Abba Eban Research Articles

Mythologies without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917–2020 by Jerome Slater

Jerome Slater’s book impressively counters Abba Eban’s profoundly false meme that the Arabs “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” In Israeli parlance, Slater contends that hahefech hu hanachon (“the opposite is the case”). Though exploiting only English-language secondary sources, he uses the rich scholarly literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict to analyze hundreds of discrete episodes, disputes, and polemical claims, showing how regularly and often breathtakingly facts contradict the narrative of official Israel and its advocates. Slater lavishes attention on the blameworthiness of Israeli governments, Henry Kissinger, and a series of weak-willed or politically paralyzed American presidents for the failure of dozens of attempts to make peace based on some version of territorial partition. The dramatic gaps between fact and widespread belief that Slater exposes are particularly well-illustrated by Israeli-Syrian relations. Quoting David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan, Slater compellingly demonstrates that aggressive and systematic Israeli attacks on Syria in the 1950s, not Syrian extremism and shelling of peaceful Israeli farmers, made a peace treaty impossible and set the stage for Israel’s conquest of the Golan Heights in 1967. With brutal repetitiveness, he shows that the failure of American-brokered efforts to secure an Israel-Syria peace was due to the intransigence of Israeli leaders (from Peres to Netanyahu), their concern with marginal domestic issues, and their confidence that Washington would never pressure them on the issue. These factors rendered irrelevant the pragmatism and flexibility of both Hafez and Bashir el-Assad.

AIPAC’s founding and the evolution of aid to Israel

ABSTRACT This exploration delves into the intricate history of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), navigating its genesis and the concurrent establishment of U.S. aid to Israel. The narrative unfolds against the post-World War II backdrop, exploring pivotal moments involving key figures like Isaiah L. Kenen, Abba Eban, and Louis Lipsky. As the Israeli embassy grappled with challenges in securing financial aid, Kenen’s vision crystallized into the creation of a domestic lobby group. AIPAC, initially known as the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), emerged, meticulously navigating the American legislative landscape to advocate for Israel. The lobby’s focus on bipartisan support, strategic alliances, and grassroots efforts paved the way for the landmark Morse–Taft Act, representing the first-ever U.S. financial aid to Israel. The narrative unfolds with a spotlight on Kenen’s strategic maneuvering, demonstrating how he deftly linked Israel’s aid to a broader regional approach, garnering support and mitigating opposition. The bill’s journey through Congress, from committee discussions to public endorsements, reflects Kenen’s orchestration of a multifaceted campaign.

Conquest of COVID-19. Publish it to death?

Conquest of COVID-19. Publish it to death?

In the Shadow of Back-Channels: Britain and the Berlin Four Power Talks, 1968–1971

In May 1967, Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister, visited Washington. Israel was on the brink of the Third Arab–Israeli War, and Eban’s mission was to secure U.S. support for Israel in the coming war. Before coming to Washington, he had met with President Charles de Gaulle in Paris, who, fearing that the conflict might start World War III, proposed to Eban the idea of convening talks among “the four great powers” to prevent the war. When Eban explained de Gaulle’s proposal, President Lyndon B. Johnson irritably retorted, “What did he mean by ‘the four great powers’? Who the hell are the other two?”1 Britain was one of “the other two” both in this episode and in the Four Power system (with the United States, France, and the Soviet Union) established for Germany and Berlin after World War II. In the historiography of Ostpolitik and the birth of the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, however, historians have treated Britain much like Johnson did. In 2009, Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer published a collection of essays on European and global responses to Ostpolitik, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office released an official volume of Cold War-era British documents on Berlin. In the former, Britain was the only Four Power state that was not featured in the essays. In the latter, there was no chapter on the 1970–1971 Four Power talks.2

Pedrosa, the “Old Lion”—Franco-Brazilian Fragments of a History of Committed Criticism

Opening session of the VIIIth Congress of the AICA, Acte du Congres de l’AICA, Tel Aviv, July 1963 © AICA (From left to right) Jorge Romero Brest, Mario Pedrosa, Will Grohmann, James Johnson Sweeney, Abba Eban, Haim Gamzu, Mordechai Namir, Simone Gille-Delafon, Giulio Carlo Argan, Hans Ludwig Cohn Jaffe, Jacques Lassaigne, Robert Delevoy – Fonds AICA Mario Pedrosa (1900-1981) is now recognized as one of the outstanding figures in the history of 20th century art criticism. As is also attested...

