Agricultural Bioterrorism Research Articles

Forensic Phytopathology: a Critical Review.

Forensic phytopathology is the application of plant pathology to legal or criminal matters. It is an emerging field. The existing literature focuses mainly on potential agricultural bioterrorism threats to the United States. Here we try to take a broader view including agricultural bioterrorism, mycoherbicide applications to eradicate plants used for illegal drugs, civil cases involving charges of sale or movement of diseased plants, and mycotoxins. In several of the examples given the evidence is inconclusive, but the examples are no less interesting for that.

Threats of Agricultural Bioterrorism to an Agro Dependent Economy; What Should be Done?

The economy of Pakistan is primarily dependent on its agricultural resources. Due to the lack of research regarding threat analysis of germ warfare in Pakistan, it is imperative for the agriculturists to understand the potential hazards associated with an attack on the cash crops that contributes heavily to the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Alarming terrorist activities such as 9/11 and many innovative terrorist strategies like Improved Explosive Devices (IED) in different countries, especially in Pakistan, has increased the potential of bioterrorism. Hence there is urgent need of security risk analysis and preparedness. State of the art research labs are not important for the effective production of biological weapons but certainly innovative strategies are required to effectively implement and counter a bioterrorist plan. Bioweapon infection to some staple crops such as wheat and maize can induce a significant loss that can take years to diffuse. This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of certain important crops in Pakistan that can be exposed as soft targets to certain bioterrorists and discusses the preemptive measures that should be undertaken immediately to prevent any sort of nefarious act of bioterrorism.

Xylella fastidiosa: A Model for Analyzing Agricultural Biosecurity

The threat to national security posed by the hostile release of human pathogens has been extensively documented. However, conclusions regarding the menace that plant pests and pathogens pose to the national economy and food supply are less developed. Here we present a risk analysis for the arrival and spread of foreign plant pathogens into the U.S. agricultural system. Xylella fastidiosa Citrus Variegated Chlorosis strain, an exotic plant pathogenic bacterium listed as a regulated biological agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, serves as a model to evaluate the threat that plant diseases pose to crops and agriculture-dependent industries. We assess the nation's capacity to detect, contain, and manage newly introduced plant pathogens, exposing areas that need improvement and limitations of the system. This analysis provides a framework for understanding the risk that exotic plant diseases pose to U.S. agricultural biosecurity and a reference to continue preparing for the possible arrival of these threats.

Bioterrorism with Zoonotic Disease: Public Health Preparedness Lessons from a Multiagency Exercise

Responding to agricultural bioterrorism with pathogenic agents that are communicable from animals to humans (zoonotic diseases) requires effective coordination of many organizations, both inside and outside of government. Action must be simultaneously taken to address public health concerns, respond to the agricultural dimensions of the event, and carry out the necessary law enforcement investigation. As part of a project focused on examining public health preparedness in Georgia, an exercise was carried out in July 2005 examining the intentional introduction of avian influenza (H5N1) in commercial poultry operations. The attack scenario, which was written to occur during an already severe human influenza season, enabled exploration of a range of issues associated with public health preparedness for major disease outbreaks including pandemic influenza, coordination of a multiagency response operation at multiple levels of government, and effective management of interdisciplinary response activities. The exercise is described and broader policy lessons regarding preparedness planning are discussed.

