ASEAN Plus Research Articles

Resources for China–ASEAN Relations

Resources for China–ASEAN Relations Juan Chen (bio) As a research institute based in Singapore, the EAI monitors developments in relations and interactions between China and the individual countries of Southeast Asia as well as the ASEAN grouping as a whole. This material is presented in the form of (i) a chronology of events and (ii) important documents. —the Editors CHINA–ASEAN RELATIONS JULY 2017 TO SEPTEMBER 2017: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS JULY 2017 3rd–4th The Third East Asia Summit Clean Energy Forum, jointly organised by the Chinese National Energy Administration and the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE), takes place in Kunming, China. At the event, ACE signs a memorandum of understanding with the China Renewable Energy Engineering Institute (CREEI). Both parties agree on long-term strategic cooperation, and launch the “China–ASEAN Clean Energy Capacity Building Programme” that is expected to produce 100 experts on clean energy in the next 10 years. Both sides also launch a joint report, the ASEAN Power Cooperation Report, on electricity development in the region. 6th Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong ahead of the G20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany. Xi points out that both countries enjoy traditional friendship and fruitful cooperation, which progress over time and feature mutual learning. Lee affirms Singapore’s willingness to actively participate in the “Belt and Road” construction, implement inter-governmental projects and expand bilateral cooperation in finance, a high-speed rail project and establishment of a free trade zone. [End Page 204] 20th The Sixth ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Youth is held in Jakarta, Indonesia. The meeting reiterates the commitment to cooperate in five priority areas put forth in the ASEAN Work Plan on Youth 2016–2020, namely youth entrepreneurship, youth employability, enhanced appreciation of the ASEAN Community, youth volunteerism and leadership, and youth resilience and competencies in advanced technological and managerial skills. 24th Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Thailand, and meets with Thailand Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai. Wangi applauds the China–Thailand Railway project as an example of mutually beneficial cooperation, which will promote Thailand’s quest to become a hub of regional connectivity. Prayut expresses hope for integration of Thailand’s 4.0 Development Plan with the “Made in China 2025” plan, and welcomes Chinese enterprises to participate in the construction of Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor. Wang also extends an invitation to King Maha Vajiralongkorn for a state visit to China. 25th Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits the Philippines, and meets with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano. Wang affirms China’s support for the Philippines on five aspects: (i) the Philippines’ pursuit of independent foreign policy; (ii) the fight against drug crimes and terrorism; (iii) Duterte’s choice of a friendly and cooperative policy towards China; (iv) the Philippines’ efforts in fulfilling duties as the rotating presidency of ASEAN; and (v) the joint effort with ASEAN countries in safeguarding peace and stability in the South China Sea. Cayetano indicates willingness to further coordinate with China on the South China Sea issue, and to discuss and implement China’s idea of joint exploitation. After the meeting, the ministers jointly sign the memorandum of understanding on cooperation between China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs. The Third Meeting of the ASEAN-China Connectivity Committee is held in Jakarta, Indonesia, and is co-chaired by Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Qian Keming and Elizabeth Buensuceso, permanent representative of the Philippines to ASEAN and rotating chair of the ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee. Both sides agree to align China’s Belt and Road Initiative with the General Plan of ASEAN Connectivity 2025, and discuss cooperation in priority areas. 28th The 10th China–ASEAN Education Cooperation Week takes place in Guiyang, Guizhou province. Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong delivers a keynote speech at the opening ceremony. Liu also meets with Lao [End Page 205] Deputy Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone who is attending the event. During the week, various events including seminars, principals’ forum, education services summit, hiking and football games are held. AUGUST 2017 6th Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends the...

China–Asean Relations January 2017 To March 2017: Important Documents

China–Asean Relations January 2017 To March 2017:Important Documents Ping Xiaojuan 13 January 2017 ASEAN Highlights Progress and Priorities towards 50th Anniversary <http://asean.org/storage/2017/01/ASEAN-in-2016-Final.pdf> 20 January 2017 Joint Media Statement of the 16th Meeting of ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and Republic of Korea) Tourism Ministers <http://asean.org/storage/2017/01/JMS-MATM-3-16-Final.pdf> 16 March 2017 Press Release of Special Meeting of ASEAN–China National Tourism Organizations <http://asean.org/storage/2017/03/ANNEX-6-NTOs-China-Special-2017-JMS-ASEAN-China-SpecNTOs-Final.pdf> 25 March 2017 Speech by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin at the Session on the South China Sea of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Meeting 2017 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/xwlb_663352/t1448860.shtml> [End Page 214] Copyright © 2017 China: An International Journal

Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN PLUS 3: A Study of the Trade Potential of India's Energy Sector Products

Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN PLUS 3: A Study of the Trade Potential of India's Energy Sector Products

The Relationship between Political Tensions, Trade and Capital Flows in ASEAN Plus Three

AbstractWe estimate the effects of political tension on trade and capital flows in ASEAN Plus Three countries in the framework of a gravity model. We quantify political tension through text‐parsing software reading daily Reuters’ articles from 1990 to 2013 and exclude Brunei and Laos due to sparsity of news coverage. Regarding bilateral trade, we find that political conflict, measured by negative reports in Reuters’ articles, seems to only affect bilateral trade between countries that are not both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). For these countries, a 1 per cent rise in the tension score results in a 0.05 per cent decline in trade. There is weaker evidence that improvement in bilateral relationship, measured by positive reports in Reuters’ articles, is associated with more trade. As for capital flows, while long‐term capital flows, measured by foreign direct investment, appear to be unaffected by short‐term tensions, both a non‐democratic government and a history of war negatively affect FDI.

Thailand's ICT Readiness for the ASEAN Economic Community

AbstractICT development in Thailand and the other ASEAN members must be prepared for the environment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which will start formally at the end of the year 2015. The Ministry of ICT in Thailand has established several ICT policies and programs for ICT administrative management in both public and private enterprises in order to create a strong network of relationships to deal with competitors in ASEAN. This study compares Thailand with the other ASEAN Plus 3 member nations based on their stage of economic development and three important indicators of competitiveness (the higher education system, technology readiness, and business innovation). The findings identify Thailand's position with respect to ICT development relative to the other ASEAN Plus 3 nations and point to strategies and partnerships that need to be developed in Thailand in order to maintain a competitive position within the AEC.

East Asia Summit or ASEAN Plus Eight – an insight into Asian regionalism from perspective of Japan

East Asia Summit or ASEAN Plus Eight – an insight into Asian regionalism from perspective of Japan

US-led TPPA and Its Implication on China Positions in Southeast Asian Regionalism

Prior to the development of ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN was the main architecture integrating countries in Southeast Asia. The organization was able to develop a closer economic cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea. However, China and Japan competing and attempting to “dictate” each other and what regionalism should be and whom it benefits. Small states such as the members of ASEAN and those skeptical of China’s motives in Southeast Asia including China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea would cling to the US. Political and economic development over the past 10 years reveal that the close allies of the United States of America (USA) such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, were unable to “limit” China’s growing domination in the Southeast Asian region. The TPPA that was allegedly “hijacked” and led by the US since November 2009, was believed as a counter measure to check China’s growing power in Southeast Asia. If the TPPA is not meant to limit China’s presence in the region, the agreement would function as a pathfinder for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. This paper attempts to answer (i) what is the motive of the US government involvement in TPPA, (ii) what the posible implication of TPPA to China (iii) what would happen to China’s role in the region, and (iv) what insurance actions developed by China.

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: Neighbors, Relatives or Foes?

The Framework Agreement for the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area was initiated in 2002. It is the first ASEAN Plus pattern free trade agreement in East Asia. To understand the cultural and historical bonds between China and Southeast Asian States, and contemporary Chinese regional political economy in building the ACFTA, this paper reviews the tributary trade and ancient Chinese diplomacy between China and the neighboring States. The primary purpose of this research is to show how the ACFTA is in the interests of all parties in the course of China’s fast economic and political growth. The following article highlights the ACFTA provisions by examining trading agreements in goods, services and investment in the context of the corresponding WTO provisions. In the end, it suggests the possible resolutions for achieving a win–win and interdependent ASEAN–China Free Trade Area.

ASEAN plus Three Financial Regionalism: Indonesia's Responses

In recent years, financial cooperation within ASEAN Plus Three (APT) has made significant progress. It has covered bond market development, better access to financing, financial stabilization and capital market harmonization, and several initiatives have resulted in concrete programmes being implemented by the APT member countries (ASEAN states, China, South Korea and Japan). In the context of the changes taking place in the regional dynamic, this paper examines the role and involvement of Indonesian financial authorities towards the development of APT financial regionalism, focusing on issues related to regional liquidity arrangements and regional bond markets. The initial findings indicate that, in considering the potential benefits of warding off future economic shocks, there is a strong intention among Indonesian financial authorities to create a space in their national framework for regional liquidity arrangements. However, the authorities are unenthusiastic about the progress of regional governance on bond markets and, for that reason, are disinclined to transform their national regulatory space as it potentially hampers the Indonesian domestic market.

