Employers often encourage, incentivize, or even require their employees to engage in politics in a variety of ways. For example, employers often encourage employees to vote, press employees to support particular political candidates or policies, require employees to participate in political events, or ask employees to contact elected officials to advocate for the employer’s interests. Such practices are all forms of employer mobilization. This essay considers the threat that employer mobilization poses to employees’ speech rights, specifically employees’ right against compelled speech. I argue that employer mobilization practices are liable to infringe on employees’ right against compelled speech when three conditions are met: (1) the employer asks or encourages employees to express a particular political message that is inconsistent with some employees’ beliefs and values; (2) the employer forces some employees to express the employer’s message; and (3) the employees are not employed in a role or an organization in which expressing or supporting such messages is an essential part of the job.

Bounded rationality presents a challenge to the notion that virtue is a capacity for knowledge, suggesting that judgments concerning the salience of specific facts are, in some cases, an indication of one’s incapacity to appreciate the full range of normatively salient facts. This problem can be mitigated by linking an account of the virtues with a theory of organizations. From this perspective, virtue is inherently shaped by the norms structuring one’s role(s) and is linked to the complementary set of roles, that is, the organization, in which one is participating through the virtues of loyalty and obedience. Within this perspective, human cognitive limitations are made to be strengths, allowing one to focus on a narrow set of reasons for action linked with one’s role to better achieve salient aims as a member of the organization than one could as an isolated individual.

This paper employs Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to interpret ‘quiet quitting’ – the practice of limiting work efforts to contracted requirements – as a strategic response by workers facing misrecognition in their work environment. Honneth argues that misrecognition in any one of three social spheres (the family, political society, and the workplace) constitutes disrespect and causes psychological harm. While Honneth contends that experiences of disrespect tend to motivate collective “struggles for recognition,” we suggest that quiet quitters present an alternative response to disrespect, individually seeking recognition in other social spheres rather than engaging in collective action. Further, we draw on Honneth to suggest that the contemporary “entrepreneurial” work ethic – the widespread expectation that workers invest emotionally in their work role – can in practice undermine workplace recognition, contributing to quiet quitters’ compensatory emphasis on recognitive relations outside of work. This recognition-theoretical approach extends current discussions around quiet quitting and yields valuable insights for management theory and practice regarding the critical role of genuine employee recognition in promoting individual well-being and meaningful work experiences.

Elizabeth Anderson claims that the prevailing culture of business is one of domination. “Most workplace governments in the United States are dictatorships, in which bosses. . don’t merely govern workers; they dominate them” (2017, p. xxii; italics in the original). If this diagnosis is correct, then the culture of business poses a significant threat to human liberty, as each year millions of people in the employ of businesses spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the job. This essay provides a further argument supporting Anderson’s analysis, by extending her treatment of Adam Smith and drawing on his claim about the potentially mind-numbing effects on workers of extreme division of labor. Smith’s analysis, though consistent with Anderson’s, implies that the problem is more worrisome than she allows, and accordingly that Anderson’s own remedy might be insufficient. Our Anderson/Smith argument suggests that worker unfreedom might warrant more aggressive institutional remedy.