The article examines the process of the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the specifics of American military presence in the two countries. The relevance of the topic is due to the ongoing US presence in Iraq and the continuing instability in the Greater Middle East. The aim of the article is to analyze and compare the processes of US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq and to find the reasons that determined the various results of the ending of the two military campaigns. In the study the following methods were used: generalization, system analysis, discourse analysis, analogy, induction, historical and comparative method. The novelty of the research lies in the identifying within one study the differences between the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and determining the specifics of each campaign that influenced the course of the American troop withdrawal. The authors came to the conclusion that the main similarity of the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq is that the American troops conducted successful combat operations in both countries but strategic miscalculations did not allow them to consolidate their success what led to the general failure of both missions. Thus, the US was forced to seek ways to end the two campaigns. Washington managed to completely withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan which was initially a priority. That happened because of the political will of different US administrations and due to the declining importance of the region. The long-term US actions in Iraq led to a noticeable destabilization of security there and a full-fledged withdrawal would worsen the positions of the Iraqi government and significantly reduce American influence in the Middle East in a period of growing instability and during the ongoing unprecedented escalation there since October 2023.

The aim of the article is to analyze and compare the differences and similarities in the reactions of various groups of American society to the end of the military campaign in Afghanistan. The groups in question are the general public, whose opinion is measured through social surveys, various political experts and think tanks, as well as the American politicians of a wide spectrum of views. The scientific novelty of the article is that the authors research the phenomenon of American public opinion on the aforementioned issue from various angles. The article describes in detail the views of the American public in general and its ideologically differentiated groups; the views of political experts as well as the politicians themselves. The methodological basis of the article. The authors use the analysis method as a general scientific method to explore the opinions of various public groups, including American war veterans, political experts, and politicians. Another method (peculiar for historical analysis) is the comparative-historical method, which is used to compare different societal perspectives on this historical event to discern similarities and differences between those perspectives. The systematic approach is also used to describe the view of American society as a system. The principle of objectivity is also applied to promote the unbiased nature of the authors’ conclusions. Results. The article helps to understand the reaction of different societal groups, including politicians and experts, on the US Armed Forces withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Conclusions of the authors of this article demonstrate that the majority of the ordinary citizens as well as of the politicians were dissatisfied with the realities of the process of the evacuation of troops and civilians from Afghanistan. The actions of the American government in this regard also received critical appraisal. On the other hand, the majority of the population generally supported the end of the war. The political experts and members of think tanks were divided among themselves on the question of what influence this withdrawal may have on the US popularity and image in the world.

The war that broke out in October 2024 between Israel and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian Gaza Strip caused a wide resonance far beyond the Middle East. One of the echoes of the conflict was the rise of threats related to terrorist and extremist manifestations in European countries. In particular, a significant increase in xenophobic (primarily anti-Semitic and Islamophobic) manifestations was recorded; representatives of the European states’ special services issued warnings about the possibility of terrorist attacks provoked by the Gaza war. The events in the Gaza Strip have become both an indicator of the sentiments existing within European societies that are far from the ideas of universal tolerance promoted by the establishment and a catalyst for intercommunal tensions in Europe. To a certain extent, the “message” carried by certain terrorist actions in European countries can also serve as a reminder to society about conflicts, especially the ones in the Middle East. In this regard, it is important to mention the easily noticeable difference between the approaches of European countries to conflicts in Ukraine and in the Gaza Strip. If in the former case the European countries took an uncompromising anti-Russian position, coupled not only with sanctions against Russia, but also with a boycott of everything Russian, then in the latter case, the attitude towards Israel’s harsh actions, leading to mass civilian casualties among the Palestinians, is not so obvious. Ritual calls to reduce the suffering of the civilian population are often coupled with open support – in word and deed – for Israel in its confrontation with Hamas. The article examines the potential and real threats associated with terrorist activity in Europe. The growth of xenophobic sentiments in Europe, as well as the widespread dissemination on the Internet of images of civilians killed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone on both sides, serves as a breeding ground for radicalization of some European residents and, possibly, a harbinger of acts of extremist and even terrorist violence, in which the main danger is the jihadist underground operating in European countries. From the point of view of the terrorist threat to Europe, parallels are drawn between the situation related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the recent conflicts in other regions (such as the invasion of Iraq, the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, and the war in Syria). Differences are also noted between conflicts in which European countries were or remain directly involved, and the war in Gaza, where Europe’s involvement is not direct. In addition, the possibility of terrorist manifestations by various actors (both internal and external to Europe) is analyzed, and it is concluded that homegrown self-radicalized lone extremists pose the greatest danger to European countries.

