The rapid global diffusion of digital technologies has prompted jurisdictions to abandon traditional effects-based competition enforcement in favor of rigid ex ante regulatory regimes. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), often viewed as a "model law," exemplifies this shift by imposing per se prohibitions on a catalogue of practices deemed inherently anti-competitive. Among these, the categorical condemnation of tying and bundling is particularly striking. Unlike other DMA-listed practices, tying has a long, contested history in industrial economics, where it is associated with both foreclosure risks and significant efficiency gains.This paper argues that the transplantation of per se prohibitions on tying into ex ante frameworks neglects economic nuance and misrepresents technological reality. Through a comparative analysis of EU jurisprudence, existing Indian competition law, and the proposed Indian Digital Competition Bill, the paper demonstrates that earlier effects-based approaches were better equipped to distinguish exclusionary tying from welfare-enhancing "technological integrations." It further contends that digital markets do not eliminate classical efficiencies; rather, they intensify them through deep product integrations. Using a brief case study of an AI product, the paper illustrates how rigid rules misclassify innovation as anti-competitive and shows how minor exemptions in draft laws often produce legal uncertainty. Ultimately, the paper contends that the per se illegality of tying reflects political choices over sound economics. It suggests that emerging economies, particularly India, should modernize their effects-based jurisprudence instead of adopting blanket bans.

Claims of unfairness often arise when individuals’ expectations are violated. Evaluating such claims requires understanding the nature and basis of those expectations. This paper examines farmers’ fairness perceptions through two case studies: policy changes to water access rights and the use of dicamba in agricultural areas. We illustrate how expectations are rooted in identifiable bases, propose methods for uncovering those bases, and assess their presence in farmers’ statements. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of identifying expectation bases, enabling more objective assessments of unfairness claims. This approach offers an alternative to normative fairness frameworks and has implications for antitrust and competition policy. In markets where concentration and power asymmetries are prevalent, fairness perceptions influence participation, trust, and regulatory legitimacy. Understanding expectation-based fairness claims can help policy-makers evaluate harms not captured by traditional metrics and design more responsive competition and contract policies.

In Cung Le v. Zuffa , a class of mixed martial arts fighters accused the major promoter of unlawful monopsonization of the MMA fighter labor market. Since the case settled before trial, we have not heard from the jury whether Zuffa was, in fact, a monopsonist. Similarly, Zuffa’s business conduct has not been found to be competitively unreasonable. The plaintiff’s damage methodology went unchallenged, and the settlement terms have gone unexamined. In this article, we explore some of these issues.

The elimination of double marginalization has been an important consideration in recent updates to the U.S. Horizontal and Vertical Merger Guidelines, in particular, and the evaluation of whether vertical mergers are pro- or anticompetitive, in general. This article extends frameworks for analyzing the effects of eliminating double marginalization on prices from situations with upstream and downstream monopolies to encompass Cournot oligopolies both upstream and downstream.

This Article summarizes and criticizes the DOJ/FTC’s 2023 Merger (M&A) Guidelines. Part I argues that the Agencies’ claim that the Guidelines are not binding, violates the antitrust laws’ addressees’ constitutional right to fair notice . Part II discusses the Agencies’ failure to articulate their understanding of the (M&A)-related tests of illegality the Clayton and Sherman Acts respectively, promulgate. Part III argues that the Agencies’ account of the U.S. antitrust law’s goals are ill-formulated and includes some goals of questionable desirability. Part IV explains why “market definitions” are inherently comprehensively arbitrary and why market-oriented approaches to analyzing the legality of (M&A)s are therefore inaccurate and their use by the Agencies is unconstitutional and avoidable. Part V delineates the various ways in which (M&A)s can affect the intensity of price-competition, analyzes the determinants of these possible impacts, and points out that the Guidelines mis-state the relevance of many such determinants and totally ignore many other such determinants. Part VI analyzes the various ways in which (M&A)s can affect the intensity of investment-competition, analyzes the determinants of the magnitudes of each of these possible impacts, points out that the Guidelines provide little information about the approaches the Agencies will take to these issues, and argues that the Agencies do not understand the determinants of the effectiveness of potential competition and may subscribe to the erroneous limit-pricing theory. Part VII delineates the correct way to analyze whether an (M or A) violates the Sherman Act and points out that the Guidelines provide almost no information about the way in which the DOJ will approach this issue. Part VIII criticizes various positions that the Guidelines take on the antitrust illegality of vertical (M&A)s.

