American Decision-makers Research Articles

Employing American Smart Power in the Middle East

The United States of America is one of the most influential countries in international politics since the end of World War II until today. The reason for this is its clear superiority in using hard power in its foreign policy. American soft power did not play a major role in the policies of hegemony that the Americans followed at the international level for many decades. However, the major changes witnessed in the global arena after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new major powers on the international scene made the United States reconsider its absolute dependence on its hard power. After the US wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), American decision-makers reached a firm conviction to diversify the sources of their power. This conviction centered on the necessity of combining hard and soft powers into one force, which was called smart power. Through its use of smart power, the United States seeks to continue its leadership of the global system and impose its will on the international arena despite its many competitors.

The fall of the pink tide: lessons for the contemporary left

The article is focused on reviewing the performance of left-wing governments that dominated Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century. The purpose is to identify and analyse significant shortcomings and challenges faced by pink tide governments in relation to social progress, economic development and regional integration. Drawing from previous studies and reports on social progress, development, political economy, and regionalism, I argue that the left fell short of its promise to tackle inequality sustainably and comprehensively. Moreover, the pink tide failed to ensure stable economic growth due to over-reliance on natural-resource exports and was not successful in strengthening regional cooperation. Nowadays, six major Latin American economies are run by the left, which some perceive as a resurgence of the pink tide. Based on the analysis of the experiences and factors that contributed to the political decline of the original pink tide, the article provides key lessons for the new generation of Latin American left-wing governments. By using an explanatory and comparative research method, I examine the social, economic and political context of the region with the purpose of juxtaposing the two waves, highlighting present challenges faced by regional actors, and offering recommendations for the contemporary Latin American decision-makers.

Chinese Rise and the Development of Conflicts with Southeast Asian Countries over the South China Sea

The American thinker Samuel Huntington at the time thought that the global conflict under the new international order would be an economic conflict, stressing that China would be the first emerging economic power that could pose a serious threat to the United States. That reading embodied the model of American readings at the time, which were looking at a set of transformations that China brought about in its economic system and structures, which began to show features of its impact remarkably since the early nineties, especially in light of the enormous material and human capabilities and capabilities that China possesses, and its relentless directions at that stage. Which was proceeding in full swing to implement a successive series of comprehensive and ambitious development plans and strategies, to make China, in the eyes of American decision-makers, the strongest potential competitor to the United States in the twenty-first century. During the past three decades, China was able to deal with various international crises positively, to become a major economic power in the world, occupying an advanced position globally in terms of progress and growth, so it tended to develop and develop its military capabilities and modernize its war arsenal, especially its naval forces, commensurate with its global position. It enables it to protect its economic interests that extend across the world, and because China has become one of the largest consumers of energy in the world, it has paid great attention to protecting waterways and oil supplies that come from overseas countries from the continents, especially the South China Sea. The China Sea occupies a very important geographical location that made it one of the most important waterways in the world, as more than 33% of international trade ships pass through it, and nearly 50% of the maritime transport of energy sources from oil and gas, and a dense network of cables passes through it. The international communication network, in addition to the mineral and fish resources that are available in it, and its containment of large reserves of oil and natural gas, which made it the focus of ambitions of many countries near and far, in that controlling it means controlling the artery of global trade and navigation, and for this China was keen to Ensuring the extension of its influence on the China Sea, especially the strategic islands that it includes, and this is what made China enter into direct confrontations and conflicts with a group of Southeast Asian countries, especially the (ASEAN) group of countries.

A Study on American Social Discussion and Decision-Making Process on Women in Combat

A Study on American Social Discussion and Decision-Making Process on Women in Combat

Creation by Destruction: America and the End of the Pacific War in Light of Economic Reconversion and Post-war Reconstruction

ABSTRACT For several decades, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 have been the subject of a fierce debate between orthodox and ‘revisionist’ historians. In so doing, however, historians have for the most part neglected to look more closely into questions of a primarily economic and organisational nature in investigating the contributing factors to the American decision-making process. Accordingly, this analysis explores systematically how in addition to the predominant need of avoiding further combat casualties, a speedy conclusion of the Pacific conflict was also deemed critical to a successful re-transition of United States war-time production to a thriving peace-time economy, as well as to a comprehensive rehabilitation of the war-shattered European continent.