Anti-Intellectualism and Israeli Politics

Anti-intellectualism is a discrete social phenomenon which eschews spatial or temporal boundaries. While it defies a restrictive definition, it is commonly understood as a populist disdain of individuals who speak of certain universal values and engage in the pursuit of knowledge from reason; conversely, an anti-intellectual is a person who is not a ‘dealer in ideas’ and is not committed to the ‘life of the mind’. This article focuses on anti-intellectualism as a defining characteristic of the Israeli ethos which predates the establishment of the Jewish state. The article begins with a terminological discussion and a brief historical survey of the prevalence of anti-intellectualism in contemporary societies. It then traces the roots of Israeli anti-intellectualism and examines their manifestations in the case of Abba Eban, Israel’s most quintessential diplomat, an orientalist scholar, a Cambridge don, a polyglot and a public intellectual. The article concludes by pointing to the uneasy fit between the political and intellectual spheres in Israeli politics and the challenges posed by the former to the latter.

Abba Eban: A Biography by Asaf Siniver

Abba Eban: A Biography by Asaf Siniver

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.

Toward a New Middle East: The Irreversible Peace Process

EDITOR'S NOTE In Abba Eban's address before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in 1995 (originally published in American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 17, no. 2), the former foreign...

Editorial

In this issue of the European Journal of Immunology (EJI), the News and EFIS forum serves as a platform for the discussion of a hot topic in clinical immunology; a topic for which a scientific immunological viewpoint makes the difference, and which matters for the care and benefit of patients. What would be better suited for such a theme than a discussion regarding immunoglobulin (Ig)-based therapies? About a year ago, a group of clinical experts met in Wildbad Kreuth for a workshop on the optimal use of clotting factors and Igs. In spite of its seemingly dry title, the meeting covered a range of aspects associated with one of the oldest and most successful immunological therapies to date, starting from passive immunization with Igs as introduced by Emil von Behring in the 19th century, to the use of Igs to provide general humoral protection and regulate inflammation, and including the use of Igs and clotting factors for long-term substitution in patients suffering from hypogammaglobulinaemia. Given that the resources for such therapies are limited and sometimes difficult to standardize, treatments are expensive and patients may have to be prioritized according to the relevant national guidelines, if established; however, for some of the Ig-based therapies, the mechanisms of action are only now slowly beginning to emerge and thus reveal the potentially novel approaches for the optimization of Ig-based therapeutic products. Obviously covering the spectrum of issues related to Ig therapy is a lot to discuss when you aim for a consensus among 36 Council of Europe states. A resume of this meeting, as well as the six recommendations for the optimal use of Ig therapy that the working group agreed upon, is published in this issue of EJI, as a News & EFIS article entitled “European consensus proposal for Ig therapies” 1. The authors have explicitly asked that the readership of EJI – i.e. the international community of immunologists – openly discuss their proposal and communicate the outcome of their discussions to the community by way e.g. of a Letter to the Editor to EJI, although this is just one public route;. I personally find this a very important step in reaching any consensus: a transparent discussion of the initial proposal, opening it for improvement and amendments, and adding new perspectives. I hope that in the end the document matures from a proposal to a consensus that it not just “European” but “International”, reflecting the expertise of immunologists from all over the world. I also hope that, after open discussion among the community, this consensus does not follow the statement of Abba Eban (1915–2002): “A consensus means that everyone agrees to say collectively what no one believes individually.” For the discussion of consensus protocols in clinical immunology, EJI is a prime choice. At EJI, basic and clinical immunology are of equal importance, what matters is the quality of the science. Interestingly, several papers recently published in EJI shed light on the mechanism of action of therapeutic Igs 2-8, some of which highlightthe role of glycosylation in determining the regulatory potential of Igs 2-4. It will be interesting to see whether and how the profound basic expertise demonstrated in these articles influences or shapes the consensus discussion. If the aim was to to unite basic and clinical immunology, we should remember Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.), who stated, albeit in a different context: “Not cohabitation but consensus constitutes marriage.”

