Auditor Incentives Research Articles

THE EFFECT OF AUDITOR EXPERIENCE, AUDITOR WORKLOAD AND AUDITOR INCENTIVES ON PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM

The aim of this research is to analyze the effect of auditor experience, auditor workload, and auditor incentives on professional skepticism. The respondents in this study are auditors working in Public Accounting Firms in the DKI Jakarta region. This research utilizes primary data and a questionnaire to obtain information from the respondents using purposive sampling method. The analysis method used is Statistical Program for Social Science (SPSS) version 25. The results of this research indicate that the variables of auditor experience, auditor workload, and auditor incentives have been proven to have a significant influence on professional skepticism.

The impact of external auditors on firms’ financial restatements: a review of archival studies and implications for future research

A systematic literature review includes 69 archival studies on the impact of external auditors on firms’ financial restatements, based on principal agent theory. In more detail, we separate between auditor incentives and auditor competencies to supply a high audit quality. Financial restatements represent one of the most important proxies of audit quality in archival audit research, stressing an increased relevance in empirical research, business practice and regulatory initiatives. The review highlights that many studies on auditor incentives and competencies show inconclusive results on firms’ financial restatements (e.g., fee and rotation studies). But there are indications that especially auditor expertise and audit firm size significantly decrease financial restatements. In discussing potential future research, we emphasize the need for a more detailed analysis of restatements proxies, controls for audit risk, inclusion of (corporate) governance mechanisms as possible moderators or mediators, and sustainability issues of the audit team.

Evidence on the Effects of an Audit Quality Bonus

Audit quality rewards might create incentives for auditors to enhance their performance. We examine whether the effects of an audit quality bonus are contingent on appetitive motivation and engagement pressure. Appetitive motivation is a personality trait of goal pursuits that consists of drive, reward responsiveness, and fun seeking. Engagement pressure is the conflict between meeting time budgets and complying with auditing standards. Relying on cognitive evaluation theory, we expect that an audit quality bonus increases audit quality for auditors with lower appetitive motivation and decreases audit quality for auditors with higher appetitive motivation when engagement pressure is low. When engagement pressure is high, the effects of an audit quality bonus are difficult to predict. In an experiment with 420 auditors, we manipulate an audit quality bonus and the level of engagement pressure and measure appetitive motivation. The results are consistent with our expectations in the setting of low engagement pressure, but only for drive. In the setting of high engagement pressure, we find no effects for an audit quality bonus. When considering audit quality rewards, it is important to acknowledge the typical audit environment of conflicting pressures and the level of drive that both can constrain these rewards’ effectiveness.

Do auditors’ incentives affect materiality assessments of prior-period misstatements?

We examine whether auditors' incentives affect materiality assessments of prior-period misstatements. Interviews with global network firm partners reveal consistency across firms in the process used to assess prior-period misstatements and highlight points in the process where judgments are most susceptible to auditors’ conscious or subconscious biases. In related empirical tests, we find that auditors assess misstatements as less material (i.e., misstatements are disclosed less prominently) when auditors face greater engagement risk (comprised of the risk of litigation and reputation loss) or have greater incentives to please important clients. These effects only occur when auditor incentives to avoid further litigation or client losses within an audit office are most salient and when the quantitative magnitude of the misstatement is in a range subject to greater professional judgment. Thus, we identify boundary conditions on the extent to which auditor incentives affect materiality judgments. Finally, additional tests suggest that neither local engagement partners nor professional practice partners are immune from these incentives. Our study should be informative to audit firms when designing and updating quality control structures.

How Changes in Expectations of Earnings Affect the Associations of Earnings Overstatements and Audit Effort with Audit Risk and Market Price*

ABSTRACTIn this study, we provide theoretical guidance for both analytical research and empirical research by considering how changing expectations of earnings affect a dishonest manager's strategy to overstate earnings and an auditor's strategy to exert effort in a two‐period setting. We expect our study's insights on changing economic conditions to help shape future research. We model the manager type as either honest or dishonest, which allows us to differentiate audit risk from audit effort. The key takeaways for future research are the insights on how changes in payoffs and expected earnings affect the associations that involve earnings overstatements and audit effort with audit risk and market price. For instance, researchers typically assume audit effort and audit risk are negatively associated, but we find the association can be positive when, for example, the auditor chooses a period 2 strategy based on the changes in period 1 game parameters. The results of our study provide two additional key insights on the design of future empirical tests. First, by dichotomizing, we show the importance of estimating the intercept in the market pricing equation when studying earnings quality, because market price also adjusts for expected bias through changes in the intercept. Second, our multiperiod setting demonstrates that the effects from a change in the manager's or auditor's incentives in period 1 may reverse in period 2. Empirical studies typically examine the contemporaneous effects of these changes on market price and/or audit risk but fail to identify the cross‐temporal effects we document in our study.

