Abstract Rigorous studies published within the past eight years have found diametrically opposed results regarding racial discrimination. Some have found that racial discrimination is very rare; others that racial discrimination is very common. The paradox is that they are all well-conducted studies. In this paper, I show why there is no paradox, and the two sets of findings are completely compatible.

Abstract The dominance of conflict theory in contemporary sociology has contributed to critical blind spots, including the discipline’s limited attention to social progress and the conditions that foster it. This paper traces the rise and fall of functionalism, examines current blind spots in sociology such as rising living standards and declines in racial and gender inequality, and identifies the theoretical and ideological factors that contribute to these omissions. The discipline can be better equipped to explain social progress by using a broader array of theoretical tools and embracing greater ideological and moral pluralism. Doing so would make sociology more relevant to public conversations about important social issues that will resonate with people from across the political spectrum and increase public trust in sociological teaching and research.

Abstract Elites can be differentiated from non-elites by their status-enhancing attributes: their accomplishments, expertise, and group memberships. Elitism is the belief that elites deserve epistemic deference because they better understand the workings of the world. Psychological elitism posits the existence of a class of elites who possess specialized knowledge of subconscious (motivational and cognitive) drivers of human judgment that is beyond the ken of non-elites. This article challenges whether psychological elites deserve deference. The central problem is the elusiveness of ground-truth standards for determining the true drivers of judgments. To warrant deference, psychological elites must demonstrate that their reasoning operates free of the same subconscious distortions ascribed to non-elites. Absent such demonstrations, it is fair game—under the very theories that psychological elites endorse—to question the competence of psychological elites to second-guess the true reasons underlying the views of non-elites.

Abstract Sociologists are not eager to talk about laws, and there is little work done towards formulating laws in the social sciences. Naïve ideas about laws, which see them as singular and exceptionless entities, are easy prey for common attacks against social scientific laws. I argue that the general avoidance of talking about laws of sociology is based on misconceptions about what laws are like in the natural sciences. In this paper, common arguments against social scientific laws are taken under scrutiny and rejected. Overly strict definitions of laws will rob not only the social sciences but almost all sciences of laws. Scientific laws are inherently related to causality. For a good definition of laws, we need to rely on the regularity view of causation. I agree with the web-of-laws approach that laws are a set of axioms that are derived from causal regularities in the state of affairs of the world. I will then argue that laws are necessary for the social sciences to become mature in Kuhnian terms.

Abstract This study begins by outlining the transparency paradox: that trust in science requires transparency, but being transparent about science, medicine and government reduces trust in science. A solution to the paradox is then advanced here: it is argued that, rather than just thinking in terms of transparency and opacity, it is important to think about what institutions are being transparent about. By attending to the particulars of transparency – especially with respect to whether good or bad news is disclosed – it is revealed that transparency about good news increases trust whereas transparency about bad news decreases it, thus explaining the apparent paradox. The apparent solution: to ensure that there is always only good news to report, which might require lying. This study concludes by emphasizing how problematic it is that, currently, the best way to increase public trust is to lie, suggesting that a better way forward (and the real solution to the transparency paradox) would be to resolve the problem of the public overidealizing science through science education and communication to eliminate the naïve view of science as infallible.