Auction Method Research Articles

Does Multi-Attribute Bidding in Public Construction Projects Prevent Corruption while Tenderers’ Preferences are Open? A Study of China’s Practice

This paper establishes a method of supply-chain multi-attribute reverse auction. Presuming the tenderers’ preference is open, the paper proposes a non-cooperative multi-attribute bidding game model about public construction projects and analyzes the bidding strategies of tenderers and bidders. Through the simulation of a case in China, we find that: (1) the more committed of the tenderers to construction quality and schedule, the greater benefits, enthusiasm in bidding, and tenderer’s surplus; (2) the bidder’s benefits have a U-shaped relationship respectively with the bidding quality and the construction period; and (3) the greater the bidder’s construction quality and period cost coefficients, the smaller the tenderer’s surplus. Such conclusions indicate, the improvement of the bidding rules or procedures can contribute to restricting the behavior of tenderer and bidder, furthermore reducing the corruption possibility of public construction projects.

The distributional effects of lotteries and auctions—License plate regulations in Guangzhou

Lotteries and auctions are common ways of allocating public resources, but they have rarely been used simultaneously in urban transportation policies. This paper presents a unique policy experiment in Guangzhou, China, where lotteries and auctions are used in conjunction to allocate vehicle licenses. Guangzhou introduced vehicle license regulations to control the monthly quota of local automobile growth in 2012. To obtain a license, residents are required to choose between the lottery and auction method. Since the introduction of the regulations, there has been heated debates on the distributional effects of lotteries and auctions; however, the debates have not been grounded in empirical studies. We analyze the distributional effects of such mixed mode of resource allocation in a positive manner based on individual behavioral choices. We conducted a survey in January 2016 (n = 1000 people ∗ 12 months), and used mixed logit models to analyze how socio-economic status, including income and household automobile ownership, determined people’s choices among lottery, auction, and non-participation alternatives. We find that income increased participation, but did not influence non-car owners’ choices between lotteries and auctions, which contrasts with the common notion that lotteries benefit the poor. Additionally, the positive impact of car ownership on participation indicates a car-dependent trajectory for automobile growth. The significant socio-economic differentiators between lotteries and auctions were age, gender, and education. Proxies of mobility needs were insignificant overall. The program attributes had a much larger impact than all other variables—people were more likely to choose lotteries with higher winning rates and more participants and more likely to choose auctions with higher prices and more participants. We concluded that for those who participated, the choice between lotteries and auctions did not depend on their income or mobility needs but, rather, the probability of winning plates and the opportunity for speculation.

Auction‐based competition of hybrid small cells for dropped macrocell users

We propose an auction based beamforming and user association algorithm for a wireless network consisting of a macrocell and multiple small cell access points (SCAs). The SCAs compete for serving the macrocell base station (MBS) users (MUs). The corresponding user association problem is solved by the proposed bid-wait auction (BWA) method. We considered two scenarios. In the first scenario, the MBS initially admits the largest possible set of MUs that it can serve simultaneously and then auctions off the remaining MUs to the SCAs, who are willing to admit guest users (GUs) in addition to their commitments to serve their own host users (HUs). This problem is solved by the proposed forward bid-wait auction (FBWA). In the second scenario, the MBS aims to offload as many MUs as possible to the SCAs and then admits the largest possible set of remaining MUs. This is solved by the proposed backward bid-wait auction (BBWA). The proposed algorithms provide close to optimum solution as if obtained using a centralised global optimization.

Changes and trends in arrival and prices of agricultural commodities in APMC Kolhapur market

The study of APMC, Kolhapur revealed that, the open auction method of sale was strictly followed in the market, the overall conduct and law and administrative promptness was seen satisfactory. The analysis of trends in arrivals and prices revealed that, arrivals of paddy, groundnut, onion, potato and jaggery had showed fluctuations yearly during the period under study (2001-02 to 2011-12) but only arrivals of wheat decreased in period under study. The prices of all commodities were found to be increased over entire period.

What Does Improved Spectrum Management Mean for the Philippines?

This paper analyzes spectrum management practices in the Philippines. The regulatory body allocates available spectrum via an administrative approach which lacks transparency and due process. The paper recommends that the regulatory body adopts the auction method in allocating spectrums which is more transparent, fair, and cost-effective if a suitable design is adopted.

