Amphibious Assault Research Articles

At the Water's Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault.

At the Water's Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault.

Situational Awareness Using the Responsive Workbench

Abstract : Our task is to provide situational awareness for the complex logistical task of directing the movement of U.S. Marines and material over rugged terrain, day and night, in uncertain weather conditions. This difficulty is multiplied by the well-known dangers of amphibious assault, long considered the most difficult problem in warfare. Even with the advent of computers and sophisticated decision-making software in Marine Corps Combat Operation Centers, command and control is predominantly undertaken with paper maps and acetate overlays. This is a cumbersome, time consuming process. In addition, detailed maps and overlays can take several hours to print and distribute. There currently exists no overall picture of the battlespace that provides a commander with a dynamic range of resolution sufficient to track units ranging from aircraft carriers to six-Marine fire teams.

Corps Values

Corps Values Brian VanDeMark (bio) Geoffrey Perret. Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur. New York: Random House, 1996. xii + 663 pp. Maps, photos, notes, and index. $32.50. “Not a simple man!” said a Japanese official of Douglas MacArthur in 1950. Like haiku poetry, the statement conveys a lot in very few words. It captures the frustrating and mercurial essence of the man. Not lovable but indeed fascinating and always elusive, MacArthur displayed exceptional ability in the fields of generalship and administration, in addition to the coarser arts of wire pulling and propaganda. In all of these, he was a supreme virtuoso. He led one of the most adventurous and dramatic lives in American history, which made him a gift to biographers and a subject of enduring interest to people. The milestones of his career are well-known. He graduated first in his class at West Point in 1903. After earning a chestful of medals for bravery in World War I France, his meteoric career included a stint as superintendent at West Point in the 1920s and service as the Army’s chief-of-staff in the 1930s. He retired in 1937 but was recalled to active duty in mid-1941. In 1942 he assumed command of the Allied forces battling Japan in the Southwest Pacific. In 1945, he received Japan’s surrender in a dramatic ceremony aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. He subsequently served as supreme commander of the forces occupying Japan, a post he used to institute enduring reforms. Given command of United Nations forces at the outbreak of the Korean War, he landed troops at Inchon in a daring amphibious assault that led to a routing of the invading enemy. By marching north through the partitioned country, however, he drew Communist China into the conflict. In the wake of bitter disagreements with his superiors about American strategy, he was recalled, his celebrated career abruptly ended. Americans either adore MacArthur or despise him; they are rarely neutral on the subject. Some laud him as a great soldier and patriot. Others excoriate him as a military blunderer and pompous charlatan. Certainly no other American commander has been more controversial or flamboyant. The catalog of myths about him is endless. Whether revered or reviled, General [End Page 132] Douglas MacArthur—brilliant and controversial throughout his fifty-three year military career—remains a landmark figure in twentieth-century American history and an endlessly fascinating subject of study more than thirty years after his death. What explains this enduring fascination with MacArthur? Part of the answer lies in his theatrical flair, another part in his spectacular rise and tragic fall, still another in the striking contradictions that lay at the heart of his character. Especially the latter. He was a proponent of the warrior’s “manly” virtues whose ambitions were fired by a woman—his mercilessly ambitious mother. He was a soldier of seemingly effortless success who viewed the path to the top of his profession as an ordeal. Behind his bravura and stern front he was restive and high-strung, an embodiment of machismo who frequently wept. He appeared to need enemies the way other people need friends, but his craving for adulation was immense, too. He was a general whose greatest achievement came as a statesman guiding Japan’s reconstruction after World War II. He was a military officer who swore an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and flagrantly violated it through insubordination to the commander-in-chief during the Korean War. An Army man through-and-through, he chose the Navy town of Norfolk, Virginia, as his final resting place. The list could go on and on, but the point would remain the same: Douglas MacArthur was a thundering paradox. Many talented historians have wrestled with the immense contradictions in MacArthur’s character, peeling back layer after layer to seek out the quintessence of the man. Professor D. Clayton James spent nearly two decades tracking the general in his The Years of MacArthur (3 vols, 1970–1985). Scholarly, perceptive, balanced, and, in its accounts of battles, extraordinarily detailed, it remains the definitive work. No one attempting an inquiry into MacArthur’s life could...

