Archidamian War Research Articles

Sparta; Mantinea and Parrhasia; Elis and Lepreon: Politics and Autonomy in 421-418 BC

Following the end of the Archidamian war Sparta intervened in Parrhasia and at Lepreon. The interventions weakened Mantinea and Elis, two states that caused difficulties for Sparta, but besides Realpolitik there were also questions of law, and the Spartans, though anxious to achieve strategic advantages, were careful to act with proper legal authority. Sparta declared both Parrhasia and Lepreon autonomous, but autonomy did not mean the same status in the two cases. Since knowledge of these incidents comes mainly from Thucydides’ Book 5, the argument depends heavily on interpretation of Thucydides’ text.

Spartan Strategies in the Early Peloponnesian War, 431–425 B.C.E.

This paper argues that the Spartans consistently adapted their strategic approach during the first half of the Archidamian War in response to shifting military conditions and emerging opportunities. Overall, Spartan military thinking was more creative, adaptive, and contingent than is usually acknowledged.

Athens and Sparta and the War of Rank in Ancient Greece: An Interview with J.E. Lendon

Athens and Sparta and the War of Rank in Ancient Greece: An Interview with J.E. Lendon Conducted by Donald A. Yerxa IN SONG OF WRATH: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR BEGINS (Basic Books, 2010) Jon E. Lendon combines military and cultural history to tell the story of the origins and first decade of the Peloponnesian War (431–421 B.C.). He portrays the war as a duel over honor marked by a series of acts of destruction and revenge. He also challenges those who would read Thucydides as the progenitor of “a realist theory of international relations narrowly grounded in power.” Lendon is a professor of history at the University of Virginia and author of Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (Yale University Press, 2005). Senior editor Donald Yerxa interviewed Lendon in September 2011. Donald A. Yerxa: Would you provide our readers with a brief summary of Song of Wrath? Jon E. Lendon: It’s another damn book about the Peloponnesian War! And it’s not even about the whole Peloponnesian War, just about its origins and the first ten years of fighting—what the ancients called the Archidamian War (431–421 B.C.). And even so it’s 566 pages long. Yerxa: What prompted you to write the book? Click for larger view View full resolution In illustrated relief of Thucydidies from The History of Thucydides, trans. S. T. Bloomfield (London, 1829). Lendon: Love of the events and their original teller, Thucydides? Ancient history is not like most other branches of history. You work with published sources. You don’t go to archives, but you rely for the most part on works of Greek and Roman historians that were preserved through the Middle Ages at least as much for their high aesthetic value as for the stories they told. Becoming a classicist is the process of falling in love with one or more of those authors. Your teachers parade the authors before you, you spend hours and days and months reading them (not least because Latin and Greek are hard) and some you end up hating (like Terence in my case, that miserable old bore!), and others end up putting a fish hook in your soul from which you can never thrash your way free. And your teachers, of course, nudge you. I was a student of Donald Kagan, a man who quite innocently left his students in no doubt that of all the Great Books, Thucydides had written the greatest. So I’ve wanted to write about the Peloponnesian War since I was an undergraduate. But the reasons why I wrote this book now are less poetic. I’ve long been interested in the culture of ancient foreign relations, and particularly the role played by revenge. I’d always imagined that I’d write about revenge in Roman foreign affairs, but my friend Susan Mattern got there first with her Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (University of California Press, 1999), which says pretty well everything I wanted to say about Rome. Luckily, I was trained to be ambidextrous in Roman and Greek history, so it wasn’t much trouble to move to the Greek side. What good luck! What a favor Susan did me! Because like many middle-aged historians I had discovered that purely analytical history rather bores me. It enforces dogmatic, mechanical thinking and dull writing. But if you consider the historians’ craft to some degree a branch of belles-lettres, you need a story to tell. From a purely practical standpoint, the Peloponnesian War is one of the few epochs in ancient history well enough reported that you can write a continuous narrative about it without constantly droning on about why we think we know what we think we know. But more important, what a story! What triumph! What pathos! What characters! The grim, unbending Pericles; the wise, dutiful Spartan king Archidamus; the dreadful demagogue Cleon; the Athenian general Demosthenes, the Odysseus of his age; the charismatic Brasidas, general of Sparta, who marched north into the snows of Thrace with a scratch army of mercenaries and freed helots and saved Sparta from defeat in the war! I know...

