Abstract Social determinants influence multiple life outcomes including depression, poverty, and mortality. While causal beliefs shape public views on these issues, studies have remained siloed across disciplines. We surveyed 1000 UK adults on 43 social and non‐social risk factors for these outcomes, using a broader set of social factors than previous work. We ask which social determinants are perceived to be causally important, how these are weighted relative to non‐social causes, and whether this differs across outcomes. To explore psychological predictors of beliefs, we measured political orientation, subjective socioeconomic status, sense of control, and material deprivation. Respondents viewed social factors as more causal for poverty and depression than for mortality. Left‐leaning views and lower perceived control were linked to stronger causal beliefs in social factors. These findings reveal that UK respondents perceive a causal role for social determinants that is comparable to that of non‐social factors.

Abstract Although performative activism is often disparaged as actions meant to increase the participant's social status rather than make real social change, not much is known about what defines it, and who, why, and where people participate in performative activism, and indeed, if it is a bad thing. The current study examined these questions in a qualitative case study of thirty students on a small residential college campus. We looked at how students understood performative activism in terms of identity (in‐group vs. ally), site (offline vs. online), and motivation (ideological vs. peer‐ or self‐focused). We found that students almost universally reported having participated in performative activism in the past, both offline and online, for causes related and unrelated to their social identities, and had multiple motives for participating. It was rare for a student to report completely peer‐ or self‐focused motivations for participating. We conclude that performative activism, though disparaged, seems to be a normal part of young adult political development.

Abstract The purpose of the current studies was to examine perceptions of sex crime severity, framing, and framing congruency on mock juror decision making. Study 1 (N = 230) was exploratory and investigated lay perceptions of legally equivalent sex crimes for both a typical victim and perpetrator. Participants were presented with six sex crimes and answered questions regarding expected nonconsensual behaviors, physical and psychological injuries, perceived severity, and injury likelihood associated with each sex crime. Rape, criminal sexual act, and gross sexual imposition were perceived as high, moderate, and low severity sex crimes, respectively. Informed by Study 1, Study 2 (N = 545) tested whether sex crime frame severity (i.e., high severity versus average or low) or framing congruency among the prosecution and defence would influence mock juror judgments in the context of a criminal trial. Mock jurors read a mock trial, responded to identical measures from Study 1, and additionally completed measures regarding their perceptions of the victim, defendant, and rendered a verdict. Framing influenced perceptions of the defendant rather than the victim or verdict. No significant results emerged regarding framing congruency. Taken together, results from both studies suggest that equivalent sex crimes are perceived differently based on frame alone.

Abstract Understanding the social‐psychological mechanisms underlying parental attitudes toward school‐based sexuality education is increasingly important in polarized societies. Guided by the Dual Process Motivational (DPM) model, the current research examined how right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and religiosity relate to opposition to school‐based sexuality education among Greek parents. Two studies were conducted with a combined sample of 643 parents (Study 1, 376 participants, Mage = 38.47, SDage = 7.39; 336 female participants; Study 2, 267 participants, Mage = 44.91, SDage = 6.77; 240 female respondents) residing in Greece. Data were analyzed using bivariate correlations, multiple regression, and bootstrapped moderation analysis. Results showed that both RWA and SDO were negatively associated with support for school‐based sexuality education. Furthermore, higher religiosity intensified the negative relationship between RWA and attitudes toward sexuality education. These findings highlight how ideological and religious worldviews may shape parental opposition to sexuality education, offering new directions for research and policy development.

Abstract Since the outbreak of the COVID‐19 pandemic, citizens of many countries have been faced with health‐related fear, as well as anti‐establishment and anti‐governmental anger. This emotional landscape colored the ongoing efforts by the authorities to convince citizens to accept various public policy proposals. In two studies (total N = 528, one preregistered) conducted in Poland in two different situations, we focused on the role of the simultaneously evoked pandemic fear and anti‐government anger in shaping attitudes toward the pandemic regulations. For negatively evaluated proposals, both of these emotions worked in opposite directions: fear was associated with increasing support, while anger was associated with increasing rejection. However, for positively evaluated policy proposals, fear and anger worked in consonance, and both were associated with increasing acceptance of the proposed regulations. Thus, while fear seems to motivate the acceptance of even negatively evaluated proposals that are seen as protective ones, anger works to amplify or polarize the proposals’ basic evaluations. Our findings could help plan the implementation of public policies in societies in times of turbulent emotional landscapes.

