ABM Treaty Research Articles

The Missile Defense Debate

Well before 2000 election, George W. Bush and his inner cir cle were clear on a few things, one of which was missile defense. If they won, it would become centerpiece of national security policy, even if all or most of world's other major capitals see national missile defense (nmd), especially U.S. approach to it, as irrelevant or un responsive to plausible threats and a potential danger to global security. There are various ways of looking at missile defense. Dispassionate advocates argue that it might actually have some deterrent value at some future moment against some violence-prone regime or possibly offer some protection against an accidental launch. And in any case, just deploying a missile defense could raise society's comfort level? its confidence that government was doing all that it could to pre vent irrational actors of world from doing what has been called the unthinkable. Less candid proponents favor a system with declared purpose of managing a threat from rogues of world but envisage it as first step toward a system really designed to neutralize China's modest strategic arsenal or expanded Chinese arsenal they expect to see. Other, even more strenuous advocates favor a thick multi-layered system?combining land-, sea-, and space-based components?that would neutralize Russia's forces, along with China's. Many, probably most, opponents regard missile defense as capable of contributing nothing but trouble. They see it as threatening deterrence and arms control structure, starting with Anti-Ballistic Missile (abm) Treaty; as inevitably creating major difficulties with America's

The wrong plan: some thoughts on National Missile Defense

The current proposals to construct a system of hit to kill interceptors as a safeguard against missiles which might be launched against the USA by a rogue state are shown in this paper to be badly flawed. Any nation with the ability to develop and construct an intercontinental ballistic missile would also likely be capable of employing countermeasures against interception. In short, the system would be unlikely to work against a missile travelling unpowered at great speed through space. If the USA is determined to have protection against such attack it would be far cheaper and more efficient to employ antimissile devices nearer to potential sources and to intercept hostile projectiles at the booster stage. It might even be possible to collaborate with Russia on such a scheme, which would not violate the spirit of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The wrong plan: some thoughts on National Missile Defense

The current proposals to construct a system of hit to kill interceptors as a safeguard against missiles which might be launched against the USA by a rogue state are shown in this paper to be badly flawed. Any nation with the ability to develop and construct an intercontinental ballistic missile would also likely be capable of employing countermeasures against interception. In short, the system would be unlikely to work against a missile travelling unpowered at great speed through space. If the USA is determined to have protection against such attack it would be far cheaper and more efficient to employ antimissile devices nearer to potential sources and to intercept hostile projectiles at the booster stage. It might even be possible to collaborate with Russia on such a scheme, which would not violate the spirit of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance

To the consternation of many Europeans, US President George W. Bush has made clear that he intends to deploy a national missile defence (NMD) as soon as possible. Whereas Bush sees NMD deployment as indispensable in a world of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, Europeans worry that it will spur an arms race with Russia and China; decouple Europe from the US; and waste scarce resources on technologies that may never work against a threat that may not exist. Narrowing this gap is critical, however, because the US needs European support - in the form of radar sites and diplomatic cooperation - if the NMD project is to succeed. As it moves forward, the Bush administration should make clear that NMD is not directed at Russia or China; make good-faith efforts to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; not rush into deployment; and stand ready to provide missile-defence coverage for Europe as well.

LAWS, POLITICS AND THE ABM TREATY

LAWS, POLITICS AND THE ABM TREATY

Clinton Decides Against Deployment of Missile Defense System, Authorizes Continued Testing; Russia Claims Plan Violates ABM Treaty

Last year, in February, I spoke to the Council's Energy Security Group about growing proliferation dangers. The comments I made then serve as a good preamble for what I want to talk about today.