"The Greatest Historian" in New English

"The Greatest Historian" in New English STEVEN J. WILLETT ^^.acaulay famously declared Thucydides to be "thegreatest historian thateverlived."This judgment reflects a good deal ofpartisanhyperbole, and quitea numberofotherhistorians ancientand modernmight justify the claim,includingHerodotus,Sima Qian, Ibn Khaldun,and Gibbon,butThucydides is certainly themostdifficult Greek historian to translate. MartinHammond'snewEnglish translation *is thefirst sinceStevenLattimore attempted to capturethe fullnuance and complexity of Thucydides'prose withoutresort to excessivesimplification or paraphrase.1 Indeed , to date Lattimore's versionis the only one thatcan stand comparison with Hobbes' magisterialtranslation, which many othersubsequenttranslators have raided for theirown work. Given the importanceof Thucydidesfor western historiography, whatever hisinternational rank,anothernew Englishversionis a signalevent.BeforeI look morecloselyat theHammond/Rhodes edition,letmesayup front thatI have no intention of comparingit closelywith RobertB. Strassler's LandmarkThucydides , now nearlyfifteenyearsbehindus .Whatever itsvirtues, andthey aremany, he choseto use RichardCrawley'sold 1874 translation with onlylightrevision to avoidthetimeand costofa fresh translation .Crawleytendsto simplify theexceptionalcomplexity of Thucydides'speeches,while Lattimoreconfronts them withEnglishthatcapturesmuchofthedifficulty. Crawleyis * Thucydides, ThePeloponnesian War , translated byMartin Hammond , introduction andnotes byP.J.Rhodes. NewYorkandOxford : Oxford University Press (Oxford World's Classics), 2009.lxiv + 708pages.$19.95,paperback. ARION 19. 1SPRING/SUMMER 20II 174 "THEGREATEST HISTORIAN" INNEWENGLISH more successfulin narrativepassages, especially where Thucydides employsa matter-of-fact stylethatoftenrisesto vivid,energetic descriptions ofaction.In testing Hammond's translation, then,I willfocuson how he handlesa representativenarrative episodeand a sectionfroma majorspeech. First, however, let'ssurvey thecontents. P.J.Rhodes'contribution to theeditionincludesthefortyfour -page introduction (pagesix-liii),theselective bibliography (liv-lvii), the detailed book-by-book summaryand analysis(lviii-lxiv),the appendixof weightsand measures (473-474), the 157-pageexplanatory notes(475-632), and (presumably) thenoteson theGreektext(633-43). The authorstake the OxfordClassical Text of H. StuartJonesas theirstarting-point and thensupplytextualnotesforthose places wherethe texttheytranslatediffers fromthe OCT and forplaces wheretheyaccept OCT readingsthatsome modernscholarsdo not: "Not all ofthesedivergences have a significant effect on thesenseor thedetail,butwherethey do the textual issues are discussed in the Explanatory Notes" (633). Martin Hammond was responsibleforthe translation,most of the "decisions on which reading to adopt in themanyplaces wheretheGreektextis in doubt" (page v), and the comprehensivesixty-four-page index (644-708). I assume that both Hammond and Rhodes workedtogether to assemblethe noteson the Greektext, even if the formermade most of the decisionson which readings to accept,and thatbothcooperatedon selecting the sheaf of ten maps. All but two of the maps are in fact adaptedfrom existing booksbyRhodes,B. W.Henderson, J. F. Lazenby,K. J.Dover and SimonHornblower.2 Whilethe maps are not as richand variedas thosein theLandmark Thucydides , theyare adequate to followthenarrative. Three aspects of this editionare, however,noteworthy. First,Rhodes' introduction is one of thebestI've everread forthegeneralreader.In forty-four crisp,concisepages,he managesto lay out thecontextto thewar,to analyzethe evolving militarystrategyfrom the Archidamian War StevenJ. Willett175 through itsmiddleand finalstages,to providea shortbiographyofThucydidesalongwithan accountofthecomposition of his history,and to detail Thucydides' historical methodsand style.He concludeswitha shortprospectus of laterGreekhistorians who followedThucydides. The sizeof the introduction beliesthe breadthand varietyof complex materialRhodes is able to deployin a lucidexpositionthat stemsfromhis long engagement withThucydides.Second, thenotesbenefit fromall thenew researchthathas developed sincetheLandmarkThucydides , particularly fromthe commentary bySimonHornblower, whichis an essentialaccompaniment to A. W. Gomme'smonumental commentary as completed by AnthonyAndrewes and K. J. Dover.3 Rhodesmakesitclearthat"These notesseekto helpa range of readers,includingreaderswithouta greatdeal of backgroundknowledge ,to understand bothThucydides'subject matterand his treatment of it" (475). Despite thatcaveat, thesynthesis ofmaterialhe offers is sufficiently diverseand varied - especially in the analysis of narrative - that it shouldproveusefulto a broad rangeof readers,fromstudentsto professionalhistorians.Finally,the translationis based on a freshexaminationof thetextualtradition. The tenpages ofdensenoteson theGreektexttestify to theeditors ' determination that this translationshould come as close as possible to what Thucydidesactuallywrote. For thatreasonalone ithas an advantageno othercurrent translation ,in or out ofcopyright, can match. Most generalreadersand teacherswill selectthisedition primarily forthetranslation and secondarily forthesupport material.I will test Hammond's work by examiningtwo passages thatreflect opposingaspectsof Thucydides'style: his treatment of narrative and his treatment of speeches.A closecomparisonoftheEnglishwiththeGreekshouldshow clearlyhow Hammond has trackedThucydides'verycomplex syntax. Bothpassages come fromBook 2. The narrative excerpt describestheTheban attackon Plataea in 431 bce. The lit- 176 "THEGREATEST HISTORIAN" INNEWENGLISH tie city of Plataea, Athens' only ally at the Battle of Marathonin 490 bce, had always been hostileto Thebes, whichconcludedthattheimminence of war gave it an opportunity to seize the citywitha preemptive attackwhile peace stillheld.The Thebanforces...

