Amphibious Assault Research Articles

The LPD 17 Ship Design: Leading a Sea Change Toward Collaborative Product Development

AbstractIn the summer of 2005, the lead ship of the LPD 17 Class was delivered to the US Navy. The LPD 17 is a highly capable amphibious assault warship, designed as a total ship system, which will provide significantly improved warfighting capabilities to support US Marine Corps and joint operations. Potential ship capabilities were initially explored as LX Concept Studies (1989–1990) and the final ship took form in the 1990s as Preliminary, Contract, and Detail Design progressed. Fabrication of the lead ship began in June 2000 and the LPD 17 was launched in July 2003. Currently, three ships have been delivered to the US Navy and five are under construction. The LPD 17 was the last contract design developed in‐house under the leadership of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) ship design group utilizing NAVSEA's highly experienced ship design workforce. Many new and innovative concepts and approaches were introduced into the LPD 17 design and acquisition process. The LPD 17 was the first surface ship design to experience the benefits of Total Ship Systems Engineering, Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD), Navy–Shipbuilder Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) collocated at the shipyard, and an Integrated Product Data Environment (IPDE). Such dramatic changes created many opportunities, hurdles, and even some pain. The Navy's Center for Innovation in Ship Design (CISD) championed a systems engineering case study of the LPD 17 ship design addressing all phases from requirements determination through detail design. This paper provides a retrospective of what occurred in order to document best ship design practices and lessons learned and to determine how the naval ship design process can be further improved. These lessons learned and best design practices will help transmit accumulated intellectual capital to other shipbuilding programs and future design leaders. The construction and delivery of ships is at a stage that provides a logical benchmark from which to make assessments. For example, the Secretary of the Navy recently received the US Marine Corps initial impressions of the LPD 17 Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL): “The Right Ship, The Right Size, The Right Capabilities.” Although a number of ship design process innovations contributed to a sound Contract Design technical package, it is now common knowledge that the LPD 17 lead ship was over budget and late. The authors conclude that the most significant best practice, or lesson learned in the case of LPD 17, is that there must be a tightly integrated, seamless, collaborative design‐build approach between the Navy and the Shipbuilder(s) throughout the whole design‐build process starting at the very beginning of ship design. There are new ship design projects like MPF(F) and CG(X) that could benefit from the innovations, best practices, and lessons learned of the LPD 17 Ship Design: leading a sea change toward collaborative product development.

Ballistic Range Potential of Scaled Gun Barrels Firing Saboted Dart-Like Barrage Round

Abstract: Providing the marines expeditionary and amphibious assault forces with long rangesurface fire support missions is one of the responsibilities of the U.S. Navy. Meeting the U.S.Marine Corps (USMC) Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM) and Operational ManeuverFrom The Sea (OMFTS) requirements required the prediction of the maximum achievableballistic ranges for a 100 lbs, 5″ diameter/12 calibers, GPS guided, dart-like barrage roundwhen fired from 5″, 155mm, 8″, 10″, 12″, 14″, 16″, and 18″ bore barrels that are 64 and 200calibers in length at maximum breech pressures of 448MPa (65Ksi) and 896MPa (130Ksi.)

Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands (review)

