This paper explores sentiocentric antinatalism, which is based on two principles: (1) prevention of the emergence of pain and (2) antispeciesism. It argues that the notion that all sentient creatures, including humans, should not be born presents an unsolvable paradox; the paradox is that the antinatalists who attempt to eliminate all births of sentient creatures must bear the obligation to survive for the purpose of preventing the emergence of all other creatures in this world. There are four phases to their attempt, and corresponding to them, there are four obligations that antinatalists should bear in pursuit of their ultimate mission. In the last part of this paper, the paradox of antinatalism is compared to the paradox of time travel, and their similarities and differences are discussed. In addition, antinatalists' obligations are discussed in terms of supererogation.

Animal research continues to serve as a foundational element in the advancement of biomedical, agricultural and behavioral sciences. Whether in the development of vaccines, testing of pharmaceuticals or the study of animal behavior, such research provides invaluable insights that benefit both human and animal health. However, increasing public awareness of animal sentience, the expansion of animal rights discourse and the tightening of regulatory frameworks have placed a renewed ethical lens on scientific experimentation involving animals. In this changing landscape, libraries are no longer mere repositories of information they are transforming into active ethical enablers within the research ecosystem.This paper explores the multifaceted and evolving role of libraries in fostering ethical conduct in animal-based research. It highlights how libraries empower researchers by providing access to curated scientific literature, international guidelines, institutional protocols and bioethical resources. Through services such as ethical literacy programs, data repositories, interdisciplinary collaboration platforms and digital innovations, libraries help ensure transparency, regulatory compliance and responsible scientific practice. Drawing on global case studies from institutions in India, the USA, the UK and the European Union-this study demonstrates how libraries are integrating open access tools, AI enhanced search systems and multilingual outreach to bridge gaps in knowledge equity and ethical awareness. It advocates for strategic investments in digital infrastructure and cross sectoral partnerships to sustain this transformative role. Ultimately, the paper positions libraries as crucial agents in shaping a humane, inclusive and ethically accountable future for animal research in the 21st century. The findings of this study provide practical guidance for libraries, researchers and institutional ethics committees to strengthen ethical compliance, transparency and responsible animal research practices.

ABSTRACT Beginning from the Kekulé essays, this article shows how McCarthy’s view of the human emerges from his account of language, its relationship to evolutionary biology, and its difference from other forms of animal signaling. For McCarthy, the human is defined by the unique form of representation found in the capacity for language, the ability of words to not only stand in for but replace the things they represent the basis of human society and culture. While much is entailed by this claim, one of its central implications is that any posthumanism worthy of the name must presuppose a notion of creatureliness not fundamentally defined by the representational logic of language. Hence, one sees in McCarthy’s account of language and human nature the parameters not just of his own thinking of the posthuman but that of any posthuman project; the possibility of a posthuman life capable of a truly sustainable relationship to the natural world necessitates a radical transformation in the human relationship to language. In this sense, McCarthy is, the article suggests, a paradigmatic thinker of the environmental humanities, his account of human and animal consciousness clarifying an important element of what it might mean to think a posthuman consciousness.

In recent years, numerous publications have emerged claiming that animals possess consciousness. Moreover, neurophysiological literature has discussed the possible existence of consciousness in artificial intelligence (AI). Both ideas stem from analyses of the behavior of animals and AI systems. Here, I argue that it is impossible to draw conclusions about animal consciousness based solely on their behavior. Addressing the question of animal consciousness requires an understanding of its neuronal mechanisms, and the challenge lies in whether these mechanisms can be understood. Views on this issue diverge widely, ranging from Cartesian dualism, which denies any neuronal mechanisms of consciousness, to the opposing position that consciousness is one of cognitive functions whose underlying mechanisms can be understood. Here, I support the latter view. In contrast, the problem of AI consciousness belongs to the field of computer science rather than neurophysiology. Even if artificial intelligence were to acquire consciousness in the future, it would be an AI-specific form of consciousness bearing little relation to human consciousness. Consequently, insights into the mechanisms underlying AI consciousness are unlikely to advance our understanding of human consciousness.

Relations between human beings and non-human fauna have assumed increasing centrality in contemporary legal and political agendas, driven by the intensification of global ecological crises, the accelerated loss of biodiversity and the expansion of ethical debates concerning the protection of sentient beings. In this context, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of the normative models and public policies aimed at the protection of fauna and nature developed in South America and in the European Union, seeking to identify convergences, divergences and structural limits within these experiences. The study adopts a functional comparative law approach, combining normative, jurisprudential and institutional analysis. On the one hand, it examines the consolidation, within the European Union, of a highly institutionalised regulatory model centred on animal welfare and the legal recognition of animal sentience, structured through supranational legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. On the other hand, it analyses the emergence, in South American countries, of constitutional and jurisprudential innovations incorporating ecocentric perspectives, particularly through the recognition of the rights of nature and the expansion of legal protection for fauna as an integral component of ecological systems. The findings indicate that, although the European model presents greater normative uniformity and institutional capacity for implementation, it remains constrained by a predominantly instrumental and anthropocentric logic. By contrast, South American experiences offer significant conceptual advances by extending legal protection beyond the human sphere yet face substantial challenges of practical effectiveness. It is concluded that these distinct normative trajectories may be understood as complementary in the construction of more coherent and effective public policies capable of addressing contemporary global socio-environmental challenges.