Laboratory testing of the pulse power system for the cannon caliber electromagnetic gun system (CCEMG)

The team of (prime contractor) United Defense LP (UDLP) and The University of Texas at Austin Center for Electromechanics (UT-CEM) has completed a significant portion of the testing phase of a trailer mounted compulsator driven 35 mm (round bore equivalent) rapid fire railgun system. The objective of the program is to develop a compact, lightweight pulse power test bed capable of launching 3, 5 round salvos of 185-g integrated launch packages to 1.85 km/s at a firing rate of 5 Hz. Per contractual requirements, the pulse power system is also size compatible with the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). The pulse power system is developed around a second generation air-core, 4-pole rotating armature, self-excited, compulsator design. The 40 MJ at 12,000 rpm composite rotor stores all 15 shots inertially and is capable of 2.5 GW performance into the 2.21 m long series augmented railgun. This paper describes the CCEMG pulse power supply configuration and highlights important features of the commissioning test plan. The paper then presents test results from mechanical runs, stand alone compulsator (CPA) rectifier tests, short circuit tests, and single shot live fire tests. Finally, CPA performance is compared with predictions for the single shot tests presented.

GPS-Aided Lane Marking and Reporting for Shallow-Water Mine Neutralization

This paper investigates the use of GPS to assist with the marking and reporting of lanes cleared of mines in preparation for a military amphibious assault. The feasibility of using GPS, inertial navigation systems (INS), GPS/INS, GPS translators, radar, laser, and videometric technologies is included in the concept study. Sensor data from the mentioned devices have potential for enhancing overall system performance and/or mission success during shallow-water mine countermeasure operations. The main objective of the study is to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the various sensor technologies as regards cost, accuracy, ruggedness, size, weight, power, and other considerations. With regard to GPS, dynamic robustness and vulnerability aspects are reviewed. Both differential and absolute GPS positioning accuracy are discussed for present and future systems within the constraints of the amphibious application. A discussion of the background for the study and the assumed scenario and environment for the operation is presented. Recommendations and conclusions are given.

Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa.

The first complete and definitive account of the Battle of Tarawa.--Maj. Gen. Mike Ryan, USMC (Ret.) Navy Cross recipient Green Beach, TarawaOn November 20, l943, in the first trial by fire of America's fledgling amphibious assault doctrine, five thousand men stormed the beaches of Tarawa, a seemingly invincible Japanese island fortress barely the size of the Pentagon parking lots (three-hundred acres!). Before the first day ended, one third of the Marines who had crossed Tarawa's deadly reef under murderous fire were killed, wounded, or missing. In three days of fighting, four Americans would win the Medal of Honor. And six-thousand combatants would die.Now, Col. Joseph Alexander, a combat Marine himself, presents the full story of Tarawa in all its horror and glory: the extreme risks, the horrific combat, and the heroic breakthroughs. Based on exhaustive research, never-before-published accounts from Marine survivors, and new evidence from Japanese sources, Colonel Alexander captures the grit, guts, and relentless courage of United States Marines overcoming outrageous odds to deliver victory for their country.Without a doubt the best narrative of the struggle ever produced.--Richard B. Frank, Author of GuadalcanalA MAIN SELECTION OF THE MILITARY BOOK CLUB Winner of the 1995 General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Award, awarded to the year's best nonfiction book pertinent to Marine Corps HistoryWinner of the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Outstanding Writer of the Year, presented by the Navy League of the United StatesWinner of the Roosevelt Naval History Prize, awarded by the Naval War College

Simulation Modeling of LHA 1 Class Cargo Handling System

ABSTRACTMovement of cargo from the holds of LHA 1 Class ships to landing craft in the ship's wet well involves the simultaneous use of a number of interdependent cargo handling systems. These systems include forklift trucks in the ship's holds, transfer tables at each deck serviced by the elevators, five cargo elevators that run from either the inner bottom or the second platform to the third deck or the hangar deck, a longitudinal conveyor and eight cargo monorail trains in the overhead of the wet well. In support of the LHA Mid‐Life Upgrade, NAVSEA PMS 335 tasked Westinghouse Machinery Technology Division to develop a cargo flow simulation model for these ships in an effort to reduce the number of trains and the complexity of the cargo handling systems needed to support amphibious assault operations. This paper discusses the development of the simulation model and the potential system simplifications derived through the use of the model. Future application of the model as a training or shipboard management tool is also evaluated.