The dynamic competition approach defines an improvement path for antitrust law. Interested in competitive realities more than political activities, the growing body of scholarship studying dynamic competition (i.e., competition through technology) wants to make antitrust diagnosis and analysis more accurate without sacrificing administrability. At a high level, the dynamic competition approach appears to some as a twenty-first-century equivalent of the Chicago school of antitrust. This article shows that the analogy is only partially correct. Unlike the Chicago school of antitrust law, the dynamic competition approach is innovation oriented, empirical, enforcement friendly, and interdisciplinary. To illustrate this distinction more concretely, the article reviews past cases through the lens of the dynamic competition approach. It concludes that the dynamic competition approach is the natural evolution for all systems of antitrust law that reassess doctrine in light of the progression of economic and technical understanding of competition.

This article questions the extraterritorial scope of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) in relation to the Western Balkans. We argue that the complex interplay between the requirement to adopt the DMA as part of the European Union (EU) accession process and the region’s limited capacity to enforce it may harm competition and consumer welfare. Moreover, it could diminish the EU’s appeal in the region. Given the potential lack of beneficial effects even after formal adoption, countries in the Western Balkans may turn to alternative regulatory models for digital market competition. These developments raise concerns about the effectiveness of the EU’s digital regulatory agenda beyond its borders. In response, we propose that the EU reassess the DMA’s extraterritorial reach to support better adoption and enforcement in the Western Balkans. A more tailored approach could help ensure that the DMA achieves its goals without producing unintended negative consequences in candidate countries.

This paper provides an overview of the changes in the regulation of vertical agreements in Croatian competition law from the adoption of the initial legislative act to the present day. Croatian competition law has evolved significantly since the 1995 enactment of the original Act on the Protection of Market Competition (ZZTN), which aligned with European Union practices and standards, particularly former Article 81 of the EC Treaty and its associated regulations. Vertical agreements, which are contracts between companies operating at different levels of the supply chain (e.g., manufacturers and distributors), have been subject to regulatory scrutiny due to their potential to limit competition. However, these agreements also have the potential to increase market efficiency, particularly by allowing new entrants to penetrate the market. The initial adoption of the block exemption regulation for vertical agreements marked the beginning of Croatia’s alignment with the EU’s economic approach, focusing on the balance between the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of these agreements. The evolution of the regulation of vertical agreements in Croatian competition law from the adoption of the block exemption regulation to the present day reflects a shift toward a more flexible, economically driven approach. Key milestones from 2003 to 2023, specially the amendments in 2009, 2013 and 2021, highlight a consistent effort to align with EU standards while fostering market competitiveness and reducing regulatory burdens. This shift aims to balance regulatory control with market freedoms, particularly for SMEs. Moving forward, the effective implementation of these changes will depend on how well stakeholders adapt to the new system of competition law enforcement, which emphasizes economic analysis and proactive compliance. Above amendments have further streamlined the regulatory process, removing the requirement for mandatory notifications of vertical agreements to the competition authority, thus fostering a culture of compliance among businesses. These changes are intended to promote greater efficiency, reduce administrative burdens and encourage companies to take an active role in ensuring compliance. The current regulatory approach maintains a focus on limiting anti-competitive effects while promoting market efficiencies and recognizing the importance of economic assessment over formal criteria. Companies are now responsible for conducting their own economic assessments to determine compliance, which requires a deeper understanding of the competitive impact of vertical agreements.

The paper explores the development of the institutional capacity of the Serbian competition authority by observing the evolution of its competencies and assesses the impact of both external and internal drivers on its administrative capacity and enforcement. The analysis highlights the necessity of institution building for efficient competition policy enforcement and tracks the development and progress within the context of negotiations to join the European Union (EU), with special focus on proactive measures based on soft enforcement. The hypotheses of the paper are largely confirmed by the analyzed data, based on which further recommendations are given. Observing the gradual strengthening of institutional capacities of the Serbian competition authority, the key driver of development was the impact of guidance received in the context of EU negotiations and assistance provided through multiple capacity building projects. There is room for improvement, but the achieved progress is respectable.