Best practice guidelines for ASEANPlus: Management of diabetic foot wounds

While there are several clinical practice guidelines for managing diabetic foot problems, none have yet been developed for ASEAN. The ASEAN Plus Expert Group Forum has been formed in November 2012 to address this issue. Its objective is to develop clinical guidelines to raise the standard of health care provided to patients with diabetic foot wounds in ASEAN Plus countries. Such best practices will benefit healthcare professionals treating such individuals.Two experts have been invited from each member country, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand to serve a term of 2 years. Members include orthopaedic surgeons, vascular surgeons, a general surgeon, a plastic surgeon and endocrinologists. We would like to thank Smith & Nephew Singapore Pte Ltd for their educational support and sponsorship. Sri Lanka Journal of Diabetes, Endocrinology and Metabolism 2015; 5: 1-37

Quality of reporting of randomised controlled trials of herbal interventions in ASEAN Plus Six Countries: a systematic review.

BackgroundMany randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of herbal interventions have been conducted in the ASEAN Communities. Good quality reporting of RCTs is essential for assessing clinical significance. Given the importance ASEAN placed on herbal medicines, the reporting quality of RCTs of herbal interventions among the ASEAN Communities deserved a special attention.ObjectivesTo systematically review the quality of reporting of RCTs of herbal interventions conducted in the ASEAN Plus Six Countries.MethodsSearches were performed using PubMed, EMBASE, The Cochrane Library, and Allied and Complementary Medicine (AMED), from inception through October 2013. These were limited to studies specific to humans and RCTs. Herbal species search terms were based on those listed in the National List of Essential Medicines [NLEM (Thailand, 2011)]. Studies conducted in the ASEAN Plus Six Countries, published in English were included.ResultsSeventy-one articles were identified. Thirty (42.25%) RCTs were from ASEAN Countries, whereas 41 RCTs (57.75%) were from Plus Six Group. Adherence to the recommended CONSORT checklist items for reporting of RCTs of herbal interventions among ASEAN Plus Six Countries ranged from 0% to 97.18%. Less than a quarter of the RCTs (18.31%) reported information on standardisation of the herbal products. However, the scope of our interventions of interest was limited to those developed from 20 herbal species listed in the NLEM of Thailand.ConclusionsThe present study highlights the need to improve reporting quality of RCTs of herbal interventions across ASEAN Plus Six Communities.

Taming the Dragon: Malaysia-China Relations and Its Impact on East Asian Regionalism

This article adopts a position that Malaysia’s relations with China in recent decades have not only facilitated in the upgrading of bilateral relations but also made a significant impact on the overall intra-regional relations in East Asia. Malaysia was the first Southeast Asian country to improve ties and establish official relations with China in 1974. With the end of the Cold War, the relationship between Malaysia and China flourished, mainly towards enhancing trade, investment and other bilateral areas. Malaysia’s footstep was followed by other ASEAN members. The overall ASEAN-China relations improved further in the age of intense regionalism and globalisation. This led to the establishment of the ASEAN-China FTA (Free Trade Agreement) and ASEAN Plus Three. Malaysia’s active and positive pursuit in strengthening ties with China has had a significant impact on China-ASEAN relations. Almost all ASEAN members are looking at the regional platform to engage China. Larger platforms like the EAS and RCEP are cementing further not only intra-regional relations involving China, but also the bilateral ties. Although there are occasional hiccups in relations due to security issues, Malaysia’s leadership in regionalism and capitalising on China’s economic rise had been the main driver in the overall East Asian regionalism. China too is fully aware and appreciates the specialities with Malaysia and ASEAN.

PRM13 - Strengthening Evidence Base for Traditional Medicine in Asean, Quality of Reporting of Randomised Controlled Trials of Herbal Interventions in Asean Plus Six Countries: A Systematic Review

PRM13 - Strengthening Evidence Base for Traditional Medicine in Asean, Quality of Reporting of Randomised Controlled Trials of Herbal Interventions in Asean Plus Six Countries: A Systematic Review

China and Japan in “ASEAN Plus” Multilateral Arrangements

Interactions between China and Japan in multilateral “ASEAN plus dialogue partners” forums––the economic groupings ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit, and the security groupings ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus––have moved from attempts at cooperation, to competition for influence, and thence to attentiveness or disinterest.

