On 18 July 1968, Robert Anderson, chairman of Atlantic Richfield Company, announced that one of largest petroleum accumulations known world today had been discovered on north slope of (1) Estimated contain between five and ten billion barrels of oil, Prudhoe Bay location would, according Mr. Anderson, soon undergo commercial development, and and transportation studies would begin immediately. (2) Within two weeks, Atlantic Richfield and Humble Oil and Refining Company had awarded a contract Houston's Pipeline Technologies, Inc., to study feasibility of transporting... recently discovered Arctic oil market by a pipeline a port in southern Alaska. (3) By mid-February 1969, Atlantic Richfield, Humble, and British Petroleum Oil Corporation jointly declared that it was their intention proceed with construction of a $900 million dollar pipeline that would run about 800 miles in a generally southern direction from Prudhoe Bay area on Arctic Ocean across Alaska's Brooks [Mountain] Range Gulf of Alaska on state's southern coastline. (4) The oil would then be transported by tanker select refinery and distribution sites along U.S. west coast, particularly in state of Washington. (5) The trio of oil corporations, while strongly indicating a preference for a trans-Alaska pipeline/tanker transportation scheme, nonetheless noted that planning studies on alternate routes are continuing. (6) The possibility that large quantities of Prudhoe Bay oil would soon be transported on an ongoing basis by tanker along Canadian west coast was not received enthusiastically by Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau. Canadian authorities were particularly concerned over passage of tankers through environmentally delicate and economically important Juan de Fuca Strait and Strait of Georgia en route refineries in northwestern Washington State. According Donald Macdonald, minister responsible, proposed transit through Straits involved the consequent risk of disastrous oil spills Vancouver Island and British Columbia mainland. (7) This possibility was compounded by two disconcerting realities then confronting Trudeau government. First, routing of tankers from Alaska Washington State would be exclusively within American territorial and international waters. As such, not only would Ottawa be unable subject these ships Canadian maritime laws and regulations, but it would also have no legal leverage with which challenge proposed routing. Second, there was no jointly coordinated vessel management regulatory arrangement between Canada and United States oversee safe passage of ships through Juan de Fuca Strait and Strait of Georgia. Fearful of environmental and economic risks posed coastal waters and lands of British Columbia by a tanker accident and oil spill, Ottawa moved dissuade United States from pursuing this option. This article reviews strategy and position taken by Ottawa prevent American oil tanker traffic along Canada's west coast and, in particular, it closely examines Ottawa's attempts from 1971 1973 convince American government and business officials that an alternate transportation route, namely an overland pipeline through Canada's Mackenzie Valley region, was a more attractive choice. (8) Finally, reasons behind Nixon administration's decision reject routing scheme touted by Trudeau government--and by definition authorize trans-Alaska pipeline/tanker route--will be detailed and considered. Canadian and American National Interests In order convince Washington that industry-favored trans-Alaska plan should not be given regulatory approval (by Department of Interior) or political authorization (by Congress and White House), Canada decided pursue two courses of action simultaneously: first, diplomatically protest, publicly and privately, use of very large crude carriers (VLCC) for shipment of Prudhoe Bay oil from Valdez American west-coast terminals; and, second, promote vigorously an alternative route for transportation of Alaskan oil--a Mackenzie Valley pipeline. …
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