Athenian Military Performance in the Archidamian War: Thucydides on Democracy and Knowledge

Athenian military success in the Archidamian war is attributed by the Corinthians in book 1 of Thucydides to an inherent national character. Although the Athenians do manifest the characteristics of agility, speed, and common-good seeking that the Corinthians attribute to the Athenians, the source of Athenian exceptionalism is better sought in the development of democratic institutions and associated patterns of behavior. Athens did well in military operations because of its superior management of useful knowledge. Likewise, breakdown in knowledge management is a key reason for Athenian military failures in the latter part of the war.

Thucydides: an introduction for the common reader

Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations xiii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Thucydides' History and Its Background 7 Chapter 2: The Subject, Method, and Structure of Thucydides' History 23 Chapter 3: Thucydides on the Causes of the War 40 Chapter 4: Thucydides and Pericles 57 Chapter 5: Scenes from the Archidamian War 75 Mytilene, Plataea, Corcyra, Pylos Chapter 6: Dialogue at Melos, the Sicilian Expedition 100 Chapter 7: Endings 125 Chapter 8: Thucydides as a Philosophic Historian 139 Notes 163 Further Reading 185 Index 187

Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' "History" 1-5.24

Thucydides has been found guilty of indifference toward financial matters without a consideration of all the evidence. Now Lisa Kallet-Marx examines Thucydides' treatment of financial resources by studying his comments on finance in the context of the whole work and scrutinizes other, chiefly epigraphic, evidence as well. Her comprehensive inspection of the Archaeology, Pentekontaetia, and history of the Archidamian War demonstrates that the role of financial resources is central to Thucydides' ideas about naval power and figures prominently in his speeches and narrative. Kallet-Marx's research reveals an important stage in the historical development of thought about state power, wealth, and imperialism. Her book will greatly interest scholars of ancient economics and classicists alike.

Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.25.

Thucydides has been found guilty of indifference toward financial matters without a consideration of all the evidence. Now Lisa Kallet-Marx examines Thucydides' treatment of financial resources by studying his comments on finance in the context of the whole work and scrutinizes other, chiefly epigraphic, evidence as well. Her comprehensive inspection of the Archaeology, Pentekontaetia, and history of the Archidamian War demonstrates that the role of financial resources is central to Thucydides' ideas about naval power and figures prominently in his speeches and narrative. Kallet-Marx's research reveals an important stage in the historical development of thought about state power, wealth, and imperialism. Her book will greatly interest scholars of ancient economics and classicists alike.

