ABSTRACT This article reframes the Western Sahara dispute as a translational struggle over sovereignty rather than a primarily geopolitical or juridical conflict. It argues that sovereignty in this case is not a stable legal category awaiting recognition, but a concept produced and reconfigured as it travels across asymmetrical epistemic regimes—precolonial Maghrebi political practice, colonial administration, and the institutional language of international law. Drawing on postcolonial Translation Studies and critical international legal scholarship, the article shows how colonial translation regimes rendered Moroccan relational sovereignty—anchored in the bayʿa—legible only as symbolic loyalty, generating archival silences that later structured what could count as admissible evidence. It then analyzes the International Court of Justice’s 1975 Advisory Opinion as a translation regime that both acknowledged “legal ties” and neutralized their sovereign force by domesticating bayʿa as “allegiance”, privileging colonial documentation, and evaluating Saharan governance through Westphalian criteria. The article analyzes Morocco’s counter-hegemonic strategy of “counter-translation”, especially through narrative reframing and hybrid political texts such as the 2007 Autonomy Plan. The article concludes that translation is not merely implicated in colonial containment; it can also operate as a decolonial strategy—expanding the field of intelligibility, recovering silenced genealogies of authority, and enabling a pluriversal conception of sovereignty.

More than a decade after the EU launched the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue, Kosovo–Serbia relations remain unresolved despite the ICJ’s 2010 advisory opinion. The 2023 Brussels Agreement and its Ohrid Annex – presented as a Balkan analogue to the 1972 interGerman Basic Treaty and framed as a breakthrough grounded in indirect recognition, following a 2022 diplomatic initiative by the United States, France, Germany, and the EU that explicitly invoked the Basic Treaty as a model – were neither signed nor implemented, thereby exposing the structural fragility of an externally imposed, status-neutral framework. While hailed as a possible Zeitenwende for Balkan diplomacy, the Ohrid Agreement (2023), inspired by this framework, was neither signed nor implemented, as Serbia framed it as a political declaration rather than a binding treaty. This paper argues that applying the ‘Two Germanys model’ to Kosovo and Serbia is conceptually flawed: unlike the inter-German settlement, the Brussels– Ohrid framework lacks reciprocal political will, enforcement mechanisms, and a credible institutional end-state. A comparative analysis shows how the Ohrid Annex entrenches asymmetric obligations on Kosovo while allowing Serbia to preserve ambiguity and obstruct Kosovo’s international integration..

Navigating state obligations: A critical analysis of the ITLOS advisory opinion on climate change and the UNCLOS

Abstract This analysis of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on climate change focuses on the application of customary international law. The ICJ identifies a customary duty to prevent significant harm to the climate system and some more specific obligations. It notes that these rules apply to every State, irrespective of their participation in climate treaties. What remains less clear, however, is the content of the duty of prevention and, more pragmatically, how courts could assess compliance with this duty. This analysis interprets the Advisory Opinion as suggesting that courts could rely on a set of indicia to determine whether, as a whole, a State is making efforts consistent with customary international law.

This commentary examines the obstacles to Bangladesh's maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction in light of changing international commitments. It places Bangladesh's decarbonization initiatives in the context of the IMO's 2023 GHG Strategy, the GreenVoyage2050 programme and recent advisory opinions from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice. The commentary denotes that, while GreenVoyage2050 provides valuable technical support, systematic legal, institutional and financial barriers continue to limit real emission reductions. Delivering maritime GHG emissions reduction in Bangladesh requires extensive legislative reform, institutional development and ongoing international support based on climate justice principles.

This article examines the complex legal relationship between the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (CUCH). During the negotiation of the CUCH, states diverged sharply on whether the new instrument should be subordinated to UNCLOS, a disagreement that continues to influence ratification practice. Against this background, the article analyzes the absence of an express subordination clause and explores how the interaction between the two treaties must be determined through general treaty law, in particular Articles 304 and 311 UNCLOS and Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The article undertakes a two-way analysis: first, it assesses how UNCLOS regulates the coexistence of subsequent agreements, focusing on the notions of compatibility and preservation; second, it evaluates how the CUCH positions itself vis-à-vis UNCLOS through clauses of non-prejudice, contextual interpretation, and jurisdictional neutrality. Particular attention is given to contested issues such as sunken state vessels, the powers of the Coordinating State in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, and the protection regime in the contiguous zone. Drawing on state practice, judicial and arbitral jurisprudence, and recent advisory opinions of international courts and tribunals, the article argues that the relationship between UNCLOS and the CUCH is best understood in terms of functional complementarity rather than hierarchy. It concludes that the CUCH may operate as a compatible specialized regime within UNCLOS’s framework, contributing to the coherent and evolutionary protection of underwater cultural heritage.