The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967

Nine days after the victory in the Six Day War the Israeli cabinet adopted a resolution which seemingly offered Egypt and Syria the territories they had just lost in exchange for contractual peace. In public and academic discourse the resolution has been presented as a ‘generous peace offer’ which was transmitted to Cairo and Damascus through the United States and was immediately rejected. The article demonstrates that the ‘generous peace offer’ was never offered to the Arabs. The cabinet resolution was mainly a diplomatic manoeuver whose aim was to gain American political support against a Soviet move at the United Nations for immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in the war. The article argues that Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister at the time, created the myth of the ‘generous peace offer’ and that it has been turned into an accepted wisdom by dozens of writers and scholars who have recycled Eban’s story unchallenged.

The Founding Father and the General: David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan

The Founding Father and the General: David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan

On Two Parallel Tracks—The Secret Jordanian-Israeli Talks (July 1967–September 1973)

The secret talks between Jordan and Israel began in 1963 and continued until the two countries signed the peace treaty in 1994. The talks are unique in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The post-Six-Day War talks were held on two tracks: one between Yaakov Herzog, the Director of the PM’s office and Zayd al-Rifa’i, King Hussein’s private secretary; the second, on a higher level, between Israeli ministers Yigal Allon and Abba Eban and the king. The two sides moved on parallel lines that could never meet. Constraints on both sides contributed to the inevitable logjam. The king genuinely hoped to reach a peace with Israel based on the principles of the Arab Summit and his talks with Nasser. Israel, on the other hand, was reluctant to commit itself to enter into peace negotiations with Jordan, avoiding serious discussion on the principles of peace. Instead it presented the Allon Plan for discussion with the king. Thus, the gap in the positions on the talks’ goals, in the components of the solution to the conflict and the peace settlement was unbridgeable. Despite this impasse both parties felt it was in their common interest to pursue the talks, which became a goal in itself. The gap was not only in the concept of peace and talks’ objectives, but in all core issues related to peace, such as the territorial issue, especially the status of Jerusalem, and interpretation of UNSCR 242. With hindsight, the core issues in the solution to the West Bank remain unchanged, but the Palestinians replaced Jordan as the main Arab party to determining the future of the West Bank.

Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviet Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War (review)

Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviet Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War, by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007. 287 pp. $26.00. The authors argue that the USSR deliberately instigated the crisis and war of 1967; that it did so in the context of blocking Israel's program; and that it committed Soviet personnel and weapons for a direct military intervention on behalf of the Arabs. According to the authors the Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Levi Eshkol, was the one who initially - against his own better judgment - instigated the May 1967 crisis, together with Yitzhak Rabin, his Chief of the IDF's General Staff, who played a role here, each of them operating on a different level. The authors begin with assurances given by Eshkol's aide to the Soviets, that the Israeli program was not ready yet, since this unconventional endeavor, including intermediate ballistic missiles ordered in France, seemed to have triggered Moscow's wrath. Hence Eshkol and his allies at home (mainly Achdut Ha'avoda nationalist-leftist politicians Yigal Allon and Israel Galili, it should be added here) allowed Moscow to extend a nuclear guarantee or umbrella to Egypt, just in case some Israeli atomic bombs were ready, and pushed Nasser to eliminate the Dimona reactor altogether, if not Israel itself. Rabin's part in this drama, whose epilogue would lead years later to the tragedy of his assassination, was purely conventional, aimed at maintaining deterrence vis-a-vis the hostile Arab States and preventing Palestinian guerillas from operating inside Israel from bases in Syria or havens in Jordan. He thus embarked upon a major retaliatory act against the then Jordanian-Palestinian village of Samu' in November 1966, prompting American wrath and a Palestinian uprising that had to be quelled by force by King Hussein. Rabin thus focused on Soviet-backed, aggressive Syria, whose radical Ba'ath regime was behind the Palestinian incursions into Israel; Damascus also directly fought Jewish farmers working a contested border land by shelling large parts of the Galilee from the Golan Heights. A series of air battles initiated by Rabin, one of which ended by downing Syrian MiGs over Damascus, was followed by open threats made by Rabin in public, to bring about a regime change in Syria. The Soviets thus operated on two levels: while trying to protect their allies in Damascus, they were given a pretext to push President Nasser of Egypt, on the other side of Israel's borders, to move his army into fortified yet empty positions along the open, hardly protected Israeli southern boarder; later he pushed out UN peacekeepers along his armistice line with Israel in Gaza, and blockaded the straits leading to Israel's southern port of Eilat. On the basis of primary sources and former Soviet officials' memoirs and interviews with Soviet military personnel, the authors describe Brezhnev's first demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean, and then assuming an extremely hostile attitude toward Israel. Previously, Eshkol presided over a rogue Israeli intelligence operation in France, which might have driven a furious General de Gaulle to cancel the delivery of French-made medium-range, nuclear-capable missiles scheduled for 1967 or early 1968. Eshkol and his Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, tried their best to find ways to lessen Washington's criticism of the Israeli program by allowing (ineffective) American inspection visits at the facility in Dimona, and also to calm Moscow down. One of these strategies might have been the message conveyed to the Kremlin that the Israeli program was not operational yet. …

