: Strengthening Autocratic Regimes with Currency Overvaluation and Remittance Flows

This paper investigates the link between remittances and autocratic regime stability. It challenges the prevailing assumption that remittances cannot be directly captured as a source of hard capital by states. It proposes that remittances increase regime durability by incentivizing and enabling currency overvaluation and seigniorage revenue generation in autocratic states that produce non-freely convertible currencies. It uses cross-national time-series data from autocratic regimes in Sub-Saharan African countries from 1975-2015 to test this theory. The analysis shows that remittances increase autocratic regime durability in countries that have monopoly control over domestic currency production.

Bending the Rules to Break the System: The Future of Interpol at a Crossroads

The scale and scope of the transnational serious and organized crime threat are growing at a concerning rate. These increasingly resilient and entrepreneurial organized crime groups directly threaten human security and the rule of law. In this strategic context, international law enforcement cooperation is more important than ever. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the preeminent multilateral cooperation mechanism in the rules-based order, is essential to the global response to this organized crime threat. Unfortunately, autocratic states increasingly seek to interact with international institutions in a manner that violates such institutions' rules and norms, as well as those of the broader global rules-based order. Because of its institutional vulnerabilities, Interpol also faces this threat. This paper explores, using case studies, how autocratic states like Turkey, Russia, and China continue to manipulate Interpol's systems to achieve outcomes that these mechanisms were not meant to achieve. Moreover, these same states are undermining the rules-based order. The paper argues that much will need to be done to future-proof Interpol and assure its continued relevance and strategic success. At the heart of this work is a requirement to dramatically increase Interpol's transparency while protecting operational security and privacy. This paper illustrates that a lack of transparency and accountability represents a distinct vulnerability. Exploiting this vulnerability is not simply about the organization and its functions but the broader functionality of multilateralism and the rules-based order. Reforming institutions like Interpol to create transparency and accountability is thus an essential step in preserving the rules-based order that generations have worked so hard to create and that benefits many.

‘РУСОФОБИЯ’ И РОДСТВЕННЫЕ ПОНЯТИЯ В ГЕРМАНИИ XIX В

The concept of ‘Russophobia’ was introduced by British radicals in 1836. In Germany 1830-1840 s, the ‘Russophobia’ debate took on a much clearer ideological connotation than it was in England. The dividing line was between democrats and national liberals, on the one hand, and conservatives, on the other; and the image of Russia was very different for both. The following words were used as synonyms for ‘Russophobia’: RussenhaB (hatred of Russians), Russen-Scheu and Russenfurcht (fear of Russians), Russenfeindschaft (hostility towards Russians), Russophagie (Russophagy), Russenfresserei (Russian-eating). First two words appeared during the Polish uprising of 1830-1831 and were usually used in connection with the Polish question. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the above designations were encountered in a foreign policy context and referred not to Russians as a nation, but to the Russian autocratic state. After the Crimean War, the topic of ‘Russophobia’ in the liberal and conservative press fades into the background. The French threat is highlighted; “Russian-eaters / Russophobes” are now called Democrats-Republicans, many of whom ended up in exile. Since the Eastern Crisis in the late 1870 s, the bulk of references to ‘Russophobia’ in the German press have been associated with Anglo-Russian relations, and the word ‘Russian-eating’ is practically out of use.

War and Peace of Peter the Great

The article analyzes the plans of Peter the Great related to the consolidation of Russia on the shores of the Baltic Sea. It focuses on the emergence of the idea to gain access to the Baltic Sea and the stages of its implementation. During the Northern War of 17001721, Russia's peace conditions changed. The article tries to explain the basis for the evolution of Peter the Greate's ideas of achieving the desired peace.It shows that after the "embarrassment at Narva" in November 1700 and the first success of B.P. Sheremetev at Erestfer in December 1701 in 1702 1709, the conduct of hostilities and the diplomatic efforts of Russia were directed exclusively at keeping the outlet to the sea. The creation of St. Petersburg, the transfer of the capital to it, the construction of a defensive system at the mouth of the Neva all this was aimed at securing the mouth of the Neva for Russia. Russia agreed to the conclusion of a peace, according to which it received only Ingria and Karelia – the old Russian provinces.After the victory under Poltava in 1709, a new struggle for peace began. The annexation of Livonia, Estland, the temporary occupation of Finland – all these conquests were motivated by the idea for which Russia started the war: keeping and ensuring the safe outlet to the sea. Russia constantly showed its readiness to conclude peace, but Sweden rejected all such attempts because it could not get along with the idea of parting with imperial ambitions.Russia began ten-year-long harsh coercion of Sweden to peace, which resulted in the devastation of a part of the Swedish territories proper by the Russian army and the forced consent of the Swedes to peace. The Nishtad Peace of 1721 ended the war and became the starting point for the extraordinary development of the imperial imagination of Peter the Great. Russia's entry into the world arena as an empire, an autocratic state dangerous to its neighbors and actively participating in the incessant division of the world.