Disciplining Role of Auditor Tenure and Mandatory Auditor Rotation

ABSTRACT This study addresses the international debate over whether the rotation of audit firms should be mandatory. Mandatory rotation rules have been adopted by the European Union, but these rules have not been established in the United States. Proponents of the policy believe that a long-tenure auditor-client relationship leads to the auditor building an excessive economic bond with the client, which may then erode auditor independence. Motivated by this claim, I build a theoretical model that compares auditor incentives to issue independent reports under regimes with and without mandatory rotation. The model demonstrates conditions under which mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence, contrary to the popular view.

Industry-Specific Knowledge Transfer in Audit Firms: Evidence from Audit Firm Mergers in China

ABSTRACT Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the effect of industry-specific knowledge transfer on audit performance after a merger of two Chinese audit firms with different levels of expertise in an industry. For clients in an industry audited by both merging audit firms, those audited by the audit firm less specialized in that industry belong to the treatment group, while all other clients belong to the control group. We find an economically significant improvement in audit quality (as reflected in a reduction in financial misstatements) for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same merged audit firm. We show the treatment effect is not driven by changes in auditor incentives or personnel movement and is more pronounced when we expect stronger communication between the less and more specialized auditors after the merger. We caution that our findings are specific to China and may not generalize to other countries. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.

How Is the Audit Market Affected by Characteristics of the Nonaudit Services Market?

ABSTRACTHow can features of the markets for audit and nonaudit services (NAS) affect an audit firm's incentives to invest in audit quality, average audit quality, and social welfare? We address these questions in a model focusing on competition in both audit and NAS markets. We show that, when audit and NAS demand are positively correlated, prohibiting auditors from providing NAS to audit clients leads to higher investments in audit quality, but can decrease average audit quality if marginal clients switch to lower quality auditors. The effect on social welfare can be positive or negative, depending on the distribution of clients' service demands. General bans on auditor provision of NAS can, via similar channels, increase or decrease audit quality and social welfare. Overall, our findings suggest a more nuanced view of how regulating an auditor's provision of NAS might affect audit quality and social welfare, and are driven by the effects of multimarket competition on the auditor's incentives to invest in audit quality, rather than previously identified auditor independence or knowledge spillover channels.

Core earnings management: How do audit firms interact with classification shifting and accruals management?

This study examines the interaction of audit firm characteristics with two core earnings management tools: classification shifting (CS) and core accruals management (CACM). CS occurs when management intentionally misclassifies recurring operational expenses as special items to inflate perceptions of core earnings. A Norwegian sample of companies, with forthcoming equity issues and acquisitions, reveals that CS substitutes for CACM for clients of Big 4 and industry‐specialized audit firms. By contrast, CS complements CACM for clients of non‐Big 4 and non‐specialized audit firms. The level of auditor‐provided non‐audit services during a forthcoming equity issue, a measure of economic bond potential, also interacts with CS and CACM, though this interaction is different for clients of Big 4 and non‐Big 4 audit firms. The overall results suggest that auditor incentives may support tolerating CS, which raises a question about the effectiveness of current accounting and auditing standards.

Audit quality and audit size: Evidence from auditor mergers in China

AbstractFocusing on the surge of mergers among Chinese local accounting firms around the year 2000, this study examines the impacts of auditor mergers on audit quality, and documents increased earnings quality for non‐Big 5 clients during the postmerger period. The study also brings up the question for further investigation, whether the Big 5 auditors provide significant higher quality audits than the non‐Big auditors do in China, a far less litigious audit market environment, during the period of 1999–2002. We find limited differences in terms of audit quality between the Big 5 and non‐Big 5 auditors. We do not find significant differences in reported discretionary accruals and probability of reporting losses between Big 5 clients and non‐Big 5 clients. Only with the earnings conservatism proxy, clients with Big 5 recognize bad news more quickly than non‐Big 5 clients. Furthermore, findings of this study suggest the Big 5 audits do not contribute to the accruals quality differences in China, implying legal enforcement and litigation risks have greater propensity to drive auditor incentives.

Capital Market Consequences of Audit Office Size: Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

SUMMARYThis study examines the association between the office size of engagement auditors and their clients' future stock price crash risk, a consequence of managerial bad news hoarding. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that local audit office size is significantly and negatively related to future stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that large audit offices effectively detect and deter bad news hoarding activities in comparison with their smaller counterparts. We further explore two possible explanations for these findings, the Auditor Incentive Channel and the Auditor Competency Channel. Our empirical tests offer support for both channels.JEL Classifications: G12; G34; M49.

