This philosophical discourse examines the relationship between temporality and ethical practice in nursing, with particular attention to the distinction between chronos (quantitative time) and kairos (qualitative, opportune time). Drawing upon ancient Greek philosophical thought, contemporary nursing scholarship, and empirical research on moral judgement, the author argues that temporal awareness fundamentally shapes ethical deliberation and action in nursing practice. Despite the existence of multiple ethical decision-making frameworks in nursing (including principle-based approaches, dignity-enhancing care models, and professional codes of ethics) these frameworks remain largely atemporal, emphasising processes and components of ethical decisions rather than their temporal dimensions. Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates that time pressure systematically alters moral judgement, yet this phenomenon has received limited attention in nursing ethics literature. Building on classical virtue ethics (particularly the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, practical wisdom, which encompasses knowing not only what to do but when to act) and integrating insights from moral distress, moral resilience, and decision-making literature, the author introduces the construct of kairotic sensitivity (the capacity to recognise moments when patients are particularly receptive to difficult conversations or crucial decisions). This construct represents a significant contribution to nursing ethics, offering a conceptual framework for understanding how experienced nurses navigate the temporal complexities of ethical practice and providing a bridge between established ethical frameworks and the lived experience of temporal decision-making in clinical settings. The author proposes that kairotic sensitivity, alongside moral resilience, constitutes an essential yet undertheorised dimension of ethical expertise in nursing, with significant implications for patient outcomes, professional satisfaction, and nursing education. Practical implications for patient care and recommendations for nursing education and practice development are discussed.

The aim of this work is to present the Peripatetic doctrine of fate (heimarmene) according to Alexander of Aphrodisias in his treatise Peri heimarmenes or De fato. The central thesis of this Alexandrian work is that everything that occurs kata ten physin (in accordance with nature) occurs kath’ heimarmenen (in accordance with fate). In order to reconstruct the doctrine underlying this claim, I alternate between an exposition of the Aristotelian concepts addressed in Alexander’s writings and his own theoretical elaborations. The paper begins by outlining the terms of the debate on fate as presented by Alexander. It then reconstructs the Alexandrian account of the causality of fate, along with the Aristotelian presuppositions that support it. Finally, it examines specific aspects and limits of Alexander’s notion of fate, particularly in relation to other key concepts in his philosophy, such as what occurs katà symbebekos, human proairesis, and divine pronoia. De fato is the main reference for this paper, but other relevant works, including the Quaestiones and De Providentia, are also considered.

Historically, women have occupied a subordinate position, with marriage and family structures perpetuating their social and economic dependence on men. The long struggle for women’s liberation has centered on securing access to education, employment opportunities, and social and economic independence as foundations for social status. Within this trajectory, feminist activists have played a pivotal role, with Mary Wollstonecraft emerging as a key figure who emphasized women’s social responsibilities and argued that, by virtue of their rational capacities, women merit equal recognition in society. Her advocacy for equality within the family structure was particularly influential in proposing that the Aristotelian concept of high-level friendship be applied to marriage—identified as “companionate marriage”—thereby positioning egalitarian marital relationships as a pathway to women’s greater status and equality. In the contemporary context, women’s increased empowerment and capacity for independent action, including greater willingness to leave marriages that no longer serve their interests, signal the autonomy they have gained but also raise questions about the rising incidence of divorce. This study examines the historical concept of marriage as a form of high-level friendship—originally advanced as a means of promoting gender equality—and investigates its potential application as a strategy for addressing contemporary divorce in a society where women are increasingly empowered. Conducted as a qualitative study using secondary data, it analyzes the notion of friendship as articulated in works such as A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and The Nicomachean Ethics. The findings indicate that Mary Wollstonecraft’s model for women’s advancement remains normatively robust and socially relevant, providing a conceptual framework for reimagining marriage as an egalitarian partnership that can respond to current gender and relational tensions. This philosophical exploration of divorce further underscores the need to dismantle patriarchal ideologies embedded in social structures so that marriage can function as a space of mutual respect, reciprocity, and shared flourishing.