Israel's Foreign Minister Eban meets President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Wilson on the Eve of the Six Day WarZaki Shalom is a senior researcher at the Ben Gurion Research Centre, Sde Boker.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. IDF GHQ/Training Dept History, The Six-Day War—The Campaign in the Egyptian Theatre, December 1971, p. 83 (Hebrew). See also Yosi Goldstein, Eshkol, A Biography, Tel Aviv, 2003, pp. 539–540 (Hebrew). 2. CIA memorandum, 19 June 1967, NSF, Country File Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Box 109, LJL. On the evacuation of United Nations forces from Sinai see Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, London, 1981, pp. 18–19. 3. CIA memorandum, 19 June 1967, NSF, Country File Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Box 109, LJL. 4. State Department memorandum, 19 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1796, National Archives (hereafter NA). See also Michael Oren, Six Days of War: The Campaign that Changed the Face of the Middle East, Tel Aviv, 2004, pp. 93–95. 5. See CIA memorandum, 19 June 1967, NSF, Country File Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Box 109, LJL 6. See CIA memorandum, 19 June 1967, NSF, Country File Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Box 109, LJL 7. Moshe Shai, ‘The Chief-of-Staff: One Punitive Operation was Insufficient for the Syrians’, (no date) Division 15, Galili, File 1–2, Container 94, Hakibbutz Hame'uchad Archives, Yad Tabenkin, Ramat Efal. 8. State Department memorandum, 18 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 2490, NA. 9. State Department memorandum, 23 May 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. XIX. 10. Discussion in the General Headquarters and government meeting, 23 May 1967, in Yemima Rosental, Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, 1974–1977, 1992–2005, Israel State Archives Publications, Jerusalem, pp. 456–457. 11. Oren, Six Days, p. 116. 12. Report from the United States Embassy in Israel to the State Department, 23 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, NA. The following is the exact wording of the British proposal: ‘We propose to study urgently, in consultation with the Americans, the question of action, in collaboration with other maritime countries concerned with access to the Gulf of Aqaba.’ Report from the British Embassy in Israel to the British Foreign Office, 23 May 1967, Public Records Office (hereafter, PRO), FO 17/483, 58902. 13. Report from the United States Embassy in Israel to the State Department, 23 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, NA. The following is the exact wording of the British proposal: ‘We propose to study urgently, in consultation with the Americans, the question of action, in collaboration with other maritime countries concerned with access to the Gulf of Aqaba.’ Report from the British Embassy in Israel to the British Foreign Office, 23 May 1967, Public Records Office (hereafter, PRO), FO 17/483, 58902 14. See the chief-of-staff's statements, Yitzhak Rabin in the government session of 23 May 1967, in Rosental, Rabin, pp. 457–458. 15. Abba Eban, Chapters in My Life, Tel Aviv, 1978, pp. 328–330 (Hebrew). 16. Report of the United States Embassy in France to the State Department, 23 May 1967, in State Department Files, The May–June Crisis 1967, Vol. I, p. 39–40. 17. Report from Israeli Embassy in France to Israeli Foreign Ministry, 24 May 1967, Hetz 4084/2, Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA). 18. Abba Eban, An Autobiography, New York, 1977, p. 337. 19. Report from the Israeli delegation in New York to the Foreign Ministry, 2 May 1967, Hetz 4078/7, ISA. See also the report from the Israeli Embassy in France to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967, Hetz 4084/2, ISA. 20. Report from the Israeli Embassy in France to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 3 June 1967, Hetz 5937/30, ISA. 21. Report from the Israeli Embassy in France to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 3 June 1967, Hetz 5937/30, ISA 22. Report from the Israeli Embassy in France to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 3 June 1967, Hetz 5937/30, ISA 23. Report from the Israeli Embassy in Britain to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 23 and 24 May 1967, File 7920/1 A, ISA. See also British Foreign Ministry memo, Eban–Wilson Conversation, 24 May 1967, PRO CO 17/483, 58902. 24. Report from the Israeli Embassy in Britain to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 23 and 24 May 1967, File 7920/1 A, ISA. See also British Foreign Ministry memo, Eban–Wilson Conversation, 24 May 1967, PRO CO 17/483, 58902 25. Report from the Israeli Embassy in Britain to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 23 and 24 May 1967, File 7920/1 A, ISA. See also British Foreign Ministry memo, Eban–Wilson Conversation, 24 May 1967, PRO CO 17/483, 58902 26. Report from the Israeli Embassy in Britain to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 23 and 24 May 1967, File 7920/1 A, ISA. See also British Foreign Ministry memo, Eban–Wilson Conversation, 24 May 1967, PRO CO 17/483, 58902