Philomel and pericles: Silence in the funeral speech

This comment occurs in the closing sequence of theepitaphiosof 431/0 attributed to Pericles. The speech was delivered at the public funeral held for Athenian casualties in the first year of the Archidamian War. The earlier part of the speech was devoted to praise of the characteristics, practices, and values of the Athenians as a democratic and imperial community. The features which Pericles is reported as stressing were those which ‘made Athens great’, those by which her dominance was shown. From these is derived the glory achieved by those who died ‘as became Athenians’ (2.43).

A New History of the Peloponnesian War. Vol. I: The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Vol. II: The Archidamian War. Vol. III: The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition. Vol. IV: The Fall of the Athenian Empire.

A New History of the Peloponnesian War. Vol. I: The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Vol. II: The Archidamian War. Vol. III: The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition. Vol. IV: The Fall of the Athenian Empire.

Herodotus and Marathon

Herodotus had has own priorities when he wrote his account of marathon. "Everyone knows that Herodotus' narrative of Narathon will not do," began A.W. Gomme, in an essay published more than thirty years ago, from which I have shamelessly borrowed my title. But it is our earliest and best account, and its point of view is more remarkable than most moderns have noticed. By the time Herodotus published his histories in the early years of the Archidamian War, Marathon had become the touch-stone of Athenian patriotism, and the fundament (or at least a good part of it) of her claim to be the saviour of Greece, as Herodotus himself acknowledged in the speech that he gave the Athenians at Plataea, where they claimed the honour of the left wing There, at darathon, they had stood alone against Persia and defeated forty-six nations! Yet, in Herodotus' account, what seems to have been most significant -- significant enough, at least, to deserve remark -- was that at Marathon, for the first, Greeks charged on the double and first dared to look without fear upon men in Persian dress (Hdt. 6.112.3). At Marathon, Persian expansionism reached its tide-mark.

The Progress of Epiteichismos

Scholarly interest in epiteichismos has, for various reasons, been centred almost exclusively upon the Athenian occupation of Pylos and the Spartan occupation of Decelea. In occupying Pylos the Athenians were adopting epiteichismos for the first time, as were the Spartans in occupying Decelea. Both enterprises were on a considerable scale and deeply influenced the course of the Peloponnesian war, though neither so decisively as had initially seemed likely. Another source of interest in them is their link with the perennial problem of speeches in Thucydides. The Thucydidean versions of speeches delivered shortly before the outbreak of the Archidamian war include references to the possibility that epiteichismos might be attempted by both sides (1. 122. 1; 142. 3–4), although in fact Athens did not do so until 425, and then partly by accident, and Sparta not until much later. These puzzling references have been thought by some scholars to be anachronistic, while others have disputed this inference, maintaining that even before the war military leaders had in mind the possibility of epiteichismos. A similar if less vexed problem arises from the fact that the occupation of Decelea, vigorously recommended by Alcibiades in the Thucydidean version of his speech at Sparta at the end of 415 and apparently accepted with enthusiasm (6. 93. 1–2), was not implemented until the spring of 413.

Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War

Journal Article Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War Get access Thomas Kelly Thomas Kelly Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 87, Issue 1, February 1982, Pages 25–54, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/87.1.25 Published: 01 February 1982

Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War

Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War

Epilycus' Negotiations with Persia

A NDOCIDES 3.29 refers to a treaty and a pact of everlasting friendship negotiated with an unnamed Persian king by an Athenian embassy headed by his uncle, Epilycus, at a date prior to the revolt of Amorges. These negotiations have frequently been discussed,' but almost exclusively in the context of the controversy about the Peace of Callias, and with comparatively little regard to the historical situation obtaining in the opening years of the reign of Darius II, the period to which the negotiations almost certainly belong. It must be admitted that Andocides is never a reliable historical witness,2 and that the agreements to which he refers made no impact upon the ancient tradition. Thucydides, despite his coverage of negotiations and proposed negotiations with Persia by both protagonists in the Archidamian War, notoriously does not mention any such treaty or pact.3 Theopompus, as cited by Theon, does refer to an Athenian claim to have negotiated a treaty with Darius, but it remains extremely doubtful whether Theon actually found the proper name Dareios in the text of Theopompus,4 and equally doubtful whether the name can be legitimately treated as an intruding gloss based on historical comment, whether wellinformed or ill-informed.5 Nevertheless the fact of a treaty with Persia in the period to which Andocides refers now seems confirmed beyond