ABSTRACT In recent years, the field of animal ethics has taken a political turn, with scholars arguing that sentient nonhuman animals should be included in the political sphere. This article explores two key challenges arising from this turn towards the political inclusion of animals: the Conflict Problem and the Numbers Problem. The Conflict Problem highlights the difficulty of resolving conflicts between humans and animals, and among individual animals, who often have competing interests (such as predators and prey). The Numbers Problem arises because animals vastly outnumber humans: if animals were to be fully included in political decision‐making processes, their representatives would form majorities that would likely predominate, potentially to the detriment of human interests. We assess four potential responses to these two problems: (i) discounting animal interests; (ii) revisiting principles of political inclusion; (iii) granting group‐differentiated rights; and (iv) adopting a bicameral system. Each response, we argue, involves significant ethical trade‐offs. Ultimately, we conclude that proponents of sentientist political equality may need to bite the bullet with respect to the Conflict Problem and the Numbers Problem. For those who think otherwise, we claim that the onus is on them to develop more viable solutions.

ABSTRACT The question of which mental functions require consciousness has recently come to the forefront because of its relevance for investigating animal consciousness. Finding out that an animal can perform a function associated with consciousness would count as evidence that it has conscious states. I argue that most of the empirical research interpreted as showing that some functions are associated with consciousness fails to show this. Instead, it merely shows that the relevant functions falter when based on degraded sensory signals—which is unsurprising. This issue hinders empirical research on the functions associated with consciousness. I explain how consciousness research can do better when investigating the functions that require consciousness. Until the relevant research is properly carried out, the presence of functions supposedly associated with consciousness in nonhuman animals should not convince the skeptics one bit.

Aim: This study aims to examine the historical and ethical aspects of anatomy and animal experimentation in Western culture, focusing on the interplay between ethical principles and scientific inquiry. Method: The study employed a descriptive historical analysis technique. From February to May 2025, a survey of scholarly literature on anatomy and ethics, spanning from antiquity to the present, was conducted to elucidate the historical connection between anatomical knowledge and ethical frameworks. Findings: Anatomical research developed via morally controversial procedures, including human dissection and animal experimentation. Pioneering individuals like as Herophilos and Galen established early methodological principles, with Galen's perspectives on animal consciousness and suffering shaping Western medical philosophy for centuries. Religious ideologies and societal factors subsequently constrained anatomical research. In the 19th century, animal rights movements and discussions around dissection inspired legal reforms. In the 20th century, the 3R concept (Replacement, Reduction, Refinement) and institutional ethics committees established institutionalized ethical monitoring. Currently, innovations like organ-on-a-chip illustrate the convergence of scientific advancement with ethical awareness. Conclusion: The historical development of anatomical research demonstrates that ethical responsibility is crucial for the validity and durability of scientific knowledge. As scientific processes advance, their ethical frameworks must also adapt.

In Switzerland, approximately 1.2 million animals are used annually for scientific purposes. This number includes animals directly involved in experiments as well as those excluded due to factors like genotype, sex, or age —so-called “surplus animals”. While ethical debates in animal research have focused largely on the pain and suffering caused by procedures such as surgeries or injections, much less attention has been paid to moral issues raised bysurplus animals. These animals are typically housed under standard laboratory conditions and killed when deemed unnecessary. Although the Swiss Animal Welfare Act aims to protect the dignity and welfare of all sentient animals, standardhousing conditions and the killing by (legally) accepted methods are not considered a harm.In this paper, we argue that this oversight leads to an underestimation of the harms involved in animal research. We make three claims: (i) the death of research animals — whether used in experiments or not — should be recognized as a non-sentientist harm; (ii) since standard killing methods often cause pain or distress, the killing of (surplus) animals should be considered a sentientist harm; and (iii) standard housing conditions in research facilities frustrate animal interests and potentially negatively impact animal welfare and thus should be reassessed with regards to their potential sentientist and non-sentientist harms. Since surplus animals are affected by various harms, moral and legal consideration should be given to their housing and killing in research.