Reviewed by: Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands Mark D. Karau Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands. By Michael B. Barrett. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-253-34969-9. Maps. Photographs. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 298. $29.95. On October 12, 1917, the Germans launched one of their most ambitious operations of the First World War, one that has largely been forgotten by historians. It was known as Operation Albion and its objective was to deal such a hard blow to the reeling Russian armed forces that the Provisional Government led by Alexander Kerensky would have no choice but to seek peace. The operation itself involved the seizure, by amphibious assault, of the major islands in the Gulf of Riga, most importantly Ösel and Moon islands. Control [End Page 1310] of the islands would give the Germans control of the Gulf of Riga which would in turn allow them to use the city and port of Riga as a base for an assault on the Russian capital of Petrograd. The campaign faced serious problems, not the least of which was the simple fact that it was Germany’s first (and only) amphibious operation of the war. Though they had learned some lessons from the British failure at Gallipoli, the Germans were not, by any stretch of the imagination, assured of success. Yet in the end they did succeed and though their victory did not lead directly to a Russian surrender it did demonstrate that, even when conditions strongly favored them, the Russian military could no longer effectively oppose the German war machine. Despite the success of the operation it has rarely been discussed by historians, especially in English language studies of the war. In this very useful work Michael Barrett corrects this oversight by providing a fully detailed and very insightful narrative and analysis of the operation. After relating the story of a German submarine that was sent to reconnoiter the Russian defenses in the Gulf of Riga, Barrett really begins his work by examining the geography of the eastern Baltic Sea, concentrating most heavily on the Gulfs of Riga and Finland, which became the hinge of the Russian defensive system for the capital, Petrograd (the former St. Petersburg). Barrett then discusses, in great detail, the Russian plans to defend the islands and the German plans to capture them. In the process, he illuminates the clashes between the services in each country, the major personalities that were involved in the battle, and the extent to which the revolutionary rot had set into the Russian forces. The heart of the book, however, is Barrett’s compelling narrative of the invasion itself. He writes with great skill and verve as he describes the German landings on Ösel Island and the Russian reactions to those landings; in particular the key struggle to take and hold the single causeway that connected Moon and Ösel islands. What becomes particularly clear from his narrative is the degree to which the Russian forces were affected by the March Revolution. The Russian units on the islands suffered from extremely poor morale and crises in leadership that made the German task much easier. These forces broke quickly and within ten days the Germans had succeeded in overrunning Ösel, Moon, and DagÖ islands while also clearing the Russian navy out of the Gulf of Riga. The operation proved to be a brilliant success for German combined arms. Barrett concludes that “Albion had not caused the collapse of the Russian military forces, but it had illustrated that the Russian armed forces were through” (p. 231). In the end, what we have in Operation Albion is a thoroughly researched, well organized, and very well written history of an operation that deserves to be more widely studied. One of the great strengths of the book is the fact that Barrett was able to make extensive use of the previously closed Russian archives and therefore was able to provide a well balanced look at the campaign. The book is also well illustrated with a number of rare pictures from the archives. I have only one criticism: the book would have benefitted from an...

Water supply maps for northern France created by British military geologists during World War II: precursors of modern groundwater development potential maps

Preparatory work for the Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, included the creation of groundwater development potential maps for a large part of coastal northern France at a scale of 1:50 000, followed by summary maps covering coastal and inland areas eastwards into the Low Countries at a scale of 1:250 000. All these maps were compiled from sources available in the UK, almost entirely by the temporary Royal Engineers officers W.B.R. King and F.W. Shotton, under conditions of strict secrecy. Their purpose was to guide military enhancement of water supplies, especially by deployment of Royal Engineers well drilling teams, to sustain the invasion force in Normandy and its advance eastwards to Germany. A uniquely complete set of maps is preserved, together with many associated documents, in the Shotton Archive of the Lapworth Museum of Geology at Birmingham. The maps are more complex than those hastily prepared by German military geologists during the summer of 1940 to guide a cross-Channel amphibious assault in the opposite direction, into southern England. They are significant as the first British attempt to produce groundwater development potential maps for a large area at detailed (1:50 000) scale, and as the precursors of modern-day groundwater harvest potential maps.

A Tuberculosis Event on a Navy Assault Ship

A tuberculosis event occurred on a U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship in September 2003. The event was signaled by a jump in monthly purified protein derivative positivity rates. A baseline new reactor rate of 0 to 1% suddenly jumped to 6.3%, prompting screening of the entire crew and embarked Marines. Ultimately, a total of 31 Navy and 17 Marine new reactors was identified. This represented 2.4% of the Navy crew and 1.2% of embarked Marines. Only 1 of 31 Navy cases involved an officer. Two Navy, male, enlisted berthing areas showed a statistically significantly increased odds ratio for infection risk. Despite intensive investigation, no active case of tuberculosis was ever identified. After treatment of new reactors with isoniazid, the ship's monthly new reactor rate returned to baseline. This case illustrates the principles and pitfalls of respiratory disease control at sea.

