This article highlights some of the toxic dimensions of Boris Johnson’s legacy as UK prime minister through a detailed examination of the key narratives and discursive tactics he employed as he gave evidence to the UK COVID-19 inquiry. In doing so, we draw upon the concept of ‘toxic leadership’, a term that has been developed through the work of Lipman-Blumen and others to highlight the damaging impact that some types of leaders can have on their followers and the organisations they lead. We contend that the inquiry provides an illuminating focal point for an exploration of Johnson’s toxic legacy. On the one hand, it brought to light myriad details of Johnson’s toxic handling of the pandemic and the damage his decisions – and often lack of decisiveness – brought to many of his most ardent followers and the reputation of the government he led. On the other hand, as our analysis shows, Johnson’s testimony also brought to light the fact that he continued to rely on some of these same toxic behaviours to defend his already tarnished record. Overall, we hope to demonstrate the utility that a focus on discourse and rhetoric can bring to the study of toxic political leadership.

Populism has been a defining element of Latin American political systems during specific historical periods. Regionalism remains a defining feature of international relations practices in Latin America. Autonomy is one of the leading concepts in the study of foreign policy and regionalism in Latin America. This article analyzes the links between populism, autonomy, and regionalism. It examines whether there is a connection between populist movements and the promotion of regional initiatives that foster autonomist policies. We argue that no inherent link exists between populism and autonomist regionalism; rather, this relationship depends on the specific variety of populism that emerges in each historical context. Based on De La Torre’s framework, we identify three distinct varieties of populism in Latin America: classical, neoliberal, and radical. Our analysis examines which varieties of populism fostered connections between autonomy and regionalism, focusing on comparative case studies of Juan Domingo Perón’s government in Argentina and Juan Velasco Alvarado’s administration in Peru.

Right-wing populism entails discursive divisions both between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, and between ‘the majority’ in society and ‘minorities’. In both instances, the former are attributed with positive attributes and characteristics, while the latter are invariably ascribed negative connotations and qualities, to the extent of being portrayed as inimical to ‘the people’ or ‘the majority’, and possible even a threat to national identity or security. Through such ideologically define or socially constructed binary divisions and polarities, ‘the people’ or ‘the majority’ are portrayed as being decent, hard-working, imbued with common-sense, law-abiding, loyal, and patriotic. By contrast, the ‘the elite’ is usually depicted as being corrupt, decadent, incompetent, out-of-touch, self-serving, and unpatriotic, while sundry ‘minorities’ are often accused of being deviant, disloyal, practicing unorthodox lifestyles, refusing to integrate, and subscribing to alien, or even subversive, values which are inimical to dominant or indigenous culture. Having constructed such binary divisions, the populist Right deploys discourses which perpetuates the identification of so-called ‘enemies within’ or ‘alien others’ against whom ‘the people’ and ‘the majority’ can be mobilised. Such discursive mechanisms serve simultaneously to divert popular attention from the failings or negative consequences of neoliberalism and/or right-wing policies (such as corporate greed and corruption, increasing job insecurity, inequality, and poverty), and promoted divide-and-rule, by persuading ‘the people’ and ‘the majority’ that socio-economic problems are the fault either of ‘the elite’ or sundry ‘alien’ minorities. These then serve to legitimise authoritarian policy responses, accompanied by further discourses, often entailing Biblical or military imagery and symbolism, about a Manichean battle between good and evil, or the nation-state facing a serious, even existential, threat from sundry internal or external enemies.

This article examines the rhetorical construction of ethos in British and Norwegian political discourse, demonstrating how political, cultural and media environments shape the credibility and authority of political leaders. While British political rhetoric often emphasises individual competence and personal narratives, Norwegian political rhetoric tends to foreground collective achievements and egalitarian values. Through a comparative analysis of key speeches and political performances, this article explores how competence, authenticity and leadership are projected in distinct democratic traditions. By situating these rhetorical strategies within their respective political and media contexts, this article highlights the role of ethos in shaping political persuasion across differing electoral and political cultures.

“Populism” is a contested term, receiving multiple qualifications in the historical record. From classic to radical populism, the scholarship on Latin America’s experience is no exception. While such efforts to grasp the phenomenon underscore its inherent plurality, they fail to recognize its limited diversity, leading to questions about their analytical validity. To address this situation, we analyze a sample of speeches of six presidents in 21st-century Latin America related, to different extents, to regional integration. This topic is particularly relevant given the growing attention to specific issues in the literature, where foreign policy stands out, and the contested nature of regionalism itself. We employ sociocultural viability theory’s typology, which depicts four ideal-typical ways of perceiving, ordering, and justifying social arrangements: individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism (which are all active), and fatalism (which is passive). The results show that the three active worldviews account for all varieties of populism. By so doing, this framework brings a degree of order to the debate and points to promising avenues for further research.