The article proposes a radical revision of the traditional metaphysics of substance, based on the Aristotelian concept of an unchanging nature. The key concepts of “pre-ontological chaos-potential”, “energetic impulse”, “logos-dia”, “circumtext”, “aggregate-event”, and “internal involution” are introduced and substantiated. It is shown that stable ontological orders (“stasis-constellations”) are secondary and derivative of the fundamental dynamics of becoming.

This article investigates the construction of poetic meaning through two competing theoretical frameworks: the classical Aristotelian concept of mimesis (imitation) and the contemporary theory of cognitive mimesis. By contrasting these paradigms, we reveal fundamental divergences in their mechanisms of meaning-making. Our analysis begins with concrete examples embodied metaphor and imaginative projection—to demonstrate how each theory interprets poetic language. We then trace the historical development of meaning in poetic theory, from Aristotle’s emphasis on repressentation to modern cognitive approaches that prioritize embodied experience. This progression highlights how poetic meaning has evolved into an interdisciplinary nexus, bridging literary criticism, rhetoric, poetics, and cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive poetics, in particular, reframes poetic imagery through models of induction, generalization, and implicature (implied meaning). These models treat the image not as a static symbol but as a dynamic construct shaped by the reader’s imagination and perceptual grounding. Central to this approach is the principle of embodiment, which ties linguistic meaning to sensory-motor experiences and challenges traditional binaries between figurative and literal language. By examining how images emerge from and interact with everyday speech, cognitive poetics reveals the deep cognitive underpinnings of poetic effect.

Abstract The principal way Aquinas comes to articulate the movement proper to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his mature corpus is with the term divinus instinctus . Aristotle is the source for this articulation. For Aristotle, a “divine instinct” explains how some fortunate souls seem consistently to move through life in the right direction. They are impelled by an external, supernatural force. Aquinas discovered in Aristotle’s “divine instinct” a fruitful way to articulate the external, divine agency that belongs to gift movement in the life of the believer. I argue that Aquinas radically transforms the Aristotelian conception of “divine instinct” making it amenable to the Christian doctrine of the graced movement that belongs to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the divinus instinctus provides Aquinas with a strong account of divine agency ( auxilium ) necessary to move the believer towards divine things. However, Aquinas shears this doctrine of the deterministic associations it has in Aristotle. Rather than short‐circuit free will, the divine instinct elevates human freedom.

The first part of the paper (Molnár 2022) examined the typology Aristotle proposes as the extension of the term “things that exist by nature” in Physics B.1 and compared it to passages containing similar typologies in the Aristotelian corpus, most importantly Metaphysics D.8, Z.2, H.1, De Caelo G.1, and Meteorology A.1. The comparative analysis revealed that – even though Aristotle introduces the lists in different philosophical contexts, and one can find several instances of discrepancies between them – there is a remarkable level of coherence between his verbal definitions, given in different texts, of the genus of which the items in the lists are the subtypes. Part Two (appearing here) sets out to analyse the structure of the typologies one by one, and uncovers a set of common structuring principles behind them. Although the individual passages make use of these principles in rather diverse ways, the texts can be ordered according to the degree of complexity they display. The concept of body proves to be the most important structure-building factor and a general scheme is suggested as underlying all the passages. Part Three (appearing in a later issue) will go on to scrutinize individual items on the lists one by one: the elements, inanimate natural objects, living beings and their parts, celestial bodies, and the heaven. It will also discuss the chronological relations between the texts and, most importantly, the impact Aristotle’s revisionist treatment of the concept of substance has on his typology. Based on the findings, at the end of the paper a cautious attempt will be made at an interpretation of the Aristotelian concepts of nature and substance in terms of the sociology of knowledge by connecting them to his concept of autarky (central in another part of his philosophy).