US Navy Power Transformer Sizing Requirements Using Probabilistic Analysis

Sizing power transformers in US Navy ships is an issue that surfaced in the design of a new amphibious assault ship. Previous methods averaged the power output from generators over each transformer and calculated load based on a demand factor curve. This technique is not accurate enough in the contract design stages or for zonal architectures since it artificially averages the electrical loads. The proposed methodology uses a systems engineering approach, applying a probabilistic (Monte Carlo) analysis of the electrical loads at each transformer, based on the electrical load analysis (ELA). This methodology will allow the designer to incorporate risk mitigation into a radial or zonal electrical system design to verify adequacy and reduce cost through probability-based transformer sizing.

The Long Arc of the Pathfinder

The Second World War was perhaps the most important event in the history of cartography; certainly more maps and charts were produced for that conflict than for any other episode of human history. This paper looks at the war and the hundreds of millions of maps produced for it from a distant vantage point: the singular perspective of a small hydrographic survey vessel alone in the Pacific Ocean. From 1942 to 1945, the US Coast and Geodetic Survey hydrographic ship Pathfinder and her crew were deployed by the US Navy in the Pacific war zone to conduct hydrographic and geodetic surveys in advance of the Allied fleets, to chart approaches to strategic islands, and to publish those charts on board the vessel (Fig. 1). These battle charts, transferred to other vessels, were then used for amphibious assaults and safe passage through coral reefs. As it was later said, 'the rocky road to Tokyo was paved with the charts of the Pathfinder* } The Coast Survey is the oldest scientific agency in the United States government; it was chartered by Congress in 1807 to map coastal waters, wherever they might be. As the United States expanded, and as it acquired territories and an empire, what became known as the Coast and Geodetic Survey (its title was expanded in 1878) 'followed the flag', particularly into the Pacific Ocean. By the twentieth century, with the purchase of Alaska (1867), the seizure of the Kingdom of Hawai'i (1893), the capture of the Philippines in the SpanishAmerican War (1898), and American territorial claims to various scattered islands based on traditions of whaling and guano harvesting, the Coast and Geodetic Survey was sailing and mapping across the entire north Pacific, with particular emphasis on the Hawaiian Islands and the vast coastal waters of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam's Invasion of Cambodia

The December 1978 to January 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was a meticulously planned, modern combined arms operation led by some of Vietnam's most talented and experienced generals. In spite of a preemptive attack by Cambodia, Vietnamese forces, using six coordinated corps-sized combined arms mechanized columns, along with a division-sized amphibious assault along the coast and air strikes conducted by captured American-made attack aircraft, quickly crushed the fanatical Cambodian resistance in a swift, blitzkrieg-like campaign. Within three weeks the Vietnamese controlled all major roads, harbors, airfields, and population centers in Cambodia, forcing the remainder of Pol Pot's Cambodian armed forces to flee to the Thai border for sanctuary.

The D-Day companion: leading historians explore history's greatest amphibious assault

The D-Day companion: leading historians explore history's greatest amphibious assault

Civil War Federal Navy Physicians

The Federal Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery experienced a substantial loss of officers during 1861. It responded to the loss and the increased demand for its services by augmenting its regular medical officers with volunteer physicians. The medical corps more than doubled in size between 1861 and 1865 as a result of the recruiting efforts. Navy physicians were involved in blockade duty, anticommerce raider cruises, amphibious assaults, riverine duty, and staffing naval facilities ashore. Their services are virtually unknown despite their involvement in most naval activity during the war. This article illuminates their efforts. It does so by analyzing individual service records and reports compiled in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies during the War of the Rebellion. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery successfully met the demands made upon it during the American Civil War.

