Archaeology Of Mind Research Articles

Pointing, Rainbows, and the Archaeology of Mind

For over a century anthropologists and folklorists have sporadically recorded a belief that one should not point at a rainbow, lest the offending finger become permanently bent, rot, be supernaturally severed, fall off, etc. In each case the belief was reported for a particular geographical region without apparent awareness of its presence elsewhere, and in no case was an explanation for this curious idea proposed. This paper documents what is called the “Rainbow Taboo” as a global phenomenon, found among peoples of quite varied cultural backgrounds, and it argues that the universality of the belief is a product of the interaction of two independent cognitive elements: an apparently innate sense that the rainbow is associated with the “other world,” and, secondly, a similar sense that pointing with the index finger is aggressive, and should not be used either in normal human interactions or more particularly against the supernatural.

Early body ornamentation as Ego-culture: Tracing the co-evolution of aesthetic ideals and cultural identity

AbstractWhile the “symbolic” meaning of early body ornamentation has received the lion’s share of attention in the debate on human origins, this paper sets out to explore their aesthetic and agentive dimensions, for the purpose of explaining how various ornamental forms would have led interacting groups to form a cultural identity of their own. To this end, semiotics is integrated with a new paradigm in the archaeology of mind, known as the theory of material engagement. Bridging specifically Peirce’s pragmatic theory and Malafouris’ enactive take on aesthetics allows us to appreciate the formation of aesthetic ideals through the agentive effects of material signs. It is thus proposed that, by attending to the interrelation between form, effect, and affect, members of social groups would have come to appreciate the ways in which their ornamental culture resembles and differs from that of neighbouring groups. Following the Lund conception of cultural semiotics, I argue that models of Ego-culture would have come to evolve along Alter-cultures that also employ ornaments, and against Alius-cultures that have yet to develop or adopt personal decoration. The aesthetic ideals associated with early body ornaments must have therefore played a catalytic role in the formation and communication of group membership. I thus close by proposing that the origins of new cultural identities can be explained by tracing the co-development of ideas and ideals.

Material Engagement Theory and its philosophical ties to pragmatism

Material Engagement Theory (MET) is currently driving a conceptual change in the archaeology of mind. Drawing upon the dictates of enactivism and active externalism, it specifically calls for a radical reconceptualization of mind and material culture. Unpersuaded by the common assumption that cognition is brain-bound, Malafouris argues in favour of a process ontology that situates thinking in action. In granting ontological primacy to material engagement, MET seeks to illuminate the emergence of human ways of thinking through the practical effects of the material world. Considering that this is a characteristic example of a pragmatic take on cognition, this contemporary theoretical platform appears to share a lot with pragmatism. As of late, scholars working at the intersection of philosophy, semiotics, and cognitive science have made important steps towards the rapprochement between pragmatism and externalism. Looking to contribute to this growing corpus of work, the present paper focuses on MET’s relation to the pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey, and Mead. Having elsewhere recognized the overlap and complementarity between Malafouris’ and Peirce’s theories in particular, I developed a pragmatic and enactive theory of cognitive semiotics that is suitably geared to trace the nature, emergence, and evolution of material signs. Therefore, besides noting some obvious historical connections, I hereby aim to establish (at least part of) the theoretical backdrop upon which this composite theory is supposed to function, while also exploring new potential avenues. Given that this cognitive semiotic framework can be seen as a pragmatic extension of Malafouris’ enactivist approach to archaeology, the current paper delves into MET’s theoretical underpinnings, seeking to complement its working hypotheses and concepts with philosophical notions and ideas advanced long ago. This synthesis ultimately concludes with a call for the reconceptualization of ‘representation’ as a heuristic concept.

The Archaeology of Mind

The Archaeology of Mind

The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions by Jaak Panksepp and Lucy Biven

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The Archaeology of Mind: It's Not What You Think

Narratives of human evolution place considerable emphasis upon human cognitive development resulting from the evolution of brain architecture and witnessed by the production of ‘symbolic’ material culture. Recent work has modified the narrative to the extent that cognitive development is treated as the product of humanity's ability to download certain aspects of brain functionality, such as the storage of information, into external media. This article questions the centrality given to the history of brain architecture as determinate of human cognition by rejecting the widespread assumption that cognition trades in representations, either stored internally in the brain or downloaded externally into cultural media. The alternative, offered here, is that human cognitive development was constructed through the development of joint attention made possible by the anatomical development of hominins and that this sustained a shared empathy between social agents in their practical understanding of the qualities of materiality.

Hafted spears and the archaeology of mind

By as early as 200,000 years ago hunters in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe had begun hafting stone points onto the ends of their spears (1⇓–3). This marked a significant step in the history of technology, for it was the first time that hominins had united separate elements into a single tool. Indeed, these compound tools actually consisted of three distinct elements: the point, the shaft, and the haft itself. It was the haft that was the challenge because it had to withstand significant impact forces when the spear was used. Many archaeologists consider the development of hafting to mark a major watershed not just for technology, but for the human mind itself (4). But just what is required, in a cognitive sense, to be able to haft a point to a shaft? In this issue of PNAS, Wadley et al. (5) set out to answer this question by duplicating one such hafting technology, identifying the procedures and knowledge required, and arguing that abstract reasoning was an essential prerequisite. In doing so they provide a good example of a relatively new perspective in paleoanthropology—that of cognitive archaeology.

Towards an Archaeology of Mind: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Cambridge on 30th November 1982. By ColinRenfrew

Towards an Archaeology of Mind: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Cambridge on 30th November 1982. By C<scp>olin</scp>R<scp>enfrew</scp>

Colin Renfrew: Towards an archaeology of mind. An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Cambridge on 30 November 1982. Cambridge: University Press, 1982. 34 pp., I drawing (Chas. Addams). £1.95.

Colin Renfrew: Towards an archaeology of mind. An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Cambridge on 30 November 1982. Cambridge: University Press, 1982. 34 pp., I drawing (Chas. Addams). £1.95.

Archaeology of mind

Archaeology of mind

Linguistics and the Archeology of Mind

Linguistics and the Archeology of Mind