The origins of military neurosurgery are closely linked to those of neurosurgery in France and more particularly in Paris. The history of the field starts with its origins by 2 men, Thierry de Martel and Clovis Vincent. The first note about the creation of military neurosurgery was in 1942, when Marcel David was reassigned from the Sainte Anne Hospital to practice at the Val-de-Grâce Military Hospital. David trained the first military neurosurgeon. The field of military neurosurgery was subsequently developed at the Val-de-Grâce Military Hospital, at Sainte Anne Military Teaching Hospital in Toulon in 1990 and then at Percy Military Teaching Hospital in 1996. Over 29 military neurosurgeons were trained in these institutions. Since 2000, French military neurosurgeons have been deployed from France in the Mobile Neurosurgical Unit. This Mobile Neurosurgical Unit represents 12% of all medical evacuation of casualties categorized as the high dependency level. Neurosurgeons were able to adapt to asymmetrical wars, such as in the Afghanistan campaign where they were deployed in the Role 3 medical treatment facility, and more recently in sub-Saharan conflicts where they were deployed in forward surgical roles. To manage the increasing craniocerebral war casualties in the forward surgical team, the French Military Health Service Academy established a training course referred to as the "Advanced Course for Deployment Surgery" providing neurosurgical damage control skills to general surgeons. Finally, military neurosurgery is reinventing itself to adapt to future conflicts through the enhancement of surgical practices via the addition of head, face, and neck surgeons.

The analysis of US policy in Central Asian countries through the prism of two phases of activity is presented. The fi rst surge of American geopolitical activity in Central Asia began with the US anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan that was launched in 2001. During that period the military and political positions of the United States in the region were significantly strengthened and the fi nancing of the political elites of the republics was increased. However, the acceleration of the processes of democratization and liberalization in the countries of the region negatively aff ected the character of relations between the United States and the ruling national elites. Russia’s return to the region as well as China’s growing economic infl uence minimized the degree of US involvement in regional processes. The decision of the American administration to withdraw the main contingent of troops from this country in 2014 undermined the authority of the United States and reduced their presence in the region. The second phase of activity began during the acute crisis of the entire system of international relations and the emerging contours of the new world order. The political and diplomatic activity of the United States in Central Asia noticeably intensifi ed, designed to slow down Russian and Chinese expansion and destroy the monopoly presence of Moscow and Beijing in the economy and military sphere of the countries of the region. It is proved that the United States began to pay more attention to the region with an emphasis on expanding the economic and military component of its foreign policy in Central Asia. Positioning itself as an alternative to cooperation with Russia and China Washington seeks to reduce the dependence of the countries of the region on Moscow and Beijing. It is concluded that the United States will continue to strive to strengthen its strategic positions in Central Asia, increase regional infl uence and displace its geopolitical rivals.

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region.

IntroductionOutcomes of traumatic brain injury (TBI) are highly variable, with cognitive and psychiatric problems often present in survivors, including an increased dementia risk in the long term. Military personnel are...

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region.

The end of the US campaign in Afghanistan in 2021 has led to mixed outcomes from the point of view of the American expert community. The article analyzes the problems and ways of evaluating the results of the US long-running campaign in Afghanistan. Special attention is paid to the key issues affecting the US withdrawal and to the main conclusions and lessons that American politicians and experts consider necessary to learn to increase the effectiveness of the US foreign policy mechanism.

