Appointment Of Governors Research Articles

Bureaucrat-Local Politician Relations and Hierarchical Local Governance in Emerging Democracies: A Case Study of Tunisia

ABSTRACT How do bureaucrat-local politician relations affect the inclusiveness of local governance in emerging democracies? This study answers the question through conducting a case study of Tunisia. The study evaluates interview data recently collected among 39 municipalities in socio-economically divergent regions with mayors, city council members, civil society members, and a governor, and examines transparency data compiled for all 350 municipalities by an independent civil society organization. The findings suggest that partisanship appointment of governors can limit the inclusiveness of local governance through perpetuating hierarchical relations with mayors at the expense of inclusive local engagement mechanisms. An analysis on the Transparency Index of municipalities within governorates with identified partisanship ties (n = 206) indicates that municipal governance becomes less transparent when a governor shares a political background similar to the ideological position of the mayor’s party. Thus, partisan appointments of bureaucrats can have implications for the inclusiveness of local governance.

Cicero’s Proconsulship in Cilicia: The Foreign Policy Aspect

The correspondence of Marcus Tullius Cicero during his term as proconsul of Cilicia provides an opportunity to better understand the complexities of governing Roman provinces during the crisis of the Republic, and above all to assess Rome’s ability to counter external threats. However, the genre of this source has strongly shaped the historiographical tradition, which has come to reflect the view of the events held by the author of most of the letters. Thus, works by modern scholars commonly justify and show full support for the proconsul’s actions. Those isolated studies that try to look critically at Cicero’s efforts during his proconsulship negatively assess the measures taken to counter the Parthian threat but identify the Roman proconsul himself as the culprit for their failure. In our view, Cicero’s correspondence allows us, at least in part, to consider the problem of the Roman provinces in the East as a whole, leaving aside the figure of one particular governor. It can be said with a high degree of confidence that the system of Roman provincial government during the late Republic did not meet the requirements of effective frontier defense in the East. The appointment of governors (proconsuls and propraetors) depended on too many random factors (as did the election of consuls and praetors) for professional managers and military men to always hold these key positions. Cicero’s example is the most striking, but obviously not unique. The elite’s focus on domestic politics automatically made foreign policy tasks secondary. Further, the governors had only limited resources, suitable for localized policing operations but inadequate even against a large-scale plunder raid, not to mention a major invasion. The allies, for many decades protecting the Roman borders with their troops and territories, now for the most part lost even the ability to control their own possessions. Traditional reliance on allied monarchs not only deprived the Romans of military support, but also led to misinformation about the situation at the border. The center’s quick response to instability on the periphery was hampered not only by slow communications, but also by the lack of a clear decision-making mechanism in Rome. Ironically, the Republic was saved by the absence of a real adversary in the East.

With or without Estates? : Governorship in Hungary in the Eighteenth Century

In the eighteenth century, the Hungarian estates had the greatest influence among the estates of the provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy. The main representative of the estates was the palatine, appointed by the monarch but elected by the estates at the Diet. He performed substantial judicial, administrative, financial, and military tasks in the Kingdom of Hungary. After 1526, the Habsburg sovereigns opted to rule the country on several occasions through governors who were appointed precisely because of the broad influence of the palatine. In this essay, I examine the reasons why the politically strong Hungarian estates in the eighteenth century accepted the appointment of governors instead of a palatine. I also consider what the rights and duties of these governors were, the extent to which these rights and duties differed from those of the palatine, and what changes they went through in the early modern period. I show how the idea and practice of appointing archdukes as governors or palatines was conceived and evolved at the end of the eighteenth century. The circumstances of these appointments of Francis Stephen of Lorraine, future son-in-law of Charles VI, Prince Albert of Saxony(-Teschen), future son-in-law of Maria Theresa and Archduke Joseph, shed light on considerations and interests which lay in the background of the compromises and political bargains made between the Habsburg(-Lorraine) rulers and the Hungarian estates.