The Image of the Issue of Jerusalem (Bayt al-Maqdis) in the Memoirs of American Decision-Makers

تناقش الورقة مذكرات عدد من صناع القرار الأمريكان وصورة بيت المقدس في مذكراتهم، وذلك في ضوء ما تتيحه من المعلومات السياسية، وفي ضوء ما تتيحه من خلفيات صناع القرار وانحيازاتهم الفكرية وتكوُّناتهم النفسية وأسلوبهم في معالجة القضايا. من جهة أخرى يُلاحظ في البيئة العلمية والأكاديمية العربية غياب التحليل للقضايا الإسلامية المعاصرة من خلال هذه المذكرات. لذا تحاول هذه الورقة سبر أغوار قضية بيت المقدس وما يحيط بها من ملابسات وأطراف كما تبدو في مذكرات ثلاثة من صناع القرار الأمريكان، وهم: كونداليزا رايس وهيلاري كلينتون وروبرت جيتس. وقد اعتمد هذا الاختيار تنوعا في التوجه والمنصب، فالأولى عملت كمستشار للأمن القومي ثم وزيرة للخارجية فجمعت بهذا بين منصبين أمني ودبلوماسي، والثانية عملت وزيرة للخارجية وهو منصب دبلوماسي، والثالث عمل وزيرا للدفاع وهو منصب عسكري فضلا عن أنه عمل سابقا كمدير للاستخبارات الأمريكية فجمع بين المنصب الأمني والعسكري. وفي العادة يحصل نزاع على النفوذ وعلى الصلاحيات والتي تؤدي إلى علاقات سيئة، ولكن الجديد أن مذكرات الثلاثة الذين نتناولهم في هذه الورقة تفيد بأنه ورغم اختلاف توجهاتهم إلا أنه كان بينهم قدر عالٍ من الانسجام والقدرة على العمل المشترك دون نزاعات قوية أو أجواء مسمومة. تعتمد الورقة المنهج التاريخي والتحليلي والمقارن، في رسم أطراف صورة القضية وزوايا معالجتها لدي الشخصيات الثلاثة لتحليل موضع الثوابت والمتغيرات في النظر إلى قضية بيت المقدس.

Emerging mental health challenges, strategies, and opportunities in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic: Perspectives from South American decision-makers.

ABSTRACTObjective.To identify emerging mental health problems, strategies to address them, and opportunities to reform mental health systems during the COVID-19 pandemic in South America.Methods.An online questionnaire was sent to mental health decision-makers of ministries of health in 10 South American countries in mid-April 2020. The semi-structured questionnaire had 12 questions clustered into three main sections: emerging challenges in mental health, current and potential strategies to face the pandemic, and key elements for mental health reform. We identified keywords and themes for each section through summative content analysis.Results.Increasing mental health burden and needs were reported as direct and indirect consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. National lockdowns challenge the delivery and access to mental health treatment and care. Strategies to meet mental health needs rely heavily on timely and adequate responses by strengthened mental health governance and systems, availability of services, virtual platforms, and appropriate capacity-building for service providers. Short- and medium-term strategies focused on bolstering community-based mental health networks and telemedicine for high-risk populations. Opportunities for long-term mental health reform entail strengthening legal frameworks, redistribution of financial resources, and collaboration with local and international partners.Conclusions.Mental health and psychosocial support have been identified as a priority area by South American countries in the COVID-19 response. The pandemic has generated specific needs that require appropriate actions, including implementing virtual interventions, orienting capacity-building toward protecting users and health providers, strengthening evidence-driven decision-making, and integrating mental health and psychosocial support in high-level mechanisms guiding the response to COVID-19.