The Candidates' Views on Science

D uring each of the past several U.S. presidential elections, Science has posed questions about science policy to the major-party candidates. The editors have tried to ask hard questions that challenge the candidates and their staffs to develop thoughtful answers—responses that will not only help Science 's readership evaluate their positions before the election but might clarify important science and technology issues for a much larger number of thoughtful Americans. This year, as in the past, the candidates have been good enough to cooperate fully with Science , and the results provide some significant insights about how the next president might deal with the multiple aspects of U.S. national interest that have scientific and technical roots. We won't insult your intelligence by rehashing or evaluating the responses, the full texts of which are available in a side-by-side outlay beginning on page [262][1] as well as on Science Online. But here are a few areas that, in the view of the editors, are worth highlighting. Our first question was the shortest: It asked Vice President Gore and Governor Bush simply to choose their top three science and technology priorities. Both mentioned education, with Bush—consistent with his major campaign theme—putting it in first place. Gore emphasized investment incentives for research and made major commitments to balance and scope in the federal RD both unveiled programs to assist students with higher education. In responding to some of the later questions, the candidates took fairly similar policy positions. Both, for example, expressed support for raising the ceiling on H1-B visas for foreign high-tech workers, but both put it forward as an interim rather than a permanent solution. And when asked about making presidential appointments in the science and technology area, both candidates promised efforts to speed the process while identifying delays in Senate approval as offering challenges to a successful outcome. Both opposed “reasonable pricing” clauses regarding drugs developed with the help of federal funding. But there were important differences. When queried about the proposal to double the National Science Foundation's budget over the next 5 years, Vice President Gore responded with a clear commitment, whereas Governor Bush promised an unspecified increase. With respect to the deployment of antiballistic missiles, Gore insists on ensuring compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, whereas Bush proposes to change the treaty terms through negotiated agreements with Russia. Gore likes the space station; Bush would reevaluate it. Gore liked the Advanced Technology Program at the National Institute of Standards and Technology; Bush didn't say, but advocated more support for defense-related research. Perhaps it is not surprising that the starkest differences are over programs and policies that have themselves been the subject of especially intense national controversy. Affirmative action programs are clearly favored by Vice President Gore; Governor Bush proposes “affirmative access”: expanded recruitment efforts without preference. Our question on the scientific evidence regarding the human imprint on global warming drew an affirmation from Gore that might have been predicted from his previously announced position. But the answer from Bush emphasized other atmospheric quality issues. On global warming, he described the temperature increase as a slight one with uncertain causes, and advocated “extensive scientific analysis” to explore the issue further. Science has not endorsed candidates for partisan elective office in the past, and we don't intend to start now. Those of our readers who are eligible to vote in the United States, most of them practicing scientists, will want to evaluate the evidence and then reach their own conclusions. We also know that in making their choice, they are unlikely to limit their evaluation of the candidates to issues that lie in the domain of science policy. Still, the future of the United States is perhaps more dependent than ever on science and technology and on how the U.S. government supports and manages them. These issues are our business here at Science . We hope that our readers will compare the candidates' responses carefully and that they will find them useful on November 7. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.290.5490.262

The Risks of Selective Europeanization

A LITTLE MORE THAN TEN YEARS AFTER the fall of the Berlin Wall, two intertwined processes are unfolding east of the Oder River: the de-Europeanization of Russia and the re-Europeanization of eastern Europe.(1) The first is more the result of inattention, insensitivity, or, at worst, negligence rather than clear calculation. The second has been conducted with considerable fanfare and has raised great expectations in eastern Europe and caused considerable trepidation in Russia. Both processes and the interaction between them are likely to have profound security implications for the region and for long-term international stability.THE DE-EUROPEANIZATION OF RUSSIATsarist Russia and the Soviet Union not only occupied a bi-continental geographic space but also had a strong political interest in both Europe and Asia. The bulk of the population and industry and much of the cultural focus were in Europe, although Russia had diverged from European political developments. The collapse of communism has created a historic opportunity for Russia not only to democratize and build markets but also to create a strong new democratic European identity without neglecting its Asian connections. That European identity would be an important component both in fostering democratic development and in bringing Russia into a security architecture that would ensure stability from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Three factors, however, threaten the creation and the retention of such an identity: Western attitudes and policies toward Russia; east European fears and insensitivities; and nationalistic, anti-democratic forces within Russia.Despite Western proclamations on the importance of Russia to international security and concern over political and economic stability in that vast state, Western attention to Russia has been rather sporadic and mostly crisis-oriented. The West has tended to focus on immediate political, economic, or military crises rather than on long-term processes. Western responses have often involved no more than band-aid measures. Ill-conceived loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have more often been used as political rewards and economic placebos than as components of a clear economic recovery programme. Poorly prepared summits, whether at the presidential or foreign minister level, have at best temporarily assuaged Russian anger rather than addressed long-term security issues. The June 2000 summit in Moscow between President Bill Clinton of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia falls into this category. Despite agreements to build a Russian-American centre to detect missile launches and for each side to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, despite the statement that both countries would try to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in the future, 'taking into account any changes in the international security environment,' the substantive results of the summit were disappointing. Not only were there no significant improvements in Russian-American relations, but, barely a week later, during a crucial visit to Germany, Putin reiterated Russia's strong opposition to changing the ABM treaty and its refusal to accept the deployment of an American national defence system, and declared that he saw no actual or potential nuclear threat from 'rogue states' in the Middle East or Asia.All too often Western policy has been merely reactive. Two Western actions, however, have been particularly damaging to Russian democratic transition and long-term security in the region: the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the bombing of Yugoslavia over the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. True, the West appears to have gained Russia's grudging acquiescence in both cases. And there seems to be an impression in many Western capitals, particularly Washington, that these matters have at least been transcended, if not fully resolved. …

Beijing's bind

Even though it is not a signatory, China seeks to preserve the existing ABM Treaty intact and unmodified. This could, ironically, force the United States to withdraw altogether.