The electoral logic of governor rotations in Ukraine: rulers’ authority, party strength, and regional polarization

ABSTRACTHow and under what conditions do authoritarian rulers use the state apparatus to help ensure victory? To answer this question, this paper examines electoral mobilization as a rationale for the appointment of governors in hybrid regimes. Given their absolute authority to use administrative resources, autocratic rulers prefer governors who can perform well in mobilizing the electorate in their favor. However, several circumstances make this strategy suboptimal or impossible. To provide empirical evidence supporting this argument, this study conducts a survival analysis using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments and dismissals in Ukraine from 1996 to 2017. The results confirm that electoral performance was the primary driver of governor appointments during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. In addition, it is demonstrated that various institutional conditions, such as party strength, the weak authority of the ruler within the central government, and regional polarization resulted in the adoption of different appointment strategies by subsequent presidents.

The Governor And The Constitution

The constitution of India has adoped the parliamentary form of Government which evisages that the President and the Governor shall be the mere constitutional or nominal heads and the real executive power shall vest in the council of ministers. The constitution makes details provisions regarding the debate over the appointment, powers and functions of the Governor. There was executive debate over the appointment, rold and position of the Governor in the consituent assembly and it resolved that the Governor would be merely a constitutional head and will exercise his powers and functions with the aid and advise of the council of ministers except whre he is under the constitution required to act in his discreation. The experience of the working of the constitution upto the last seven decaded regarding the appointment and the exercise of the powers of the Governor has shown that there is no defined, transparent, objective and merit base approach in the appointment of Governor and at times the Governors exercise their powers in partisan and arbitary manner in complete disregard to constitutional spirit and mandate as well as settled consitutional conventions. In view of the multiple political parties with different ideology and volatile an charged political environment since the nineties onward, an enquiry into the appointment, position, powers and functions of the Governor under the Indian constitution is the need of the hour.

Модернизация регионального управления забайкальского края по назначению губернатора н. Н. Ждановой

Модернизация регионального управления забайкальского края по назначению губернатора н. Н. Ждановой

“What Happened to Russian Federalism?: Federal Reform under Putin and Medvedev”

The Constitution of the Russian Federation unequivocally identifies itself with a federal state declaring as follows: ‘The Russian Federation – Russia shall be a democratic, federative, law-based state with a republican form of government’(Article 1). Indeed, in terms of constitutional arrangements, there is no denying that Russia is a federative system. However, in the minds of many scholars and commentators both inside and outside Russia a simple but important question may arise: At the moment, is Russia a federal state? For instance, in the aftermath of introduction of the law on the appointment of governors of 2004, some protesters in Russia appealed to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the law violated their “constitutional right to live in a federal state.”1) Also, a commentator maintains that after experiencing political chaos due to the fragmentation of state power during the 1990s, Russia came to introduce a leviathan, a strong political entity, to overcome such a state of nature. However, such a new leviathan, unlike the Thomas Hobbes’ idea, has not been created from below through individuals’ consents

Philip II’s Quest. The Appointment of Governors-General during the Dutch Revolt (1559-1598)

Philip II’s Quest: The Appointment of Governors-General during the Dutch Revolt (1559-1598)Recent historiographical studies have presented the Habsburg appointment of governors-general during the Dutch Revolt as the outcome of factional infighting at the Spanish Court. While this so-called ‘faction model’ has yielded new insights, it also raises a number of problems. Firstly, in the new model, the role of the dynasty is unduly relegated to the background – even though Philip II’s appointment decisions were mainly driven by dynastic considerations. Secondly, the power struggle at the Spanish Court was not only a conflict between court factions, but also between noble houses vying for prestige and trying to secure positions for their offspring. Thirdly, there is an excessive focus on the Spanish Court, while the feuds between noble houses in the Low Countries also played a role in the interim appointments made during the Revolt. Finally, Philip II always looked for the most suitable candidate in terms of administration and warfare during the Dutch Revolt, in accordance with the constraints of the composite Spanish monarchy. Only the combination of these four (frequently contradictory) motives reveals how Philip II’s appointment of governors can be seen as a quest for the right man or woman in the right place.