Introduction: The article analyzes the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC) in light of the human right to care, recently established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Advisory Opinion 31/2025 and by Brazilian Law No. 15,069/2024, which instituted the National Care Policy. Objective: The study investigates whether the BPC, beyond its function of guaranteeing subsistence, can be reframed as an instrument for effectuating the human right to care, considering the new legal paradigms established. Methodology: The deductive approach method is used, with analytical procedure and research technique based on direct documentation, including analysis of Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) rulings (notably Claim 4.374/2013), international documents (Advisory Opinion OC-31/25 of the IACHR), and relevant legislation. Results: It is concluded that the STF's decision in Claim 4.374/2013, which relaxed the income criterion for granting the BPC, combined with new legal and international frameworks, paves the way for a reinterpretation of the benefit. The BPC is identified as a mechanism not only to guarantee income but also to enable autonomy, alleviate family overload, and operationalize the right to care in practice. Conclusion: The BPC can and should be reframed as an effective instrument for realizing the human right to care, in line with Brazil's international obligations and the principles of the National Care Policy. This reinterpretation requires coordinated action by legal practitioners and public managers to align the application of the benefit with these new paradigms. KEYWORDS: Continuous Cash Benefit; Inter-American Court of Human Rights; right to care; National Care Policy; Supreme Federal Court.

Considered the Constitution for the Oceans, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) is a multilateral international treaty that covers the most important legal issues related to seas and oceans. Since its entry into force on 16 November 1994, UNCLOS 1982 has demonstrated its importance in many aspects, contributing to peace and stability at sea. Meanwhile, climate change is a global environmental challenge that directly affects human health and life. Addressing climate change is a shared responsibility of the international community, requiring states, including Vietnam, to be proactive in enacting and effectively implementing relevant legal regulations. In this context, this article aims to study and evaluate the role of UNCLOS 1982 in the global fight against climate change. Using analytical and comparative methods, the article first provides an overview of UNCLOS 1982 and climate change, and explores their interrelationships. It then analyses specific provisions of UNCLOS 1982 on climate change to assess Vietnam's capacity to respond to climate change. Finally, the article reviews and discusses the current provisions of Vietnamese law on climate change and analyses their relationship with UNCLOS 1982. In particular, the article evaluates the role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in addressing climate change by examining its Advisory Opinion dated May 21, 2024. Based on the analysis, the article proposes some recommendations to enhance Vietnam’s proactive engagement in the global response to climate change.

Abstract A critical aspect of the future of public law is the development of constitutional justice on a global scale and its impact on democracy and political transformation. In this context, a revival of scholarly discussions regarding the idea of establishing an International Constitutional Court (ICC) warrants closer examination, raising the question of whether it remains an idealistic concept or if we are closer to realizing this establishment than we think. This study addresses this challenging topic by offering a perspective on the Venice Commission as a model – or, at the very least, an essential step – towards creating such a court. Building on ideas developed in the legal literature, especially the premise advanced by Professor Richard Albert, the article examines the evolution of the Venice Commission from a regional organization established to support new European democracies after the collapse of communism into a global entity engaged in democratic processes such as constitutional amendment, legislation in key areas of state function, and the promotion and implementation of the rule of law. Particular attention is given to the Venice Commission’s influence on both regional human rights courts and national constitutional courts, highlighting how its advisory opinions are absorbed into binding judicial reasoning and how its networks foster transnational convergence. At the same time, the study highlights the limitations of this model. Although the Commission aligns with Professor Albert’s vision of an ICC by depending on authoritative yet non-binding advice, it still misses key aspects of that model. Notably, it lacks universal membership and is made up of independent experts rather than judges selected through a transparent global process. It concludes that the Venice Commission represents a unique structure in the field of constitutional justice, exercising an increasingly influential role at the global level, and may be regarded as a de facto ‘Albert ICC’ in the making. This perspective aims to stimulate further scholarly debate.