Literature Review on Influencing Factors of Audit Fees

Audit fee refers to the remuneration obtained by accounting firms and auditors for providing professional services. The determination of audit fees requires mutual consultation between audited units and accounting firms. In order to ensure the quality of the audit report, as an important part of the auditor incentive mechanism, the establishment of reasonable audit fees is a necessary condition to ensure that the certified public accountants perform the normal information assurance function and ensure the effective operation of the audit work. Audit fee is the price of audit report. As the supplier of audit report and the demander of audit report, the relationship between supply and demand of both parties will inevitably affect audit fee. Therefore, this paper mainly from two aspects—from the perspective of accounting firms to investigate the impact of audit fees and the impact of customers’ perspective on audit fees to sort out the relevant literature on audit fees in these two aspects, hoping to provide reference value for the study of audit fees.

Strategic Interactions Between Tax and Statutory Auditors and Different Information Regimes: Implications for Tax Audit Efficiency

We examine whether tax audit regimes become more efficient if (i) there are audited financial statements and (ii) tax auditors have access to the internal statutory audit report revealing information about statutory audit adjustments. Our analysis is based on a standard tax compliance game that we extend to model the strategic interaction among a firm issuing financial and tax reports, a statutory auditor, and a tax auditor. We find that the efficiency effects of additional information depend on the strength of tax auditor incentives and the weight that firms place on book income. For high-powered tax auditor incentives, we obtain no information effect on our efficiency measures. For low-powered tax auditor incentives, we find an ambiguous effect, and for mediumpowered tax auditor incentives and firms that place a high weight on book income, tax audit efficiency increases if the tax auditor has access to additional information. In the latter case, we find that granting the tax auditor access to the internal statutory audit report increases firms' tax compliance, raises tax revenues, and decreases tax audit frequency.

The Interrelation between Audit Quality and Managerial Reporting Choices and Its Effects on Financial Reporting Quality

ABSTRACTTwo distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial reporting quality (measured as the earnings response coefficient or ERC) is associated with management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. However, researchers have yet to consider how ERCs are affected by either the auditor's reaction to changes in the manager's reporting bias or the manager's reaction to changes in audit quality. Our study provides theoretical guidance on these interrelations and how changes in the manager's or the auditor's incentives affect both reporting bias and audit quality. Specifically, when the manager's cost (benefit) of reporting bias increases (decreases), we find that expected bias decreases, inducing the auditor to react by reducing audit quality. Because we also find that the association between expected audit quality and ERCs is always positive, changes in managerial incentives for biased reporting lead to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. When the cost of auditing decreases or the cost of auditor liability increases, we find that expected audit quality increases, inducing the manager to react by decreasing reporting bias. In this case, changes in the costs of audit quality lead to a negative association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of our theoretical findings by focusing on the empirical observations documented in the extant literature on managerial ownership and accounting expertise on the audit committee. In light of our framework, we provide new interpretations of these empirical observations and new predictions for future research.

The Effect of The Internal Auditor Incentive on The Disclosure Of financial Information In Jordanian Industrial Companies

The objective of the study is to investigate the relationship between internal auditor incentive and disclosure of financial information in Jordanian industrial companies. The quantitative research design was used in the study by (51) self-administrative questionnaire distributed to CEO in in Jordanian industrial companies, the data were analyzed by (SPSS 21) software. The results of the study showed there is a positive relationship between the internal auditor's incentives and the disclosure of financial information and there is a clear problem of the credibility of disclosure in the Jordanian industrial companies, where some financial information is hidden from outside parties for special reasons. According to the result of the study the researchers recommend that the Jordanian industrial companies pay attention to the incentives of the internal auditor and this study recommend the future researchers to focus on the all Jordanian companies. in addition recommend the future researchers to focus will be on examining the corporate governance policies as a moderating variable between internal auditing and disclosure credibility that will strengthen the relationship between them.

Knowledge Transfer in Audit Firms

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the effect of industry-specific knowledge transfer on audit performance after a merger of two Chinese audit firms with different levels of expertise in an industry. For clients in an industry audited by both merging audit firms, those audited by the audit firm less specialized in that industry belong to the treatment group, while all other clients belong to the control group. We find an economically-significant improvement in audit quality (as reflected in a reduction in financial misstatements) for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same merged audit firm. We show that the treatment effect is not driven by changes in auditor incentives or personnel movement and is more pronounced when we expect stronger communication between the less and more specialized auditors after the merger. We caution that our findings are specific to China and may not generalize to other countries.