President Medvedev and the Contested Constitutional Underpinnings of Russia's Power Vertical

Abstract: The author investigates Russian federalism and the constitutional underpinnings of the vertical, looking specifically at the Constitutional Court's December 2005 case about the appointment of governors. The court's decision upheld the constitutional notion of a system of executive power as the primary legal justification for the vertical. However, not all of the justices agreed with this reading of the Russian constitution, and the dissenting special opinions provide alternative interpretations of the Russian constitution's division of power. The author also analyzes President Dmitry Medvedev's November 2008 state of the nation address and Medvedev's unexpected call to reexamine and clarify the Russian constitution's requirement for a unified system of executive power. Keywords: constitution, elections, federalism, governors, vertical ********** In his November 2008 state of the nation address, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev boldly extolled the virtues of the Russian constitution. According to Medvedev, the Russian constitution upholds freedom and justice, human dignity and welfare, protection of family and Fatherland, and unity of our multiethnic people--not just as common values but as legal concepts. (1) However, despite this effusive praise, during the speech Medvedev also announced his openness to certain corrections to the constitution. Most notable, Medvedev called for increasing the terms of the Russian president and Duma representatives to six years and five years, respectively, an amendment that was swiftly enacted into law. Medvedev raised the specter of less flashy but more fundamental legal reforms as well. Interestingly, in his inaugural address to the nation, Medvedev chose to revisit several pillars of the so-called vertical, the term generally used to describe Putin's highly centralized, Kremlin-controlled political system. Medvedev expressly called for a modification in the gubernatorial selection process, proposing that potential nominees should come from those parties that received the highest number of votes in the regional elections. Medvedev also raised Article 77 of the Russian constitution, one of the provisions that define the construction of Russia's federal structures. This article consists of two parts: Article 77.1 states that, subject to certain constitutional limitations, individual regions should be allowed to establish their own institutions of state independently; Article 77.2 calls for a system of executive power over the subjects of the Russian Federation. (2) Medvedev specifically highlighted Article 77.2 in his state of the nation address and the need to clarify this provision's mandate for integrating Russia's federal and regional structures into a single system. From a constitutional standpoint, although Article 77.2 currently serves as the cornerstone of the vertical, this provision remains one of the most ambiguous and unexplored clauses in the constitution. What does a unified system of executive mean in practice? How does one reconcile this single system with other constitutional provisions assigning specific rights and powers to the regions? Indeed, how does one reconcile the two parts of Article 77? The most comprehensive legal analysis of this issue--and the vertical in general--can be found in the Constitutional Court's December 2005 landmark decision to uphold then-President Vladimir Putin's law on the appointment of governors. (3) Along with the 1992 Trial of the Communist Party and the 1995 case on the legitimacy of the Chechen war, the 2005 appointment-of-governors case stands out as one of the court's most controversial political decisions in its nineteen-year tenure. Despite this decision's important legal and political ramifications, it has received only limited attention. Such neglect unfortunately has meant overlooking the court's (at times) convoluted reasoning in support of the vertical and the ringing dissents filed against the majority opinion in the 2005 case. …

Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796 (review)