ABSTRACT This article develops the concept of a juridical Minka to explain how civil society interventions shaped the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ advisory opinion on the climate emergency. Inspired by Andean traditions of collective labour, the Minka captures a conjunctural alignment in which Indigenous organisations, grassroots movements, NGOs, and expert institutions pooled their capacities to widen the interpretive horizons available to the Court. Rather than reading the Advisory Opinion as a purely judicial creation, the article reconstructs the collaborative field formed through written statements, hearings, and the Manaus Declaration. Focusing on four recurring clusters – mitigation, extraterritorial obligations, reparations, and fair shares – the article compares participants’ proposals with the Court’s decision. The result is neither wholesale adoption nor rejection, but translation. Claims become generalisable standards and burdens of justification. Reciprocity, therefore, lies in the return of portable normative infrastructure, enabling renewed mobilisation across litigation, policy, and territorial struggles.

Abstract The Climate Change Advisory Opinion (AO) by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) demonstrates the growing prominence of general principles of law in international law. The Climate Change AO was handed down at the end of the International Law Commission's project on general principles of law with the adoption of its Draft Conclusions. In the Climate Change AO, the ICJ accords general principles of law particular importance in environmental protection. This article documents how States identified general principles of law as the bedrock of the international climate change regime, and how the ICJ employed a systematic approach to ‘thicken’ climate change law, both in terms of normative content, obligations and consequences of breach. It then examines the general principles of law affirmed by the ICJ, in particular, the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and intergenerational equity, both extracted from the broader general principle of equity. These principles guide the interpretation of ‘how far’ or ‘how much’, operating as balancing tools in relation to other obligations. The broader significance of this development lies in the ICJ's growing recognition of general principles of law as a means of supporting and structuring its legal reasoning. The article further argues that the normative development of these principles has been reinforced by reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and that Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute provides a broader gateway for taking account of normative contributions by actors such as the IPCC. The identification of customary law and peremptory norms ( jus cogens ) is more narrowly defined than general principles of law. The article concludes by examining the IPCC's role in underpinning the normative character of certain general principles of law, building on the interaction of law and science, and suggests that strengthening these principles may facilitate their more robust incorporation into future treaty‐design mechanisms.

Abstract In its Advisory Opinion on the Request submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law , the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) concluded that, under Article 192 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), States must take all necessary measures to protect and preserve the marine environment from the impacts of climate change. Acknowledging the disruptive effects of climate change on fish stocks, the Tribunal concluded that Article 192 gives rise to additional obligations under international fisheries law. In particular, States must take climate change impacts into account when conserving and managing fish stocks pursuant to Articles 61, 63, 64, and 117–119 of UNCLOS. This article analyzes ITLOS’ interpretation of these provisions. It then explores their practical implications and applications, given the Tribunal’s limited guidance. Finally, it argues that certain obligations concerning climate-driven stock redistribution remain insufficiently clarified.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the realization of the right to a safe environment for life and health as a common interest of the international community and a universal obligation of States. It examines the evolution of international environmental law to the status of erga omnes norms, which apply to all States irrespective of specific treaties, with reference to key decisions of the International Court of Justice, in particular the Barcelona Traction case (1970) and the precedent-setting recognition in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025 of the erga omnes character of obligations to protect the climate system from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (the obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm under customary international law).Separate attention is given to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in cases involving environmental and climate threats, viewed through the lens of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (positive obligations of the State to protect life and private/family life from industrial pollution, noise, climate change, etc.). The article highlights the tension between national sovereignty and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as well as the limitations of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction (absence of a direct right to a clean environment, requirement to exhaust domestic remedies).The authors emphasize that effective protection of the right to a safe environment is impossible without international cooperation, as environmental threats are transboundary in nature, and the further development of the erga omnes concept and accountability mechanisms will strengthen guarantees of every individual’s right to a clean and safe environment.

The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: Content and Consequences

This opinion critically analyses the ‘advisory opinion’ of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which concerns the obligations of States in respect of climate change (2025), and in doing so, identifies issues that remain unresolved with the advisory opinion. This opinion also considers the principle of erga omnes, which is briefly mentioned in the ‘advisory opinion’ and also discusses climate change obligations that have the character of erga omnes , that is, obligations that are owed by a State to members of the international community as a whole. It is suggested that the ICJ has missed opportunities to clarify the relationship between the obligation(s) concerning climate change, the principle of erga omnes , consent and customary international law. It is also argued that the list of obligations that were considered jus cogens by the International Law Commission could be expanded, in the context of climate change, and notes that these types of obligations are also owed to members of the international community as a whole ( erga omnes ).