Artificial intelligence (AI) ethics guidelines make strong appeals for ensuring that AI benefits human beings without unjustifiably harming them. Yet these guidelines largely overlook AIs ethically relevant positive and negative impacts on sentient nonhuman animals. This paper argues that it is time to include sentient animals in AI ethics guidelines produced by governments, supranational and intergovernmental bodies, NGOs, academics, professional groups, for-profit corporations, and the like. AI ethics guidelines should explicitly and adequately include values and principles that protect and promote sentient animal interests. The case proceeds by considering five possible objections to recognising animals in these guidelines: 1) Animals and their interests are not significantly affected by AI; 2) Humans lack duties to protect or help animals; 3) Considering animals is overridden by more pressing duties to humans; 4) There is too much disagreement about how animals should be treated; 5) AI ethics guidelines are unhelpful or counterproductive. These objections, the paper argues, ultimately fail. A very important reason for being more inclusive of animals, it claims, is their ongoing moral and social invisibility. Paying more attention to sentient animals as morally significant interest-holders in the rapidly evolving AI ethics discourse would go one step towards redressing this problem of marginalisation. Finally, this paper makes broad suggestions for how animals might be appropriately incorporated in ethics guidelines.

Why Positive Emotions Matter in Animal Sentience

This article addresses the normative challenge to panpsychism. This challenge stems from the need to reconcile panpsychism with both sentientism and the normative asymmetry between living and nonliving entities. Two unsuccessful strategies for addressing this challenge are considered. First, one might argue that the moral implications of panpsychism are not so significant as to have any impact on our actual practice. However, panpsychism presupposes a more inclusive approach to animal consciousness and potentially leads to the notion that our nervous system includes multiple auxiliary subjects. Second, counterexamples to sentientism can be proposed. However, such counterexamples have not yet been proposed. A more successful approach to resolving the normative challenge is panqualityism, according to which fundamental properties are unrealized qualia, or “mental qualities”. Panqualityism faces the Q-zombie objection, which stems from the conceivability of beings that have mental qualities and cognitive access to them but lack a distinct sense of self. Panqualityism can resolve this problem by denying the existence of a distinct sense of self, but this potentially undermines the idea of separateness of persons. Since this idea underlies the imposition of strict deontic constraints on our actions, it still implies counterintuitive moral consequences. Panqualitiysts have three ways to respond to this problem: embrace consequentialism, embrace agent-neutral deontology, or reject the very division of moral theories into agent-neutral and agent-relative.

This article examines the evolving legal and ethical debate on granting legal rights and personhood to animals within contemporary jurisprudence. It argues that the traditional classification of animals as property is increasingly incompatible with scientific evidence of animal sentience and with modern theories of justice. Drawing on ethical frameworks such as utilitarianism and deontology, the study analyzes how recognition of animals as rights-bearing beings can challenge anthropocentric legal systems and promote a more inclusive conception of justice. The article further reviews significant constitutional developments and landmark judicial decisions, including the Kaavan case in Pakistan and the Sandra and Cecilia cases in Argentina, to demonstrate the growing international shift toward acknowledging animals as subjects of legal concern rather than mere objects of human use. It highlights the implications of animal personhood for welfare, conservation, biodiversity, and sustainability, while also addressing major objections based on legal capacity, economic disruption, and practical enforcement. The study concludes that recognizing legal rights and limited personhood for animals represents an important step toward interspecies justice, humane governance, and sustainable coexistence.

In this article, I defend and expand my evolutionary account of consciousness developed in A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness against four critical replies. I respond to de Weerd’s challenge to the evolutionary bottom-up approach, clarifying what it entails. I address Sachs’s discussion of autopoiesis and enactivism, distinguishing my naturalistic framework from these alternatives. I engage Frankish’s concerns about my remaining Cartesian commitments. I reply to Suzuki’s prediction-based alternative to my evaluation-first view of consciousness, his criticism of my discussion of disunity, and his scepticism that consciousness is an adaptation. Finally, I address Chincarini’s comments on the connection between the pathological complexity thesis and animal welfare science.

This essay functions as the introduction to the second issue in a two-part special issue on Walter Veit’s recent monograph A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023). Here, Veit offers a summary of the remaining six commentaries, as well as his two response pieces.

Legal systems, almost without exception, are gradually adapting to scientific advances and evolving social values regarding animal sentience. The common goal is to improve the protection of animals based on their sentience. However, this is often legislatively undervalued. This paper therefore seeks to answer one main question: what is protected and how is it protected? Firstly, the criminal protection of animals in Spain is analysed as an example of a common direction in the European Union. Secondly, a brief comparative analysis is carried out with Latin America in order to conclude whether there is a common political-criminal direction and how legislative measures aimed at achieving the common goal affect animal protection.