マスカスタマイゼーションの実現を目指す生産スケジューリング手法の－提案ーオークション手法の計画・運用段階への適用－

マスカスタマイゼーションの実現を目指す生産スケジューリング手法の－提案ーオークション手法の計画・運用段階への適用－

The IPO Issue Process

This note covers the institutional process for companies making an initial public offering (IPO) of equity. It focuses on the basic institutional requirements of an underwritten security offering and the role of investment bankers. It is designed to familiarize students with the terminology and institutional practices of an IPO. In addition, it discusses the regulatory changes brought about by passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in April 2012 and compares the process before and after the act was implemented. Excerpt UVA-F-1700 Rev. Dec. 4, 2018 The IPO Issue Process An initial public offering (IPO) is a private company's initial issuance of stock to the public, also known as going public. While there may be several reasons to take a company public, the primary purpose of an IPO is usually to raise cash. The cash may be used to expand operations or to pay off debt. Alternatively, an IPO might be part of a process where the company's founder and early investors sell all or part of their interests in the company as part of an exit strategy. Whatever the reasons for considering an IPO, it is a significant event in the life of a company. Before management embarks on an IPO, they should have knowledge of the process of taking a company public. This note covers the basic institutional requirements of an IPO that is done on a firm commitment basis. Firm commitment offers are the predominant way firms choose to go public compared to other methods of issue (e.g., best-efforts offers and auction methods). It reviews the steps of the IPO issue process and the rationale for these long-standing institutional arrangements. The IPO issue process was altered by passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in April 2012, which attempted to reduce the regulatory burden and derisk the IPO process for potential first-time issuers. These changes were prompted by concerns about the decline in the number of firms going public in the United States and whether the process itself had become too burdensome and costly for firms. Timeline of IPO . . .

LYRIC: Local Recall-Based Dynamic Double Spectrum Auction Mechanism With Heterogeneous-Demand Secondary Users

In this paper, we investigate the problem of recall mechanism in a dynamic spectrum auction system. The licensed spectrum holders (SHs) can auction their idle channels to the secondary wireless service providers (SWSPs) for economic incentive. However, the primary user (PU) of an SH has higher priority than the SWSPs for the spectrum access. To deal with a sudden increase in PUs’ spectrum demands after auction and guarantee their quality of services (QoS), we propose a Local recall-based dYnamic double spectRum auctIon meChanism (LYRIC) for SHs’ spectrum auction operation. Different from the most existing approaches about spectrum recall-based spectrum auction, the proposed spectrum auction method for heterogeneous spectrum transaction takes account of the joint effect of heterogeneous demand , spectrum spatial reusability , and the economic efficiency . Simulation results show that the proposed LYRIC algorithm can improve the auction process of SHs, the channels utilization efficiency and the average buyers’ satisfactory level with guarantees on the QoS of PUs.

Operating Simulation of RPS using DEVS W/S in Web Service Environment

Web system helps high-performance processing for big-data analysis and practical use to make various information using IT resources. The government have started the RPS system in 2012. The system invigorates the electricity production as using renewable energy equipment. The government operates system gathered big-data with various related information system data and the system users are distributed geographically. The companies have to fulfill the system, are available to purchase the REC to other electricity generation company sellers to procure REC for their duty volumes. The REC market operates single auction methods with users a competitive price. But the price have the large variation with various user trading strategy and sellers situations. This papler proposed RPS system modeling and simulation in web environment that is modeled in geographically distributed computing environment for web user with DEVS W/S. Web simulation system base on web service helps to analysis correlation and variables that act on trading price and volume within RPS big-data and the analysis can be forecast REC price.

Better Procurement by Comparing the Behavior of Electronic and Non-Electronic Procurement

Paradigm of administrative change the procedures method of government procurement, particularly the open auction method through a pattern of electronic procurement (e-proc). However, the development of e-proc has not been applied to the direct procurement system to purchase the stuf of governmental or procurement goods. Direct Procurement system adheres to a slightly different mechanism with the concept of an open auction. This difference implies the actor behavior in both methods is different too. Studies comparing the behavior of the both actors / organizer on the electronic procurement (public tender) and non-electronic (direct procurement) was conducted to determine the level of performance of government procurement. The factors and impact each of the procurement methods have been studied for understanding advantages and disadvantages of each method, so that it can formulate better procurement models.

A Study on the Real Estate Auction System in China

The paper provides an analysis of the real estate auction system in China, and comparisons against Korea with examples. Although the procedure of the real estate auction system in China is similar to Korea, its detailed contents are significantly different between two countries. The purpose of this paper is to look the relevant statutory provisions of real estate auction system, parties to auction, auction procedure, etc. The comparative analysis of two countries real estate auction system makes clear the characteristics on China s real estate auction system. The differences of two countries system are as follows. Firstly, the relevant statutory provisions of China s real estate auction system exists, but it still has not been sorted out systematically. Secondly, unlike Korea, the auctioneer which is an enterprise legal person in China advances auction between court and vendee. Thirdly, Sale of immovables shall follow the method of the quoted auction in China, while it shall follow the method of the date auction in Korea. Fourthly, The auctioneer in China shall announce the opening of an auction seven days prior to the date of auction. On the other hand, the court in Korea shall announce the opening of an auction fourteen days prior to the date of auction. Consequently, many ordinary people can t participate in sale of immovables because they are limited to acquire the information of real estate auction in China. Fifthly, the striking characteristics of China s auction procedure is virtually free from risk of real estate rights analysis and eviction. Since there are no similar researches conducted on this field, this paper initially analyzes the basic materials on the real estate auction system in China. In conclusion, this paper clarifies the contents and characteristics on China s real estate auction system. It will be very useful to Korean investors in China and researchers on this field.