Becoming an Eco-Innovative Industrial Cluster Through De-Regionalization: Lessons from Italian and Brazilian Clusters

This research intends to contribute to the literature by exploring current changes in de-regionalization of intervention forms in clusters to transform them into eco-innovative industrial clusters. The regions of Emilia-Romagna (Italy) and Santa Catarina (Brazil) are analyzed as longitudinal case studies. Our findings revealed that Emilia-Romagna industrial districts are targeting innovation and sustainability, allowing the Italian clusters to benefit from the shift from regionalized “100% made in Italy” to greater value added through innovation and “green.” The Santa Catarina region is a pioneer Brazilian State in the de-regionalization of clusters through Innovation Centers and thus contrasts with the Italian region. Contributions for considering third-level government in microregions are addressed for Latin American practitioners, scholars, and decision makers.

Facets of Interdependency in Russia-US Relations

The appliance of interdependence concepts in the International Relations studies can hardly be regarded as something new. However, slowing down globalization and rising international tensions even among partner or allied states make rethinking of these concepts relevant. The notion that interdependence may ease tensions was put under question and opposed by the idea that interdependence may become a source of conflict. Scholars also missed their focus on conceptualization of interdependence forgetting that it was not a product of globalization, rather a result of the Cold War era. Thus, it can be applied to relations not only between partner countries, but also rivals, as was in the case of the U.S.-Soviet relations. The dense fabric of bilateral agreements, institutions, and regimes in various fields (primarily in security domain) prevented superpowers from a destructive conflict. After the collapse of the bipolar world, both states tried to consolidate the legacy of interdependence by increasing cooperation, transferring relations from mutual assured destruction to sustainable partnership, from deterrence to security community. However, structural changes in world politics reshaped Russian-American relations. Unlike the Cold War period with its unique U.S.-Soviet interdependence model, which served as a necessary precondition for lasting peace, contemporary Russian, as well as American decision-makers do not tend to estimate cooperation between two countries as critical in terms of national security and conflict prevention. In contrast, they are more likely to treat bilateral relations as too costly and burdening. Moscow and Washington increasingly prefer to be unbound in achieving their short- or long-term political goals and choose the way of unilateral decisions and actions with no corresponding with the counterpart. These risky policies of mutual neglect increase the likelihood of future conflict between the two powers.

Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era by Joseph A. Fry

Reviewed by: Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era by Joseph A. Fry David Sim Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era. By Joseph A. Fry. Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019. Pp. [viii], 241. $40.00, ISBN 978-0-8131-7712-0.) Joseph A. Fry has written a brisk, readable account of the Union's diplomatic efforts, with the relationship between Abraham Lincoln and William H. Seward at its heart. The book is, he notes, "an unapologetic synthesis of the rich literature on Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. foreign relations preceding, during, and following the American Civil War" (p. 6). Though the book contains a largely biographical chapter on the two men's lives before the Civil War and a final chapter that examines Seward's statecraft during the administration of Andrew Johnson, the heart of the book is a convincing, chronological narrative that demonstrates that forestalling foreign intervention was absolutely central to the prosecution of the Union war effort. Fry argues that the combination of Lincoln and Seward's strategic vision and Seward's willingness to deploy effectively [End Page 718] both threats and conciliation meant that foreign governments—and particularly the British and French governments—feared the costs of intervention more than they anticipated its benefits. Throughout, Fry manages to balance the structural forces that mitigated against intervention with a sense of contingency and uncertainty. Though his protagonists on both sides of the Atlantic eventually came to appreciate their counterparts' goals and motivations, this process was educative. Only gradually did British statesmen, for instance, come to fully grasp the Lincoln administration's intentions with regard to abolition. Fry narrates the central episodes that one expects, including the Trent affair, foreign reception of the Emancipation Proclamation, and controversies over Britishand French-built Confederate raiders, with skill and subtlety. There is some great detail, too, on the depth and endurance of Charles Sumner's antipathy toward Seward; Sumner and Salmon P. Chase emerge from the book with little credit. Fry is absolutely right to emphasize the importance of public diplomacy to Lincoln's administration and demonstrates that such efforts were often paired with private reassurance. The least persuasive part of the narrative is the one that reaches beyond the book's titular focus on Lincoln and Seward to examine Seward's postwar vision. Here, Fry emphasizes the coherence of Seward's imperial ambition at the expense of the haphazard nature of American foreign policy making after the Civil War. The latter arguably tells us more about how contemporaries conceptualized American power in the postwar period. Readers who are seeking fresh archival insights should look elsewhere: that is not Fry's aim. In terms of conceptual or methodological innovation, there is a nod to Joshua Wolf Shenk's theoretical work on the development of productive alliances between pairs of talented figures, but for the most part this is framed conservatively. The narrative that Fry offers is very much about American decision-making and agency, and, as the title suggests, Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era does not really seek to escape the focus on the two pivotal figures in Civil War statecraft. In that respect, it eschews the transnationalism of recent work by Don H. Doyle, for instance, and even the international contextualization offered by Niels Eichhorn in favor of high politics and a prioritization of British and French diplomacy. Overall, however, Fry has produced an impressive and judicious account of Lincoln and Seward's conduct of Civil War foreign relations, and, while his book may not reinvent the wheel, it is an excellent, slim volume to recommend to undergraduates and lay readers alike. David Sim University College London Copyright © 2020 The Southern Historical Association