Reviewed by: Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796 Jane Kate Leonard (bio) R. Kent Guy. Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796. A China Program Book. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010. xii, 445 pp. Hardcover $64.00, isbn 978-0-295-99018-7. Paperback $42.00 isbn 978-0-295-99019-4. Kent Guy's groundbreaking institutional study of the evolution and role of the provincial governorship in the Qing period (1644–1911) examines one of the pivotal innovations that enabled the Qing dynasty to rule effectively such a large and culturally diverse empire for so long. He traces the evolution of the post of provincial governor from the founding of the dynasty in 1644 to the end of the Qianlong reign (1796) and alludes to its continuing importance in the dynasty's response to the crises of the nineteenth century to 1911. The author treats the Qing governorship as an amalgam of earlier imperial experiments with governor-like positions that had served as links between central and local government—experiments that largely misfired either because these posts became the foci of regional opposition to dynastic interests or because they represented intrusive central interference in regional-local affairs. Among these [End Page 506] experiments, he highlights the importance of the Yuan dynasty's (1264–1368) practice of using centrally appointed agents to serve in territorial governance, as well as later Ming (1368–1644) attempts, largely unsuccessful, to pair and coordinate military and civilian administrators in the provinces. The Qing, according to the author, overcame obstacles to effective regional administration through a series of steps taken in each reign from the Shunzhi to the mid-Qianlong periods (1644–1768) that added important features to the evolving post of governor. In general, these steps refined the routine system for appointing, evaluating, and promoting officials by factoring in and giving weight to those with administrative talent and special competencies. At the same time, the emperors carved out special appointment prerogatives for themselves that allowed them to bypass the routine process and appoint individuals to serve as governors. These officials would carry out new policy initiatives and/or had special abilities and experiences that facilitated Qing rule in discrete provincial settings, each with its own unique challenges. This enabled the Qing dynasty "to manufacture homogeneity" (p. 352) out of regional diversity. The special appointments, not surprisingly, spiked during the beginning of each new reign and also during emergencies. They decreased somewhat in the Qianlong (1736–1795) and Jiaqing (1796–1820) reigns after the institutions of governorship had crystallized in the Yongzheng reign (1723–1735), only to surge again in the nineteenth century when economic and social change, especially in the southeast coastal provinces, caused tensions between provinces and sparked unrest and rebellion (pp. 112–116). By the eighteenth century, the author asserts, those who served as governors had developed into an extremely prestigious cadre of skilled and experienced administrators who functioned as pivotal middlemen between the court and a tightly organized provincial administrative hierarchy that reached down to the department (zhou) and county (xian). Thus, the governors played a dual role. On the one hand, each served as a central agent who was bound to the imperial agenda and court interests by the relationships that the emperor fostered through direct, secret communications and the special imperial appointment of governors. On the other hand, he also served a second set of interests as the head of tightly organized provincial bureaucracy for which he bore overall responsibility for fiscal accounting, the evaluation of official subordinates down to the county level, judicial review, grain storage and relief, military policing, and logistical support and supply of Qing armies during military emergencies. As the governor emerged as a pivotal actor tying center and province into one stable imperial whole, his power and authority, too, gradually expanded. Particularly important in the growth of gubernatorial power, according to Guy, was the gradual increase in the governor's prerogatives in designated provinces to appoint and transfer local officials to subordinate posts deemed "important" or "very important"—posts that posed serious administrative challenges and required officials with...

Le retour du Léviathan : la politique de recentralisation en Russie depuis 2000

<titre>The Return of the Leviathan: Re-centralization Policy in Russia since 2000 </titre> During a television appearance on September 13,2004, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced a series of political reforms including the cancellation of elections for representatives of the executive branch of government in the regions of the Russian Federation. This return to the appointment of governors concludes the re-centralization policy initiated in 2000, in response to the spontaneous regionalization process of the 1990s, which had proved difficult to control. What are the sources of this recentralization policy, and the principles and fundamental interests behind it? How have these factors influenced its evolution and its effects? How important is this re-centralization process in Russian political development, and what are its prospects today? To answer these questions, we re-examine the regionalization process of the 1990s. Next, we consider what ideologies and interests were driving Russian political protagonists during the recentralization process that followed, as well as their influence upon the course of federal reform, which we can describe as &#8220;new centralism&#8221; (as opposed to Soviet-style &#8220;old centralism&#8221;). Finally, we analyze the implementation of this new policy and its effects on the process of State reform.