Apec's Regional Economic Integration Agenda and the Evolution of Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region

In the early years of the twenty-first century proposals reflecting two distinct “visions” of Asia-Pacific integration were being advanced for consolidating the regional trade architecture through the establishment of region-wide trade agreements. The rise of East Asian regionalism was reflected in proposals for an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), envisaged as major elements in an agenda for building an economically integrated East Asian region. APEC’s “trans-Pacific vision”, of integrating economies on both sides of the Pacific through achievement of APEC’s Bogor goals of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, was refreshed in modified form with the proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), conceived in principle as a free trade agreement embracing all APEC members.In 2006 APEC leaders sought to emphasise complementarity between the two “visions” by formally adopting a Regional Economic Integration agenda in which the FTAAP was recognized as a “long-term prospect”. At Yokohama in 2010 the leaders set out the way forward in more concrete terms, when they unambiguously endorsed the FTAAP as the end-point to be reached in the evolution of the Asia-Pacific regional trade architecture, while at the same time endorsing a “two-track” approach to its eventual achievement. The leaders stated that achievement of the FTAAP is to be based on progress made within both a “trans-Pacific track”, represented by the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), involving economies from both sides of the Pacific, and an “East Asian track”, now represented by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a successor initiative to the EAFTA and CEPEA, with participation at this stage limited to the sixteen “ASEAN Plus Six” economies on the western side of the Pacific. Six of the 21 APEC economies are currently participating in both “tracks”, while four are participating in neither track. Four of the RCEP participants are not members of APEC.The leaders left open the question of how the two “tracks” might evolve and eventually converge into the FTAAP. In the meantime, attention is focused on the substance of the TPP and RCEP agreements being negotiated within each “track”, and their implications both for the size and distribution of the prospective economic benefits of each agreement, and for the prospects of each agreement for gaining acceptance from other economies in the Asia-Pacific region as the “model” for the eventual FTAAP.Of the two agreements, the TPP at this stage appears to have the more ambitious and comprehensive agenda. After three years negotiations have advanced to the point where failure, while still possible, would be a major surprise, but there are many sensitive issues remaining to be resolved. In addition to the expected market access issues of particular sensitivity to individual participating economies, other highly sensitive issues involve rules of origin, intellectual property, pharmaceutical evaluation pricing and subsidy programmes, management of electronic data flows, labour and environment. These and other issues are discussed in detail in the paper. How these issues are eventually resolved will be important in determining both the extent to which the TPP lives up to its stated ambition of being a “high quality” agreement and also its prospects of being accepted as a “model” for an eventual FTAAP.The RCEP negotiations are only just beginning. It is correspondingly more difficult to evaluate its likely content and its potential as a basis for the eventual FTAAP. It appears likely that the most substantive provisions will be those on trade in goods, trade in services, and investment, prospects for which are analysed in detail in the paper. In these areas the RCEP faces formidable challenges in consolidating existing arrangements among the participating economies to a level that would mark an impressive step towards the eventual FTAAP. On the other hand the RCEP may be better placed than the TPP to develop rules of origin that foster deep integration among the production systems of participating economies. Provisions on intellectual property and competition policy are included in the proposed content of the RCEP, but it would be a surprise if these provisions approach the depth of commitment being sought in the TPP. Like the TPP before it, RCEP faces all the issues involved in establishing agenda priorities and modalities for negotiating an agreement among countries that in many cases are already linked by existing agreements, or in some cases by ongoing negotiations. The complexities and difficulties will be compounded by the likelihood that the participating economies will come to the negotiations with widely divergent levels of ambition. Especially under these conditions ASEAN’s determination that the RCEP should be an ASEAN-led process also means that RCEP negotiations could turn out to a defining test of ASEAN’s ability to maintain its leadership role in regional economic integration.

Paths ahead for East Asia and Asia-Pacific regionalism

East Asia and the Asia–Pacific are core components of the global economy, and there have been important recent developments in the regionalism of both regions. After the 1997–1998 financial crisis, East Asian countries initiated more exclusive regional cooperation and integration ventures mainly through ASEAN Plus Three, but lately this process has stumbled. The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has also failed to make substantial progress. Attention has instead increasingly turned to free trade agreements (FTAs), yet these have hitherto been overwhelmingly bilateral in nature. There are still only a few truly regional FTAs in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific—and these are on a sub-regional scale. However, various frustrations over the messy and fractious pattern of heterogeneous bilateral agreements led to the recent initiation of ‘grand regional’ FTA talks. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an Asia–Pacific-based, United States-led project while the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an East Asia-centred project. Each contains highly diverse memberships and the successful conclusion of TPP and RCEP talks is not assured. It is argued that, if negotiated, the RCEP is more likely to advance meaningful and effective regionalism than the TPP due to the former ascribing more importance to regional community-building. Furthermore, bilateral FTAs already in force may over the long term transform into more comprehensive economic agreements that address new regional and global challenges such as energy security and climate change.