Research Viewpoint: International Relations and the Second Space Race Between the United States and China

ABSTRACTHow do the three major schools of international relations theory – liberal internationalism, realism, and constructivism – account for the second space race, the rivalry between China and the United States to scientifically explore and economically develop the Moon? This article assesses answers drawn from these three schools of international relations. Rather than distance from the Earth, surface area, and resource endowment, it is the lack of native population and status as a commons in international law that make the Moon a novel object of international relations. From the perspectives of both liberal internationalism and constructivism, the Sino-American rivalry represents failure. International institutions and organizations, which were established to extend the liberal world order into outer space, failed in this case to restrain the behavior of China and the United States. The diplomatic communication between Chinese and American national decision-makers failed to draw them into adherence with the norm of international cooperation encoded in those international institutions and organizations. By contrast, realism accounts for the second space race as an example of balancing of power. National decision-makers ignored international institutions and organizations together with international norms to gain or not lose relative international prestige, business opportunity, and potential economic growth.

Master of the Game: The Relationship between the United States and Iran Revisited, 1969-1972

ABSTRACTHow and why did the Richard Nixon Administration end up with an Iran policy more in line with the preferences of the Shah of Iran than of the United States? At its onset, the Administration did not have a clearly defined or formalised Persian Gulf policy. Attempts to create over-arching guidelines regarding American conduct toward Iran were of little consequence, as the pro-Iranian inclinations of leading decision-makers led to day-to-day decisions that strongly favoured the Shah. This limited room for manoeuvre amounted to little more than acceptance of what was already established procedure. The Shah’s strenuous lobbying of American decision-makers, using their common Cold War considerations to his advantage and the effective sidelining of critical voices within the Nixon Administration, explain this outcome.

The Double Game: The Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation

Spanning three presidencies, from 1961 to 1972, James Cameron's important study meticulously untangles a diverse array of factors and actors to reveal how each administration played a “double game,” advancing a confident public position on the nation's strategic posture that was increasingly at odds with private anxieties. This double game culminated in 1972 with the outlawing of a nationwide antiballistic missile (Abm) system, the acknowledgement of strategic parity, and the official acceptance of the logic of mutually assured destruction (Mad). While the standard narrative explains the double game as the outcome of a new formulation of the nuclear-strategic calculus, Cameron convincingly argues that key American decision makers privately accepted the logic of Mad much earlier but hid their views from the public due to a changing combination of bureaucratic and domestic political considerations. Cameron begins his analysis with John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara's effort to maintain a rational superiority in nuclear weapons. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962, however, prompted them to question privately the strategic utility of maintaining nuclear superiority. Moreover, they privately considered that mutual vulnerability may actually enhance stability. Significantly, this acceptance of the basic tenets of mutually assured destruction occurred ten years prior to the signing of the Abm treaty. Despite these misgivings, leading officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations continued to assert publicly that the United States must maintain its strategic edge.

