Three primary and interconnected aims guide the arguments developed in this article. The first, and most general, calls for a kind of truce in rigid disciplinary boundaries, for the benefit of the heuristic potentialities of reclaiming the unity of the social sciences, as conceived by Pierre Bourdieu, for the study of dynamics of struggle and political dimensions of social life. The second aim is to present frameworks and procedures deemed effective for a research agenda focused on sociological studies of political phenomena. To this end, we draw on canonical themes (institutions, representation, the state, public policies, political parties, and activist engagement) to reflect on how they can be approached within the framework of a Bourdieusian-inspired political sociology. The third aim is to propose some brief adjustments to a French analytical tradition, for better analyzing social configurations that differ from the context in which it was originally developed, particularly in terms of criteria for social hierarchy and legitimation of intervention practices.

The primary objective of this essay is to develop the interpretation made by Giorgio Agamben in his Criation and Anarchy (2017) around the aporia of the Greek word arché. As a secondary objective, this essay also seeks to develop into the underlying anarchy of the act of commanding, giving orders, and issuing rules. The question-problem of this essay is: What ontologically grounds a command? The hypothesis arises from the discussion surrounding two distinct interpretations of the anarchic nature of the "ontology of command." Between Reiner Schürmann and Jacques Derrida, Agamben differentiates the anarchic interpretation and the democratic interpretation of post-Heideggerian philosophy, respectively. From this, the conclusion is drawn to a reading that combines these two interpretations, revealing the mystical, hidden, but also unfounded, and, therefore, "an-archic" (Andityas Matos) nature of the act of commanding, of giving an order, as this subject can also be understood from the analytical philosophy of John L. Austin and his theory of the "act of speech." The study method adopted in this essay is hermeneutic-philosophical, based on studies of bibliographic and theoretical-qualitative sources.

ABSTRACT This article proposes an intercultural model of ecological poetics by placing Shakespearean theatre in dialogue with Tang Xianzu’s Kunqu opera. While Shakespeare often explores ecological rupture and human-nature conflict through dramatic intensity and elemental disruption, Tang approaches ecological imagination through a metaphysical lens, evoking cycles of emotion, seasonality, and spiritual entanglement. Together, their eco-poetic visions offer complementary modes of engaging with more-than-human worlds via rupture and renewal, crisis and attunement. Through close readings of both playwrights’ works, this paper develops the concept of ‘entangled ecologies’: an aesthetic mode in which human and nonhuman forces, affect, and ethics interact dynamically. By tracing how Shakespeare’s storm scenes and Tang’s seasonal dreamscapes differently negotiate environmental vulnerability, the study suggests that cross-cultural performance analysis can expand Shakespeare studies beyond Anglophone traditions, contributing to a pluralistic and relational ecological poetics in the Anthropocene.

Anti-Black racism persists as a global social phenomenon despite its lack of empirical foundation and its incompatibility with rational moral theory. This paper investigates the paradox of racism's endurance by integrating evolutionary psychology, cognitive bias theory, colonial history, and analytic philosophy. It argues that anti-Blackness is not a natural or biologically grounded disposition but a historically constructed and cognitively reinforced system of false belief. Drawing on evolutionary accounts of in-group and out-group heuristics, the paper demonstrates how adaptive mechanisms designed for rapid threat assessment become maladaptively misapplied to morally irrelevant traits such as skin color. These cognitive tendencies are amplified through well-documented biases—including availability, confirmation, and affective salience—that sustain racialized misperceptions even in the presence of counterevidence. The analysis further situates these cognitive mechanisms within the historical consolidation of European colonial power, where phenotypical differences were deliberately transformed into moral and ontological hierarchies to legitimize exploitation, enslavement, and economic domination. Through philosophical and historical examination, the paper shows how theological interpretations, Enlightenment-era contradictions, classical philosophical appropriations, and pseudo-scientific racial taxonomies collectively produced a globalized ontology of Black inferiority. This ontology persists through cultural transmission, institutional reinforcement, and contemporary technological systems that reproduce historical bias under the guise of neutrality. The paper demonstrates that racist reasoning commits fundamental category errors and epistemic fallacies, conflating descriptive biological variation with normative moral value. The paper concludes that dismantling anti-Blackness requires epistemic reconstruction, cognitive retraining, and the systematic deconstruction of inherited metaphysical and institutional frameworks that continue to sustain irrational racial hierarchies.