Evidence for the Date of Herodotus' Publication

In this paper I contest the usually accepted terminus for the date of the publication of Herodotus' Histories, namely, just prior to the production of the Acharnians in February 425. I argue instead that Herodotus survived the Archidamian War—basically a return, this, to the position taken until the middle of the last century, especially in Germany, before the work of Schoell, Kirchoff and then Meyer and Jacoby. Further, I suggest that he published at a date close to 414 B.C. or, at least, that his Histories reached the Athenian public at around that time. Since even the orthodox date for his publication (426 or so) figures in the constructions of modern scholars merely as a literary curiosity devoid of significance—such are the preconceptions dominating our notion of Herodotus' ‘era’—a reconsideration of this question needs no apology if it serves the purpose of directing attention to a matter vitally affecting our interpretation of this author.First, a general observation. In seeking for external evidence to establish the date of the publication of Herodotus' Histories, we need to distinguish between possible and certain echoes of Herodotus in the works of others. The question must constantly be asked whether any allusion we have isolated presupposes and requires the knowledge of Herodotus' work on the part of the contemporary audience. For otherwise we could be misled by a coincidence or we could reach a false conclusion because some point of specific knowledge eludes us. Of the latter the famous parallel in the Antigone of Sophocles (909 ff. with Herodotus iii 119) provides a notable example. If Herodotus had been just a little more strict with himself in avoiding allusions to his own time, who would not suppose that his work had been published prior to 441? What we require, therefore, is material which is calculated to evoke Herodotus himself—the special characteristics of the man and his Histories—so as to leave in no doubt a general familiarity with his work on the part of others.

Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War

THE AVOWED AIM of the Spartans in 431 was to liberate the subjects of Athens (2.8.4; cf. 1.139.2);1 but, according to Thucydides, truest motive for making war was the growth of Athenian power and the fear it inspired which forced to fight (1.23.6), and the Spartans voted for war in 432 so much persuaded by the speeches of allies as because they were afraid that the Athenians would acquire greater power, for they saw that the larger part of Greece was already subject to them (1.88). Thucydides indeed held that the Spartans were normally reluctant to enter on wars, unless they were forced into them, a condition that in his view was now fulfilled; they at last resolved to check the Athenians when their power was patently growing and when they were striking at the Spartan confederacy (1.118). It is no part of my plan to re-examine fully the true cause of the Peloponnesian war. I believe that Thucydides' explanation will stand in essence. The truth is, however, perhaps a little more complex than he makes explicit. The allies of Sparta at whom Athens was directly striking in 432 were Corinth and Megara. Thucydides makes the Corinthians threaten to abandon the alliance with Sparta and turn elsewhere, if Sparta refused support (1.71). This was surely an empty threat and known to be such at Sparta. There was no reason to think that Corinth could obtain help against Athens from any other quarter, if Sparta failed her. Argos, the only strong city in Greece which was uncommitted, had a secular feud with Sparta over Cynuria or Thyreatis; she never abandoned her claim to this border-land, and would make no permanent peace with Sparta, only truces;' with Athens she had no quarrel, but an ideological link by reason of her democratic institutions.' In any event Argos was not strong enough to give Corinth effective aid.4 Corinth