An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology and the Hidden History of America's Mobile ICBMs by Steven A. Pomeroy

Reviewed by: An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology and the Hidden History of America's Mobile ICBMs by Steven A. Pomeroy Christopher Gainor (bio) An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology and the Hidden History of America's Mobile ICBMs. By Steven A. Pomeroy. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2016. Pp. 304. Hardcover $44.95. Some of the biggest and most expensive engineering works on earth are the hundreds of silos designed to protect intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the United States, Russia, and China. These huge silos are designed to ensure that nuclear-armed missiles are protected against a surprise first strike in a nuclear war. Submarine launched ballistic missiles [End Page 485] (SLBMs) are also widely used because their constant movement underwater makes it difficult for adversaries to target or even locate them. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Air Force, which operates America's landbased ICBM force, has also given serious consideration to making ICBMs portable as a means of safeguarding America's nuclear deterrent against a first strike. The USAF has also been motivated by its desire to retain its hold on the U.S. ICBM force against the inroads made by the U.S. Navy and its SLBMs. Many people will recall that as the Soviet Union's advances in the field of ICBMs became a major concern to American policymakers, President Jimmy Carter proposed in 1979 that 200 of a newly developed ICBM known as MX be based in 4,600 underground shelters linked by roads known as "racetracks." The idea was that each missile could be hidden under any of a number of shelters, making it very difficult for Soviet ICBMs to hit every ICBM during a first strike. In the face of growing controversy over the idea, particularly among landowners in Utah and Nevada, President Ronald Reagan cancelled the shelter system in 1981. Reagan renamed the MX missile Peacekeeper, and it was later deployed until 2005 in refurbished silos originally built for Minuteman ICBMs. Less well known is the fact that the USAF began studying similar mobile ICBM schemes even before its first ICBM was deployed and continued through to the end of the Cold War. In its efforts to protect ICBMs, the air force considered basing them on trains, trucks running on public highways and purpose-built tracks, aircraft, ships, and even submarines renamed "manned underwater launch platforms" in a doomed attempt to avoid the navy's notice. In spite of all the studies and proposals for mobile ICBMs, the USAF has never deployed them. Author Steven A. Pomeroy's book asks why this technological route was never taken. He concludes that the U.S. Navy's successful creation of its SLBM force that would survive a first strike, along with the success of Minuteman missiles in silos, especially in comparison to the ponderous Atlas and Titan ICBMs that preceded them, undermined the USAF's case for portable ICBMs in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s and 1980s, American decision makers were divided over the degree of the vulnerability of ICBMs. Pomeroy, whose scholarship is informed but not limited by experience as a launch officer in the USAF, has written a rare and badly needed history of the deployment of America's ICBMs during the Cold War while telling the story of the USAF's quest for mobile ICBMs. In explaining why he emphasized the road not taken in this history, Pomeroy argued that too great an emphasis on adopted technologies fosters determinist narratives in the history of technology. Reading this well paced account of the USAF's many schemes to move missiles before [End Page 486] launch, this reviewer is struck by the prodigious work and expenditure that went into developing these schemes before they were rejected. Many books have been written about nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft, but comparatively little attention has been given to ICBMs, and much of that relates to the first generation ICBMs that were also used as space launch vehicles. Works like An Untaken Road and Gretchen Heefner's The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland (Harvard University Press, 2012), are valuable histories of this expensive military technology. More historical work needs to...