Stress-Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility of Various Product Forms of Aluminum Alloy 2519

Aluminum alloy 2519 is the main structural alloy for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). A potential drawback to the use of 2519, particularly for an amphibious vehicle, is its susceptibility to corrosion. General corrosion, which is largely in the form of pitting, may reduce the effective life of the system, while stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) of any high strength aluminum alloy can lead to catastrophic failure. Therefore, an evaluation of the SCC susceptibility of various 2519 product forms was performed. Plate, extrusions, ring roll forgings, and weldments all exhibited excellent SCC resistance as measured by a series of standard ASTM tests. Multi-axis hand forgings were the only product forms that exhibited SCC susceptibility, and this susceptibility was remedied via the use of a specifically designed heat treatment. While all product forms passed the prescribed SCC tests, each exhibited a significant reduction in strength after simultaneous exposure to both stress and the saline corrosion environment. Such behavior was not apparent when the exposure was limited to the corrosion media alone. That is, while resistant to SCC, the load-bearing capacities of all products tested are somewhat degraded during concurrent exposure to stress and corrosive media by a mechanism that includes pitting. This article will discuss the effort that was conducted by the National Center for Excellence in Metalworking Technology (NCEMT) to evaluate the SCC susceptibility of 2519 in various product forms and tempers.

The Integrated Ocean Prediction System (IOPS)

Abstract : Knowledge of wave and surf conditions can play a major role in planning and executing a successful amphibious assault on a targeted beach (Figure 1). The dynamic surf zone is affected by waves that may have propagated from long distances (swell) and by refraction, which causes waves to become aligned with depth contours as they approach the coast. Local wind waves and tides can also change the character and width of the surf zone. Local bathymetry (e.g. beach profiles) can change dramatically due to wave action from storms. Offshore bars can form and migrate due to seasonal changes in wave dynamics and surf conditions. Accurate predictions of surf processes are dependent on models that contain the appropriate physics, and realistic environmental inputs to these models.

Mapping for D-Day: The Allied Landings in Normandy, 6 June 1944

Operation Overlord, with Neptune, its naval counterpart, was the largest amphibious assault in history. On 6 June 1944, after years of planning and benefiting from the topographical preparations for, and experience of, the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, over 150 000 men landed from more than 4000 ships along 80 km of Normandy coastline. Careful examination of existing maps revealed that because of its relatively flat terrain and lack of obvious physical obstacles, the area was the most suitable for and Allied invasion. Vast quantities of new maps — many drawn up from existing maps, postcards and photographs, and updated using aerial photos and intelligence from various sources — had to be prepared. Montgomery subsequently commended the D-Day survey effort, stating that map supply never failed or prejudiced operations. In turn, the planning and experience of the Normandy landings informed the preparations for operation Anvil, the landings in the south of France on 15 August 1944. This paper examines the development of Allied mapping and geographic support programmes during the two-year period of preparations for D-Day, and during the landings, establishment of the bridgehead and breakout.

What if …"China Attacks Taiwan!"

Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War when they are unprepared, make your move when they do not expect it. So a military force is established by deception, mobilized by gain, and adapted by division and combination. Sun Tzu, The Art of War In surveying the landscape of international politics, the Taiwan Strait stands out as an area with grave potential for seismic instability. Beijing argues that Taiwan remains a province of China, while Taiwan steadily establishes de facto independence and contemplates the formal announcement of national autonomy. Such a declaration would cross China's political red line and push Beijing to the use of force. The United States, meanwhile, clings to a policy of ambiguity, recognizing only one China, with diplomatic ties to Beijing and withholding diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. The United States argues that any Chinese military aggression against Taiwan would be a serious threat to American interests, but so far has stopped short of extending formal security guarantees to Taiwan, fearing that such agreements would embolden Taiwan to formally declare independence and trigger a conflict with China. The Bush Administration does appear to be edging toward a more assertive position in support of Ta iwan than was the case during the Clinton era, however. President Bush in April 2001 publicly stated that the United States would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. [1] Despite the intractable political dilemma, many commentators and observers dismiss the potential for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They argue that China's public comments on reserving the right to use force to cut the Gordian knot amounts to little more than bluff and bluster because China will lack the military means to attack and occupy Taiwan for at least ten years. This confident assessment lends itself to the United States resting comfortably on its current policy position of strategic ambiguity and dismissing the potential for a military conflagration in the Taiwan Strait that could bring American and Chinese forces into direct combat. What if the prescience of these analysts is less than perfect? This article constructs a devil's advocate analysis to weigh against the analyses that see little prospect for major Chinese military action against Taiwan. It suggests that the Chinese could use strategic surprise to compensate for shortcomings in military capabilities and orchestrate a successful military campaign to take control of Taiwan. The Chinese could do so by readily deceiving outside observers about the scope of their sealift and airlift capabilities, which would fundamentally undermine the linchpin assumptions of sanguine analyses about Chinese force projection capabilities. The Chinese also could use massive barrages of surface-to-surface missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction to profoundly disrupt Taiwan's air force, air defenses, and other measures to counter Chinese amphibious and airborne assaults in a coordinated campaign to occupy Taiwan. What the Chinese military lacks in technological sophistication could be compensa ted for in military mass, contrary to the assertions of the optimists. This sort of devil's advocate analysis has significant implications for US policy. American policymakers can better protect national interests if policy and military options are thought through long before the outbreak of a cross-Strait conflict than if they wait and are caught off-guard by a Chinese surprise attack. Surprise Attack and Deception Surprise attack is the use of military force against an unsuspecting and ill-prepared adversary. …

Salvaging of USS La Moure County (LST 1194) in Cinfuncho Bay, Chile

ABSTRACTOn September 12, 2000 USS La Moure County (LST 1194) ran aground in Cifuncho Bay, Chile during a joint USMC amphibious assault exercise. While transiting to the intended anchorage site in the early morning hours, the ship struck an outcropping of rocks and was unable to free herself. Hard aground and in the surf zone, the ship pounded further onto the rocks and into a perilous situation. Fortunately for the crew, a Chilean ATF was in the vicinity and quickly pulled the vessel free and into a safe haven.The damage that resulted from the initial impact and the subsequent pounding in the surf while aground was extremely serious. Numerous holes, dents, tears, and areas of severe structural damage were scattered from the bow to amidships. Further aft, both propeller hubs each lost a blade while both rudders incurred impact damage with one completely inoperable. Flooding was rampant and affected 29 tanks and spaces. Thousands of gallons of diesel fuel spilled and polluted the waters of Cifuncho Bay. However, the worst and most serious damage was a 40‐foot hole amidships which spanned from bilge radius to bilge radius and encompassed shell plating, all structural members, and numerous piping systems. With the hull in a critical hogging condition, the 4TH deck was now the bottom most longitudinal strength structure amidships. USS La Moure County was definitely in need of immediate salvage assistance.This paper summarizes the damage control and salvage efforts that took place after the ship was pulled from the rocks. It addresses some of the immediate damage control measures effected by ships force, the cooperative salvage actions of the U.S. Fleet, the Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters, and the Chilean Navy, and the joint Navy/contractor repair and oil pollution abatement efforts. Additionally, it addresses the logistic difficulties encountered in mobilizing and demobilizing personnel and equipment in the remote area off the Chilean coastline. Lastly, it discusses the requirements necessary to support a large‐scale salvage crisis in a distant portion of the world, such as the USS La Moure County grounding in Cifuncho Bay, Chile.

Science and Security before the Atomic Bomb: The Loyalty Case of Harald U. Sverdrup