I offer a contribution to studies into the role played by women in the history of analytic philosophy through an examination of the way in which Dorothy Wrinch rejected idealism in the early 1920s. I show that Wrinch viewed certain idealist interpretations of Einsteinian physics as literally not significant, through an application of Russell’s notion of ‘logical construction’ to scientific concepts. I show, though, that Wrinch’s view departed from Russell’s in certain crucial respects and constitutes an original and radical empiricism rooted in an understanding of scientific language. I briefly compare Wrinch’s empiricism with that of the Aufbau and show that her rejection of metaphysics pre-dates that of Carnap by several years.

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ABSTRACT Conceptual Engineering promises to deliver a new (or unduly neglected) way of doing philosophy whereby progress is to be made by assessing and improving our representational devices (words, concepts, meanings). This methodology faces a famous objection. Namely, Strawson’s Objection: ‘To do [Conceptual Engineering] is not to solve the typical philosophical problem, but to change the subject’ (Strawson [1963]. “Carnap’s Views on Conceptual Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy.” In The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 503–518. La Salle: Open Court). Despite being over sixty years old, this Objection has yet to receive a fully satisfactory treatment – or so it will be argued. In fact, there are really two worries at large here. There is Strawson’s original worry plus a strengthened, deeper problem: even if you are not changing the subject in doing Conceptual Engineering, you are still not solving the original problem. This deeper objection is The Old Problem Problem. The primary goal here is to offer a response to this Problem which, in turn, delivers a new solution to Strawson’s Objection. This then yields a response to a related worry (The New Problem Problem): Conceptual Engineers are just answering questions that weren’t being asked. The aim here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering as such but to gain a better (more pluralist) picture of what this new approach to philosophy does, and does not, involve.

We remember Michele Di Francesco as a distinguished colleague and a dear friend, who accompanied us for a part of our process of developing the Theory of the Self-Subject. A philosopher of mind and language, Michele Di Francesco, played a significant role in both the Italian and international intellectual landscape through his contribution to the dissemination and advancement of contemporary reflections on consciousness, personal identity, and theory of mind. His work is situated within the tradition of analytic philosophy and cognitive science, with a sustained commitment to interdisciplinary dialogue with neuroscience and experimental psychology. [...]

People usually believe that didactic fiction implicitly conveys propositional truths about the real world, known as the moral of the story. This paper presents five possible epistemological concerns with the idea of implicit narrative transmission of propositional knowledge: (1) narratives do not contain justification of their didactic meaning; (2) recipients gain no knowledge if they are uncertain of the author’s intention; (3) fiction has no cognitive content or value; (4) whatever recipients gain from the story may not be new propositional knowledge; and (5) if a proposition is not explicitly stated in the story, it is unclear how it can be extracted. These concerns are presented as a series of arguments and possible objections. Most of the arguments and objections are drawn from the analytic philosophy of literature and adapted to the listed epistemological issues.

ABSTRACT An examination of the concept and role of ’world’ in Heidegger and in analytic philosophy. My basic claim is that the notion of world is as motley and varied in analytic philosophy as it is in everyday language. This by itself makes any comparison between Heidegger and analytic philosophy on the notion of world more than a little fraught. More than that, if one looks at particular cases in analytic philosophy (Putnam, McDowell, Sider, Lewis, Goodman), whatever Heidegger is after with the notion of world does not align with – and in some cases diverges massively – from how the notion is deployed in analytic philosophy. This should make us cautious about trying to attribute theses couched in the language of analytic philosophy (e.g. the internalism-externalism) debate to Heidegger. To the extent that comparisons can be made, they primarily illustrate the ways in which, from Heidegger’s perspective, analytic philosophy fails to recognize the questions and problems that motivate his philosophy.

Traditional logical methods of analytical philosophy are poorly suited for analyzing statements expressing religious views, so analytical philosophy of religion often reduces to linguistic analysis of such statements. This method is often used to analyze theistic judgments. In this case, the explication of the social phenomenon of non-traditional religiosity becomes a very specific problem, as it involves analyzing judgments that express alternative views on the existence of religious objects. In addition, non-traditional religiosity may not be theistic, which takes us beyond the traditional discourse of analytical philosophy of religion. We believe that in order to solve this problem within the framework of an analytical approach, we must consider traditional and non-traditional religions within a common meta-discourse that includes alternative religious views as subsystems.