Abstract Diversity education in the K‐12 years is a contentious issue in the contemporary US context. Given evidence that parental identity influences beliefs about and support for diversity education, we qualitatively explored cisgender‐heterosexual and LGBTQ+ parents’ (N = 609) beliefs about the appropriateness of inclusive educational policies in K‐12 classrooms. We collected qualitative data on parental perceptions of inclusive signals in classrooms (e.g., displaying a rainbow flag) and on perceptions of inclusive curriculum (whether children should learn about diversity at school/from teachers or at home/from parents). Parents’ responses reflected variability in support for inclusive signals. Cisgender‐heterosexual parents were more likely to endorse that cues should not be allowed and were less likely to indicate holistic support of cues compared to LGBTQ+ parents. For inclusive curriculum, cisgender‐heterosexual parents were more likely than LGBTQ+ parents to endorse that diversity information should be discussed only at home with parents. We contextualize parents’ responses within contemporary political rhetoric (e.g., discussions of Parents’ Bills of Rights) and highlight implications for educators and policymakers.

Abstract During the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, two supporter groups of presidential candidates exhibited negative attitudes toward each other. This study aimed to explain the mediating effect of collective narcissism on the relationship between three predictors (religiosity, group‐based anger, and shared reality) and attitudes toward opposing groups. We conducted two surveys before and during the official campaign period (Study 1, n = 300) and after the official campaign period until one day after the election (Study 2, n = 158). The results of Study 1 showed that group‐based anger and shared reality had a significant relationship with negative attitudes toward the opposing group. In Study 2, collective narcissism was found to significantly predict negative attitudes toward the opposing group and mediate the relationship between shared reality and negative attitudes. We also found a mediating effect of collective narcissism on the relationship between group‐based anger and negative attitudes. These findings indicate that the strength of collective narcissism in the ingroup can predict negative attitudes toward the opposing group.

Abstract For many people, the coronavirus pandemic meant an enormous and existential loss of control. At the same time, an increase in right‐wing extremist attitudes like xenophobia could be observed in Germany. In this study, we hypothesize that the loss of control caused by the pandemic has contributed to the rise in xenophobic and anti‐Semitic attitudes in Germany. We propose that this occurs through an attempt to restore control via elements of a revised authoritarian syndrome understood as both the classic authoritarian dynamic of aggression, submission and conventionalism on the one hand, and a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other. In a representative, probability‐based study, N = 2522 participants were surveyed on locus of control, right‐wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, xenophobia, and anti‐Semitism. It was found that right‐wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality mediated the relationship between external locus of control and xenophobia (partial mediation) and anti‐Semitism (full mediation). Surprisingly, internal control beliefs had a direct effect on right‐wing authoritarianism—an effect that also leads to increased resentment. We conclude that social crises make people particularly vulnerable to regaining control via conspiracy theories and authoritarianism, which harbors dangers such as right‐wing extremism as a consequence. Limitations are discussed.

Abstract While much research on churches and the LGBTQ+ communities has been done in North America, little research has focused on this topic in Europe. Since 71% of European LGBTQ+ respondents agreed that better acceptance by religious leaders would allow them to live more comfortably as LGBTQ+ people, we investigated the types of messages and imagery that help and hinder Swiss LGBTQ+ Christians’ feelings of acceptance within churches. We also investigated the impact this content had on the feelings of acceptance of Swiss straight Christians. We found that when LGBTQ+ Christians were presented with affirming church messages and imagery, they felt significantly more accepted. Conversely, LGBTQ+ Christians who were presented with non‐affirming church messages and imagery felt significantly less accepted. Straight Christians did not evidence significantly more or less feelings of acceptance in either condition, demonstrating affirming church messages and imagery serve as identity safety cues that help LGBTQ+ Christians the most without excluding straight Christians. In a context like Switzerland, where certain churches can be public institutions, institutional churches should consider the impact their messages and imagery have on LGBTQ+ Christians, and the broader LGBTQ+ communities, to cultivate a space of belonging for all.