For most political science scholars, populism is conceived as a domestic phenomenon. For decades, populism has been considered either as a democratic deviation that threatens the rule of law or as a legitimate discourse that encourages participation. Beyond this ongoing debate, it is necessary to consider whether populism has had effects on regional integration or cooperation. Such is the case with Latin American Pink Tide governments, most of which were populists. Those regimes were different from the most well-known Latin American populist leaders, such as Juan Domingo Perón, Getúlio Vargas, or Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, as new leftist governments promoted a regional cooperation framework. In 2004, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) was founded; two years later, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was created; and in 2008, this was the case for the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Unlike traditional populists, who focused their interests on domestic politics, this new radical populism has had a regional scope. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to explore how populism has been reshaping regional cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last 20 years. The research is divided into three parts. First, we explore the causes of the reemergence of populism in Latin America from the 2000s. Second, we analyze how Pink Tide populisms proposed and institutionalized a regional integration and cooperation framework on three fronts: ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC. Finally, we discuss the current relevance of populism to regional integration dynamics, two decades after the Pink Tide populist governments’ appearance.

This article examines how the Constitutional Court of Colombia (CCC) balances its role as guardian of the Colombian constitutional order while engaging in regional integration processes across Latin America. Through an analysis of constitutional theory, institutional development and the Colombian political context since 1991, the study explores how the Court interprets constitutional integration clauses while navigating increasing populist pressures. Moving beyond reductionist views of populism as mere demagoguery, the article analyses case studies of two contrasting populist leaders: conservative authoritarian Álvaro Uribe (2002–10) and progressive reformist Gustavo Petro (2022–26). By examining the theoretical foundations of constitutional guardianship and the institutional framework within which the Court operates, this analysis highlights the complex relationship between constitutional courts, regional integration and populist challenges in Latin America. The findings demonstrate how the CCC has developed judicial approaches that, while focused on domestic constitutional matters, contribute to broader regional judicial discourse. This theoretical exploration underscores how constitutional courts can shape regional integration processes while safeguarding their domestic institutional legitimacy. The Colombian experience offers valuable insights into the evolving role of constitutional courts in balancing national sovereignty with regional legal developments in an era of rising populism.

Occupational health research shows that work is no better for health and well-being than its work environment and employment conditions. Yet, the assumption that work is health promoting as well as rehabilitating is central in social insurance and labour market measures. Based on occupational health research and theories of motivation and stress, Basic Income is discussed here as a resource that motivates and enables further resource gain and protects against stress and related illnesses, such as depression and exhaustion. Applying research and theories from occupational health research to the demands and resources in what is here labelled the ‘psychosocial welfare environment’ elucidates the effects of the conditionality and means testing of different welfare measures, as well as those of Basic Income in various experiments, on health, well-being and labour market participation. The difference between ethical and evidence-based arguments concerning Basic Income is discussed from the perspective of the workfare society, where the evidence-based effects of unconditionality meet ideological convictions concerning poverty and the myth of the work cure.

The year 2024 marks 25 years since ‘Chavismo’ took office in Venezuela. Commencing with Hugo Chávez in 1999, and continuing with Nicolás Maduro (2013–), the Bolivarian revolution has challenged local and foreign elites by retaking control of the country’s oil industry, rejected US hegemony, and promoted greater political and economic independence through the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean. While Chávez and Maduro’s populist rhetoric has been evident during both presidencies, both leaders have differed in the effectiveness of their speeches and media presence. Also, while Venezuela’s push for regional integration has continued in recent years despite serious setbacks to such projects as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – People’s Trade Treaty (ALBA–TCP), Petrocaribe, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the effectiveness of Caracas’ foreign policy has diminished under Maduro due to the impact of US economic sanctions, a decline in global oil prices from 2014 onwards and changing administrations in Brasilia from the progressive presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Vana Rousseff (2003–16) to the hard-right governments of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro (2016–23). Analysing these developments and the rift between Caracas and Brasilia over the 2024 presidential election result in Venezuela, this article will explore some of the trajectories of Caracas’ foreign policy towards the promotion of regionalism in the Americas while seeking to contrast some of the successes and failures between the Chávez and Maduro administrations.

This introduction explores the paradox of Latin America’s weak regional integration despite its shared linguistic, historical, and cultural ties, alongside strong public support for cooperation. It situates this regional challenge within broader global trends, contrasting Latin America’s fluctuating and fragile integration efforts with the more institutionalised and sustained regionalism observed in other regions around the world. The discussion focuses on the role of populism, examining how it influences integration by fostering collective action but, at times, prioritising national sovereignty over supranational commitments. The introduction also considers the historical legacies of colonialism, socio-economic inequalities, and competing ideologies – such as Pan-Americanism and Latin Americanism – that shape these dynamics. By addressing key questions regarding the influence of populism on integration processes and examining case studies across different contexts, this special issue provides a timely intervention into debates about the relationship between populism and regional integration. It offers new perspectives on how ideologies, power structures, social forces, and historical legacies have shaped integration processes in Latin America while connecting these developments to global patterns of regional cooperation.