The Orthodox Preference for Democracy: An American Response to “The Church in the Public Square” (Section II), in For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church

In For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church, there is a clear preference for the “democratic genius of the modern age.” This preference for democracy is due, in part, to the long experience of the Orthodox Church with other governmental forms, especially autocratic and authoritarian states.

Digital sovereignty–European Union's action plan needs a common understanding to succeed

AbstractIn the states of the European Union (EU), the question currently raised is to what extent dependence on technologies from the USA and China will have a lasting impact on state sovereignty. The concept of digital sovereignty represents the EU's efforts to compensate for the deficits of the past decades caused by an inadequate positioning of Europe as a location for software and hardware development. Autocratic states use the path of digital autarky, the USA a path of liberalisation and high degrees of openness. In the EU, on the other hand, regulation, data protection and liberal values developed over centuries play a major role in the less pronounced IT development. The path of European states to more digital sovereignty has been addressed politically as an “action plan”, but there is still no common understanding or definition of what digital sovereignty exactly means, where the EU and thus also an individual European state stands. There is a lack of a target and a measurable index as well as evaluated measures derived from it. The present article articulates the basis, namely the common understanding and the definition of digital sovereignty. It places the concepts of digitalisation and state sovereignty in a historical framework and locates them in the current literature, then analyses digital sovereignty as a composite term and places it in the context of current research. Finally, a definition is proposed that can serve as the basis for further research to identify an index of digital sovereignty. This definition can also become the basis for EU legislation to implement the “action plan”.

Business representation in an autocratic regime: Tariff policy and exchange committees in late Tsarist Russia

AbstractStudies on the role of interest groups in the formation of public policy are generally focused on those in democratic countries. However, the emerging literature on interest groups in autocratic regimes suggests that business in such states is actively involved in policy formation. On the basis of the first dataset on the 1891 tariff reform in the Russian Empire, this study carries out an empirical examination of the role of business in policymaking in one of the most autocratic states in history. Dominance analysis is used to estimate the contribution of participants to tariff reform. The results show that while the state had an overriding influence on tariff formation, the contribution of business representatives is noteworthy. The addition of business associations to the model explaining tariff changes leads to an increase in the explained variance of the model by about seven percentage points. Additional regression analysis confirms that the success of lobbying depended on the homogeneity of the proposals presented by regional business associations.

Sovereignty in the Digital Age – How Can We Measure Digital Sovereignty and Support the EU’s Action Plan?

Abstract In the states of the European Union (EU), the question currently being asked is to what extent dependence on technologies from the USA and China will have a lasting impact on state sovereignty. The term digital sovereignty stands for the EU’s desire to compensate for the deficits of the past decades, which were caused by an insufficient development of the location for software and hardware development. Autocratic states use the path of digital autarky, the USA a path of liberalization and high degrees of openness. In the EU, on the other hand, regulation, data protection, and liberal values developed over centuries play a major role in the less pronounced IT development. The path of European states to more digital sovereignty has been addressed politically as an “action plan,” but there is still no common understanding or definition of what digital sovereignty exactly means. There is a lack of a target and a measurable index as well as evaluated measures derived from it. Based on a historical derivation, this article proposes a definition for European digital sovereignty and the formation of an index. The index needs to be further scientifically elaborated for applicability.

Propaganda beyond state borders: the deployment of symbolic resources to mobilize political support among the Chinese diaspora

Today, authoritarian states, such as that of China, strive to cultivate political allegiance among their diasporic subjects through state-run propaganda operations beyond national borders. Aiming to construct a stable, exclusive, and institutionalized diasporic network of influence within host societies, autocratic states use extraterritorial propaganda to amass integrative capacity by dispersing carefully tailored discourses, penalizing opposing voices, promoting a unified interpretive framework for conceptualizing socio-political reality, forming a standard meaning system for diasporic communities, coordinating collective action, and forging an integrated patriotic identity through the repetition of codified communication. The early 21st century has witnessed the rise of pro-regime solidarity among diasporic Chinese, a global force buttressing China’s communist regime. In this article, we argue that this unprecedented forging of solidarity is the product of China’s extra-territorial propaganda. The ruling party-state consistently uses concise, catchy, and carefully tailored symbolic resources, such as ‘China insult’ (ruhua) incidents, to extend its political influence beyond national borders. This poses novel challenges to the Westphalian sovereign state. The state’s tactic overseas propaganda operations have facilitated the emergence of an extraterritorial Chinese ‘symbolic state’ that relies on shared symbolism and identity, rather than territorially defined Weberian coercion, to project control over a transnational socio-political domain.

Battling over Social Media: Public Protest and State Responses to Dr Li Wenliang’s Death in China

This article discusses the state and public reactions on the internet to the death of Dr Li Wenliang, the whistle-blower who warned of the COVID-19 outbreak in China. Contrary to findings in existing literature, this study argues that the society–state interaction over the internet is far more dynamic and complex, and that autocratic states have the capability and resilience to manage and even control the internet. While the internet could help rally waves of public outpourings and protests, the state, in response, broadcast its tactical concessions to ease widespread public anger. However, the state has been able to portray its overall highly effective control of the epidemic, thereby claiming political credits and legitimacy for governance.