Over the past decade, a debate on atmospheres has developed among philosophers (see, e.g., Schmitz 2016; Böhme 2017; Griffero 2017; Jagnow 2024; Fernandez Velasco and Niikawa 2025). Examples of atmospheres are the joyful atmosphere exuding from a lively party; the shady atmosphere of a run-down back alley; the poignant atmosphere of Venice, Italy. Philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition, such as Gernot Böhme and Tonino Griffero, typically characterize atmospheres as “quasi-things” that are neither entirely subjective nor entirely objective, that emerge out of a combination of aspects of environments, and that arouse affective reactions in perceivers. Recently, analytic philosophers have joined the debate on atmospheres, seeking to provide accounts that are firmly grounded in current research on metaphysics and affectivity: Pablo Fernandez Velasco & Takuya Niikawa (2025) defend a metaphysics of atmospheres, while René Jagnow (2024) puts forward a view of how atmospheric experiences are elicited and of how paintings can elicit them too. Interestingly, both Fernandez Velasco & Niikawa and Jagnow agree with phenomenologists in characterizing atmospheres as having an intrinsically affective dimension. As I shall argue, this claim is, however, not convincing. Still, it is natural to think of atmospheres as bound to producing affective reactions. The reason for this, I shall suggest, is likely to have something to do with the fact that atmospheres are properties of environments. Environments are typically experienced from within and a look at some contemporary media practices reveals that there is a quite widespread assumption that environments are particularly well-suited for producing affective reactions in experiencers.

Usually, a sharp break in the history of philosophy is assumed, separating continental or post-Kantian philosophy from analytic philosophy and the new logic from the old. In research, this division is typically dated to the year 1879, when Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift was published. In recent decades, however, research has repeatedly sought out Frege's predecessors and speculated on the path by which the mathematician Frege acquired his philosophical knowledge. The following paper presents a new source: Gottlob Frege's father Alexander studied with a philosopher from the broad circle of German idealism and tried in several writings to apply and continue his philosophy himself. This new source not only elucidates Gottlob Frege's familiarity with post-Kantian philosophy, but also has the potential to explain logical influences, such as that of Leibniz.

The author analyzes modelling as a method of research inadequately developed in domestic legal studies yet widespread in the United Kingdom and the United States for that purpose. It proves a considerable heuristic potential of modelling for legal science in the context of digital change, with legal regulation based on predicting and assessing the implications and risks of rule-making as a substitute for reactive approach. It is pointed out a legal system analysis can be well-served not only by realistic models based on empirical data, but also by abstract semantic models employing the idealization method and deliberate distortion of simulated system’s qualities. The article identifies core methodological issues to be addressed for an adequate choice of models relevant to the specific research objective. It analyzes the typology of scientific models proposed by R. Frigg and S. Hartmann based on the target object’s representation type and justifies its applicability to legal studies for analysis of constraints of specific legal system models and their construction principles. The essential types of scientific models and their conceptual features are showcased by key papers of modern British and American legal science, with a focus on those widespread in analytical jurisprudence for building comprehensive theory of law and order. These include analogical models (H. Hart, R. Dworkin) designed to analyze the essential qualities of the legal system; idealized models (J. Austin, H. Kelsen) disregarding exogenous social factors that obstruct an analysis of law, and toy models (J. Bentham, L. Fuller) which use deliberately false system assumptions and exaggerate its specific qualities to analyze theoretic foundations. It is noted that modelling is crucial for analytical philosophy to identify essential qualities of law and reveal the internal logic of normative systems. While for each model type under study the article identifies methodological constraints inherent in interpretation of findings, it is concluded that such constraints should be treated with care and that methodological design is crucial for theoretic studies of law.

Legal positivism is often subject to simplistic criticism as an “outdated” approach, reduced to J. Austin’s formula (“law is the command of the sovereign, backed by sanction”). This approach ignores the conceptual distance between classical positivism and its contemporary variants. Insufficient attention to the evolution of positivism in Anglo-American jurisprudence leads to its perception in Ukraine exclusively as a “classical” stage, limited to the period up to the mid-20th century. This article proposes the author’s periodization of the stages of formation of Anglo-American legal positivism. In particular: “pre-classical” (T. Hobbes, J. Bentham), “classical” (J. Austin – “command theory”), “modern” (H. Hart, J. Raz), and “ultra-modern” (S. Shapiro, K. Himma) stages. The “pre-classical” stage of legal positivism has a philosophical basis, primarily in J. Bentham’s utilitarianism, while the “classical” stage is characterized by J. Austin’s well-known formula mentioned above. The “modern” stage, initiated by H. Hart in the 1960s, refers to the analytical philosophy prevailing in Oxford, which is transferred to the philosophy of law, criticizing J. Austin and introducing a division into primary and secondary rules (including the rule of recognition). Its foundations are based on key theses: social fact and separation theses. J. Raz, a representative of exclusive positivism, shifted the emphasis to the authority of law as its effectiveness in society through the existence of “the authority of law” rather than coercion. The “ultra-modern” stage offers qualitatively new concepts: K. Himma’s asserts the conceptual necessity of coercion for the functioning of law, not limited to physical coercion, while S. Shapiro considers law as a “planning theory” – an instrument of impersonal social planning for achieving the goals of social life. The author of the article offers a clear periodization and classification of Anglo-American legal positivism, which makes it possible to discuss the ideas of these authors in scientific discourse, including authors of the “ultra-modern” period.