Generic Build Strategy—A Preliminary Design Experience

From the very inception of the preliminary design phase of the U.S. Navy's new amphibious assault ship, which at the time was designated only as the LX, there has been an emphasis on generating a design which is producible—one that requires a minimum of redesign by the building yard and which can be built efficiently using modern ship construction techniques. This emphasis resulted in establishment of a Producibility Task Manager as a member of the LX Preliminary Design Team and in the creation of a Product-Oriented Design And Construction (PODAC) Working Group. The functions of this Group were to mimic a shipyard production planning effort and to interact with the design team on a regular basis. This paper describes the results of their efforts, including the development of a Generic Build Strategy and numerous Design for Producibility improvements during the LX Preliminary Design Phase.

Use of the amphibious warfare model to evaluate the cost effectiveness of alternative marine corps amphibious assault vehicles

The Marine Corps' current amphibious vehicle will reach the end of its service life around the turn of the century. Therefore, the Marines are planning the design and development of a replacement, designated the Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) system. This article describes the methodology and results of a cost and effectiveness analysis performed to support a milestone decision in this program. The analysis first examined the performance of the alternative systems, and then evaluated the overall effectiveness of forces equipped with the alternative systems. The force effectiveness was accomplished using a dynamic, two-sided, air-land-naval warfare model known as the amphibious warfare model. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.1 This article is a US Government work and, as such, is in the public domain in the United States of America.

The Longest Day Turns Fifty.

The Longest Day Turns Fifty Raymond A. Callahan (bio) Stephen E. Ambrose. D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 655 pp. Maps, appendixes, notes, bibliography, and index. $30.00. Robert J. Kershaw. D-Day: Piercing The Atlantic Wall. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 245 pp. Maps, appendixes, notes, bibliography, and index. $34.95. The fiftieth anniversary of D-Day, 1994 saw a flood of books on the subject. None of the works is likely to approach in impact Cornelius Ryan’s The Longest Day, which first appeared in 1959 and a few years later as a Hollywood movie that fixed the image of the Allied landings in Normandy firmly in the popular mind: the British gliderborne attack on what is still called Pegasus Bridge; the widely scattered American airborne descents (with one unfortunate paratrooper ending up suspended by his chute from the church steeple at St. Mere-Eglise); the American Rangers scaling the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc to capture, expensively, empty gun emplacements; the shambles on Omaha and the fortuitously easy assault on Utah. It seems that successive anniversaries of June 6, 1944, simply replay these stories — in print, in speech and, of course, on film. Stephen Ambrose brings to the task of retelling the story of D-Day impressive credentials. From working as one of the editors of Eisenhower’s wartime papers, he went on to write an excellent account of Ike’s three years (1942–45) as an Allied supreme commander and then a two-volume biographical study of the general and president. As the head of the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans, Ambrose and a team of assistants have collected nearly fifteen hundred oral history interviews with veterans, which are the heart of this book. Ambrose, of course, puts these personal accounts into a larger context — Anglo-American debates on strategy, training and preparation in England, the whole incredibly complex business of mounting the largest aerial and amphibious assault in history is laid out for the reader. The heart of Ambrose’s narrative, however, is June 6, and especially the American experience on that day, for the heroes of this story are [End Page 313] the rank and file who, at the “sharp end,” made the planners’ concepts and commanders’ intentions work. Ambrose has clearly conceived a great affection for the American soldier (and sailor) of 1944, and this book is perhaps best seen as a tribute to the generation of American veterans who fought the “last good war,” whose greying ranks are now beginning to thin. There is little new for specialists, but this is not a book written for specialists. Its audience is the broader public, and that Ambrose has gotten the tone and balance right for such a narrative seems amply attested by the book’s summer-long presence on the best-seller list. This is all to the good — if capable historians scorn the “popular” market, the market will not disappear but will merely be served by bad historians. Robert J. Kershaw’s book is cooler in tone but similar in many ways. An officer in the British army, Kershaw extends his story to June 18, by which time the bridgehead was secure and the emphasis shifted from consolidating a foothold to breaking out of a beachhead. Kershaw covers all the lodgement areas, and both sides of the firing line, with even-handed skill. As he did in his earlier study of the ill-fated operation “Market Garden,” It Never Snows in September (1990), he makes excellent use of German material. Anyone — specialist or general reader — interested in the story of June 6, 1944, on the beaches of Normandy, and the manner in which the thousands of individual decisions and actions taken (or not taken) on that day coalesced into the mosaic that we remember and commemorate will find these two books well worth the time spent reading them. The intense concentration on D-Day itself, however, does seem to have kept certain very important issues from being developed in both of these books. One of the enduring controversies about D-Day (and the ensuing weeks) has to...