The ABM treaty was dead on arrival

This article updates the author's book, The ABM Treaty Charade (Washington, DC, Council for Social and Economic Research, 1997), with new evidence from Russian and U.S. sources corroborating Soviet violation of article 1 of the Anti‐Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by deploying massive national ABM defenses, rather than just 100 missiles at Moscow as permitted by the treaty, and Russia's modernization of its illegal national ABM defenses inherited from the Soviet Union.

The International Politics of National Missile Defence: A Response to the Critics

INTRODUCTIONTo encourage more informed discussion of national missile defence (NMD) and to widen a dangerously narrow public debate on the subject, this article challenges critics of NMD to confront the logical and factual errors in their arguments against deployment. Because the American programme has important implications for Canadian foreign and security policies (and Canadian-American relations more generally), critics should be prepared to defend their positions beyond simply reiterating the same superficial criticisms. The Canadian public should expect nothing less from the academic community (not to mention our elected officials) than a sophisticated exchange of ideas on such an important issue.The first four sections of this article deal with the four core arguments most often used by critics to describe the aftermath of NMD deployment - impending demise of arms control agreements(1); nuclear proliferation by Russia and China; technological limitations of interceptor technology; and financial costs. Section five addresses the implications for Canadian security and defence policies.'Critic' throughout this article refers to individuals (or groups) who offer any one of the critiques evaluated below. Although there is extensive overlap in the positions of those opposed to NMD, all critics do not share precisely the same views or assign equal weight to the various arguments - there is no homogeneous position, nor is one likely to emerge in such a complex issue. Among opponents of NMD are experts and practitioners in the fields of foreign, security, and defence policies; currently serving and retired military officers; and scientists and engineers (including recipients of the Nobel Prize) with extensive knowledge of NMD and the physics of interceptor technology. Any critic, but especially those with impressive credentials, should be prepared to confront the weaknesses in the position he or she puts forward. Many critics will disagree with some or all of the points I raise.(2) But the fact remains that we desperately need a meaningful and substantive debate on the topic. Without it, the discussion (and attendant policy prescriptions) will continue to be driven entirely by political agendas and stifled by efforts to protect the intellectual capital invested in defending simplistic (and largely outdated) assertions about the dangers of defending people against ballistic missiles.THE DEMISE OF THE NPT AND ABMThe most common criticisms of NMD are associated with warnings about the demise of the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Signed in 1968 and 1972, respectively, these treaties are the two pillars of nuclear disarmament and arms control that, according to proponents, were responsible for slowing the pace of proliferation during the cold war and stabilizing the longest nuclear rivalry in history. Because they continue to be essential for controlling proliferation and maintaining a stable nuclear environment, it is imperative that their underlying principles and fundamental logic should not be undermined.What critics fail to point out is that the worst abuses of horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology occurred after the treaties were signed. Regardless of the indicator used to track nuclear proliferation - overall nuclear stockpiles, numbers of strategic warheads in submarine launched ballistic missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers,(3) production and stockpiles of weapons' grade plutonium, thefts of fissile material, trade in dual use technology tied to the atomic energy industry, trade in ballistic missile technology, and so on - the evidence of an increase in the pace of proliferation is clear. Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are but the latest illustration of the same pattern. To claim that the NPT and the ABM treaty are essential parts of the international arms control structure doesn't say much for the treaties or for the prospects for serious arms control and disarmament in the future. …

Deploying NMD: not whether, but how

The United States will deploy a national missile defence (NMD) system within the next decade. The question is no longer, therefore, whether to build an NMD system, but how to do so without making the US less secure. Washington must avoid two risks. One is that Moscow will respond by taking steps that raise the risk of nuclear war. The other is that the US Congress will reject a deal worked out with Moscow to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow for NMD deployment. Avoiding these two risks requires astute diplomacy abroad and smart politics at home. On the international front, the US needs to move quickly to strike a deal with Russia on modifying the ABM Treaty. On the domestic front, the Clinton administration needs to act quickly to begin building domestic political support for any deal that it might reach with Russia.