This essay reflects on the broad contours of the war in Afghanistan from Southeast Asia’s perspective. While the United States’ withdrawal from Kabul was calamitous, the pessimism about America’s role in Southeast Asia has been overstated. The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan was largely inconsequential for the region. Southeast Asian states deftly mixed their support for America’s campaign in Afghanistan and the broader war on terror without being seen as too sympathetic, including, in some instances, condemnation of America’s attacks on Islam. Regional governments balanced their domestic political interests with their foreign policy objectives. The abrupt Afghan withdrawal may instead have positive outcomes, as the United States boosted its courtship with countries of Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region through new security arrangements such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Australian, U.K., and U.S. trilateral pact (AUKUS).

Based on the revealed declassified documents, the paper examines previously unknown sources about the attempts of the American government to support various programs of dissent, freedom of speech and mass media in the USSR and countries where the pro-Soviet regime was supported. The subject of the study is the content of foreign intelligence published and declassified documents describing specific US measures to implement covert actions in Afghanistan in order to counteract the influence and strengthen the position of the USSR, as well as support centrifugal trends in the Soviet Union through the organization and financing of programs to support dissent, the development of radio broadcasting, increasing radio coverage areas, assistance in the publication of Samizdat literature, etc. The object of the work is the documentary correspondence of the US President and key figures of the American establishment on the use of resources for the implementation and promotion of anti-Soviet activities. The article reveals previously unknown details of the preparation of options and the implementation of approved programs of covert actions to discredit the Soviet regime as part of the military campaign in Afghanistan, as well as inside the USSR. The sources allow us to highlight the activities of the US Special Coordinating Committee for the preparation of this strategy. The authors draw attention to the complexity of solving financial issues in the American administration, as well as the size of US financial injections to support destructive forces in the Soviet Union. Such evidence from very authoritative sources significantly expands the source base in the scientific coverage of the facts of the implementation of subversive activities of the United States against the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s.

The war in Afghanistan ended as it had started, with total ambiguity of its objectives as well as what it achieved. The official Western narrative in 2001 was that “everything changed” on the day four airliners were hijacked and nearly 5,000 people murdered. The US intervention in Afghanistan, by this account, was hastily improvised in less than a month. However, the decisions shaping the US military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 show a remarkable continuity based on an ongoing pre-September 11 evolution in the US foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the US operations in Afghanistan did not begin 20 years ago. But in 1979, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter.

The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy

After the end of the Cold War, the significance of Central Asia and the level of competition among great powers in the region dipped for two decades. The return of hard-edged competition between the U.S. and Russia, and the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, have brought three great powers into an asymmetric competition for influence in the region. Russia remains the dominant security patron for most Central Asian states while Chinese forays under the BRI have established it as the leading investment patron. While U.S. interests have focused on sustaining the campaign in Afghanistan, this may change if a political settlement to the war emerges. As the Central Asian states consider the prospect of Sino-Russian competition or condominium, the U.S. represents a potentially attractive albeit secondary patron. The U.S. offers prestige and security cooperation without the prospect of overbearing and constant intervention in the domestic and foreign policies of the states. The obstacles to expanded U.S. influence remain physical access and proximity, scale of investment, and the friction associated with U.S. concerns over human rights. As the region moves into this three-cornered fight for influence, the Central Asian States will face a series of choices on how secure external assistance from one or more of these great powers without surrendering sovereignty or independence in political, military, and economic terms. At the same time, the three great powers will face strategic choices on cooperation and competition for influence given their very different interests and endowments.