A Comparison of French and U.S. Amphibious Ships

ABSTRACT Amphibious and littoral operations have become the prime naval focus for many countries, and have elevated the level of interest in the ships and technologies concerned. This paper explores the effects of differing national approaches to amphibious warfare by comparing the capabilities and systems of two amphibious ships, the French TCD (equivalent to LSD in English) Foudre and the U.S. LSD 41 Whidbey Island class. Both classes of ships have broadly similar roles and capabilities, but differing operational doctrines, military requirements and design standards have led to quite different approaches in ship design.The French Navy is similar in function and composition to the U.S. Navy, but about one‐fifth the size. French amphibious assault is carried out by an Army division, while the U.S. assault force is a branch of the Navy, the Marines. The French amphibious fleet is sized to carry a proportionally smaller landing force than that of the U.S.: but the Foudre would be the centerpiece of the French assault group, while the LSD 41 would normally operate with big‐deck ships like LHDs and LHAs. Current French assault doctrine calls for conventional landing craft, while the U.S. uses air‐cushion vehicles. Finally, the ground assault forces differ in size and composition.These operational differences, as well as other technical ones, have led to outwardly similar but in fact rather different ships. This paper describes the technical differences between the ships in the context of differing operational requirements, and illustrates how these larger factors greatly influence the outcome of the design process.

Marine Rear Guard Escapes Serious Injury While Covering UN Evacuation From Somalia

THE MARINES covering evacuation of the last United Nations (UN) peacekeepers from Somalia were in turn covered by military medicine. The last US Marines to leave the beaches of the civil war—torn African country, despite being under fire from some Somali clan members, suffered only sprains, bruises, minor burns from back-flashes of their own rapid-fire weapons, and—in two or three instances—heat exhaustion from the 28°C (82°F) temperatures combined with the 80% humidity, says Steven L. Nichols, MD, a US Navy commander. Nichols is CATF (Commodore, [three-ship] Amphibious Task Force) surgeon aboard the USS Essex , an amphibious assault ship whose nearly 2000 US Marine Corps troops were the last to leave the land where UN forces have sought since 1992 to help feed the population and end interclan fighting ( JAMA . 1993; 269:2833-2838 and 270:2531, 2535). The United States withdrew its forces from long-term duty there a year ago ( JAMA . 1994;271:894). International

Optimization and critical design issues of the air core compulsator for the cannon caliber electromagnetic launcher system (CCEML)

The Center for Electromechanics at The University of Texas at Austin (CEM-UT) is nearing completion of the manufacturing phase of a mobile platform, compulsator (CPA) driven 30 mm ground bore equivalent rapid fire railgun system. The system has been designed to deliver 15, 185 g integrated launch packages at 1850 m/s muzzle velocity, using a series of three, five round salvos, and be compatible for integration into the amphibious assault vehicle (AAV). This paper describes the results of the optimization process used in determining the power supply requirements for the CCEML. The paper also presents predicted performance specifications which are based upon an end to end system simulator, a brief overview of the CPA design, and critical engineering design issues in the CPA which have been resolved along the way to reduce risk for the CCEML program. >

Electromagnetic (EM) weapon system integration into combat vehicles

Weapon system effectiveness analysis (WSEA) was conducted to create a map of the operational window for a cannon caliber type EM gun. For a 0.9 probability of hit, with a 0.5 mm round-to-round dispersion, the number of rounds per engagement is determined as a function of range for a variety of mission scenarios. This information was then used to generate functional maps for prime power and thermal management for the EM weapon system. A point design was selected to investigate integration issues into combat vehicles. Using the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) as a baseline, more detailed analysis was performed to assess integration of EM weapon systems into combat vehicles. Both electrical and mechanical drive configurations were considered. The analysis considered thermal losses and determined incremental size increases to existing vehicle cooling systems, while staying within vehicle prime power constraints for land mobility. Viable engineering concepts have been created that show the feasibility of EM weapon system integration into combat vehicles. >

Advanced Waterjet Systems

ABSTRACT Several advanced waterjet systems have recently been developed for Marine Corps applications. In developing propulsor technology for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program, a compact system was designed to meet specified thrust, speed, and envelope requirements of a baseline planing vehicle configuration. A second propulsor design was completed to meet requirements of a revised vehicle. Concurrently, design studies of an outboard motor‐fitted pumpjet concept were undertaken for the MARS system development program, and modified components were designed and manufactured as part of an effort to improve performance of the commercially‐developed pumpjet units. Optimization procedures, detailed designs, and available performance data are discussed for each of these applications. In addition, new waterjet design concepts aiming toward improved thrust and efficiency for planing craft applications are discussed.