The Dating of Documents to the Mid-Fifth Century—I

In his paper ‘The Athenian Coinage Decree’, in Historia x (1961) 148–88, Mattingly proposes to date this decree (Tod 67: ATL ii D14: the ‘Decree of Klearchos’) to 425/4. This involves two important principles, historical and epigraphic. Historically, he contends that a measure of this coercive sort is out of place in the middle of the century (it is dated in ATL to 449/8) and finds its proper context in the time of Kleon's ascendancy, in the latter part of the Archidamian War. Epigraphically, since one copy in which this decree is preserved (the only copy which uses the Attic alphabet) writes sigma always with three bars Mattingly is led to challenge the current epigraphic doctrine, namely, that in Attic inscriptions this form of sigma is not used (at least in the ‘chancery style’, for a public decree) later than 446.The epigraphic doctrine about three-bar sigma is not self-evidently true, and it is fair and right that it should be called in question. We believe it is true in fact, and that the use of three-bar sigma in the Kos copy of D14 creates a strong presumption that Mattingly's date is too low. We deal with the documents alleged by Mattingly to run counter to this doctrine, and hope to show (in each case) that they do not. We deal with these and other documents under three heads: first, the two from which Mattingly starts, the decree of Klearchos about coinage and the decree of Kleinias about the collection of tribute; next, some other decrees concerning Athens' allies; last, those which are concerned with building projects.

Argive Politics and Policy after the Peace of Nicias

IN THE summer of 418 B.C. the Spartans in full force, accompanied by their Helots, and the Tegeans with all their Arcadian allies marched out to attack the territory of the Argives. At the same time their allies from Boeotia and Corinth along with those from the rest of the Peloponnese gathered at Phlius to take part in the campaign. The magnitude of the force was well justified by the seriousness of Sparta's grievances against Argos. The Argives had seized upon the weakened condition of Sparta after the Archidamian war to try to recover the hegemony of the Peloponnese. They had allied themselves with Elis and Mantinea to form a league which powerfully threatened the Spartan position. More recently they had made a treaty with Athens and were engaged in besieging Epidaurus. The prestige of Sparta was at low ebb; some Peloponnesian states had already revolted and others were restive. With the Spartan position deteriorating daily King Agis set out against the Argives to destroy a serious threat to the hegemony of Lacedaemon. After some preliminary maneuvers to achieve a favorable position (these will be discussed later) Agis moved into the Argive plain and prepared for battle. The Argives were arrayed to meet him and all was in readiness for a great conflict; the armies had all but made contact when a remarkable event took place. Two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five strategoi, and Alciphron, proxenos of the Spartans, came forward to Agis asking him to avoid battle. They offered, as Thucydides tells us, to put to arbitration any grievances the Spartans might have against them and to make a treaty as well. Agis accepted the offer, struck a four months' truce with the Argives, and led his army homeward. The battle never took place. The decision of Agis is very surprising; the battlefield and his position on it had been of his choosing and he had at his disposal a formidable army. Thucydides tells us, moreover, that the Argives were hemmed in on all sides and that they were without cavalry to face the Boeotian horse. Why, then, did Agis agree to a truce ? Some have suspected that the decision was founded on political rather than military considerations without giving a fully satisfactory account of the political situation involved.' Others have rejected politics and explained the incident in purely military terms.2 It is the purpose of this paper to show that the military interpretation is inadequate and to suggest an explanation based on political factors. Thucydides tells us plainly that during the Peace of Nicias there were

Plato's Euthyphro

PLATONISTS today agree to the genuineness of the Euthyphro, the delightful dialogue concerning piety; an occasional voice of protest arose in the nineteenth century, when Ueberweg, for example, suspected the treatise because it classifies impiety as an Idea in the Republic, however, Plato classifies to adikon as an eidos, and Aristotle observes that Plato's theory involves negative Ideas (ton apophaseon ideas).1 Although its authenticity is not questioned by contemporary scholars, the Euthyphro has received in the last thirty years only passing attention, which too frequently, by culling passages from the context, fails to appreciate the dialogue as a unit.2 Only two personae appear: Socrates and Euthyphro the former a defendant and the latter a prosecutor in separate trials which are to take place in the near future (399 B.C.). The Cratylus refers to an inspired authority on the philosophy of names, called Euthyphro, whom Platonists generally regard as the same person.3 A. E. Taylor, however, questions the identification; but he admits that there is no necessary chronological difficulty between the identification and the dramatic date of the Cratylus (soon after the beginning of the Archidamian War) if Euthyphro is assumed to be about fifty years of age and his father seventyfive in 399 B.C. an assumption which, in our opinion, should not seem illogical.4 The important point is that Euthyphro in the dialogue bearing his name is not a young novice, but rather a man of mature years, if not of mature judgment. A moot question is the relation of Euthyphro's views on religion and