Organizational structure and seasonal indices in arrivals and prices of agricultural commodities in KolhapurAPMC market

The study revealed that, organizational structure and composition was established well according to the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1963. The open auction method was strictly followed in the market, the overall conduct and law and administrative promptness was seen satisfactory. This study was suggested that the wheat growers should bring wheat for sell in the APMC, Kolhapur during the month of December to March. The paddy growers shall bring paddy for the sell in the APMC, Kolhapur during the month of August to December. In case of the onion growers shall bring onion for sell in APMC, Kolhapur during September to December. Potato can be brought for sell in APMC, Kolhapur during the month of September to December and the groundnut during April and September to January and in case jaggery for sell in APMC, Kolhapur during August and October to December in order to get good prices for their produce.

On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

We study mechanisms for the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special case of s -CAs, where agents are interested in sets of size at most s , for which a simple greedy algorithm obtains an s + 1 approximation, but no polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism is known to attain an approximation ratio better than O ( m /√log m ). We view this not only as an extreme gap between the power of greedy auctions and truthful greedy auctions, but also as exemplifying the gap between the known power of truthful and non-truthful polynomial time deterministic algorithms. We associate the notion of greediness with a broad class of algorithms, known as priority algorithms, which encapsulate many natural auction methods. This motivates us to ask: how well can a truthful greedy algorithm approximate the optimal social welfare for CA problems? We show that no truthful greedy priority algorithm can obtain an approximation to the CA problem that is sublinear in m , even for s -CAs with s ≥ 2. Our inapproximations are independent of any time constraints on the mechanism and are purely a consequence of the greedy-type restriction. We conclude that any truthful combinatorial auction mechanism with a non-trivial approximation factor must fall outside the scope of many natural auction methods.

Auction-Based Random Access Load Control for Time-Dependent Machine-to-Machine Communications

Random access channel (RACH) contention issue has drawn great attention due to the prospering development of machine-to-machine (M2M) and Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. Since a high preamble transmission rate is the direct cause of RACH contention, in this paper, we propose a two-stage scheme to control preamble transmission in multiple periods. In stage I, we design an auction method to balance and allocate the RACH transmission traffic among periods. In stage II, we propose an RACH attempt estimation method to control the preamble transmission rate decided by stage I. Through the two-stage scheme, we can efficiently handle a great number of random access request coming from diverse M2M applications.

Online auction-based resource scheduling in grid computing networks

The aim of this article is to introduce a novel auction-based algorithm for grid computing wireless networks and resolve some incompetence with dynamic mechanisms. We develop a reverse online auction method to allocate grid resources, where the grid resource providers arrive dynamically and user broker has to make a multi-attribute decision whether to sell tasks or not before the end of current round. In our approach, a trade-some-with-forecast algorithm is proposed to help the user broker to utilize his forecast ability to allocate the grid resource in an online setting. Furthermore, two reverse online auction-based protocols are presented to demonstrate the resource scheduling in grid computing wireless networks. Experiments show that the reverse online auction-based with forecast protocol has better performance in comparison with the reverse online auction-based protocol. It is efficient in terms of auction stages, user satisfaction, and successful forecast.

Structure and conduct of private vegetable market vis-à-vis public vegetable market – A study in Kolar district of Karnataka state

The present study was conducted in Mulbagal taluk of Kolar district of Karnataka state. The study analysed and compared the structure and conduct of private vegetable market [Mahatma Gandhi - 6 Fruits and Vegetables Wholesale Market (India) Private Limited] and public vegetable market (Mulbagal APMC). The primary data was collected from 50 farmer respondents participating in MG-6 market and another 50 farmers participating in Mulbagal AMPC market, resulting in a total sample size of 100 farmers. MG-6 market was oligopolistic in nature while Mulbagal APMC market was monopolistic in nature. Infrastructural facilities such as market yard, auction platform, storage/godown, weighing machine, shops, public address system, audio visual aids and electrification were available in both the markets. The method of price determination followed in both MG-6 and APMC markets was open auction method. Tomato was the major vegetable traded in both the markets. The market fee collected in MG-6 market was two per cent while in the case of Mulbagal APMC market; it was only one per cent. In both the markets, the major marketing cost was transportation.