The United States and United Kingdom (UK) had differing approaches to the surgical skill mix within deployed medical treatment facilities (MTFs) in support of the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US and UK combat trauma registries were scrutinized for patients with penetrating neck injury (PNI) at deployed coalition MTF between March 2003 and October 2011. A multivariate mixed effects logistic regression model (threshold, p < 0.05) was used stratified by MTF location and year of injury. The dependent variable was fatality on leaving Role 3, and the independent variables were ISS on arrival, nationality, MTF nationality, and presence of head and neck surgeon. A total of 3,357 (4.9%) of 67,586 patients who arrived alive at deployed military MTF were recorded to have sustained neck injuries; of which 2,186 (83%) were PNIs and the remainder were blunt injuries. When service members killed in action were included, the incidence of neck injury rose from 4.9% to 10%. Seven hundred nine (32%) of 2,186 patients with PNI underwent neck exploration; 555 patients were recorded to have sustained cervical vascular injury, 230 (41%) of 555 underwent vascular ligation or repair. Where it was recorded, PNI directly contributed to death in 64 (28%) of 228 of patients. Fatality status was positively associated with ISS on arrival (odds ratio, 1.05; 95% confidence interval, 1.04-1.06; p < 0.001) and the casualty being a local national (odds ratio, 1.74; 95% confidence interval, 1.28-2.38; p < 0.001). Significant differences in the treatment and survival of casualties with PNI were identified between nations in this study; this may reflect differing cervical protection, management protocols, and surgical capability and is worthy of further study. In an era of increasing specialization within surgery, neck exploration remains a skill that must be retained by military surgeons deploying to Role 2 and Role 3 MTF. Retrospective cohort study, level III.

Coalition military personnel with stabilised facial fractures are less likely to require tracheostomy: a comparison of treatment in US and UK Medical Treatment Facilities during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts

ABSTRACTRevisiting the US-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, we examine to what extent the concepts of legitimacy of the Taliban and the US counterinsurgents showed congruence with pre-existing Afghan notions of legitimacy. We move beyond dominant approaches of social contract theory and materialist legitimacy by using a threefold model of legitimacy to assess the different concepts of legitimacy. Both the Taliban and the US, we argue, diverged markedly from historically developed notions of legitimate rule. The article demonstrates that counterinsurgents need to be aware of and adapt to local norms. Moreover, we point towards relevant norms in the case of Afghanistan.

Over the past decade, the study of change and transformation in military organizations has become a major and very productive subfield of security and strategic studies. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have led researchers to explore mechanisms of military change beyond the ‘major transformations’ studied in the 1990s, in particular bottom-up adaptation. One of the contemporary challenges for the field is to reconcile the study of top-down innovation, including the introduction of major weapon systems that have had a structuring effect on the armed forces, with the analysis of small-scale, incremental change. In particular, there is a need for more studies exploring how adaptation can become institutionalized as this subject is currently under-researched. Matthew Ford's book helps fill this gap in a creative and well-researched manner, which makes it an important point of reference for future work in the field. First, Ford correctly identifies that innovation studies are usually overly focused on major weapon systems at the expense of smaller innovations. Second, instead of seeing culture as a barrier to the institutionalization of bottom-up adaptation, he contends that an approach rooted in the social shaping of technology (SST) yields more explanatory power. Indeed, there is an ontological problem in treating culture as an independent or intervening variable. An approach weaving together technological practices and their cultural environment helps capture the struggles for power, status and authority between competing individuals and groups, which shape weapon design, production and adoption.

Anatomy of a village razing: Counterinsurgency, violence, and securing the intimate in Afghanistan

Abstract This article asks what is the significance of making the soldiering body (hyper)visible in war. In contrast to the techno-fetishistic portrayals of Western warfare in the 1990s, the recent counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan witnessed a re-centring of British soldiering bodies within the visual grammars of war. In the visibility of this body, violences once obscured were rendered viscerally visible on the bodies of British soldiers. Locating the analysis in the War Story exhibition at the Imperial War Museum, London, the article details two moments of wartime violence experienced and enacted by British soldiers, tracking how violence was mediated in, on and through these hypervisible soldiering bodies and the attending invisibility of ‘other’ bodies. The article argues that during the Afghanistan campaign, soldiers’ bodies became not just enactors of military power but crucial representational figures in the continuance of violent projects abroad and their acceptance back home.