In the summer of 1941, Harald Sverdrup, the Norwegian-born Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) in La Jolla, California, was denied security clearance to work on Navy-sponsored research in underwater acoustics applied to anti-submarine warfare. The clearance denial embarrassed the world renown oceanographer and Arctic explorer, who repeatedly offered his services to the U.S. government only to see scientists of far lesser reputation called upon to aid the war effort. The official story of Sverdrup's denial was the risk of blackmail over relatives in occupied Norway. Declassified documents tell a different story. Although Sverdrup's integrity was defended on the highest levels of U.S. science, doubt was cast upon him by members of his own institution, who accused him of being a Nazi sympathiser. Personal distrust, rooted in scientific and intellectual disagreement, spilled over into questions about Sverdrup's loyalty and judgement. These doubts were considered sufficient grounds for withholding clearance, until Roger Revelle, a former student of Sverdrup now working within the Navy, was able to obtain a limited clearance for Sverdrup to develop techniques to forecast surf conditions during amphibious assaults. After the war, this work was credited with saving many lives, but at the time it placed Sverdrup out of the mainstream of Navy-sponsored oceanographic research. In being denied access to major areas of scientific work, Sverdrup's position as a leader of American oceanography was undermined. The loyalty case of Harald Sverdrup illustrates the emergence of an institutional apparatus through which the U.S. military began to control and shape the organisation of American science in the twentieth century. Military sponsorship of scientific research, begun during the open conflicts of World War II and continuing into the simmering tensions of the Cold War, involved explicit control by the U.S. military of who had access to critical information. This in turn meant who could do science in conjunction with the military. As the U.S. Navy became the principal sponsor of oceanography in the post-war years, clearance to do military work became to a great extent clearance to do oceanography. Choices about who could be trusted were also choices about who would do science, and what kind of science they would do.

A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-Led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810

A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-Led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810

Interferometric height estimation of the seafloor via synthetic aperture sonar in the presence of motion errors

An end-to-end simulated processing chain related to an existing synthetic aperture sonar (SAS) system is developed and described, including motion compensation, efficient image formation and autofocus procedures. The processing is extended to include interferometric height estimation capability. It is the goal of the paper to study the application of interferometry to SAS systems in the presence of motion errors. The system is analysed with respect to motion errors and the subsequent damaging effects to both imaging and height estimation. Results using both measured and simulated data are presented. The problem is addressed with respect to both one-pass and two-pass imaging geometries, and it is hypothesised that for slowly varying target height, one-pass SAS interferometry may be a more robust imaging tool than conventional SAS alone. The simulated results suggest that height information is recoverable even in some situations in which the conventional SAS reflectivity image is completely ruined by phase error induced blur. High-resolution SAS imaging coupled with interferometric height estimation for seafloor imaging has military applicability in mine detection or classification and in topographic mapping in preparation for an amphibious assault. Civilian uses would include surveying of objects such as oil pipelines and seabed mapping.

Skin and Soft-Tissue Infections after Injury in the Ocean: Culture Methods and Antibiotic Therapy for Marine Bacteria

Isolated organisms from two common Indo-Pacific marine animals (Echinometra mathaei urchins and Acanthaster planci sea stars) likely to cause puncture wounds to recreational beachcombers, diverse, or operational military forces during amphibious assaults demonstrate why practitioners should consider their first choice for potential antibiotic therapy differently from their usual favorite antibiotics. The effects of thiosulfate-citrate-bile-sucrose (TCBS) agar, varying salt concentrations in the standard media, and comparison of room temperature incubation versus use of the 30 degrees C (86 degrees F) incubator are reviewed. The yield of pathogenic marine bacteria is increased if TCBS agar is used and more than one temperature is used for incubation. A potentially significant human pathogen, Vibrio vulnificus, appears to be ubiquitous.

Continued testing of the cannon caliber electromagnetic gun system (CCEMG)

The cannon caliber electromagnetic gun system is based upon a compulsator driven 30 mm rapid fire railgun system. The objective of the program was to develop a compact, lightweight test bed capable of launching three, five round salvoes of 185 g integrated launch packages to 1.85 km/s at a firing rate of 5 Hz. Per contractual requirements, the pulse power system is also size compatible with the amphibious assault vehicle. The pulse power system was developed around a fourth generation air-core, 4-pole rotating armature, self-excited, compulsator design. Although the contract for this effort has expired, the system continues to be used in part to demonstrate compulsator driven railgun technology. This system has performed seven single shots using identical control settings for each shot, which is the first such experience using a compulsator driven railgun system. This paper describes the experimental set-up for the demonstrations and compares the generator, converter, gun switch, and launcher performances for each shot.