Enhancing Regional Integration with the ASEAN Plus Three States?

지역적 협동과 통합을 규격화하는데 사용된 다양한 이론적 견해와 방법들이 있다. 그러나 앞으로 다가올 지역적 통합의 증가와 감소에 대한 국가적 차원의 양적 측량은 적은편이다. 이 논문은 ‘누적적 협동’이라는 용어를 사용하여 안보, 경제 그리고 문화 이 3가지 관점에서 근거하여 지역 통합 향상을 위한 국가적 측정 방법을 제시한다. 이 논문은 질적 문맥과 독특한 양적 방법들을 사용하여 ASEAN plus Three 국가 간 한국의 향상된 지역통합의 가능성을 분석하고자 한다. 이 새로운 방법은 지역적 통합에 관한 3가지 양적 기준을 제시, 한국이 세계적 안보 협력에 대한 관심과 지역 안보 협력에 대한 독립적 행보를 보여 준다. 이 연구결과는 또한 한국이 2007~2008년 이후 ASEAN Plus Three국가들과 경제적, 문화적 협동이 감소하고 있는 것을 파악, 지역통합 가능 지역들을 알아보고 지역 통합 강화를 제안한다.

Evolving China–ASEAN Relations and CAFTA: Chinese Perspectives on China’s Initiatives in Relation to ASEAN Plus 1

China’s rising profile as a global economic and geopolitical actor has been matched with a parallel improvement in its relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Many Chinese scholars see this improvement as a testament to the efficacy of a Chinese geopolitical strategy which combines economic diplomacy launched during the late 1990s, with an on-going diplomatic ‘charm offensive’. To them, it is this geopolitical strategy which has made it possible for both China and its ASEAN neighbours to move away from antagonism and confrontation towards economic partnership, mutual cooperation and good-neighbourly relations. From this perspective, CAFTA, initiated by China within the framework of ASEAN Plus 1, has not only created the world’s largest free trade area that represents the world’s most energetic and fastest growing economy, it has also made it possible for China to leverage itself internationally. For most Chinese scholars, CAFTA seems to have ensured that while China claims its due place on the global stage by virtue of its wealth, power, modernisation of its military might and its cultural expansion, its neighbours do not construe its ‘peaceful rise’ as a threat.

China-ASEAN Relations, May 2012 to August 2012: Important Documents

China-ASEAN Relations, May 2012 to August 2012:Important Documents Wu Dan 3rd May 2012 Joint Media Statement of the 15th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meeting, Philippines <http://www.aseansec.org/Joint%20Media%20Statement%20of%20the%2015th%20ASEAN+3%20Finance%20Ministers%20and%20Central%20Bank%20Governors'%20Meeting.pdf> 10th May 2012 Joint Communique of the 22nd ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting (22nd ALMM), Phnom Penh <http://www.aseansec.org/Joint%20Communique%20The%20Twenty%20Second%20ASEAN%20Labour%20Ministers%20Meeting%2022nd%20ALMM).pdf> 11th May 2012 Joint Statement of the Seventh ASEAN Plus Three Labour Ministers Meeting (7th ALMM+3) <http://www.aseansec.org/Joint%20Statement_of_7th_ALMM+3_FINAL_11%20May%20adopted.pdf> 17th August 2012 Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the Rakhine State, Myanmar <http://www.aseansec.org/documents/Statement%20of%20ASEAN%20FM%20on%20Recent%20Developments%20in%20the%20Rakhine%20State.pdf> 26th August 2012 Joint Media Statement of the Fourth Cambodia-Lao PDR-Myanmar-Viet Nam (CLMV) Economic Ministers' Meeting <http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/THE%20FOURTH%20CLMV%20ECONOMIC%20MINISTERS.pdf> 29th August 2012 Joint Media Statement of the 14th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) <http://www.aseansec.org/documents/Joint%20Media%20Statement%2014th%20AMBDC%20Ministerial%20Meeting%20-%2029%20August%202012%20(final)%201.pdf> [End Page 153] Copyright © 2012 China: An International Journal

Approaches and Challenges in Fostering Growth and Reducing Poverty and Inequality in ASEAN Plus Three

This paper outlines the conceptual differences of the various frameworks adopted by governments and global institutions since the 1950s to help developing countries generate growth and reduce both poverty and inequality. It also discusses the inadequacies of the Pro-Poor Growth and the Inclusive Growth frameworks before positing that the two are in fact not mutually exclusive and both serve a purpose to a country during different stages of economic development.