United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics by Zachary D. Kaufman

Reviewed by: United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics by Zachary D. Kaufman Samantha Lakin (bio) Zachary D. Kaufman, United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics (Oxford, Oxford University Press). ISBN: 9780190243494, 383 pages. In his new book United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics, Zachary D. Kaufman establishes a novel framework to explain how and why the United States government (USG) has made decisions in the aftermath of mass atrocities. His framework is based as much on politics and pragmatics as it is on legal tradition and commitment to norms. In his introduction, Kaufman outlines his central research questions, which he addresses through relevant case studies throughout the book. The book centers around two such questions: (1) Why did the USG support particular transitional justice (TJ) [End Page 257] options in the immediate aftermaths of World War II and the Cold War? and (2) What theoretical framework best explains USG policy on TJ? In addressing these two questions, Kaufman introduces his new theory, “prudentialism,” which contrasts with the theory of “legalism” that Gary Bass presents in his book, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. In his first three chapters, Kaufman outlines the different policy options that the USG has considered and taken in the aftermath of genocide and other mass atrocities, and he argues how these policy decisions stem from prudentialism rather than legalism. Kaufman defines his theory of prudentialism as based in realism by focusing on the relationship between three factors: normative beliefs, politics, and pragmatics. Kaufman describes Bass’ contrasting legalism theory as grounded in a liberal and normative commitment to due process and other legalistic principles and traditions. By introducing prudentialism as a case-specific balance of normative beliefs, politics, and pragmatics, Kaufman challenges the legalistic proposition that liberal states will generally choose to prosecute perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Kaufman therefore introduces greater—and more accurate—nuance to our understanding of policy decisions during and after atrocity crimes. His theory is compelling, for without completely discarding the influence of normative values of liberal states, Kaufman demonstrates through his case studies that politics and pragmatics matter at least as much when states make TJ decisions. Kaufman chooses a case study approach to test and compare prudentialism and legalism. The cases Kaufman chooses are Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan; the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; the 1990 to 1991 Iraqi offenses against Kuwaitis; the atrocities in the Balkans in the 1990s; and the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. In his discussion of these six cases, Kaufman impressively uses an enormous amount of primary source data, including hundreds of previously classified USG documents he obtained and elite interviews conducted with key decision-makers. His meticulous research and sophisticated analysis of these cases reveal that, instead of consistently supporting prosecutorial TJ mechanisms, as legalism would suggest, the USG considered and implemented a range of TJ options—legalistic and not. Kaufman thus demonstrates the confluence of norms, politics, and pragmatics driving USG policymaking on TJ. For example, in the case of atrocities committed by Japan during World War II, the USG implemented amnesty and lustration as TJ options in addition to prosecution. Kaufman describes the prominent role the USG played in the Tokyo Tribunal, serving as the most prominent convener of discussions on creating the court, producing the initial draft of the tribunal’s charter, dominating the prosecution team, assisting the defendants, and presiding over the trials. Based on his new theory of prudentialism, Kaufman offers the following explanations for this central US involvement. First, the US was highly sensitive to the fact that Americans suffered at the hands of the Japanese during the war, as the Japanese abused American POWs and attacked the US itself at Pearl Harbor. In addition to retrospective concerns, the US wished to assert its presence in Asia, where American and Soviet spheres of influence were emerging at a time when the US sought to stem the spread of communism. Finally, racism likely also drove American decision-making. [End Page 258] Alongside the Tokyo Tribunal, the USG provided amnesty to...

Cognitivism, prospect theory, and foreign policy change: a comparative analysis of the politics of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Afghanistan

This article investigates the cognitive limitations on policy change in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by examining why American decision-makers failed to revise their government strategy substantially while fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003–2014 and why their British counterparts were more successful in adjusting their policies in the Malayan insurgency in 1948–1954. Unlike most of the COIN literature that concentrates on military strategy and tactics, the analysis of government policy-making in Malaya holds some important political lessons for American leaders today despite differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and British Malaya. As a response to the criticism of COIN studies in general that they lack theoretical guidance, this article utilizes an integrated cognitivist-prospect theory framework. It is argued that some of the COIN literature mistakenly suggests that a more difficult strategic situation was primarily responsible for American failure in Afghanistan. Instead, American decision-makers faced a more difficult task cognitively than their British counterparts, as policy change in Afghanistan would have required greater ideational change. American principals were much more attached to their beliefs emotionally, had no alternative problem representation, and had to shift between frames in order to engineer a response that was more in line with events on the ground in Afghanistan. Regarding prospect theory, findings indicate that gains frames appear to be unhelpful in monitoring progress until catastrophic failure endangers the reference point, and that decision-makers often have more than one reference point to attune their policies to, which often results in suboptimal choices with regard to at least one reference point.