ABSTRACT The evolution of phenomenal consciousness remains a central challenge in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Although many argue that consciousness can be understood as a biological phenomenon, there is considerable disagreement about its origins. Competing theories range from early evolution views, which trace consciousness back to the Cambrian period around 540 million years ago, to latecomer theories, which associate it with complex cognition in mammals or humans. We argue that this divergence stems largely from unresolved debates about how to identify consciousness in extant animals. Which behavioural and neural properties we regard as evidence of consciousness directly impacts how we reconstruct its evolutionary history. These issues carry significant ethical implications for how we treat nonhuman animals. This paper maps the key positions in the debate, analyses their underlying disagreements and explores how evolutionary approaches might move the discussion beyond anthropocentric assumptions towards a more inclusive understanding of animal consciousness.

The article is devoted to the systematization of current scientific views on sensations, feelings, and consciousness in animals based on an interdisciplinary analysis of literature in neuroscience, cognitive ethology, and veterinary behavioral medicine. The review was conducted in the format of a scoping review with elements of critical analysis. Data collection was performed using PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, CAB Abstracts, PsycINFO, and Google Scholar. Publications from 2013–2023 were prioritized, while classical works that significantly influenced the formation of modern concepts were also included. The inclusion criteria were peerreviewed empirical studies, review articles, metaanalyses, and consensus documents of international expert groups. A historical and philosophical analysis shows that ideas about animals’ mental experience evolved from mechanistic denial (Descartes) to the evolutionary continuity of emotions and cognitive processes (Darwin). Modern studies confirm that sensations, feelings, and consciousness in animals form an integrated system that determines their behavior and welfare. Sensations provide sensory integration, feelings reflect the affective evaluation of stimuli, and consciousness enables the cognitive integration of experience. Neurophysiological data highlights the involvement of specific sensory and cognitive brain networks, while behavioral and physiological indicators allow identification of emotional states. Negative emotions are associated with chronic stress and reduced resilience, whereas positive emotions enhance social activity and cognitive stimulation. Studies on consciousness emphasize self-recognition, metacognition, and cognitive control. The integration of data from different disciplines opens new perspectives for creating comprehensive models of welfare assessment. Contemporary evidence confirms the existence of interconnected sensory, emotional, and cognitive processes in animals, which form the basis of their welfare and adaptive capacity. Future research should focus on standardizing methods for assessing consciousness and emotional states, applying non-invasive monitoring technologies, and using artificial intelligence tools for behavioral analysis. Such approaches will contribute to evidence-based strategies of animal care, housing, and ethical human–animal interaction. Keywords: sensations, feelings, consciousness, cognitive ethology, neuroscience, emotional states, animal welfare, affective processes, cognitive functions, veterinary behavioral medicine.

This paper seeks to explore how contemporary British fiction recontextualizes posthumanist thought when applied to issues of artificial intelligence through narrative speculations about the technology, using Ian McEwan's Machines Like You (2019) and Kazuo Ishiguro's Klara and the Sun (2021). At the convergence of literary criticism, posthumanist theory, and AI ethics, the study questions how the works speak to human exceptionalism, re-theorise subjectivity, and mediate the question of the moral standing of intelligent machines. The analysis will draw on theoretical approaches and arguments expressed by Haraway, Braidotti, and Hayles, as well as philosophical statements on the debate on AI ethics, and apply them through a close reading approach that identifies theme-based convergences and divergences in the narrative structures of the authors. The historical fantasy of McEwan is based on a vision of an alternative past as a politically loaded context that questions agency, empathy, and the end of life. In contrast, Ishiguro's metaphorical sensitivity is a somber meditation on care and memory, a thoughtful victory of a humane consideration of sentient creatures. Their results indicate that the ontological borders between humans and machines are unstable in both texts, as evidenced by the hybrid identities introduced in both pieces that challenge the moral and lawful systems. Moreover, the research indicates that British AI fiction serves as a reconfiguration of the posthumanist discourse, highlighting the interconnection between speculative stories and the need to establish ethical relationships in the development of future technologies. Where the research makes a contribution to the study of cultural implications of AI as an interdisciplinary field of research, it demonstrates the synthesis of literary analysis and philosophical questioning that proposes a relational approach to the ethical implications of AI as a derivative of interdependence between human and nonhuman beings in the form of a technological lifeworld.

Mather’s call to consider cephalopods’ consciousness “on their own terms” raises the question of the extent to which cephalopods can be considered a homogenous group. While coloeoid cephalopods share traits that strongly distinguish them from other molluscs and invertebrates, they show vast ecological and morphological diversity, with implications for the design of empirical investigations of consciousness. Extending Mather’s argument, we apply Birch et al.’s (2020) five-dimensional model to compare octopus, cuttlefish, squid, and nautilus. This comparison shows that even within a graded rather than categorical framework, putative consciousness profiles depend on which taxa are included in discussions of “cephalopod consciousness.” The resulting uncertainty highlights that choosing a taxonomic level for discussing animal consciousness remains a central conceptual challenge.