This article examines how the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, identified and developed general principles – the third source of international law codified in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute – across advisory and contentious proceedings. Drawing on a database of 164 principles identified between 1922 and 2025, it compares their formulation, function, and evolution in both contexts. The study challenges the assumption that general principles in advisory proceedings are inherently more abstract or foundational. While contentious cases dominate in identifying and refining general principles, advisory opinions contribute proportionately to their development, particularly when the opinion is adversarial in nature.

This article examines the prospects and limits of developing an ecological labour law within Argentina’s extractivist constitutional order. Argentina constitutes a paradigmatic case of structural contradiction, where a robust tradition of social constitutionalism coexists with a political economy deeply dependent on large-scale resource extraction. The article argues that, notwithstanding the 1994 constitutional recognition of environmental rights, the Argentine legal framework has largely facilitated extractivist policies. Judicial interventions by the Supreme Court to curb environmental harm, while normatively significant, remain exceptional and have not displaced the prevailing productivist logic underpinning labour regulation and development policy. Against this backdrop, the article explores whether an ecological reconceptualisation of labour law is conceivable within existing legal constraints. It situates just transition, approached from a workers’ rights perspective, as a pivotal yet under-theorised component of ecological labour law, particularly in contexts marked by informality. The analysis then turns to the recent jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, with particular emphasis on Advisory Opinion OC-32/25. Although still fragmented, it opens a normative space for integrating labour rights, climate protection and just transition within the Inter-American framework and the Argentine legal order, offering pathways for rethinking labour law beyond its traditional productivist foundations.

The recent advisory opinions on climate change by the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, alongside the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Klimaseniorinnen, extend their legal implications to international tax law. These implications reach well beyond tax measures that directly impact mitigation, such as exemptions for fossil fuels. According to these pronouncements, the obligations under the Paris Agreement, the customary duty to prevent significant environmental harm and other applicable law, oblige states to undertake tax reforms within their national circumstances when necessary to ensure the fiscal adequacy of domestic climate measures. Also, the duty to cooperate requires states to better align international tax rules with climate objectives. Amending tax treaties to reflect climate objectives – such as introducing variable withholding tax rates or capital gains taxing rights based on environmental concerns – deserves consideration. Through the prism of climate legal obligations, the influence of international law – including customary international law previously considered of limited efficacy in constraining tax sovereignty – is substantially strengthened within the tax domain.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine exemplifies many of the challenges that humanity has faced throughout modern history, including religious differences, nationalism, economic inequality, colonialism and totalitarianism. The legal context of this conflict is extremely complex and encompasses issues relating to self-determination, human rights, international humanitarian law and the jurisdiction of international organizations. The International Court of Justice has issued three advisory opinions on the Palestinian issue. This article examines the most recent of these: the Opinion on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations in the occupied Palestinian territory, dated 22 October 2025. After reviewing the Court’s main conclusions, the article examines the positions of the judges who issued dissenting opinions and provides the author’s comments. In the author’s view, the Opinion differs from others in terms of its tone (the Court attempted to avoid criticizing Israel), the narrow formulation of the question (the UN General Assembly requested that the Court determine Israel’s obligations rather than the consequences of their violation) and the Court’s refusal to interpret the question more broadly. However, the main problem is that the Opinion is unlikely to be taken into account by Israel and is unlikely to help the UN General Assembly determine its own course of action. Thus, the opinion reflects the broader trend of international judicial proceedings increasingly taking on the character of lawfare.

The 2025 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Climate Change is seen as part of a coordinated effort by the Global South to hold Western countries accountable for their "historical" contributions to climate change, which are directly linked to their colonial past. Despite the apparent pressure on the court, it has been cautious in its conclusions about the responsibility of one group of states towards another, emphasizing that all states, albeit to varying degrees, contribute to global warming. Given the caution of international courts in matters of state responsibility, it seems more promising for applicants to file lawsuits against major Western companiesemitters of greenhouse gases. In this case, the real steps taken by states to reduce the rate of global warming take a backseat, and the main focus of the lawsuits is on compensation.