ABSTRACTThe concept of autonomy is central to many debates in aesthetics. However, exactly what it means to be autonomous in our aesthetic engagements is somewhat unclear in the philosophical literature. The normative significance of autonomy is also unclear and hotly debated. In this essay, I propose a method for clarifying this elusive concept by distinguishing three distinct senses or varieties of aesthetic autonomy: experiential autonomy, competence‐based autonomy, and personal autonomy. On this taxonomy autonomy is a context‐sensitive concept and autonomy applies to several different moments or stages of aesthetic appreciation. Throughout this critical discussion, important issues concerning the nature of aesthetic appreciation are also explored.

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ABSTRACTConventionalism about necessity was deemed hopeless for a long time. The philosophical landscape, however, is shifting now with recent work in modal metaphysics locating the source of necessity in some kind of convention, albeit non‐linguistic. Modal neo‐conventionalists claim that a proposition is necessary just when it is true and is classified as such as a matter of convention. But what is the function of adopting a convention about necessity? And what are these conventions that distinguish what is possible from what is impossible, anyway? In this paper, I first offer an elucidation of the two accounts of neo‐conventionalism, which I call ‘worlds‐based neo‐conventionalism’ and ‘axiom‐based neo‐conventionalism’. Then, I discuss a number of pressing questions that modal neo‐conventionalism faces. The moral is that neo‐conventionalists have some work to do in order for the account to be explanatorily satisfactory.

ABSTRACTThis article explores the significance of engaging in intercultural reversals of perspectives by reconstructing Voltaire's reflections on the relationship between China and Europe. It highlights the ensuing ethics of universal religious tolerance in this civilizational comparison. Voltaire employed China as a heuristic model primarily to criticize the intolerance and fanaticism of French Catholics. He also used the methodology of intercultural reversals of perspectives to articulate his arguments for universal religious toleration. This paper's focus on the philosophical reception of China reveals the emergence of what we call “intercultural self‐critique” and an important conception of religious toleration during the European Enlightenment.

ABSTRACTSome artworks are aesthetically better than others. But can bad artworks have certain merits in virtue of being bad? Can something be so bad that it is good? In this paper I distinguish several interpretations of the question and consider whether contemporary theories of aesthetic value can render such a claim true. I also present a handful of desirable features which a plausible theory of the value of bad art should satisfy.

AbstractValues, and a critique of values, are at the center of Nietzsche's philosophical work. He famously proposes to launch a “revaluation” of values. But this raises a number of philosophical questions about the nature of values for Nietzsche, and how he proposes to critique them. I will begin by tracing Nietzsche's descriptive psychology of valuing. Then I will look to Nietzsche's sociology of values: what is it for a framework of values to be ascendant at a given time and place? We will next turn to the mode of value critique that Nietzsche employs. Then we take up the question of whether there is an overarching value for Nietzsche (such as power or life, for example). Finally, I will turn to the question of whether such values might have genuine normative authority. In other words, is Nietzsche's evaluative schema simply his preferred outlook? Or does it have a more secure claim on the attention of others?

ABSTRACTWe ordinarily use epistemic concepts to evaluate our moral views. We know certain things are wrong, we are sometimes uncertain about the morally best thing to do, we think there are rational and irrational ways of reaching moral conclusions, etc. Like most meta ethicists, expressivists aim to explain this; they want to offer accounts of our moral thought, talk, and practice. However, most expressivists think moral thought and talk are fundamentally non‐representational or desire‐like. Critics have argued that this makes the view incompatible with central aspects of our epistemic evaluations. In this paper, I survey the main epistemic challenges for expressivism, highlight their interconnections, and discuss the most promising responses.