An Uneasy Relationship: American Jewish Leadership and Israel 1948–1957 (review)

An Uneasy Relationship: American Jewish Leadership and Israel 1948-1957, by Zvi Ganin. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005. 255 pp. $29.95. In this study Israeli writer Zvi Ganin discusses the dynamics of the often divided American Jewish Community as it sought to respond to the newly established State of Israel, whose leaders, especially David Ben-Gurion (Israel's first prime minister), had a very different view of Zionism from theirs. A second focus of the book is an analysis of the interaction of the American Jewish leadership with the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, many of whose top leaders were openly hostile to Israel. The book highlights the role of the American Jewish Committee, and especially its leader from 1949 to 1954, Jacob Blaustein, who was to play a key role in dealing both with the Israeli leadership and with Truman and Eisenhower. Drawing upon the Israeli State Archives, the archives of the American Jewish Committee, and the documents in the U.S. State Departments Foreign Relations of the United States series, among other sources, Ganin presents a highly readable analysis of the challenges facing Israel in its early years and the problems it had in dealing with the American Jewish Community and the U.S. Government. After beginning his book with a detailed description of a divided American Jewish Community in 1948 (Zionists [the majority], non-Zionists, led by the American Jewish Committee, and anti-Zionists, led by the American Council for Judaism), and their often hostile interactions, Ganin focuses on the lack of understanding between Israeli leaders (especially Ben-Gurion) who saw all Jews living outside of Israel as living in Exile, and American Jews who saw the United States as their Zion, and who had no intention of moving to the newly established State of Israel. Abba Eban, then Israel's ambassador to the United Nations and later to the United States, put the matter clearly (p. 71): Culturally, America's Jews feel American. There is doubt whether through the Diaspora there ever was such a Jewish community which identified so closely with the host nation as does American Jewry. And not just Jewish leaders, even the leaders of American Zionism use the terms our country, our our government in relation to the United States. Such a community was very hard for Israeli leaders such as Ben-Gurion to understand. Growing up in Russia and Eastern Europe where Jews were an often-hated minority subject to pogroms, these Israeli leaders developed the Zionist concept of the negation of the Diaspora, and assumed the American Jewish community would go the way of the German and Polish ones. The Israeli leaders simply could not understand that when American Jews referred to their nation, they meant the United States, and not the Jewish people. Nonetheless, in order not to jeopardize the aid flowing from American Jews and the U.S. Government at a time when Israel was in desperate need of such support to recover from its War of Independence and resettle hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Europe and the Arab world in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Ben-Gurion was willing to compromise on his ideological position. …

Eye on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally (review)