D-Day, the 6th of June

With an issue dated June 6, 1994, it is impossible to resist the temptation to comment on events on the beaches of Normandy on this day a half century ago and on what those events mean today. For this reporter, who as a youth was living in London at the time, these events stir deep memories. The D-Day invasion was the largest amphibious assault in history. It was the last major military action in which the British played the leading role. The landing force of two British, one Canadian, and two U.S. divisions was commanded by a British general. The supporting naval forces were heavily British, as was about half of the air support. The U.S. quickly became dominant as a result of the rapid buildup that followed the initial landings. D-Day was the portal through which the U.S. stepped into its position of world dominance that has lasted to this day. D-Day was a ...

Casualty Rates Among Naval Forces Ashore

Casualty rates for naval forces ashore across varying battle intensities are needed as input to medical and manpower planning models. Casualty data of medical and construction battalions participating in World War II amphibious assaults, Korea, and Vietnam were extracted from archival sources. Casualty rates among naval ashore forces fluctuated with battle intensity. The rate during intense combat was 15 per 1,000 per day among hospital corpsmen organic to infantry units, 7.5 for medical battalion personnel, and 2.1 among construction forces. Casualty rates dropped dramatically with decreasing battle intensity, especially among construction and medical battalions.

Multimission Ship Design for an Alternative Fleet Concept

ABSTRACTThe design of a battle force as a total system, rather than isolated designs of individual ships, can achieve significant improvements in military effectiveness and affordability. It is a momentous decision to alter the battle force architecture of a navy; usually a change occurs only after the opening gambits of a major war have demonstrated the inadequacies of the old battle force architecture. However, the question of battle force architecture must be raised now, after forty‐five years of relative peace and cold war, at a time when the role of the navy and military is being questioned. If the decision is made to change the surface battle force structure of the U.S. Navy, the conversion will be a lengthy process that should commence with the next vessels to enter preliminary design. This paper presents a summary of one envisionment of an alternative battle force, and focuses on a 35,000‐ton Carrier Dock Multimission ship with increased commonality between variants for amphibious assault, combat logistics, aviation support and deplorable vehicle support.

LHD‐1 – Designed for Marine Corps A viation

ABSTRACTThe new LHD‐1 multipurpose amphibious ship currently entering service with the U.S. Navy is a major new weapon system with a multimission capability. The LHD's primary mission is to launch an amphibious assault and provide aviation support to the assault echelon. In its secondary mission as a sea control ship, it could augment a carrier battle group and provide a cost‐effective force multiplier.As the first ship specifically designed to support and operate the fixed wing light attack AV‐8B Harrier II V/STOL and the rotary wing CH‐53E Super Stallion helicopter, the LHD will be the most effective ship platform developed to date for tactical support of amphibious operations. The LHD has been designed to support Marine Corps aviation more effectively than any other amphibious ship by providing maintenance and repair shops, spare parts including engines and transmissions, weapons stowage and handling, and aircraft command and control. This ship/aircraft system will allow the projection of tactical air capability into a larger combat support area and at the same time provide a high degree of flexibility for the amphibious ready group commander.

COMBATANT SHIP DESIGN GUIDANCE THROUGH MISSION EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

ABSTRACTA combatant ship design technique is described that provides guidance for new designs and can assist in evaluating current designs and their revisions. The technique attempts to provide design evaluations by comparing competing designs in a mission performance context. For a selected mission, a number of ship alternatives are selected for study. Task groups are then selected to carry out the mission. The ship characteristics are determined to match each of the ship alternatives including size, first cost and life cycle cost. Then the task groups are put through a simulated mission including enemy attack (defense by the group) and their offensive mission. The losses resulting from enemy action and the performance of the group in carrying out their mission are computed for various enemy threats. Measures of effectiveness, both for the mission itself and the ship operating in a peacetime format are then determined. For the mission, the effectiveness is defined as the percent of mission completion divided by the total mission cost (including all ship operations and losses). For the peacetime mode, two measures of effectiveness are determined: ship capability per unit of first cost and ship capability per unit of life cycle cost. The relative merits of each design selection, whether it be combat system, survivability feature, or subsystem selection or combinations of design features can be assessed in a systematic way. Design guidance is directly forthcoming.Several full examples are examined including a strike mission and an amphibious assault operation. The value of different ship types, armor, radar cross section reductions, task group compositions and missile allocations between defensive and offensive use are examined. Conclusions are drawn and the usefulness of the approach is analyzed.