ABSTRACT Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.

ABSTRACT Public financial information plays a critical role in the takeover market by helping acquirers search for and value potential targets. Using a difference-in-differences research design around a regulatory disclosure mandate that changed the granularity of financial disclosure for certain privately held banks, we find that banks with reduced disclosure are less likely to be targeted in M&A transactions. Acquirers adapt to information frictions arising from reduced disclosures by bidding for geographically proximate target banks and increasing the proportion of stock in their bids. We also find that serial acquirers are less affected by the reduced financial disclosures of targets. Furthermore, banks that reduced disclosure while earning nonbanking income or engaging in intracompany transactions were affected more severely. Overall, we highlight the critical role of mandatory financial reporting in the takeover market and its nuanced implications for bank owners, regulators, and policymakers. Data Availability: Data are available from sources noted in the manuscript. JEL Classifications: D83; G21; G28; M41.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the credit supply-side effect of the U.S. 2003 dividend tax cut on the real economy through the banking sector. We show that C-corporation banks (treatment group), particularly those capital-constrained, increase the supply of small business loans more than S-subchapter banks (control group) following the tax cut, aligning with the old view of dividend taxation and the supply-side effect rooted in credit rationing. Such an enhanced small business loan supply stemming from the tax cut translates into real effects on the economy. We find that areas with a greater presence of C-corporation banks exhibit more small business formations, employment, and innovations. The positive real effects are concentrated in subsamples when business growth opportunities are more abundant or international trade exposures are higher. Overall, our findings add to the literature on the real effects of the tax cut by showing an important yet unexplored bank credit supply channel.

ABSTRACT I examine how mandatory position disclosure of claimholders’ economic interests affects Chapter 11 bankruptcy outcomes. Exploiting a regulation that increased disclosure by creditors and equityholders on certain committees, I find that position disclosure is associated with a decrease in the length of bankruptcy cases, especially the duration of negotiations between claimholders across classes. Further, I show that position disclosure is associated with lower post-bankruptcy recidivism. Contrary to the concerns expressed by critics, I find little evidence that position disclosure reduced claimholders’ participation in committees or decreased trading in the market for bankruptcy claims. My findings highlight the overall benefits of position disclosure in facilitating negotiations during bankruptcy. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D82; G33: G34; K22; M40.

ABSTRACT Non-arm’s-length transactions between a firm and its related parties, or related-party transactions (RPTs), are widely used in emerging economies. We examine the effect of creditor rights on the usage of financing RPTs using the enactment of India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) of 2016 as a shock to creditor rights. We show that stronger creditor rights make arm’s-length external financing more attractive relative to RPT financing. In particular, we find that firms that are ex ante more likely to be affected by IBC (i.e., those with low asset tangibility) reduce their dependence on financing-related RPTs, in particular, RPT loan inflows. This effect is strengthened for firms with greater financial constraints and higher growth opportunities. Our findings suggest that creditor rights influence financing choices and contribute to our understanding of how insolvency reforms affect financing and RPTs in emerging markets.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of financial regulation on nonfinancial violations. Using differences in compliance requirements with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) Section 404, we find that adoption of Section 404 increased firms’ propensity for nonfinancial violations. This effect is stronger for firms with greater external scrutiny toward their financial reporting, greater challenges in monitoring their operations, and limited resources. These results, together with an examination of changes in audit fees, conference call transcripts, and 10-K disclosures, suggest that the effects primarily stem from a shift in attention and resources toward SOX 404. Further, the effects are concentrated in employee-related violations and persist for approximately two years. Overall, our results suggest that financial reporting regulation can result in unintended consequences harming stakeholders, such as employees. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.

ABSTRACT We examine whether and how a widely established finding—employees respond negatively to managerial monitoring—generalizes to different performance-evaluation systems. We predict that relative performance evaluations (RPEs), a common evaluation feature in multiagent settings, attenuate employees’ negative responses to managerial monitoring. The results of our experiment support our theory. Consistent with prior literature, we find that without RPE, employees respond significantly more negatively to managerial monitoring compared to no monitoring. However, we find that the effect of managerial monitoring on employee responses is moderated in the presence of RPE—employees respond similarly regardless of whether their manager implements a monitoring control. We provide robust analyses to support our theory-derived mechanisms, demonstrating that our results are driven by employees’ fairness perceptions of managers’ monitoring decisions. Collectively, this study aids in the understanding of how and under what circumstances managerial monitoring may be more or less beneficial. Data Availability: Available upon request. JEL Classifications: C90; D91; J31; M40.

ABSTRACT This longitudinal study investigates the integration of the controllability principle in the redesign of a performance measurement system (PMS). The PMS and the controllability principle are conceptualized as “epistemic objects” (open, question-generating, and complex objects) which are associated with varying stakeholder desires. The paper makes two contributions. First, it demonstrates how a PMS can oscillate between different interpretations of the controllability principle (narrow versus broad), resulting in different controllability boundaries (tight versus loose). Second, the paper theorizes how multiple epistemic objects are formed into combination structures (a combination of epistemic objects that are subsequently codeveloped). Three sequentially developed combination structures of the controllability principle and the PMS, along with their associated effects, are reported. The paper demonstrates how combination structures can, ironically, become antithetical to the desires that set change in motion, and in this case, render the PMS incapable of measuring performance on complex environmental and societal challenges.

ABSTRACT Despite the growing use of subjective performance incentives used in executive bonuses, empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains inconclusive. This study explores three aspects of subjective metrics in bonus plan design: their prevalence, the goals they target, and their impact on managerial behavior and firm outcomes. First, I document 53.8 percent of CEO bonus plans include at least one subjective performance measure, and among these plans, an average of 38.9 percent of total bonus weight is allocated to these measures. Using machine learning, I show subjective metrics target incentives related to employees, firm culture, and executive performance. Second, using the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act as a quasi-exogenous shock to contract design, I find firms increase the number and weight of subjective metrics by 22.9 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively. Finally, I find the increasing prevalence of subjective performance measures positively influences CEO effort, corporate culture, and innovation. Data Availability: The data used in this study are from public sources and available upon request. JEL Classifications: M12; J33; G38; M41; H2.

ABSTRACT I examine how Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 606 affects R&D alliance formations and innovation in the drug development industry. ASC 606 alters revenue recognition timing and increases disclosure requirements. I document that firms dependent on R&D alliance revenues accelerate revenue recognition and expand revenue-related disclosures following ASC 606 adoption. These concurrent changes reduce information asymmetry, both between firms and between managers and investors, but only when increased disclosure accompanies accelerated recognition. Consistent with these net reductions in information asymmetry, affected firms raise more equity capital and increase R&D investment. Notably, these firms, which historically acted as technology providers (principals), form more R&D alliances as technology acquirers (partners). Consequently, they exhibit higher innovation output, measured by new patents and drug candidates. This study identifies a specific mechanism through which accounting standards can stimulate innovation: reduced information asymmetry that facilitates strategic R&D alliance formation.