Account Of Irony Research Articles

Bradley, Irony, and Minimalist Metaphysics

Abstract This paper explores the metaphysical and metaphilosophical irony of the British philosopher F. H. Bradley (1846–1924). Using Richard Rorty's account of irony in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, it advances a reading of Bradley's work as one in which he ironically plays absolute idealism, pragmatism, and skepticism off each other. It then develops an account of the deeper reason for such an ironic approach to metaphysics, namely, that Bradley aimed to secure both the autonomy of metaphysical inquiry against incursions by science, religion, and morality, and the limits of such inquiry against the more exuberant idealists of his generation.

Zwischen Fallibilismus und Hochmut

In this paper I reconstruct Hegel’s famous critique of irony by drawing on present-day vice epistemology. I argue that the categories of contemporary theories of epistemic vices are sufficient to classify a type of irony as a vicious stance. Yet they fail to grasp the property in virtue of which irony deserves criticism. I show that, for Hegel, this feature is intellectual pride. In the remainder of the paper, I specify the axiological, metaphysical, and epistemological background assumptions which guide the self-assessment of proud persons according to Hegel. Finally, I throw some light on the theoretical presuppositions of Hegel’s account of irony and pride.

A New Analysis of Verbal Irony

This article contributes a new analysis of verbal irony to the literature. It presents the main analyses of verbal irony – and the main criticisms of these analyses – found in both older and modern literatures as part of its attempt to build a new account for verbal irony. Thus, this paper discusses traditional, echoic and pretense accounts of irony and the limitations of these analyses. In traditional account, verbal irony is analyzed as a type of a trope or a figurative, in which the speaker communicates the opposite of the literal meaning (see Utsumi (2000)). In echoic analysis, verbal irony is assumed to be an echoic interpretation of an attributed utterance or thought (see Wilson and Sperber (1992)). As for pretense account of verbal irony, it views the ironist as pretending to be an injudicious speaker talking to an uninitiated hearer (see Clark and Gerrig (1984)). The three analyses of verbal irony attract some criticism in the literature (see Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) and Utsumi (2000)). This paper argues for a new analysis, suggesting that there are multiple types of verbal irony that should be examined under more than one analytical approach based on their meanings. This paper suggests that ironic verbal expressions that communicate the opposite of their literal meaning should be analyzed as a type of metaphor with two oppositional subjects in which the ironist pretends to believe that they resemble one another.

Theodore Metochites On Philosophers’ Irony

The present article offers the first Polish translation of Theodore Metochites’ important essay on the philosophers’ use and abuse of irony. The translation is preceded by an introduction which briefly presents the author of the Miscellanea philosophica et historica, upon which it reconstructs the argument of essay 8 and provides an assessment of Metochites’ account of irony.

Book review: Leonor Ruiz Gurillo and M Belén Alvarado Ortega (eds), Irony and Humor: From Pragmatics to Discourse

This is a review of an edited volume which is part of the ‘Pragmatics and Beyond New Series’, published by John Benjamins Publishing Company. Following an introduction by the editors, the volume is divided into three parts which give an account of irony and humor from pragmatic perspectives, within mediated discourse, and within conversational interaction. A range of perspectives, approaches and theories is offered within the volume, which is intended to be relevant to scholars and researchers who are interested in pragmatics, discourse analysis and social sciences.

The Temporal Aside: “Transzendentale Buffonerie” in Two Works of Novalis

Expanding on Friedrich Schlegel's multifarious account of irony, this article examines a further form of irony in Novalis's “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” and his “Monolog.” The article argues that there is an ironic relationship between the temporality portrayed within these literary works and the temporality that structures them, that is, their “transcendental temporality.” The ironic relation of these two literary temporalities resists theoretization and requires instead a figural approach.

The Problems of Irony: Philosophical Reflection on Method, Discourse and Interpretation

This article provides a broad overview of the problem of irony to contemporary hermeneutics. It offers a thematic account of the effects of irony on interpretation, and argues that the problems of irony are embedded within the relation between the free play of irony and the regulative role of interpretative discourse. It argues, against hermeneutic theories such as that of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, that the “problems” which irony poses for interpretation can be seen as symptomatic of irony's identification: that irony is, essentially, problematic. It argues that any account of irony needs to account for the value of irony as a problem, rather than subsuming such problems into larger models of understanding. The article explores this notion by looking at the interpretative “discourse of irony” and noting its thematic features. It is argued that the account of irony as a negation of meaning is intrinsically tied to the construction of a sovereign economy in response to the excesses of ironic possibility, but that such a construction is determined only by the stepping‐away from the initial ironic possibilities which enabled its construction. Using the work of Gadamer as an example, the article argues that this in itself does not close irony, but produces yet more irony which frustrates the interpretative act while lending itself to interpretative possibility.