Whose Shoe Fits Best? Dubious Physics and Power Politics in the TMD Footprint Controversy

Apparent design breakthroughs in short-range missile defense systems such as Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) have prompted questions about the legality of such systems under the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Prominent physicists have used computer “footprint” methodology to prove that if engineered to specifications, THAAD might exceed ABM Treaty performance limits banning highly effective missile defense systems. In response, missile defense officials commissioned Sparta, Inc. to conduct secret research casting doubt on the validity of such findings. The substantial diplomatic issues at stake and the interesting rhetorical dynamics involved in this dispute warrant close scholarly analysis. Attention to the iterative relationship between the interpenetrating spheres of public argument and scientific practice in this case yields novel insight about the processes in which technical knowledge of defense systems is forged and raises fresh issues for the “closure project” in science and technology controversy studies.

The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty

The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty

Arms control in Russia today

Prospects for continued arms control and disarmament agreement between Russia and the United States are now problematic. Internally, Russia has been unable to define a coherent foreign and military policy, and the economic situation remains extremely difficult. The policy‐making process can work, however, as demonstrated by the Duma's ratification of the Chemical Weapon Convention On the other hand, START II has been subject to the vagaries of domestic politics and isses related to ABM treaty revision. On March 22, 1999, President Yeltsin submitted the Draft Law on START II ratification, revised in close cooperation between the parliament and the government. But the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia meant that further consideration of START II was impossible. Forthcoming Duma and presidential elections raise uncertainties on START II prospects and on the structure of the post‐Cold War arms‐control process.

Amending the ABM treaty

In deploying NMD, the challenge facing the US is to devise a package of incentives that will secure Russian agreement to amend the ABM Treaty. The most promising would involve US concessions in a future START III Treaty to accommodate Moscow's interests. In particular, the US could allow Russia to deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are far less destabilising to the nuclear balance than many arms-control advocates assume. In addition, before making a deployment decision, the US should give greater attention to several 'boost-phase' NMD concepts which could produce a more effective defence with fewer negative consequences for relations between the major powers.

US missile defence

The US is due to decide by autumn 2000 whether to deploy a system of national missile defence (NMD) against perceived threats from North Korea and other ‘rogue states’. Such a system would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Moscow. The proposed NMD deployment has alarmed Russia and China, which see it as a threat to their nuclear capabilities. If Russia refuses to amend the ABM Treaty, it is probable that the US will withdraw from it, thereby endangering US relations with other states, and global non-proliferation efforts. This impasse might be overcome by developing a system of ‘boost-phase’ missile defence, which would be effective against North Korea, but useless against Russian and Chinese strategic forces. So far, however, neither Washington nor Moscow has given this option the attention it deserves.

Russian security requirements and the U.S. limited national missile defense system: Is accommodation possible?

Two competing paradigms are at the heart of the present Russian strategic debate. The “traditonalist” paradigm seeks to maintain a military strategic balance with the United States and to preserve the ABM Treaty, while the “reduced‐threat” paradigm recognizes the virtual disappearance of the U.S. nuclear “threat” against Russia. There remain considerable Russian suspicions of U.S. objectives in its National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Consequently, the Russian Federation probably will insist on the narrowest possible interpretation of the ABM Treaty. At the core of Russian concerns lies their perception of the future potential for the U.S. NMD system's rapid vertical and horizontal expansion. The U.S. and Russia need to achieve genuine political understanding on fundamental BMD/NMD issues. A new politico‐diplomatic forum, based on the Ross‐Mamedov High Level Working Group of the early 1990s, could be established to examine areas of mutual accommodation.

The ABM treaty and US NMD

The ABM treaty and US NMD

Helsinki, demarcation, and the prospects for U.S.‐Russian accommodation on the anti‐ballistic missile treaty

Despite its billing, the March 1997 Helsinki summit joint statement concerning the Anti‐Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not a demarcation agreement, because it failed completely to draw a clear line between ABM and theater missile defense (TMD) systems. The Helsinki agreement also enlarges the ABM Treaty by prohibiting for the first time space based theater missile defenses. If the United States approaches national missile defense (NMD) negotiations in the same way that it has approached demarcation, it is likely to be unsuccessful. Rather, the United States should return to the concept of negotiating strategic offensive and defensive treaties together.