Encyclopedia of bioterrorism defense

Preface. Contributors. Acknowledgment. Abu Sayyaf Group. Aerosol. Agricultural Bioterrorism. Aliens of America: A Case Study. Al-Quida. Animal Aid Association: A Case Study. Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis). Anthrax Hoaxes: Case Studies and Discussion. Anti-Material Agents. Armed Islamic Group: A Case Study. Army of God. Army Technical Escort Unit. Assassinations. Aum Shinrikyo and the Aleph. Baader-Meinhof Gang. Biological Simulants. Bioregulators. Biosecurity: Protecting High Consequence Pathogens and Toxins Against Theft and Diversion. Biotechnology and Bioterrorism. Bioterrorist Attack, Stages, and Aftermath. Botulinum Toxin. Breeders: A Case Study. Brucellosis (Brucella spp.). Camelpox. CDC Category C Agents. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Bioterrorism Preparedness Program. Central Intelligence Agency. Characteristics of Future Bioterrorists. Chechen Separatists. Christian Identity. Consequence Management. Cost-Effectiveness of Biological Weapons. Crisis Management. Cuba. Dark Harvest. Dark Winter. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Defense Research and Development Canada-Suffield. Delivery Methodologies. Department of Defense. Department of Health and Human Services. Department of Homeland Security. Department of Justice. Department of State. Detection of Biological Agents. Diane Thompson: A case Study. Director of Central Intelligence Counterterrorist Center. DoD Policies on Force Health Protection: Medical Defense Against Biological Warfare Agents. Dual-Use Equipment and Technology. Dugway Proving Ground. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (Formerly Edgewood Arsenal), Aberdeen Proving Ground. Education for Biodefense. Epidemiology in Bioterrorism. Equine Encephalitis, Venezuelen, and Related Alphaviruses. Ethnic Weapons. Fatality Management. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Food and Beverage Sabotage. Food and Drug Administration. Food and Waterborne Pathogens. Fort Detrick and USAMRIID. Glanders (Burkholderia mallei). HAMAS. Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses. Hizballah. Homeland Defense. Human Immunodeficiency Virus. Influenza. Intelligence Collection and Analysis. International Cooperation and Bioterrorism Preparedness. International Regulations and Agreements Pertaining to Bioterrorism. Iran. Iraq. Islam, Shi'a and Sunna. Islamism. Israel. Joint Task Force Civil Support. Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Kurdistan. Laboratory Response to Bioterrorism. Larry Wayne Harris. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Libya. Los Alamos National Laboratory. Marine Algal Toxins. Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force. Mau-Mau. Media and Bioterrorism. Metropolitan Medical Response System. Minnesota Patriots Council. Minutemen: Case Studies. Modeling the Public Health Response to Bioterrorism. National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. NATO and Bioterrorism Defense. North American Militia. NORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command). Office International des Epizooties: World Organization for Animal Health. Orange October: A Case Study. Palestine Liberation Organization. Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Pharmaceutical Industry. Pine Bluff Arsenal. Plague (Yersinia pestis). POLISARIO. Prevention and Treatment of Biological Weapons-Related Infection and Disease. Prion Diseases. Psychological and Social Sequelae of Bioterrorism. Public Health Preparedness in the United States. Rajneesjees. Republic of Texas: A Case Study. Ricin and Abrin. RISE: A Case Study. Risk Assessment in Bioterrorism. Sandia National Alboratories. Scientists, Societies, and Bioterrorism Defense in the United States. Smallpox. Staphylococcal Enterotoxins. Sudan, Republic of. Suicide Terrorism. Syndromic Surveillance. Syria. Terrorist Group Identification. Threat Reduction in the Former Soviet Union. TOPOFF. TOPOFF 2. Toxins: Overview and General Principles. Tularemia (Francisella tularensis). Typhus, Epidemic (Rickettsia prowazekii). United Kingdom: Bioterrorism Defense. United States Department of Agriculture. United States Legislation and Presidential Directives. Water Supply: Vulnerability and Attack Specifics. Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Weather Underground: A Case Study. Index.

Rapid detection of bovine viral diarrhea virus as surrogate of bioterrorism agents

Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) is a major pathogen of cattle that is chosen as a model for select agents associated with agricultural bioterrorism, such as foot and mouth disease virus. Bovine viral diarrhea virus causes early embryonic death, abortion, respiratory problems, and immune system dysfunction in cattle throughout the world. Due to the insidious nature and economic loses from BVDV infections, a rapid diagnosis of BVDV becomes an important component to control and prevent the infections. In previous studies, a conductometric biosensor was developed and evaluated by the authors for bacterial pathogen detection. In this paper, the biosensor was adapted to detect BVDV in culture media and blood serum. The biosensor consisted of two parts: the immunosensor and the electronic data collection system. The biosensor used the method of lateral flow to enable the liquid sample to move from one region to another, through capillary action. The specificity of the biosensor depended on the unique binding characteristics of the polyclonal and/or monoclonal antibodies immobilized on the immunosensor. Polyaniline was used in the biosensor architecture as the transducer due to its electronic properties and bio-molecular properties. Preliminary results showed that the biosensor was sensitive at a concentration of 10/sup 3/ cell culture infective dose per milliliter of BVDV antigens. With the development of the conductometric biosensor for BVDV detection, further adaptation could be made for detecting select agents of concern to homeland security.

Mosquitoes and the TV—eh?