Do Allies Really Free Ride?

American decision-makers and security analysts often complain that allies ‘free ride’on the United States. This charge serves a political end.

Cold War, Hot Summer: Superpower Involvement in the War of Attrition in 1970

Using U.S. archival documents as well as insights gained from Israeli historians who made excellent use of Soviet sources, this article examines the diplomacy and military developments that occurred late in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition. Understanding that Moscow was pursuing a more forward policy than Washington officials understood at the time, it becomes clear that Soviet military intervention began earlier than American and Israeli decision-makers then recognized or than historians have understood until recently. Likewise, the operational deployment of Russian air defense forces and fighter pilots challenged Israeli air superiority in the skies over the Suez Canal, which separated Egyptian and Israeli troops. While American diplomats were willing to help the Israelis with equipment and countermeasures to deal with the new threat, they put enormous pressure on Jerusalem not only to accept the ceasefire that ended the conflict but also to not respond militarily to Egyptian violations of the agreement. Thus, Israel found itself in a fundamentally more vulnerable position when the shooting stopped in August 1970.

Geopolitics of a changing world order: US strategy and the scramble for the Eurasian Heartland

Geopolitics is about power and hegemony, with its dual components of domination and consent. Controlling space requires dominion. Organizing and administering space at reasonable costs demands authority and acquiescence. This conceptualization of geopolitics pertains to the underlying causes behind current instabilities in the Middle East as they link with broader geopolitical and strategic interests of great powers, particularly the US. Geopolitical theory helps offer deeper insights into how American decision makers are likely to think and act in the post-Cold War era, and in explaining, understanding, and possibly reading and forming expectations about US policies. It allows for more clarity in observing continuities in US strategy and in shaping expectations about tactics and policies in the service of its durable strategic international and global interests. The main argument of this paper is that the American ruling establishment, together with its supporting intellectual and military structures, persists in observing the emerging global venture geopolitically. In those terms much of what is occurring in the Arab region, more specifically in countries such as Syria among others, can be understood. It is also in those terms that one can conceptualize the American approach toward regional and world powers such as Iran, China and Russia.

Britain's Korean War: Cold War Diplomacy, Strategy and Security, 1950-53. By Thomas Hennessey.

The cultivation of the so-called ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the USA has lain at the heart of the former’s dealings with the latter before, during, and since the Cold War. Yet, as Thomas Hennessey—hitherto best known for his work on the fraught history of Northern Ireland—points out, comparatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to the ways in which the Korean War both illustrated and helped shape the nature of Anglo–American relations in the early 1950s. This book aims to go beyond the relatively small number of extant studies of particular episodes by providing a comprehensive overview. It makes the case that, despite the widening gap in the comparative strength of the USA and Great Britain, ‘the British did have—albeit limited—influence over American decision-making during the Korean War’ (p. 3). Issues over which a good deal of trans-Atlantic discussion and argument took place between 1950 and 1953 included the British response to American calls for military support in the wake of the North Korean invasion, the question of expanding the war north of the 38th Parallel, what to do about Chinese military intervention, how to handle the drawn-out peace negotiations in relation to the issue of prisoner-of-war repatriation, and planning an appropriate response should the communists break the eventual armistice agreement. The style and tone changed somewhat after the Conservatives replaced Labour in government in the wake of the 1951 General Election, but the substance of British policy remained roughly consistent: to persuade the USA to avoid escalation of the conflict, thereby keeping American attention from drifting too far from the defence of Europe and perhaps even preventing a Third World War.