Market Interactions between Audit and Non-Audit Services: Bundling, Bans, and Competition

How can features of the markets for audit and non-audit services (NAS) affect an audit firm's incentives to invest in audit quality, average audit quality, and social welfare? We address these questions in a model focusing on competition in both audit and NAS markets. We show that, when audit and NAS demand are positively correlated, prohibiting auditors from providing NAS to audit clients leads to higher investments in audit quality, but can decrease average audit quality if marginal clients switch to lower-quality auditors. The effect on social welfare can be positive or negative, depending on the distribution of clients' service demands. General bans on auditor provision of NAS can, via similar channels, increase or decrease audit quality and social welfare. Overall, our findings suggest a more nuanced view of how regulating an auditor's provision of NAS might affect audit quality and social welfare, and are driven by the effects of multi-market competition on the auditor's incentives to invest in audit quality, rather than previously identified auditor independence or knowledge spillover channels.

Do Big Four Auditors Always Provide Higher Audit Quality? Evidence from Pakistan

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of external auditors in potentially approving or limiting a firm’s earnings management practices in institutional settings which do not provide incentives for auditors to deliver high audit quality. We use signed discretionary and performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as proxies for earnings management, and audit firm size (Big 4 vs. Non-Big 4) and audit opinion type (Qualified vs. Unqualified) as measures for audit quality. Using a sample of 183 firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, Pakistan for the five-year period from 2009 to 2013, we find that there is statistically no significant difference between earnings management activities of firms audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. Audit opinion is not being issued in response to the earnings management activities being employed by firms. Further consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, we find that earnings management is pervasive in family controlled firms and Big 4 auditors do not moderate the relation between family firm dominance and earnings management. A small audit market coupled with non-existent litigation risk, strong economic bonding of auditors with their clients, lower investor protection, poor enforcement mechanisms and dominance of firms by influential family groups lead auditors to behave opportunistically, which undermines their independence and objectivity.

Fee competition among Big 4 auditors and audit quality

Both the GAO (Public accounting firms: mandated study on consolidation and competition. GAO, Washington, 2003; Audits of public companies: continued concentration in audit market for large public companies does not call for immediate action. GAO, Washington, 2008) and the US Treasury (Advisory committee on the auditing profession: final report, 2008. http://www.tres.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/final-report.pdf ) have implied that the Big 4 dominated US audit market lacks competition. More recently, the PCAOB has expressed a somewhat different concern, i.e., that because audit committees may be primarily interested in negotiating a lower audit fee (rather than championing higher audit quality) for their clients, fee competition in the US audit market could pressure the incumbent auditor to compromise on audit quality (Doty in Keynote address: the reliability, role and relevance of the audit: a turning point, 2011. www.pcaobus.org ). We utilize the notion of counterfactual fees chargeable by auditors to assess fee competition and investigate competing views on the relation between fee competition among Big 4 auditors and audit quality in US local audit markets. To operationalize fee competition at the client-level in the context of each local audit market, we compute a separate counterfactual audit fee that would be charged by every other Big 4 auditor for that particular engagement and use the minima of the counterfactuals. We validate our audit fee competition metric by showing a positive relation with the incumbent auditor’s switching risk. Collectively, our findings suggest that fee competition is useful as a mechanism for improving audit quality in the highly concentrated US audit market, albeit only in local audit markets where the incumbent auditor has below-median market power and only for higher quality clients. Overall, our findings speak to the interplay between fee competition and auditor incentives and are of potential interest to regulators such as the PCAOB concerned about competition in US audit markets.

Core Earnings Management: How Do Audit Firms Interact with the Balance Between Classification Shifting and Accruals Management?

This study examines the interaction of audit firm characteristics with two core earnings management tools: classification shifting (CS) and core accruals management (CACM). CS occurs when management intentionally misclassifies recurring operational expenses as special items to inflate perceptions of core earnings. A Norwegian sample of companies, with forthcoming equity issues and acquisitions, reveals that CS substitutes for CACM for clients of Big 4 and industry-specialized audit firms. By contrast, CS complements CACM for clients of non-Big 4 and non-specialized audit firms. The level of auditor-provided non-audit services during a forthcoming equity issue, a measure of economic bond potential, also interacts with CS and CACM, though this interaction is different for clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. The overall results suggest that auditor incentives may support tolerating CS, which raises a question about the effectiveness of current accounting and auditing standards.