Among my many character quirks, I seem to be constitutionally unable to travel anywhere out of the ordinary unless there’s a speaking engagement involved. This not only makes for a great deal of family tension over vacation destinations (which almost invariably are university towns, most of which lack the white sand beaches and other amenities my daughter is understandably partial to when thinking of vacations), but it also is the principal reason that for more than 30 years, I never managed to make it to any kind of reunion—high school, college, graduate school, or even summer camp. It never was for want of interest—I always wondered what it might be like to attend a reunion but never could justify the travel involved to satisfy that curiosity. So, when the 30th Reunion Committee of the Yale Class of 1975 invited me to serve as a member of a discussion panel, I jumped at the chance. Never mind that the invitation was to serve on a panel discussion on bioterrorism, a subject area in which I have no distinguished credentials. The extent of my claim to any expertise at all was the fact that I was one of 16 reviewers of a National Research Council report on agricultural bioterrorism (NAS 2002). Although this study had been commissioned by the Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, on which I served a term and currently serve as chair, the study was actually conducted during the interval when I was neither on the Board nor Chair of the Board—making my connection to agricultural bioterrorism even more tenuous. Although I do work on insects, and although insects could conceivably be involved in acts of agricultural bioterrorism, the insects I work with have little terrorism potential; the black swallowtail, Papilio polyxenes, may pose a threat to America’s parsley crop, but somehow I think our great nation can survive the challenge of steaks with no garnish. It seemed odd to me that a reunion committee thought a discussion of bioterrorism would be appropriate entertainment for returning alumni—but, since I had so little previous reunion experience, I thought maybe my notion that reunions were for getting together with old friends and trying to remember the lyrics to Cat Stevens songs was perhaps out of step with reality. And it turns out that the panel discussion was well attended, at least in part because the other panel discussion that had been organized, on the difficulties faced by Yale alumni living abroad, had to be cancelled because not enough of the panelists, all Yale alumni living abroad, had managed to make it to the reunion. What surprised me most about the reunion, though, was how few of the people I knew really well while I was an undergraduate at Yale attended the reunion, and how many people that I swear I’d never seen before were actually my classmates. Among the classmates I would have liked to see again was Brandon Centerwall, who was briefly the freshman-year roommate of my best friend Robert; Robert’s erratic hours and professed fondness for licit and illicit psychotropic substances eventually drove Brandon to find alternate living arrangements before the end of first semester. After graduating from Yale, Brandon went on to medical school and became an epidemiologist. He gained no small measure of fame in the field thanks to a series of papers linking television-watching with violent behavior (Centerwall 1989, 1992). In his 1989 study, Brandon compared the relationship between television ownership and homicide rates in the United States and Canada from roughly 1945 to 1975 with the homicide rate in South Africa over the same time period, during which time television broadcasts were banned. Whereas homicides declined by 7% in South Africa over the period, they essentially doubled in the United YIKES! Forget jogging! I think watching TV would be healthier for me!

Complying with the 42 CFR Part 73—Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins and the Companion Rule Issued by the USDA, 7 CFR Part 331, and 9 CFR Part 121, the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins—A Biosafety Officer's Perspective

Complying with the 42 CFR Part 73—Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins and the Companion Rule Issued by the USDA, 7 CFR Part 331, and 9 CFR Part 121, the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins—A Biosafety Officer's Perspective

Food security issues-a potential comprehensive plan

The need for a comprehensive plan to protect the food production system has emerged as a critical issue over the last several years. To address this need, a comprehensive food security plan has been developed at Auburn University. The proposed program, entitled the Consolidated American Network for Agriculture Resource Intelligence (CANARI) system is one of several systems being proposed to deal with potential agricultural bioterrorism or agroterrorism events. Unlike other systems, which hastily emerged in many agencies after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the system has been planned over the last 5 yr with the input of the agricultural industries, is comprehensive in its conception, and is designed to coordinate all components (existing and planned) necessary to prevent, detect, and respond to potential agroterrorism events. The plan uses the principle that the first line of defense must be within the states and agricultural companies for the detection of agroterrorism incidents to be rapid and the response effective, organized, and timely. CANARI is designed to integrate the previously disparate elements by fostering a cooperative network of local, state, and federal agencies as well as commodity entities and interested non-governmental organizations. Using a market-driven approach, the system encourages commodity membership and cooperation through positive incentives rather than regulatory duress. A centralized command structure is envisioned, which would be provided through the creation of a National Agroterrorism Defense Center. The responsibility of this Center would be to coordinate all of the activities presently available in components at the local, state, and federal levels and develop and manage new and emerging activities provided by the stakeholders. CANARI offers a new paradigm by which all of its constituent members act collectively and cooperatively to lessen the risk of an attack and better ensure the continued availability of a safe, abundant, and economical food supply.

Ralstonia solanacearum Race 3, Biovar 2, the Causal Agent of Brown Rot of Potato, Identified in Geraniums in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Connecticut.