Human rights and healthcare converge distinctly when examining how life changes, like perimenopause and menopause, impact emotional health, interpersonal relationships and human connections. This paper examines medical factors, such as psychophysical symptoms, anxiety, cognitive challenges, mood alterations and cultural factors, emphasising their effects on physical and mental change, social belonging and personal identity. Psychophysical symptoms, such as anxiety, cognitive challenges and mood alterations, as observed in counselling and healthcare settings, can affect relationship quality and lead to stigma, isolation and misunderstanding. Medical and philosophical perspectives underline the importance of early recognition of physical and emotional symptoms. This approach and appropriate healthcare and counselling are essential for supporting women during significant life changes. A key interpretation of these physical and emotional symptoms is also found in the Aristotelian concept of the ‘matter-form/soul-body’ relationship. Creating supportive environments, through education, workplace policies, empathetic communication and government, can enhance well-being and human rights and strengthen relationships. Through case study analysis, this paper advocates for holistic support approaches - integrating medical care with therapeutic interventions like person-centred, CBT, mindfulness and pluralistic approaches - to improve understanding and connection during these significant life phases. Keywords: Perimenopause; Menopause; Life stages; CBT; Healthcare; Social well-being; Mental health; Pluralistic approach; Human rights.

Abstract The aim of this article is to explore the benefits of a genealogical approach of gamification in our understanding of government and its history. Since gamification is as much a discourse on the game as a project of governmentality, to make its genealogy in the field of the history of ideas is about understanding to which problems such discourses are aimed to answer and how. To point out the value of this historicization, the first part will expose some difficulties that appear from the confrontation of the idea of gamification and “traditional” definitions of game that insist on its “separate” feature. This presentation shows how problems associated with gamification are generally understood according to a psychologizing understanding of the game. In the face of this psychological reification, the second part will show the relevance of the game’s discourses inscription within a governmental genealogy. To do that, it exposes a global understanding of the rupture in Western culture with the Aristotelian concept of game. The last part, built on the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberalism, explores the reelaboration within neoliberalism of the “game rule” notion through this genealogical approach in order to show in which historical transformation of the game concept gamification is inscribed.

Abstract In this paper I analyse the motivation for the cyclical cosmogonical model in Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Maʾamar Yiqqawu ha-Mayim (Let the Water Gather). The problem ibn Tibbon deals with is a paradox in Aristotelian natural philosophy, and the premises ibn Tibbon draws on to compose his solution are Aristotelian as well; yet the solution itself is far from any theory promoted by Aristotle himself. I argue that ibn Tibbon is privileging two philosophical commitments – the Aristotelian concept of matter, the Aristotelian Principle of Plenitude – above any others, consciously aligning himself with a special brand of Aristotelian natural philosophers. This brand of natural philosophy was outlined by Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed, but few philosophers in history fit its description, and none as well as ibn Tibbon.

This paper explores the application of Aristotelian virtue (arête), as quality of excellence and as a key notion of ethics, to AI systems as classified in the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. It argues that while the Act’s approach based on ‘ethical data’ and ‘prima facie values’ aligns with the Rossian paradigm, such principles may not be suitable for all AI systems, particularly those in ‘limited’ or ‘minimal risk’ zones. The paper suggests that the Aristotelian concept of virtue can be effectively applied to designing, training, operating and using no-risk or low-risk AI systems. However, its application to the design and training of high-risk areas such as migration, asylum, border control, and justice, where clearly defined objectives are essential, requires ongoing consideration. The paper concludes that by distinguishing between (a) design, development, training, deployment, operation and use, (b) by stage evaluation of systems, and c) virtuous use of the systems, Aristotelian ethics can serve as a post ex evaluating method for all-risk AI systems, while further research and the potential use of regulatory sandboxes are needed to explore the integration of Aristotelian virtues into the design, development and training of such applications. Finally, we propose a virtuous-based ‘AI Seal of Excellence’ certification process, which empowers the virtuous use of AI systems.

In Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades, we encounter a conception of dialectic that can be interpreted in terms of the philosopher’s reception of Socratic and Platonic ideas while at the same time being compatible with the relevant Aristotelian conception. We will try to show that this is the case to the extent that dialectic is ascribed a propaedeutic function, aimed both at promoting the search for truth and at practicing and developing persuasive skills that could prove beneficial in theoretical disputes. On this basis, it can become clear that dialectic is related to Proclus’ conception of the soul because it necessarily integrates specific characteristics of partial philosophical disciplines, while, on the other hand, it requires the active participation of the soul as a whole. This means concretely that through the practice of dialectic, the inner differentiation of the soul emerges as a necessary dimension of its coherent unity.

This paper explores Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo et mundo as the culmination of his lifelong project to synthesize Aristotelian natural philosophy with Christian theology. Focusing on Books I–III, it analyses key cosmological themes such as the incorruptibility and motion of celestial bodies, the composition and transformation of sublunary elements, and the teleological order of the cosmos. Aquinas integrates Aristotelian concepts— like ether, potentiality and actuality, and natural motion—into his metaphysical and theological framework. He harmonizes Aristotle’s eternal cosmos with Christian doctrines of creation ex nihilo and divine providence, demonstrating the compatibility of reason and faith. His commentary affirms a hierarchical and purposive universe, reflecting the wisdom and care of the Creator. By uniting natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology, Aquinas elevates Aristotelian cosmology to a theological plane, building a bridge between ancient philosophy and medieval Christianity. This study positions De caelo et mundo as the final and essential element of Aquinas’ intellectual synthesis and underscores its enduring relevance for contemporary philosophical and theological inquiry.

This article investigates the construction of poetic meaning through two competing theoretical frameworks: the classical Aristotelian concept of mimesis (imitation) and the contemporary theory of cognitive mimesis. By contrasting these paradigms, we reveal fundamental divergences in their mechanisms of meaning-making. Our analysis begins with concrete examples embodied metaphor and imaginative projection—to demonstrate how each theory interprets poetic language. We then trace the historical development of meaning in poetic theory, from Aristotle’s emphasis on repressentation to modern cognitive approaches that prioritize embodied experience. This progression highlights how poetic meaning has evolved into an interdisciplinary nexus, bridging literary criticism, rhetoric, poetics, and cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive poetics, in particular, reframes poetic imagery through models of induction, generalization, and implicature (implied meaning). These models treat the image not as a static symbol but as a dynamic construct shaped by the reader’s imagination and perceptual grounding. Central to this approach is the principle of embodiment, which ties linguistic meaning to sensory-motor experiences and challenges traditional binaries between figurative and literal language. By examining how images emerge from and interact with everyday speech, cognitive poetics reveals the deep cognitive underpinnings of poetic effect.

Abstract The aim of this article is to examine Aristotle’s treatment of the relationship between the accentuated mobility and the overwhelming imagination of melancholics. I begin by retracing the main lines of Aristotle’s reflection on the psychological and ethical implications of the propensity of melancholics to be guided by φαντασία. With specific regard, then, to the connection between certain peculiar psycho-somatic conditions – such as, among others, that deriving from an overabundance of μέλαινα χολή – and the capacity of foreseeing the future by oneiric φαντάσματα, I analyse some crucial passages from the De divinatione per somnum and the Eudemian Ethics, as well as some fragments of the dialogues Eudemus and On Philosophy. Finally, I put forward the hypothesis that the focus on psycho-somatic conditions constitutes the fil rouge of the Aristotelian conception of dream divination, and argue – contrary to what is mostly claimed by scholars – its substantial unity.

This article explores two predominant conceptions of reading – the Aristotelian framework from the Western traditions and the holistic dynamic approach rooted in Chinese philosophies. The Aristotelian conception emphasizes truth-seeking, knowledge acquisition, and self-fulfilment through a linear, teleological process. In contrast, the holistic dynamic conception, informed primarily by Confucian and Daoist texts, views reading as an ongoing, cyclical process of transformation, moral cultivation, and alignment with the broader milieu. Rather than treating these frameworks as oppositional, I propose a synthetic conception of reading that integrates both perspectives. This synthesis combines the pursuit of stable truths with the adaptability and moral cultivation central to the holistic dynamic approach. This article argues that such a combined framework offers a richer, more comprehensive understanding of reading as a practice that shapes individuals and societies alike. This approach holds significant implications for contemporary political theory, fostering more resilient and engaged political agents through transformative reading practices.