Reviewed by: Eye on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally Herbert M. Druks Eye on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally, by Michelle Mart. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 242 pp. $65.00. Michelle Mart describes how American moviemakers and writers came to regard Israel more favorably during the years of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies. She assumes that the public view of Israel helped influence American officials to be pro-Israel. But it is an assumption not supported by fact. Truman recognized Israel in May of 1948, but throughout his years in the White House he did not lift the arms embargo against Israel. A loan was extended to Israel, but Mart does not mention that Israel paid back the loan with interest. She claims that the Eisenhower administration grew to like and admire Israel and readily quotes Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declaring his admiration for the contribution Israel and the Jews made to the development of Christian civilization. She likewise quotes Ambassador Abba Eban as saying that the U.S. "was obviously coming to regard Israel not as a burden to be chivalrously sustained, but as an asset in the global and ideological balance." Such observations were typical of Abba Eban. He talked that way [End Page 199] when I interviewed him. But in his correspondence with the Israel Foreign Office he was greatly critical of Secretary Dulles. Frustrated by Dulles' refusal to allow Israel to puchase weapons for its own defense, Eban observed that with all of Dulles' reference to scripture he should have chosen to become a preacher rather than a diplomat. Moreover, Eban noted on February 26, 1953 that Dulles showed "nervousness and a lack of calm frightening in one holding so important a position. At times his left eye twitches, and at times, his right. He plays with his hair, now smoothing one side down with one hand and then smoothing the other side down with his second hand. He runs his pencil down the parting in his hair and then sucks his pencil. Dulles was scarcely still for a moment." While attending a Foreign Affairs Committee he doodled: "Dulles Must Go." "Freudians could explain what he really meant" (Israel Foreign Office Papers 2414/27B). In conversation with Dulles on February 26, 1953, Eban advised that Israel could be of great help to the United States in case of a Soviet threat. "Israel could put eight divisions into the field. If its airfields were enlarged and its industry increased in advance of an emergency Israel could be of great use in the event of an international crisis. One should not underrate the military value of Israel. Others might be hesitant, but we were prepared to fight along with the West." Dulles responded with: "You have given me a lot to think about. I have no reaction at the moment." But he added that he was concerned with Arab antagonism toward the British, French and to lesser extent the U.S." (Israel Foreign Office Papers 2414/27B). Those who like Michelle Mart conduct research on Israel and the U.S. should not only learn to use American archival sources, but they should research the Israeli archives as well. This is something that should be done most carefully, especially since individuals like professors Stephen M. Walt of Harvard and John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago have chosen to publish diatribes against Israel, claiming that the Israel lobby controls U.S. Middle East foreign policy. While the author claims that the focus of her study is "the image of Israel in American culture" and that she did not intend to make her work "a comprehensive history of American-Israeli relations," she does attempt to show how American public views of Israel impacted on the formulators of American policy towards Israel and the Arabs. She observes that Israelis "came to be accepted as insiders once they were re-constructed to Americans" (whatever that is supposed to mean). Israelis were viewed as pioneers, as builders and farmers, while the Arabs were regarded as backward intruders seeking to destroy that which Israel was building. Writers...

Interview With Abba Eban, 11 March 1976

Interview With Abba Eban, 11 March 1976

Interview With Abba Eban, II March 1976

ABBA EBAN WAS OFTEN REFERRED to as the voice of Israel. He was one of Israel's most brilliant, eloquent, and skillful representatives abroad in the struggle for independence and in the first 25 years of statehood. He was less effective in the rough and tumble of Israeli domestic politics because he lacked the common touch and, more importantly, because he lacked a power base of his own. Nevertheless, he played a major role in the formulation and conduct of Israel's foreign policy during a crucial period in the country's history.

Relationships of American jews with Israel: What we know and what we need to know

WHAT WE KNOW Distancing from Israel: The Evidence In May 1967, millions of American Jews were transfixed by events unfolding in the Middle East. Israel stood on the brink of war, threatened by Arab armies on all its borders. The drama was also being played out in the United Nations, punctuated by the memorable eloquence of Israel's ambassador, Abba Eban, as well as in the corridors of power in Washington, where Israel's representatives sought American diplomatic and material support. To many American Jews, the threat to Israel's very existence, the possibility that millions of Jews might perish, and the seeming indifference (or overt hostility) of the world's major powers aroused painful memories. It had been only twenty-two years earlier that the few survivors of the Holocaust were liberated from the concentration camps and the full horror and tragedy of the Nazi atrocities were revealed.