The Plant Disease Diagnostic Laboratory of the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture received diseased geranium (Pelargonium × hortorum) samples from several Pennsylvania (PA) greenhouses in 1999 and 2000 and from one Delaware (DE) greenhouse in 1999. Originating from Guatemala, plants exhibited yellowing, wilting, stunting, and bacterial oozing from the vascular tissues. Isolations on yeast dextrose-CaCO3 (YDC) and triphenyl-tetrazolium-chloride (TTC) agars resulted in off-white mucoid colonies and white, fluidal colonies with pink centers, respectively. Such colonies are typical of Ralstonia solanacearum (1). The disease was similar to a bacterial wilt of geranium caused by an unidentified biovar of R. solanacearum (3). Preliminary tests using Biolog MicroLog 3 (Hayward, Ca; 4.01A) and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) (Agdia Inc., Elkhart, IN; BRA 33900/0500) identified the organism as R. solanacearum. For pathogenicity tests, a 10-μl droplet of water suspension containing 1 × 106 CFU of each of five geranium strains (PDA 22056-99, 81849-99, 81862-99, 51032-00, and 64054-00) per milliliter was placed on a stem wound made by cutting off the terminal growth of each of 4 6-leaf stage plants of geranium 'Orbit Scarlet', tomato 'Rutgers', potato 'Russet Norkotah', and eggplant 'Black Beauty' in a growth chamber at 28°C, 86% relative humidity, and 12 h light/dark cycle. Water was included as a control. The five strains caused severe yellowing and wilting within 10 days. Colonies typical of R. solanacearum were reisolated from symptomatic tissue on YDC and TTC. To determine the specific biovar, 20 pathogenic geranium strains from PA and DE plus a strain of R. solanacearum originally isolated from a geranium plant of Guatemalan origin received from Connecticut in 1995 were grown up to 28 days on Ayers mineral medium supplemented with a 1% final concentration of D-cellobiose, dextrose, meso-inositol, lactose, maltose, D-ribose, trehalose, mannitol, sorbitol, or dulcitol (1). Acid was produced by 21 test strains from the first five carbohydrates only. Such carbohydrate utilization is typical of bv 2 (1). Bv 2 identification was confirmed by real-time polymerase chain reaction using bv 2-specific primers and probes (N. Schaad, unpublished) designed from a bv 2-specific DNA fragment (2). All tested strains were positive using ELISA. In contrast, strains of bv 2 from geraniums in Wisconsin and South Dakota were reported to be negative using ELISA (4). From our results, it appears that bv 2 was introduced into the United States on geraniums from Guatemala in 1995 and 1999. This cool climate bv 2, a regulated agent by the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, has caused extensive crop loss in potatoes in Europe, but has not been found in potatoes in the United States.

The threat of plant pathogens as weapons against U.S. crops.

The U.S. National Research Council (NRC) concluded in 2002 that U.S. agriculture is vulnerable to attack and that the country has inadequate plans for dealing with agricultural bioterrorism. This article addresses the vulnerability of U.S. crops to attack from biological weapons by reviewing the costs and impact of plant diseases on crops, pointing out the difficulty in preventing deliberate introduction of pathogens and discovering new disease outbreaks quickly, and discussing why a plant pathogen might be chosen as a biological weapon. To put the threat into context, a brief historical review of anti-crop biological weapons programs is given. The argument is made that the country can become much better prepared to counter bioterrorism by developing a list of likely anti-crop threat agents, or categories of agents, that is based on a formal risk analysis; making structural changes to the plant protection system, such as expanding diagnostic laboratories, networking the laboratories in a national system, and educating first responders; and by increasing our understanding of the molecular biology and epidemiology of threat agents, which could lead to improved disease control, faster and more sensitive diagnostic methods, and predictions of disease invasion, persistence, and spread following pathogen introduction.

US report says better defences needed against agricultural bioterrorism

US report says better defences needed against agricultural bioterrorism

Waging war on the economy. The possible threat of a bioterrorist attack against agriculture.

2001 was a difficult year for the British farmers and for the government. The foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak is now supposedly under control, but not before it resulted in the slaughter of almost 4 million cattle and an estimated cost of £5 billion to the UK economy. A national election was postponed, the agricultural department was completely restructured and British meat exports may never recover to their pre‐outbreak levels. The indirect effects were widespread, with the tourist industry suffering the greatest losses of all due to restricted access to the countryside. This FMD outbreak has been traced to a single farm in the North East of England and was due to natural causes. But if the disease had been deliberately introduced, the outcome would have been identical. ‘Agricultural bioterrorism’, or simply ‘agroterrorism’ as the phrase has now been coined, is clearly not aimed at agriculture per se , but at crippling the economy. ![][1] The events of September 11 have caused many aspects of society that were previously taken for granted to be looked at in a different light. Security, not only of the individual but also of the environment, is being re‐examined. But even before last year, there has been a steadily growing awareness, mainly in the USA, that the agricultural industry needs to be protected against a possible terrorist attack. This has resulted in increased government spending, including the establishment of a new research institute in Texas in December 2001, to investigate the potential threats and devise countermeasures. Agroterrorism could conceivably be perpetrated in a number of ways. It could manifest as a contamination of the food supply, such as the discovery in May 2000 that Palestinian terrorists had deliberately released salmonella‐ridden eggs onto the Israeli market. It is not known how many suffered food poisoning as … [1]: /embed/graphic-1.gif

Foot and mouth disease control: the next steps

Foot and mouth disease control: the next steps

Crop Biosecurity and Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism: Responses of The American Phytopathological Society

Crop Biosecurity and Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism: Responses of The American Phytopathological Society