In E-Co-Affectivity, Marjolein Oele explores the deep connectivity and relational entanglements of plants, animals, humans, and the soil as elemental components of a co-affective community. Her deconstructive reading of the Aristotelian conception of degrees of three souls, with such hierarchy of humans-animals-vegetables via what she calls categorical contamination,” is a brilliant example of how re-reading the western canon can cast important interpretive light upon contemporary ethico-political questions. Oele’s work shows how it is crucial to foreground (eco)feminist re-interpretations of the writings of major figures in the western philosophical traditions. It is reconstruction and construction of feminist hermeneutics so that it is not a mere interpretation, but a transformation of old traditions into planetary cosmo-centric new-becomings. Through my reading of E-Co-Affectivity, I focus on the coherence of the crucial themes of the middle voice, precarity, and e-co-affectivity, from my comparative ecofeminist perspective. The Korean concept of jeong, which can be a healing mechanism in the midst of our planetary crises, I will suggest, resonates profoundly with e-co-affectivity.

In the Aristotelian tradition, the relationship with Aristotle’s treatment of infinity has always been ambiguous for reasons connected to theology, creation, and natural philosophy. Scholastic philosophy generally rejects the existence of real infinities in the created world, while recognising potential infinities in the doctrine of the continuum, in line with Aristotle’s views on this matter. According to this view, there is no infinite power or greatness in the world. Nevertheless, notable developments emerge in which this orthodoxy is questioned, and the possibility that God could produce an actual infinity in terms of quantity, number, or intensity becomes widespread among later scholastics – such infinist approaches sometimes drawing on highly interpretative readings of Aristotle’s own thinking. Alongside these examples of internal development, the concept of the natural infinite – the presence of infinity in nature – becomes a source of tension between the new philosophy and Aristotelianism at the beginning of the modern era, even when a general framework or vocabulary of Aristotelian descent is maintained. Such a multifaceted subject could not be exhausted in a few pages, so we will only discuss two emblematic examples: a 16th-century literary celebrity and a 17th-century mathematician and philosopher. Despite being as different as possible, they are both signs of an interesting dependence on Aristotelian concepts and terminology, even while moving away from and fundamentally distorting the framework they were cast in.

The Affection In Between argued that the Aristotelian concept of sunaisthesis, or sensing in common, revived through contemporary theories of intercorporeity and affect, ought to play a larger role in current ethical and political philosophy. But the historical neglect of this concept did not leave it intact. What effect did its longstanding marginalization and relegation to the private or intimate sphere have on sunaisthetic practices, and how might this impact any revival? This article charts opportunities and hazards for a contemporary deployment of sunaisthesis by drawing on the work of Ingeborg Bachmann. First, I connect Bachmann’s “moral impulse before all morality” to sunaisthesis as a sense-making activity at the limits of language. Next, I read her literary theory as charting attempts to traverse these limits and reawaken sunaisthetic experience. Finally, a close reading of a key passage from Malina illustrates the dangers of restricting sunaisthetic affect within strictly policed borders of intimacy.

<title>Abstract</title> <p>A comprehensive understanding of any phenomenon, according to Aristotle, requires an integrated consideration of the four causes that determine it: material, formal, efficient, and final. This Aristotelian conception of causality has been employed by authors from various scientific disciplines, including psychology. The present article reviews Aristotle’s original conception of the four causes and its application to the study of human behavior, personality, and psychological disorders. The contributions of different authors are critically examined, and their strengths and weaknesses are highlighted. Finally, a radically human alternative is proposed, unifying the four causes at a psychological meeting point that takes into account the interaction between the individual and their context at an anthropic scale. This approach aims to overcome mechanistic reductionism and traditional dualism, offering a comprehensive perspective that integrates the biological, social, and historical dimensions in explaining human behavior and suffering.</p>