Desirability bias and perceived effectiveness influence on willingness-to-pay for pro-environmental wine products

Purpose Consumer marketing suggests that greater concern for the environment is impacting purchase behavior. Recent surveys into US pro-environmental (PE) purchase patterns show a considerable gap between consumers’ attitude and actual behavior regarding PE products. What these products have in common is a normative component. This research aims to understand whether perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) and social desirability bias (SDB) influence consumers’ purchase decisions regarding PE wine products and willingness to pay (WTP). Design/methodology/approach To assess whether PCE and SDB influence consumer’s actual WTP for PE and conventional wine despite normative beliefs (NBs), two studies with sample sizes of 117 and 124 were conducted in the USA. The first part of each study involved surveying participants as to their NB, SDB, PCE and demographics. The second part of the study measured their actual WTP through participation in an experimental auction. Findings Consumers with high levels of NBs were significantly more likely to pay higher premiums for PE wines compared to non-PE wines and had higher levels of PCE, suggesting that they believe their purchase behavior makes a difference to the environment. However, this same group is strongly influenced by SDB, indicating that they may “over-report” desirable behaviors. Controlling for PCE and SDB, the significant difference in price for PE wine and non-PE wine was mitigated. Those with lower NBs were just the opposite, less concerned whether their purchase behavior directly impacts the environment, feeling that non-PE wine may be a better value proposition. Research limitations/implications The use of an auction method to assess actual behavior may be skewed by the attempt to get a winning bid, and this research was conducted in one particular part of the USA, which limits the generalizability of the results to other parts of the country or world. Originality/value The findings from the current research provide important information for wine producers, distributors and retailers, specifically the development of marketing and branding strategies, and as a method for normative product/brand differentiation in a competitive marketplace.

Evaluation of Auction-Based Multi-Robot Routing by Parallel Simulation

Auction methods are a promising approximation approach for distributed routing including multi-robot routing, where targets on a map need to be allocated to agents while a team objective is satisfied. While many algorithms based on sequential single-item (SSI) auctions have been presented, they are currently evaluated by serial simulation where agents serially calculate their bids on a single machine. We consider a scenario where a bidding algorithm incurs significant computational overhead due to on-demand calculations of the shortest distances on a road map. We evaluate the bidding algorithm under parallel simulations where agents perform bid calculations simultaneously on a parallel machine, and reveal that the algorithm suffers from severe synchronization overhead ignored by serial simulation. We also present the broadcasting and speculation techniques to alleviate such synchronization overhead. Our empirical results on multi-robot routing variants show that both techniques improve the efficiency of parallelization, and speculation achieves more significant improvement.

Assessing hypothetical bias: An analysis beyond the mean of functional food

In this study, the experimental auction method is used in a between-sample analysis to assess hypothetical bias and willingness to pay (WTP) for canned crushed tomatoes enriched with lycopene. The empirical analysis indicates the presence of a statistically significant bias between hypothetical and real bids at different levels of bids. The difference in bids for the functional and control products defines the implicit WTP variable. WTP exhibits a statistically significant total difference between real and hypothetical bids increasing at the upper and lower levels of bids. Implicit WTP shows differences that are of opposite signs and that balance on average. Focusing on the factors driving the bias, the empirical analysis indicates two primary groups of variables: socio-demographic variables and attitude toward food technologies.

Incentive Compatible E-mandi with Large Scale Consumer Producer Matching Using BigData Based on Gale-shapely Algorithm for Perishable Commodities SCM

In this paper, we propose to transform the global matching mechanism in an electronic exchange between the producers and consumers in the SCM system for perishable commodities over large scale data sets. Matching of of consumers and producers satisfactions are mathematically modeled based on preferential evaluations based on the bidding request and the requirements data which is supplied as a matrix to Gale Shapely matching algorithm. The matching works over a very transparent approach in a e-trading environment over large scale data. Since, Bigdata is involved; the global SCM could be much clearer and easier for allocation of perishable commodities. These matching outcomes are compared with the matching and profit ranges obtained using simple English auction method which results Pareto-optimal matches. We are observing the proposed method produces stable matching, which is preference-strategy proof with incentive compatibility for both consumers and producers. Our design involves the preference revelation or elicitation problem and the preference-aggregation problem. The preference revelation problem involves eliciting truthful information from the agents about their types that are used for computation of Incentive compatible results. We are using Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design in our match-making settings where the agents’ preference types are multidimensional. This preserves profitability up to an additive loss that can be made arbitrarily small in polynomial time in the number of agents and the size of the agents’ type spaces.