Abstract In this paper, I draw on feminist resources to argue that Christian analytic philosophers of religion have good reason not only to focus more thoroughly on the topic of love in their treatments of the divine nature but also to give it a substantial and transformative role in the divine nature. The way forward, I propose, involves three moves: (1) designate a place for love in the divine nature, (2) attend to feminist insights on love when doing so, and (3) consider how these interventions transform our understanding of God overall. I then begin this work. Starting with the first task, I consider two ways we might conceptualize love within the divine nature. On the first (which I call ‘the mutually conditioning approach’), love is assigned equal shaping power and, on the second (which I call ‘the orienting trait approach’), love is given enlarged shaping power in the divine nature. In comparing the two, I conclude that both have the good outcome of resulting in a transformed view of God. However, though the second option is more radical and metaphysically complex, we have good reason to prefer it to the first both from philosophical reflection on love’s nature and for its coherence with the Christian tradition. After clarifying how my argument relates to divine simplicity, I begin working towards accomplishing the second and third tasks by considering how the orienting trait approach applies to the topic of divine violence.

Abstract This paper pursues a trail of never fully explained remarks by Ian Hacking on positivist antecedents of his styles-of-reasoning project. The method is critical explication and the aim is to gain a historical perspective on his project within analytical philosophy. After a brief overview of his decidedly deflationist approach to historical ontology, Hacking’s use and understanding of semantic pluralism and verificationism is investigated. The latter is argued to hold the key to what are actual commonalities of doctrine between the styles-project and a certain type of scientific metatheory promoted, unbeknownst to Hacking, on the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle. His thesis that reason has a history finds support in unexpected places.

Abstract In this paper, I examine Ian Hacking’s theory of styles of scientific reasoning and its relationship to Michel Foucault’s archaeology of discourse. In his early writings on styles, Hacking draws on Foucault’s notion of “positivity,” which involves the introduction, by styles, of classes of propositions that are, as it were, “up for grabs as true-or-false.” However, beginning in the 2000s, Hacking replaces “positivity” with “truthfulness,” understood as “ways of telling the truth”—a concept he borrows from Bernard Williams. Hacking presents this shift as a recasting of the same thoughts using an alternate idiom, one intended to be more accessible to analytic philosophers. Contrary to Hacking’s own assessment, I argue that positivity and truthfulness are only apparently similar and that some of Hacking’s original intentions may risk being partially lost or overlooked in the transition from the former to the latter.

ABSTRACT What has the ‘critical’ in Critical Military Studies meant? What criticalities have informed and been developed within CMS approaches to the study of militarism and military institutions, power and processes? What might some of the limits of this be? And as we look ahead to the future of the field, what imperatives might guide the directions we take next? Responding to these animating questions I set out to do two things in this article. Firstly, I map out where the ‘critical’ in critical military studies came from, how it developed, and attempt to locate the field in broader analytic traditions and social and political projects. Secondly, I take the article in a more exploratory direction in which I map some of my misgivings about the limits of CMS’s criticalities and invite directions we might take next. I focus on two areas: the disavowal of denunciation, which I argue has foreclosed important normative work within CMS; and the framing of alternative, which I argue has been limited by a post-structuralist concern with opening space for, rather than delineating the conditions of, alternatives.

The terms ‘catchwords’ (including ‘catchphrases’ and ‘keywords’), ‘winged words’ (including ‘winged phrases’) and ‘precedent lexemes’ (under which both words and phraseological units are subsumed) are used, supposedly synonymously, in different analytical traditions. As linguistic analytical terms, the three terms discussed seem to have an overlapping referent in the world. However, the terms evoke different associative interpretations and are based on different conceptual metaphors, indicating different conceptualizations of the phenomenon of special wordhood. The question that the paper addresses is which of these three conceptualizations of special wordhood is most suited to capturing the sensitivities of political cognition. The paper analyzes three catchwords in Bulgarian discourses and their ‘politicalness’, contrasting these with their patterns of use in English discourses. In view of the fact that digital communication and social media have made everyone and anyone a political actor, the redefinition of ‘political’ as indexing any social juncture, which leads to contentious, debatable and controversial communicative exchanges, it appears that the term ‘catchphrases’ most naturally accommodates the premodifier ‘political’ in both senses (as a point of origin from institutionally/actor marked political discourses and as an index-symbol of shared public sensitivities and opinions with clusivity-neutral properties) and reveals the communicative and cultural contagion of special wordhood.